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MĀNAMEYODAYA

OF

NĀRĀYAṆA

(AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE MĪMĀṂSĀ)

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

C. KUNHAN RAJA

AND

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

FOREWORD BY

PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI

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FOREWORD

BY

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA VIDYĀVĀCASPATI DARŚANAKALĀNIDHI
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IT is a source of great pleasure to me to write a foreword to this publication, in compliance with the request of its editors—Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D.Phil., who happens to be my present friend and colleague and former pupil, and Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Head of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Madras.

This is a revised edition of the Sanskrit Philosophical treatise called *Mānameyodaya*, which was first published in 1912 as No. 19 of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri are responsible for this revised edition and include in it the Sanskrit text and their English translation. The Sanskrit text given in this edition is far more reliable and accurate than the text given in the first edition. In bringing out the present revised edition, the editors have used an additional manuscript which was not used in the first edition and which is deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (D.C.S. No. 15297). A comparison of this edition

with the first edition will disclose noteworthy improvements, variations and additions. In this connection, section 13, page 7, and section 147, page 233 in the present revised edition may be compared with the corresponding portions in the first edition. The English translation is faithful and accurate and brings the contents of this important philosophical text within the easy reach of the students of modern universities, who are mostly using the English language as their medium of thought and expression in their academical and public life. The detailed table of contents and the comparative list of doctrinal differences prefixed to this edition greatly enhance its value.

The Sanskrit text published in this volume is a valuable philosophical manual of the Bhāṭṭa school; and as its significant title *Mānameyodaya* shows, it represents an authoritative and informative elucidation (*udaya*) of the recognized means of valid knowledge (*māna*) and the categories (*meya*) constituting the objective content of valid knowledge, in accordance with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's school known as the Bhāṭṭa school. The first part of this book (*mānapariccheda*) deals with the *pramāṇa-s* and was written by the famous Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Malabar, who flourished in the latter half of the 16th century. The second part (*meyapariccheda*) was produced by a later scholar, who was also called Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, the author of the first half, was one of the greatest scholar-poets of Kerala in the 16th century. He is the famous author of he *Nārāyaṇīya* and the *Prakriyāsarvasva*. His versatility,

profound scholarship, saintly character and great poetic talents are justly praised in the following terms at the beginning of the *Bhaktapriyā*, a commentary on the *Nārāyaṇīya*:

समधिगतनिखिलनिगमार्थसतत्त्वः, शाब्दपरब्रह्मपारावारपारीणः, परमभागवतः सकलसहृदयमहितयशाः श्रीनारायणकविः ।

The second part of this work is an appropriate complement to the first part and rises to an almost equally high level.

Within a brief compass, in a style which is at once lucid and terse, this work gives an able and well-grounded exposition of the leading tenets of the philosophical side of the Bhāṭṭa school, and adds comparative and critical remarks, where required, with particular reference to the corresponding tenets of other systems of Indian philosophical thought—chiefly the Prābhākara, Nyāya, Advaita and Bauddha systems. I am sure that, in the form in which the text is presented in this edition and with the reliable English translation which is given here, this work will be of great value as an efficient aid to the study of Indian philosophy in general, and more especially to the appreciation of the distinctive features of the Bhāṭṭa phase of realism in Indian philosophical thought. I congratulate Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri on this substantial piece of work in the sphere of Indian Philosophy.

10 May 1933 S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI

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(8) Conclusion, pp. 145-148

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(6) Non-existence, pp. 289-310

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(7) CONCLUSION, pp. 289-310

Dedication to Hari. Even evil Karma is a blessing in that it has led to a vision of the Lord in his corporeal form. Ancestors of the author. Prayer to Kṛṣṇa. The teachers of the author. Praise of the book. Praise of King Mānaveda.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE MĀNAMEYODAYA is an excellent introduction to the Bhāṭṭa system of Mīmāṃsā. The text was published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series as No. 19 in 1912. A revised edition of the text with an English translation by Prof. C. Kunhan Raja and S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri was published by the Theosophical Publishing House in 1933. It was very well received by scholars and soon became out of stock. There has been great demand for bringing out a reprint of this useful volume. It is now being brought out as No. 105 in the Adyar Library Series.

The whole work *Mānameyodaya*, consisting of the two sections 'Māna' and 'Meya', was projected by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa himself as is clear from the introductory verse; but he wrote only the first part; probably he passed away before completing it. Nārayaṇa Paṇḍita who completed it, adding the 'Meya' portion, during the reign of his patron Mānaveda, Zamorin of Calicut (A. D. 1655-58) is the well-known author of the *Vivaraṇa* commentary on the *Raghuvaṃśa* and the *Kumārasambhava*. Mānaveda wrote the *Pūrvabhāratacampū* in A. D. 1643 and the *Kṛṣṇagīti* in A.D. 1652; being an admirer of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, he wanted to complete the unfinished *Mānameyodaya* and requested his friend and protege

(who was also probably his old class-mate) to write the 'Meya' portion also. For details regarding this see my book, *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, University of Madras, 1958.

Written in a lucid and compact style and containing comparative and critical remarks with reference to the views of other schools like the Prābhākara, Nyāya and the Bauddha, this Mīmāṃsā work on epistemology and ontology is sure to be a useful guide to the students of Indian philosophy in general.

1975 K. KUNJUNNI RAJA.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE MĀNAMEYODAYA is an elementary treatise on the Mīmāṃsā system of Indian philosophy according to the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. This work occupies the same position in the Mīmāṃsā system which the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* occupies in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system or the *Vedāntaparībhāṣā* in the Advaita system. The work was published some years ago in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series as No. 19. In preparing the present edition we have utilized, besides the printed book, a manuscript belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (No. D.C.S. 15297, vol. 27, p. 10,068).

With the help of the manuscript we have been able to incorporate in the present edition many passages that are not seen in the original edition. We have also been able to correct many passages in the printed book. Where the manuscript and the printed edition differed, we have chosen for our edition that reading which in our opinion was the better one.

The present edition is meant for the use of students of Indian philosophy, especially university students, who desire to familiarize themselves with the elements of the Mīmāṃsā system. In the other systems of

Indian philosophy there are textbooks which suit the purposes of a beginner. We found that for the Mīmāṃsā system this work serves the purpose best.

In translating the work into English, we have tried to make the translation as close to the original as possible, and at the same time to make the English readable and simple. The interest of clarity has been kept in view more than that of literal fidelity. Wherever we thought that the student might require additional help, we have added brief notes. The detailed contents, the comparative tables, the list of doctrinal differences, the glossary—these, it is hoped, will be of considerable help to the students.

The book is the work of two authors. The first part dealing with the means of valid knowledge is the work of one Nārāyaṇa, and the second part dealing with the objects of valid knowledge is by a later Nārāyaṇa. It is certain that the Nārāyaṇa who wrote the first part meant to write both the parts, as could be seen from the second stanza in the beginning:

> The existence of things is twofold, divided into means of knowledge and objects of knowledge; therefore we propound both according to the path of the venerable Kumārila.

This is also evident from the many references to the second part that are met with in the first part. There is no way of ascertaining why he did not complete the work.

Nārāyaṇa who wrote the first part is a famous poet and scholar of Malabar, who lived about four

centuries ago. He is the author of *Nārāyaṇīya* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. 18), *Prakriyāsarvasva*, a work on grammar (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. 106) and many short poems, some of which have already been published in the Kāvyamālā Series. Little is known of the Nārāyaṇa who completed the work, except what can be gathered from the information which the author himself gives in the work.

The work is more or less an abridgement of a book called the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* by Cidānanda Muni (Adyar Library MS. No. TR 117), which has not yet been printed. Although the material is taken from Cidānanda's work, it has been entirely rearranged to suit the needs of a beginner. On a comparison of both the works, we found that the *Mānameyodaya* suits the requirements of a student much better than the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*, and therefore we chose the former in preference to the latter for translation and publication.

The present edition is issued under our joint names. The material was in the first instance prepared by one of the editors (C. Kunhan Raja). Then both of us examined the translation, revised and made necessary corrections and alterations, before the book was finally sent to the press.

For separating, in both the parts of the book, the two sections called the Introduction and the Conclusion, there is no manuscript authority. The division into paragraphs too is a feature which we introduced, in the hope that it would be a convenience to the student.

We take this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude to Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Darśanakalānidhi Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, M.A., I.E.S., for the instructive and valuable Foreword which he has been kind enough to write for this edition.

University of Madras
27 April 1933.

C. K. R.
S. S. S.

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COMPARATIVE TABLES

1. Pramāṇa-s accepted by the different systems

Cārvāka-s	Buddhists and Vaiśeṣika-s	Bhāsarvjña and Sāṃkhya-s	Udayana, etc.	Prābhākara-s	Siddhānta and Vedāntin-s	Paurāṇika-s		Names of the Systems
One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six	Eight		No. of Pramāṇa-s
Perception	Perception	Perception	Perception	Perception	Perception	Perception	1	Names of the Pramāṇa-s
	Inference	Inference	Inference	Inference	Inference	Inference	2	
		Authority	Authority	Authority	Authority	Authority	3	
			Analogy	Analogy	Analogy	Analogy	4	
				Presumption	Presumption	Presumption	5	
					Negation	Negation	6	
						Inclusion	7	
						Tradition	8	

2. Sense-contact

Siddhānta	*Prabhākara*	*Logicians*
Conjunction	Conjunction	Conjunction
Identity with what is in conjunction	Inherence in what is in conjunction	Inherence in what is in conjunction
[1] Identity with what is identical with what is in conjunction	Inherence	Inherence in what is inherent in what is in conjunction
		Inherence
		Inherence in what is inherent
		Relation of attribute and substrate

3. Fallacies

Siddhānta:

Fallacies of the subject—

1. Having an established attribute.
2. Having a sublated attribute:
   sublated by perception;
   inference;
   authority;
   analogy;
   presumption;
   negation;
   one's own words;
   the world;
   previous statement.
3. Having a non-established attribute.

[1] This is not distinct from the previous one; but accepted if pressed.

Fallacies of the probans—

1. Non-established:

non-established existence { of the attribute; of the substrate;

non-established pervasion;

non-established subject;

non-established relation { to the whole; to a part (sometimes called non-established pervasion);

non-established relation { of the attribute; of the substrate;

non-established { through futile attribute; through futile substrate;

non-establishment { through different basis; of difference;

non-established apprehension { through non-knowledge; through doubt.

2. Contradictory { to the existence of it; to the existence of a particular form of it.

3. Non-conclusive or common;[1]
Suspected non-conclusive.

4. Non-common.[1]

Fallacies of the example—

Positive example:

devoid of probandum;

devoid of probans;

[1] The two are identical, according to some; this too is accepted.

devoid of both;
devoid of base.

Negative example:

devoid of probandum;
devoid of probans;
devoid of both;
devoid of base.

Non-statement of pervasion Reverse statement of pervasion	for both kinds of example.

Other fallacies:

Contradictory non-inconstant;
The particular-sublater.

Logicians:

1. Non-established.
2. Contradictory.
3. Non-conclusive.
4. Similar to the context or having an opponent.[1]
5. Discarded due to lapse of time or sublated.[2]
6. Non-efficient (according to some)
Non-determined (according to Bhāsarvajña)

4. Objects of Knowledge

Siddhānta	*Prabhākara*	*Logicians*
Substance	Substance	Substance
Genus	Quality	Quality

[1] According to the Siddhānta this to be included in sublated attribute or in the non-conclusive.

[2] According to the Siddhānta this is to be included in sublated attribute.

Siddhānta	*Prabhākara*	*Logicians*
Quality	Action	Action
Action	Genus	Genus
Non-existence	Potency[1]	Particularity
	Similarity	Inherence
	Number	Non-existence
	Inherence	

5. Substances

Siddhānta	*Logicians*
Earth	Earth
Water	Water
Fire	Fire
Air	Air
Darkness[2]	Ether
Ether	Time
Time	Space
Space	Soul
Soul	Mind
Mind	
Sound	

6. Qualities

	Siddhānta	*Logicians*
1.	Colour	Colour
2.	Taste	Taste
3.	Smell	Smell
4.	Touch	Touch

[1] A quality according to the Siddhānta.
[2] A quality of earth according to some.

	Siddhānta	*Logicians*
5.	Number[1]	Number
6.	Size	Size
7.	Distinctness	Distinctness
8.	Conjunction	Conjunction
9.	Disjunction	Disjunction
10.	Remoteness	Remoteness
11.	Proximity	Proximity
12.	Weight	Weight
13.	Fluidity	Fluidity
14.	Viscidity	Viscidity
15.	Cognition	Sound[2]
16.	Happiness	Cognition
17.	Misery	Happiness
18.	Desire	Misery
19.	Aversion	Desire
20.	Volition	Aversion
21.	Impression	Volition
22.	Audible sound[2]	Virtue[2]
23.	Manifestedness[2]	Vice[2]
24.	Potency[2]	Impression

[1] A distinct category according to Prabhākara.
[2] Not accepted by the other system.

LIST OF DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES

1. *Valid knowledge*:

Siddhānta—The knowledge of an unknown real object is valid knowledge.

Prabhākara—Experience is valid knowledge.

Logicians—The knowledge of an object as it is is valid knowledge.

Buddhists—Knowledge which does not fail to accord is valid knowledge.

2. *Restatement*:

Siddhānta—excluded from validity and invalidity.

Logicians—can be valid.

3. *Mind*:

Siddhānta—It is all-pervasive.

Logicians—It is atomic.

4. *Sight at a distance*:

Siddhānta—Due to the light from the sense of sight becoming one with the all-pervasive external light.

Logicians: Due to the velocity of light.

5. *Knowledge*:

Grammarians—There is no non-determinate knowledge.

Buddhists—Non-determinate alone is perceptual and determinate is neither perceptual nor valid.

6. *The term perception*:

Siddhānta—By convention *cum* etymology.
Prabhākara—By etymology.

7. *Determinate knowledge*:

Siddhānta—There are five kinds, as determined by substance, genus, quality, action or name.

Some: Re-cognition is a sixth variety, (included in the name-determinates according to the Siddhānta).

8. *Perception*:

Siddhānta—Knowledge produced by sense-contact is perception.

Prabhākara—Direct cognition is perception.

Buddhists—Perception is what is devoid of determination and what is non-delusive.

Logicians—Perception is what is pervaded by immediate valid cognition.

9. *Pervasion*:

Siddhānta—Apprehended by repeated observation.

Prabhākara—Apprehended through a single observation.

Buddhists—Established through identity and origination therefrom.

10. *Inference*:

Siddhānta—Knowledge of what is non-proximate resulting from the perception of what is pervaded.

Prabhākara—Only the existence of the probans in the subject is to be apprehended as something new.

Materialists—Either there is no pervasion or there is proving what is already known.

11. *Inferences, ' seen ' and ' generically seen '*:

Siddhānta—That whose content is only the particular seen object is the ' seen one '; when there is the inference on seeing the pervasion in general, that is the ' generically seen '.

Logicians—The ' seen ' is the inference of that whose content is a perceptible object; and the ' generically seen ' is where the content is a supersensuous object.

12. *Conveying of the sense by the word*:

Pārthasārathi—Expression.

Cidānanda, etc.—Recollection.

Prabhākara—Words express the bare object and then the objects as related too.

Logicians—Expression.

13. *The meaning of a sentence*:

Siddhānta—The senses of the words convey the meaning of a sentence through secondary implication.

Logicians—The senses of the words convey the meaning of the sentence, which is of the form of a relation among themselves.

14. *The sentence*:

Siddhānta—The doctrine of the relation of what are expressed.

Others—The doctrine of the expression of what are related.

15. *Importation*:

Siddhānta—There is the importation of the word.

Prabhākara—There is the importation of the sense of the word.

16. *Authority*:

Siddhānta—Both human and super-human.

Prabhākara—Only the scriptural (super-human).

Kaṇāda—It is only a form of inference.

17. *Analogy*:

Siddhānta—The knowledge of the similarity of what is not in contact, having as its sphere an object that is remembered, and arising from the similarity to an object that is seen.

Logicians—The understanding of the relation of the name and the named from a statement of analogy. (Analogy as explained according to Siddhānta is inference according to the Logicians.)

18. *Similarity*:

Siddhānta—Included in substance, quality or common attribute.

Prabhākara—A distinct category.

19. *Knowledge through presumption*:

Siddhānta—Results from the conflict of two valid cognitions.
Prabhākara—Results from doubt.
Logicians—This is only a form of inference.

20. *Presumption*:

Siddhānta—From the seen and from the heard.
Prabhākara—Only from the seen.

21. *Negation*:

Siddhānta—A distinct means to cognize non-existence.
Prabhākara—No such means, since there is no non-existence.
Logicians—Non-existence cognized by perception.

22. *Fallacies*:

Siddhānta—It may be for the subject, probans or example.
Logicians—It is only for the probans.

23. *Qualities*:

Siddhānta—One quality can exist in another.
Logicians—Qualities exist only in substances.

24. *Causal relation*:

Siddhānta—Cause and effect can come into existence simultaneously.
Logicians—Cause must precede the effect.

25. *Bodies*:

Siddhānta—What are produced from sprouts are bodies (they are not bodies according to Vācaspati).

Prabhākara—They are not bodies.

26. *Air*:

Siddhānta—Air is perceptible.

Logicians—Air is to be inferred.

27. *Darkness*:

Siddhānta—It is a substance (some accept it as a quality of earth).

Logicians—It is the absence of light.

Prabhākara—Non-perception of light along with the perception of the soul, which is the apprehender, produces the conception of darkness.

28. *Part and whole*:

Siddhānta—They are distinct.

Buddhists—There is no whole distinct from the parts.

29. *Primal atoms*:

Siddhānta—They are perceptible.

Logicians—Can only be inferred and seen in Yogic vision.

30. *God*:

Siddhānta—A supremely merciful Being.

Logicians—Creator of the Universe and author of the Veda-s.

31. *Dissolution of the Universe*:

Siddhānta—There is no ultimate dissolution of the Universe.

Logicians—There is such a dissolution.

32. *Validity and Invalidity*:

Siddhānta—Validity is intrinsic, invalidity extrinsic.

Sāṃkhya—Both are intrinsic.

Logicians—Both are extrinsic.

Buddhists—Validity is extrinsic, invalidity intrinsic.

33. *Ether, etc.*:

Siddhānta—They are eternal.

Śaṃkara—They are non-eternal.

34. *Ether, Time and Space*:

Siddhānta—They are perceptible.

Logicians—They are to be inferred.

35. *Manifestation of the soul*:

Siddhānta—To be understood through mental perception.

Prabhākara—Soul is perceptible, having to be understood from the experience 'I', in all cognitions.

36. *Knowledge*:

Siddhānta—To be understood from manifestedness.

Prabhākara—Self-manifesting.

Śaṃkara—Self-manifesting.

Logicians—Perceptible.

37. *Soul*:

Siddhānta—Abode of intelligence, and many.
Aupaniṣada-s—Soul is intelligence itself, and one.

38. *The meaning of a proposition*:

Siddhānta—The qualified or the relation.
Prabhākara—What is to be done.
Śaṃkara—The impartite.

39. *Release*:

Siddhānta—When there is the absolute rooting out of misery, the experience mentally of the happiness that existed in the soul.
Materialists—The dissolution of the body.
Buddhists—The series of cognitions, free from extraneous adjuncts, remaining in its own form.
Logicians—Rooting out of the twenty-one varieties of misery.
Prabhākara—When the soul remains in its own form after all the specific qualities have been destroyed.
Sāṃkhya—When the soul remains in its own nature through the discrimination of Prakṛti and Puruṣa.
Śaṃkara—Dissolution of the universe.

40. *Virtue and vice*:

Siddhānta—Substance, quality or action.
Logicians—Distinct quality.

41. *Sound*:

Siddhānta—An all-pervasive substance, eternal.

Logicians—A quality of ether, produced and destroyed momentarily.

Grammarians—Sphoṭa, eternal, but manifested in time.

42. *Genus*:

Siddhānta—There is genus.

Buddhists—There is no genus (the appearance of unity is only the exclusion of what are not that).

43. *Genus and individual*:

Siddhānta—The relation is a combination of difference and non-difference.

Prabhākara—The apposition is through inherence.

44. *Existence, etc.*:

Siddhānta—They are genuses.

Prabhākara—They are not genuses.

45. *Existence*:

Siddhānta—It abides in genus too.

Logicians—It does not abide in genuses.

46. *Distinctness*:

Siddhānta—Exists in all substances.

Prabhākara—Does not exist in produced substances.

Aupaniṣada-s—There is no reality called distinctness.

47. *Conjunction*:

Siddhānta—Exists between any two substances, and is either eternal or produced.

Logicians—Does not exist between two all-pervasive substances and is always produced.

48. *Cognition*:

Siddhānta—Not an object of cognition, and is understood through presumption.

Prabhākara and Śaṃkara—Self-manifesting.

Logicians—Perceptible.

Buddhists—Cognition is the form of the object.

49. *Non-existence*:

Siddhānta—It is never a cause.

Logicians—It can be a cause.

50. *Action*:

Siddhānta—Perceptible.

Prabhākara—Inferable.

51. *The Universe*:

Siddhānta—Real.

Mādhyamika-s—Void.

Yogācāra—Cognition is real, not the objects.

Sautrāntika—Cognition and objects are real; external world is inferable and momentary.

Vaibhāṣika—The external world is real, perceptible and momentary.

Aupaniṣada-s—Illusory.

मानमेयोदयः

१. प्रमाणानि

१. उपोद्घातः

१. आचार्यमतपाथोधौ बालानपि निनीषताम् ।
भीमतां कोऽपि गोपालपोतः पोत इवास्तु नः ॥
मानमेयविभागेन वस्तूनां द्विविधा स्थितिः ।
अतस्तदुभयं ब्रूमः श्रीमत्कौमारिलाध्वना ॥

MĀNAMEYODAYA

I. MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

(1) Introduction

1. To us, who, desiring to take even youngsters across the ocean of the system of the Preceptor, are diffident, may that indescribable cowherd boy be a boat as it were.

प्रमाकरणमेवात्र प्रमाणं तर्कपक्षवत् ।
प्रमा चाज्ञाततत्त्वार्थज्ञानमेवात्र भिद्यते ।।

२. अज्ञातपदेनात्र ज्ञातविषययोः स्मृत्यनुवादयोर्निरासः। तत्रानुवादानामप्रामाण्यं तार्किकादीनां नानुमतम् । वयं तु ब्रूमः । अनुवादो ह्यर्थपरिच्छेदे व्यवहारे वा न पूर्वज्ञानात् कंचिद्विशेषमाधत्ते । अतः फलविशेषाभावात् फलार्थं च प्रमाणानां स्वीकारात् स्मृत्यादिवदनुवादोऽपि बहिष्कार्य एव इति ।

The existence of things is twofold, divided into means of knowledge and objects of knowledge; therefore we propound both according to the path of the venerable Kumārila.

Here, as in the view of the Logicians, 'means of valid knowledge' is only the instrument of valid knowledge. But valid knowledge is the knowledge of an unknown real object: here alone lies the difference.

2. Here, by the word 'unknown', there is the exclusion of recollection and restatement, which have known objects. Now, the non-validity of restatement is not acceptable to Logicians and others. But we say: restatement indeed does not possess any difference from the previous knowledge either in the determination of facts or in empirical usage. Therefore, since there is no distinctive result, and since the adoption of valid knowledge is for some result, restatement too, like recollection, etc. is certainly to be kept out.

३. ननु अज्ञातावगमस्यैव प्रमात्वे घटोऽयम् घटोऽयम् इति धारावाहिकज्ञानेषु द्वितीयादीनाम् अप्रमात्वं स्यात् ।

४. मैवम् । तत्राप्ययमयमिति उत्तरोत्तरेषां कालांशानामज्ञातानामवगमाद् उत्तरे क्षणे घटादिसद्भावस्य च पूर्वज्ञानेनानधिगतत्वात् ।

५. ननु कालभेदस्यौपाधिकत्वात् केनोपाधिना अवच्छिन्नानां कालांशानाम् अत्रावगम इति वक्तव्यम् ।

६. उच्यते । पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानजनितानां प्राकट्यानामुत्तरोत्तरज्ञानपर्यन्तमवस्थानात् तदवच्छिन्नानां कालांशानां तत्र तत्रावगम

3. Now, if validity lies only in the cognition of the unknown, then in continuous streams of cognition like 'this is a jar', 'this is a jar', there will be invalidity in the second and the following.

4. It will not be so. Because, even there, there is the cognition of each succeeding element of time like 'this', 'this', which was unknown, and because there is not understood by the previous cognition the existence of the jar in the succeeding moment.

5. Now, since difference in time is due to an extraneous adjunct, one has to specify by what extraneous adjunct is defined the element of time that is here cognized.

6. This is the reply. Since the manifestedness that is produced by each of the preceding cognitions lasts right up

इति । न च प्राकट्यभेदानां सूक्ष्मत्वात् तदवच्छिन्नानां कालभेदानामपि सूक्ष्मतया दुरवगमत्वम् इति वाच्यम् । सूक्ष्मत्वे कमलदलशतं सूच्या युगपद्भिन्नमितिवत् सकृदवबुद्धो घट इति यौगपद्याभिमानप्रसङ्गात् । इह तु अयमयमिति पुनः पुनः क्रमेणैव प्रतीतेर्धारावाहिकस्वभावसिद्धत्वाद् यौगपद्याभिमानस्य विरोध एव । तस्मात् प्राकट्यभेदानां कालभेदानां च न सूक्ष्मत्वम् ।

७. ननु प्राकट्यस्यैवाभावात् कालस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावात् कथं कालांशावगम इति चेत्, न । तयोः साधयिष्यमाणत्वात् इति ।

to the succeeding cognition, the cognition there is of the element of time defined by that. It should not be said that since the different manifestednesses are subtle, the elements of time defined by them are also subtle, and as such, they are not cognizable. Because, if they are subtle, the result will be the conceit of simultaneity that there is a single cognition of the jar, just like the conceit that a hundred lotus-petals are pierced simultaneously with a needle. But here, since the nature of a continuous stream is established only as the conceit of 'this', 'this' again and again only in succession, there is certainly contradiction of the conceit of simultaneity. Therefore the differences of manifestedness and the differences of time are not subtle.

7. Now, if it is asked: 'Since manifestedness itself is non-existent, and since time is non-perceptible, how can the element of time be cognized'? it is not so, because both of them will be established.

८. तत्त्वपदेन भ्रमसंशयादीनामयथार्थज्ञानानां निरासः। तत्रायथार्थज्ञानस्याभावात् तत्त्वपदमनर्थकमिति प्राभाकराः प्राहुः। एवं हि तेषां मतम्। इदं रजतम् इत्यत्र इदम् इति अगृहीतविशेषं शुक्तिशकलं गृह्यते। रजतम् इति च रजतमात्रं स्मर्यते। तयोश्च भेदाग्रहात् पुरोवर्तिनि रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिः। न तु शुक्तिशकलस्य रजतत्वेन भानमस्ति इति।

९. तत्तज्ज्ञानस्य स्वविषय एव प्रवृत्तिकरत्वनियमाद्र-जतज्ञानस्यापि इदंविषयत्वाभावे तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्न सिध्येत्। तथा इदमेव रजतम् इति सामानाधिकरण्यं तयोरभेदप्रतीतिं विना न सिध्येत्, इत्यादिदिशा निराकरणीयम्।

8. By the word 'real', there is the exclusion of false knowledge like delusion, doubt, etc. Here the followers of Prabhākara say that the word 'real' has no purpose, since there is no false knowledge. This indeed is their theory: In 'this is silver', the piece of shell whose particularity is not comprehended, is apprehended as 'this'; and silver in general is recollected as 'silver'; on account of the non-apprehension of their difference, there is for a man requiring silver activity in respect of what is in front; there is no appearance of shell as silver.

9. Since there is the rule that a particular cognition can prompt a man only towards its own object, if the knowledge of silver too has not 'this' as its object, one's activity in respect of it would not result. Similarly the apposition 'this itself is silver' would not result without a concept of their non-difference. This is the direction in which it must be refuted.

१०. तस्मादन्यथाग्रहणरूपभ्रमादिज्ञानसद्भावात् तन्निरासार्थं तत्त्वपदम् । तदेवमज्ञाततत्त्वावगमरूपायाः प्रमायाः करणत्वेन इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वं सिद्धम् ।

११. इह च प्रमाशब्देन लक्षणया तत्कार्यभूतस्य प्राकट्यस्यापि प्रतिपादनात् प्राकट्यरूपप्रमाकरणत्वेन ज्ञानस्यापि प्रमाणत्वमाहुः । एतावता च वयं फलप्रमाणवादिन इति गीयामहे ।

१२. तार्किकास्तु—प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । अनुभवश्च स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानम् इति लक्षयन्ति । तदनुवादस्याप्रामाण्यसाधनात् तद्व्यावर्तकस्य च पदस्यात्राभावाद्

10. Therefore, since there is cognition, like delusion, etc. consisting in apprehending a thing as otherwise, the word 'real' is used to exclude that. So in this way contact of senses, etc. are made out to be means of valid knowledge, being the instrument of valid knowledge, consisting in the knowledge of an unknown reality.

11. And since here, through secondary significance, by the term valid knowledge is meant also manifestedness, which is its effect, cognition is also a means of valid knowledge consisting in manifestedness. And on this account we are known as upholders of the doctrine of means of valid knowledge in respect of the fruit.

12. But the Logicians give the definition: 'Means of valid knowledge' is the instrument of valid knowledge;

अतिव्याप्तम् । अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम् । स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्ता च संविदनुभूतिः । इति प्राभाकराः । तदपि भ्रमादीनां साधनात् तेषामपि स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तेष्वतिव्याप्तम् ।

१३. किंच सर्वज्ञानेष्वपि आत्मा ज्ञानस्वरूपं विषय इति त्रितयमपि प्रकाशते । सर्वत्र चात्मस्वात्मांशयोः प्रमाणत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वमप्यस्तीति तेषां मतम् । ततश्च स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानस्यैव प्रमाणत्वे स्मृतेरात्मस्वात्मांशयोरप्रामाण्यं स्यात् । इत्यव्याप्तिरप्यस्ति इति ।

experience of an object as it is is valid knowledge; and experience is knowledge other than recollection. Since the non-validity of restatement has been made out and since there is no word here to exclude it, this is too wide. Experience is valid knowledge. And cognition other than recollection is experience. So say the followers of Prabhākara. That also is too wide, since delusion, etc. have been established and since they too are other than recollection.

13. Further, in every cognition, the self, the form of the cognition, and the object—these three shine. And everywhere there is validity and perceptibility for the elements of self and the form of the cognition. This is their doctrine. And therefore if validity lies only in knowledge other than recollection, the elements of self and the form of cognition in recollection will become non-valid. Thus this is too narrow also.

१४. अविसंवादि विज्ञानं प्रमाणम्। अविसंवादित्वं च अर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्। इति बौद्धाः। तत्र भूतभविष्यद्विषयस्यानुमानस्य अर्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावाद् अप्रामाण्यं स्यात्। स्मृतेश्च क्वचिदर्थक्रियाकारित्वात् प्रामाण्यं स्याद् इति।

१५. तस्मादज्ञाततत्त्वार्थज्ञानसाधनमेव नः।
प्रमाणमिति निर्णीतं तद्विशेषानथ ब्रुवे॥
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शाब्दं चोपमितिस्तथा।
अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च षट् प्रमाणानि मादृशाम्॥

14. Knowledge which does not fail to accord is valid; non-failure to accord means producing successful activity in respect of the object: so hold the Buddhists. There, since inference about objects past or future does not produce successful activity in respect of the object, there will be non-validity; and since recollection sometimes produces successful activity in respect of the object, it will have validity.

15. Therefore only an instrument of knowledge of an unknown real object is to us a means of valid knowledge: so is it established. Now I state its division.

Perception and inference, similarly authority and analogy, presumption and negation—these are the six means of valid knowledge for those who think like us.

चार्वाकास्तावदेकं द्वितयमपि पुनर्बौद्धवैशेषिकौ द्वौ
भासर्वज्ञश्च सांख्यस्त्रितयमुदयनाद्याश्चतुष्कं वदन्ति ।
प्राहुः प्राभाकराः पञ्चकमपि च वयं तेऽपि वेदान्तविज्ञाः
षट्कं पौराणिकास्त्वष्टकमभिदधिरे संभवैतिह्ययोगात् ॥

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२. प्रत्यक्षम्

१. तत्र इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षम् । कानि पुनरिन्द्रियाणि । उच्यते । चक्षूरसनघ्राणस्पर्शनश्रोत्राणि मनश्चेति षडिन्द्रियाणि ।

Cārvāka-s speak of one; the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika-s both speak of two; Bhāsarvajña and the Sāṃkhya-ṣ speak of three; Udayana and others speak of four; the followers of Prabhākara speak of five; we and those well-versed in Vedānta speak of six; the Paurāṇika-s, however, speak of eight, adding inclusion and tradition.

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2. Perception

1. Of these, valid knowledge produced by sense-contact is perception. What then are the senses? This is the reply: the sense of sight, the sense of taste, the sense of smell, the sense of touch and the sense of hearing, and the mind—these are the six senses.

२. **चक्षुर्नाम कनीनिकान्तरगतं तेजोऽथ जिह्वाग्रग-**
स्तोयांशो रसनं क्षितेरवयवो घ्राणं च घोणोदरे ।
सर्वाङ्गप्रसृताश्च मारुतलवास्त्वङ्नाम कर्णोदर-
व्योमैव श्रवणं मनस्तु विभु तद्देहे च कार्यावहम्। ।

३. तत्र रूपज्ञानस्य केनचित्कारणेन भवितव्यम् इति सामान्येन सिद्धौ दीपादितेजस एव रूपज्ञानहेतुत्वदर्शनात् तैजसं चक्षुः कल्प्यते । तथा रसज्ञानस्यापि कारणकल्पनायां रसव्यञ्ज-

2. What is called the sense of sight is the light existing within the pupil of the eye; then the water-element at the tip of the tongue is the sense of taste; the earth-particle within the nose is the sense of smell; the air-particles distributed throughout the limbs are what is called the sense of touch; the sense of hearing is only ether within the ear; the mind, however, is all-pervasive, and it produces its effect in the body.

3. Of these, for the perception of colour, there must be some cause; when this is generally made out, since it is found that only of light like a lamp, etc. causality of the cognition of colour is seen, the sense of sight is assumed to be made of light. Similarly when a cause for the perception of taste has to be assumed, since it is only of water that manifestation of the taste of dry things is seen, the sense of taste is assumed to be watery. Thus, since the earthy paste of Margosa bark is found to manifest smell in sandal, the sense of smell assumed as manifesting smell is earthy. And since

कत्वमपामेव शुष्कवस्तुषु दृष्टमिति रसनमाप्यतया कल्प्यते। एवं चन्दनगतपार्थिवनिम्बत्वगनुलेपनस्य गन्धाभिव्यञ्जकत्वदर्शनाद् गन्धाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेन कल्प्यमानं घ्राणं पार्थिवं भवति। व्यजनपवनस्य चाङ्गसङ्गिसलिलस्पर्शाभिव्यञ्जकत्वदर्शनात् स्पर्शोपलम्भकस्य त्वगिन्द्रियस्य वायवीयत्वम्। शब्दग्राहकतया कल्प्यस्य श्रोत्रस्य तु परिशेषादाकाशात्मकत्वम्। चक्षुरादीनां खल्वन्येन्द्रियारम्भकेणारब्धत्वं न दृष्टमिति तेजःप्रभृतीनामन्येन्द्रियारम्भकत्वात् तेषां श्रोत्रत्वं न भवति। भूतात्मकत्वमेव च बहिरिन्द्रियाणां दृष्टमिति अवशिष्टस्याकाशस्य भूतस्यैव श्रोत्रत्वम् इति।

४. तार्किकास्तु शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् तद्ग्राहकस्य श्रोत्रस्याकाशत्वमिति साधयन्ति। तत्तस्य गुणत्वासिद्धेरयुक्तम्।

the breeze from a fan is found to manifest the touch of water sticking on in the body, the sense of touch which makes touch known is made of air. The sense of hearing, however, which is to be assumed as apprehending sound, is of the nature of ether by elimination. Of course, the sense of sight, etc. are not found to be produced by what produces other senses; so, since light, etc. produce other senses, they cannot be the sense of hearing. The external senses are found to be of the nature of elements; so the sense of hearing can be only the other element ether.

4. But the Logicians make out that since sound is the quality of ether, the sense of hearing which apprehends it must be ether. This is not correct, as it is not made out to be a quality.

५. मनस्तु सुखाद्यपरोक्षज्ञानसाधनेन्द्रियत्वेन कल्प्यते। तस्य च विभुत्वं साधयिष्यते। तथापि शरीरावच्छिन्नस्यैव तस्येन्द्रियत्वमिति तत्प्रदेश एव कार्याणि करोति। रूपादिज्ञानेष्वपि तच्चक्षुरादिपरतन्त्रं प्रवर्तत एव। अनुमानादिष्वपि लिङ्गादिसहायम् इति स्थितिः।

६. अत्र चक्षुःश्रोत्रयोः प्राप्यकारित्वे विवादोऽस्तीति तयोरपि बहिरिन्द्रियत्वात् त्वगादिवत् प्राप्यकारित्वं साधनीयम्। ततश्च चक्षुषः पृथुतरपृथिवीधरादिदर्शनात् पृथ्वग्रत्वमपि तेजःस्वभावसिद्धमाश्रयणीयम्। तथा उन्मीलनक्षण एव दूरतरशनैश्चरादिदर्शनाद् व्याप्यावस्थितेन बाह्यतेजसा निर्गमनसमय एवैकीभावः कल्पनीयः। न च बाह्यतेजसः सकलव्यापित्वात् केरलेभ्योऽपि गङ्गादर्शनप्रसङ्गः। अदृष्टोपगृहीतेनैवालोकभागेनैकीभावात्।

5. The mind, however, is assumed to be a sense as the instrument of the direct cognition of pleasure, etc. Its all-pervasive nature will be made out later. Even then, it is a sense only in so far as it is defined by a body; so it produces effects only in that part. Even in the cognition of colour, etc. it does function depending on the sense of sight, etc.; and also in inference, etc. with the help of the probans, etc. So it stands.

6. Here, in the case of the eye and the ear, there is a difference of view in regard to functioning by reaching to the object. So, they too being external senses, like the sense of touch, etc. it has to be made out that they too function by reaching the object. And again, since the sense of sight perceives mountains, etc. which are much larger, we have to

७. तार्किकास्तु तदिदं दूरदर्शनं वेगातिशयात् साधयन्ति । तदनन्तयोजनान्तरितेष्वपि शनैश्चरादिषु झटिति दर्शनं वेगमात्रादसंभाव्यमिति उपेक्षितमस्माभिः ।

८. एतानि च चक्षुरादीनि अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण न गृह्यन्त इति ।

९. सिद्धानीन्द्रियाणि । संनिकर्षस्तु द्विविधः । संयोगः संयुक्ततादात्म्यं चेति । तत्र पृथिव्यप्तेजसां चक्षुस्त्वगिन्द्रियाभ्यां

acknowledge also for it, an extended field at the end, which is made out as the nature of light. Similarly, since just at the moment of opening the eyes, Saturn and other very distant objects are perceived, it has to be assumed to become one with the pervasive external light, even at the moment of coming out. Nor does there result the possibility of seeing the Gaṅgā from Kerala for the reason that the external light is all-pervasive; because, it becomes one only with that part of the light which is taken hold of by some unseen potentiality.

7. The Logicians establish this sight at a distance through excessive velocity. But this is discarded by us, as by mere velocity instantaneous sight of Saturn, etc. separated by innumerable leagues, is impossible.

8. And these, the sense of sight, etc. having produced no colour and touch, are not cognized by perception.

9. Thus are established the senses. Now, contact is of two kinds: conjunction and identity with what is in conjunction. Of these—earth, water and light—the apprehension is by conjunction with the senses of sight and touch; of air by conjunction with the sense of touch; of space, ether and darkness by conjunction with the sense of sight; of sound by

संयोगाद् ग्रहणम् । वायोस्त्वक्संयोगात् । दिङ्नभस्तमसां दृक्संयोगात् । शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसंयोगात् । आत्मनो मनःसंयोगात् । अत्र विभुनोरप्यात्ममनसोरजन्यसंयोगसाधनात् संयोगः । कालस्य तु युगपदादिप्रत्ययस्य कालविषयत्वेन्द्रियजन्यत्वयोर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् तस्य च सर्वेन्द्रियजन्यत्वात् सर्वैरपीन्द्रियैः संयोगाद् ग्रहणम् ।

१०. यदा तु चक्षुरादिसंयुक्तेषु पूर्वोक्तेषु पृथिव्यादिषु तदात्मभूतानां जातिगुणकर्मणां ग्रहणं तदा संयुक्ततादात्म्यं संनिकर्षः । तदुक्तम्—

रूपादीनां तु संयुक्तद्रव्यतादात्म्यमेव नः ।
प्रतीतिकारणं तस्मान्न संबन्धान्तरस्पृहा ॥

conjunction with the sense of hearing; of the soul by conjunction with the mind. Here, even of the all-pervasive soul and the mind, there is conjunction, since a non-produced conjunction is made out. Of time, however, since it will be said later that concepts like simultaneity, etc. have time as their object and are produced by the senses and since they can be produced by all the senses, the apprehension is by conjunction with every one of the senses.

10. But when in earth, etc. spoken of above, which are in conjunction with the sense of sight, etc. there is the apprehension of class, quality and action, which are of the form of earth, etc. then the contact is identity with what is in conjunction. So it is said:

For colour, etc. the cause of cognition is
according to us, only identity with substances

इति। यदा तु जातिगुणकर्मगतानां सत्तारूपत्वकर्मत्वादीनां ग्रहणं तदा तेषामेव परंपरया तादात्म्यसंभवात् संयुक्ततादात्म्यमेव संनिकर्ष इति मन्यामहे। यद्वा यथा परे रूपत्वादिग्रहणाय संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमाश्रयन्ते तथास्माकमपि संयुक्ततदात्मतादात्म्यं नाम तृतीयः संनिकर्षोऽस्तु। का हानिः। जातिगुणकर्मणां च स्वाश्रयैस्तादात्म्यमेव संबन्ध इति पश्चात् साधयिष्यते। तस्माद् द्वेधा त्रेधा वा संनिकर्षः।

११. तार्किकाः पुनस्तादात्म्यस्थाने समवायमभिषिञ्चन्तोऽन्यथा संनिकर्षमाहुः। संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायः विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च

that are in conjunction. There is thus no need for another contact.

But when there is the apprehension of existence, colourness, actionness, etc. which exist in class, quality and action, then, since there can be identity for them too indirectly, the contact is only identity with what is in conjunction—so we hold. Or, just as our opponents have recourse to inherence in what is inherent in what is in conjunction for the apprehension of colourness, etc. similarly, for us also let there be a third kind of contact called identity with what is identical with what is in conjunction; what harm is there? That for class, quality and action, the relation with their substratum is only identity will be established later. Therefore, contact is twofold or threefold.

11. The Logicians then, installing inherence in the place of identity, enumerate contacts in another way: conjunction, inherence in what is in conjunction, inherence in

इति षोढा संनिकर्षः। तत्र चक्षुरादिभिः संयोगाद् द्रव्याणां ग्रहणम्। चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते द्रव्ये समवायाद् गुणादीनां ग्रहणम्। संयुक्ते द्रव्ये समवेतेषु गुणादिषु समवायाद् गुणत्वादीनां ग्रहणम्। शब्दस्य चाकाशगुणत्वादाकाशात्मकेन श्रोत्रेण समवायाद् ग्रहणम्। शब्दत्वस्य तु श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे समवायाद् ग्रहणम्। अभावस्य तु भावधर्मभूतयोः संयोगसमवाययोरभावात् संयुक्तभूतलादिविशेषणविशेष्यरूपसंनिकर्षेण ग्रहणम्। तथैव समवायस्याप्यद्रव्यत्वेन संयोगाभावात् समवायान्तराश्रयणे अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाद् विशेषणविशेष्यभाव एव संनिकर्ष इति।

१२. तत्राद्यं त्रिविधं तावन्नाममात्रेण भिद्यते।
समवायादयस्त्वन्ये संनिकर्षा निराश्रयाः॥

what is inherent in what is in conjunction, inherence, inherence in what is inherent, and the relation of subject and attribute—thus contact is sixfold. Of these, through conjunction with the sense of sight, there is the apprehension of substances; there is the apprehension of quality, etc. through inherence in substances which are in conjunction with the sense of sight, etc.; there is the apprehension of qualityness, etc. through inherence in quality and other things which are inherent in substances, which are in conjunction with the sense of sight, etc.; and since sound is a quality of ether, there is the apprehension of it through

12. Of these, the first three varieties differ only in terminology; but the other contacts beginning with inherence are devoid of a base.

शब्दस्य हि श्रोत्रगुणत्वाभावात् समवायाख्यः समवेतसमवायाख्यश्च संनिकर्षो निरवकाशः। अभावस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावात् समवायस्य च शशशृङ्गायमाणत्वाद् विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंनिकर्षोऽपि हेयः। किं च चक्षुःसंयुक्तेनार्थेन अभावसमवाययोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंनिकर्षो न संभवति। दण्डी पुरुष इत्यादौ संबन्धान्तरपूर्वकस्यैव विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य दर्शनाद् अभावसमवाययोश्चार्थेन संबन्धान्तराभावाद् इति।

inherence, by the sense of hearing, which is of the nature of ether; and there is the apprehension of soundness through inherence in sound which is inherent in the sense of hearing; there is the apprehension of non-existence through the contact of the nature of subject and attribute with the floor, etc. which are in conjunction, since there cannot be conjunction or inherence, which are the attributes of positive things alone. Similarly, the contact for inherence too is only the relation of subject and attribute, since, not being a substance, it cannot be in conjunction, and since, if we have recourse to another inherence it will result in infinite regress.

Indeed, since sound is not a quality of the sense of hearing, there is no room for the contacts called inherence and inherence in what is inherent. And since non-existence is not perceptible, and since inherence is only like a hare's horn, the contact of the relation of subject and attribute has also to be abandoned. Further, it is not possible for non-existence and inherence to be in the relation of subject and attribute with an object in conjunction with the sense of sight; because in cases like 'a man with a stick' we see the relation of subject and attribute only as preceded by another relation; and non-existence and inherence have no other relation with the object.

१३. प्राभाकरास्तु संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः समवाय इति त्रेधा संनिकर्षमाहुः। तन्मते रूपत्वादीनामभावात् संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायो नाश्रयणीयः। शब्दत्वस्याभावात् समवेतसमवायोऽपि। अभावस्य चाभावात् समवायस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावाद् विशेषणविशेष्यभावोऽपि नाश्रयणीय इति। तदपि मतं रूपत्वादीनां साधनात् तार्किकैरेव निराकृतम्। तस्मादुक्तप्रकार एव संनिकर्ष इति।

१४. तच्चेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजं ज्ञानं द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति। तत्रेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षानन्तरमेव द्रव्यादिस्वरूपमात्रावगाहि शब्दानुगमशून्यं यत्संमुग्धज्ञानं जायते तद् विशिष्टकल्पनाभावाद् निर्विकल्पकमित्युच्यते। यत्तु तदनन्तरं शब्दस्मरण-

13. But the followers of Prabhākara speak of contact being threefold, namely conjunction, inherence in what is in conjunction, and inherence. Since in their system there is no colourness, etc. inherence in what is inherent in what is in conjunction need not be accepted, and also inherence in what is inherent, as there is no soundness. Since there is no non-exsitence, and since inherence is not perceptible, the relation of subject and attribute too need not be accepted. And this theory has been refuted by the Logicians themselves by establishing colourness, etc. Therefore contact is as has been explained.

14. And this knowledge produced by sense-contact is of two kinds, namely non-determinate and determinate. Of these immediately after the contact with the senses, there arises a confused cognition devoid of verbal accompaniment, and comprehending the bare existence of substances, etc.

सहकृतं जात्यादिविशिष्टवस्तुविषयं रक्तोऽयं घटोऽयम् इत्यादि-व्यक्तविज्ञानं तत्सविकल्पकम् ।

१५. तत्र शाब्दिका निर्विकल्पकं नास्तीत्याहुः । तदुक्तम्—

'न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।'

इति । तदयुक्तम् । पूर्वमर्थदर्शनाभावे शब्दस्मरणस्य हेत्वभाव-प्रसङ्गात् ।

१६. सौगतास्तु निर्विकल्पकमेव प्रत्यक्षमाश्रित्य सवि-कल्पकस्य प्रमाणत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वं च नास्तीत्याहुः । तदप्ययुक्तम् । तस्य प्रत्यक्षतया लोकसिद्धस्य निषेधे लोकविरोधात् । तदुक्तम्—

and this is called non-determinate, because of the non-determination of a thing as qualified. But immediately after this a clear cognition like 'this is red', 'this is a jar', etc. having as its object a thing qualified by class, etc. and assisted by recollection of words, is produced; and this is determinate.

15. Here the Grammarians say that there is no non-determinate cognition. This is said:

> In the world there is no cognition devoid of verbal accompaniment.

This does not stand to reason. Because, if there is no perception of the object in advance, it will result in the absence of a cause for the recollection of the word.

16. The Buddhists say that determinate cognition is neither valid nor perceptual, accepting the non-determinate alone as perceptual. This too does not stand to reason. By denying what is universally accepted as perceptual, it is opposed to the world. This is said:

'चन्द्रशब्दाभिधेयत्वं शशिनो यो निषेधति ।
स एव सविकल्पस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं निवारयेत् ॥'

इति । किं च सविकल्पकानन्तरमेवार्थक्रियादर्शनात् तस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणं प्रमाणत्वं दुर्निवारम् ।

१७. ननु अर्थक्रियाकारित्वमस्य अर्थतोऽतिविप्रकर्षाभावाद् दैवागतमेव । न स्वाभाविकम् । यथाहुः ।

'मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुध्याभिधावतोः ।
मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥'

इति । वस्तुतस्त्वयं विकल्पो मिथ्या अवस्तुभूतसामान्यादिविषयत्वात् । इति चेन्मैवम् । अनुमानविकल्पस्यापि अप्रामाण्य-

> Who denies that the moon is the denotation of the word 'moon', he alone can prevent a determinate cognition being perceptual.

Further, since we find successful activity only immediately after a determinate cognition, its validity, defined as producing successful activity cannot be set aside.

17. Now, its production of successful activity is brought about by chance, since it is not very remote from the object; it is not by its nature. So they say:

> In the case of two persons who hurry towards the flame of a gem and a lamp, thinking them to be the gem itself, although there is no difference in the illusory knowledge, there is a difference in successful activity.

In reality, this determinateness is an illusion, since its object is class, etc. which are non-real. If it is said so, this cannot

प्रसङ्गात्, सामान्यादेर्वस्तुत्वस्य साधयिष्यमाणत्वाच्च । अतः प्रमाणमेव सविकल्पकम् ।

१८. ननु तथापि कथमस्य प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यत्वं निर्विकल्पकव्यवधानेन साक्षादक्षजत्वाभावात् । परंपरयाक्षजस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे अनुमानादीनामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । मैवम् । सविकल्पकस्यापि निर्विकल्पकवदेव साक्षादक्षजत्वात् । यथाहुराचार्याः ।

'ताश्चेन्द्रियानुसारेण जायन्ते पञ्च कल्पनाः ।
यदि त्वालोच्य संमील्य नेत्रे कश्चिद्विकल्पयेत् ।
प्रत्यक्षं नैव मन्यन्ते तल्लौकिकपरीक्षकाः ।।'

be. Because, it will result in the determinateness of inference also being invalid; further, the reality of class, etc. will be established. Therefore, determinate cognitions are certainly valid.

18. Now, even then, how can it be denoted by the term perception? Because of the intervention of the non-determinate cognition, it is not directly produced by the senses; and if what is produced by the senses indirectly too is perception, it will result in inference, etc. also becoming perception. This cannot be; because, the determinate too, just like the non-determinate, is produced directly by the senses. So say the preceptors:

> And these five kinds of determination are produced in the wake of the senses. If after perception, some one makes the determination with the eyes closed, neither the ordinary man nor the investigators recognize it as perception at all.

इति । अपि च परंपरया अक्षजत्वेऽपि नानुमानादिषु प्रत्यक्षत्व-प्रसङ्गः । पङ्कजादिष्विव योगरूढिस्वीकारेण अनुमानादिषु प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्याप्रवृत्तेः ।

१९. अत्र गुरुराह । न पङ्कजादिषु रूढिरस्ति अवयव-शक्त्यैव पद्मे वृत्त्युपपत्तेः । कुमुदादिष्वप्रवृत्तिस्तु तेष्वप्रयोगादेव भविष्यति इति ।

२०. तदयुक्तम् । पङ्कजशब्दस्य पद्मे वृत्तौ का सामग्री इति चिन्तायां योगमात्रस्य कुमुदादिष्वपि सद्भावेन व्यभिचाराद् रूढिरपि सामग्रीत्वेन कल्प्या । योगश्च प्रतीतो न हातुं शक्यः । इत्युभयसिद्धेः । तस्माद्योगरूढिशक्त्या निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकयो-

Further, even though it is produced by the senses indirectly, there is no occasion for inference, etc. becoming perception. By the acceptance of etymology *cum* convention, as in the word *paṅkaja* (marsh-born, i.e. lotus), the word perception does not apply to inference, etc.

19. Here, the Guru says: in *paṅkaja*, etc. there is no convention, because its application to the lotus is intelligible even through the significance of the parts. Its non-application to the lily, etc. may however, be due to its mere non-usage with reference to them.

20. This does not stand to reason. When we consider what is the causal aggregate for the word *paṅkaja* to be applied to the lotus, convention too has to be assumed as forming part of the causal aggregate, since mere etymology, because of its existing in lily also, is inconstant. And etymology, having been apprehended, cannot be dispensed with; and

रेव प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यत्वं न अक्षापेक्षाणामप्यनुमानादीनाम् इति सिद्धम् ।

२१. सविकल्पकेन च द्रव्यजातिगुणकर्मनामभिः पञ्चधा विकल्पो भवति । यथा वेणुमानयं गोपोऽयं श्यामोऽयं गायत्ययं गोविन्दोऽयम् इति ।

२२. प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षमपि षष्ठो विकल्प इति केचित् । तन्न । नामकल्पनायामन्तर्भावात् । नाम्ना हि पूर्वमनुभूतरूपे स्मारिते तद्रूपविशिष्टतया अर्थस्य कल्पना नामकल्पनेत्युच्यते । तेन गोविन्दोऽयम् इत्यस्य अयमर्थः । योऽसावस्माभिर्गोविन्दशब्दवाच्यतया पूर्वं गृहीतः स एवायम् इति । यदा तु शब्दवाच्यत्वमतन्त्रीकृत्य

thus both are established. Therefore, it is established that by the force of etymology *cum* convention, the word 'perception' denotes only non-determinate and determinate cognitions, and not inference, etc. though they too depend on the senses.

21. According as it is determined by substance, class, quality, action or name, determinate cognition is of five kinds. For example: he has a flute, he is a cowherd, he is dark, he sings, he is Govinda.

22. Some say that the perception called re-cognition is a sixth kind of determinate cognition. It is not so. It comes under the name-determinates. Indeed, when what is of the nature of having been experienced before is recalled by its name, the determination of the object as qualified by that form is called name-determination. Therefore, the meaning of 'he is Govinda' is: he who has been previously apprehended by us as denoted by the word 'Govinda', he is certainly this person. But when, without having regard to

पूर्वापररूपयोरैक्यावगम एव तात्पर्यं तदा स एवायम् इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्पष्टा भवति । सा च प्रत्यभिज्ञा संस्कारसहितेनेन्द्रियेणैकज्ञानत्वेन जायते । तथा च स इति अयमिति च द्वे भाने जन्येते । तत्र स इति भानजननशक्तिः संस्कारकृता । अयम् इति भानजननशक्तिरिन्द्रियकृता । इत्यलमनेन ।

२३. इह च प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेषु विवक्षाभेदेन इन्द्रियस्य तत्संनिकर्षस्य ज्ञानस्य वा करणत्वं भवति । अतः सिद्धम् इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

२४. गुरुस्त्वाह । साक्षात्प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्च मेयमातृप्रमास्वरूपमिति त्रिपुटं भवति । इति ।

denotation by a word, the meaning is simply the cognition of the identity of the two forms, earlier and later, then the re-cognition, ‘ he is certainly this man ’ becomes clear. And this re-cognition is produced as a unitary cognition by the sense-organ, in co-operation with impressions. And so two cognitions are produced, ‘ that ’ and ‘ this ’. Of these, the power of producing the cognition ‘ that ’ is supplied by impressions, and the power of producing the cognition ‘ this ’ is supplied by the sense-organs. This will suffice.

23. And here, according to the differences in what is intended to be stated, among the perceptual cognitions, instrumentality may belong to the sense-organ, its contact or cognition. So it is established that valid knowledge produced by sense-contact is perception.

24. The Guru, however, says: direct cognition is perception; it has three elements, namely the object of cognition, the agent of cognition and the form of cognition.

२५. तत्र किमिदं साक्षात्त्वं नाम ।

२६. ननु साक्षाद्धीः स्वरूपधीः । अक्षाद्धि स्वेनैव रूपेण भानम् । लिङ्गादिभ्यस्तु परसंबन्धिरूपेणैव अग्न्यादीनां भानादसाक्षात्त्वम् । इति चेत् । तर्हि नामादिपरसंबन्धिरूपेण भानात् सविकल्पकस्य असाक्षात्त्वं स्यात् । अथ तत्र परसंबन्धिरूपभाने सत्यपि स्वरूपधीरप्यस्ति इत्युच्यते । तर्हि अनुमानादिष्वपि तथाभावात् साक्षात्त्वं स्यात् । आत्मस्वात्मनोस्तु सर्वज्ञानेषु प्रत्यक्षत्वकथनं निराकरिष्यामः । इत्यास्तामेतत् ।

२७. कल्पनापोढम् अभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षम् इति बौद्धाः । कल्पनापोढपदेन सविकल्पानां निरासः । अभ्रान्तपदेन निर्विकल्पकेऽपि

25. Here, what is it that is called directness?

26. Now, direct cognition is the cognition of an object in its own form. Manifestation of an object in its own form is indeed through the senses. From probans, etc. however, fire, etc. are cognized only in their relation to something else. If this be said then, since there is the manifestation in relation to something else like name, etc. the determinate cognitions will become non-direct. Again, if it be said that even though there is the manifestation of the aspect of being related to something else, there is also the cognition of its own form, then, since it is so in inference, etc. there will be directness there too. We shall refute their statement that there is the perception of the soul and of the form of cognition in all cognitions. And let this rest there now.

27. The Buddhists say that perception is what is devoid of determination and is non-delusive. By the term ‘devoid

भ्रमत्वेनाभिमतानां केशोण्डुकादिज्ञानानाम् इति। तदपि सविकल्पकस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वसाधनादव्याप्तम् इति।

२८. यत्पुनर्भूतभविष्यदादिविषयं योगिज्ञानमीश्वरज्ञानं च इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजत्वाभावेऽपि अपरोक्षमस्ति इति तत्संग्रहणाय अपरोक्षप्रमाव्याप्तं प्रत्यक्षम् इति लक्षयितव्यम् इति तार्किकैरुक्तं तदप्ययुक्तम्। प्रत्यक्षस्य विद्यमानोपलम्भनियमाद् भूतादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वस्यानुपपत्तेः। तस्मादस्मदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं रमणीयम्।

इन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तानि द्रव्याण्येषां च जातयः।
प्रायश्च गुणकर्माणि प्रत्यक्षाणीति वक्ष्यते ॥

Substances other than senses, their classes, and generally qualities and actions are, it will be said, perceptible.

of determination', are excluded determinate cognitions, and by the term non-delusive are excluded, even among the non-determinates, such cognitions of things like *keśoṇḍuka*, which are recognized as delusion. This also is too narrow, as determinate cognitions have been made out to be perceptual.

28. Again it has been said by Logicians that there is the cognition of the Yogin-s and of God, which have as objects things past, future, etc. and which are not non-direct, though not produced by sense contact, and that to include them also, perception has to be defined as what is pervaded by immediate valid cognition; this too is not reasonable. For perception must as a rule be the cognition of what *is*, and as such what is past, etc. cannot be reasonably said to be perceived. Therefore the definition of perception as given by us is the one acceptable.

३. अनुमानम्

१. व्याप्यदर्शनादसंनिकृष्टार्थज्ञानमनुमानम् । यथा पर्वते धूमवत्त्वदर्शनादग्निमत्त्वज्ञानम् । किमत्र धूमस्य व्याप्यत्वम् । उच्यते । यद्यतो बहिर्न वर्तते तत्तस्य व्याप्यम् । धूमश्च दहनादन्यत्र न वर्तत इति धूमस्य व्याप्यत्वम् । दहनश्च धूमादन्यत्रापि वर्तते-ऽङ्गारावस्थायामिति तस्य व्यापकत्वमेव । तदियमग्निधूमयोरन्यो-न्यव्याप्त्यभावाद्विषमव्याप्तिः । क्वचित्तु समव्याप्तिरप्यस्ति यथा कृतकत्वानित्यत्वयोः । तत्र खलु कृतकानां सर्वेषामनित्यत्वमस्ति । अनित्यानां सर्वेषां कृतकत्वमप्यस्तीति समव्याप्तिरेव ।

3. Inference

1. The cognition of what is not proximate resulting from the perception of what is pervaded is inference. For example: from seeing the mountain to have smoke, there is the cognition of its having fire. What is it here that makes the smoke the pervaded? The reply is: If one thing does not exist outside of another, the former is pervaded by the latter. And smoke does not exist outside of fire; so smoke is the pervaded. But fire exists even outside of smoke, in the state of embers; so it is the pervader alone. Therefore this is non-reciprocal pervasion, since there is no mutual pervasion between fire and smoke. Sometimes there is reciprocal pervasion also, for example, between what is produced and what is non-eternal. And here, of course, all things that are produced have non-eternality; and all things that are non-eternal have the property of being produced also. Thus the pervasion is reciprocal.

२. का पुनरियं व्याप्तिः। उच्यते। स्वाभाविकः संबन्धो व्याप्तिः। स्वाभाविकत्वं चोपाधिराहित्यम्। उपाधिरिति च साध्यस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजकं हेत्वन्तरमुच्यते। तत्सद्भावे हि तद्दत्तमेव साध्यसंबन्धं क्वचिल्लभमानः प्रस्तुतो हेतुः स्वयमेवासाधको भवति। तद्यथा। अग्नीषोमीयहिंसा अधर्मः हिंसात्वाद् बाह्यहिंसादिवत्। इत्यवैदिकानां सांख्यानां च प्रयोगः। तत्र निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिः। तदेव ह्यधर्मत्वस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजकम्। बाह्यहिंसानामपि च निषिद्धत्वकृतमेवाधर्मत्वमिति क्रतुहिंसाया निषिद्धत्वाभावे हिंसात्वमात्रेणाधर्मत्वं न सिध्यति इति।

३. साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्त उपाधिः इति

2. What then is this pervasion? The reply is: pervasion is natural relation. And naturalness is freedom from extraneous adjuncts. And an extraneous adjunct is said to be another probans that leads directly to the probandum. And when that exists, indeed, the probans in question, having sometimes a relation with the probandum only in so far as related to that, becomes by itself non-instrumental. It is thus: the cruelty in the sacrifice *agnīṣomīya* is a vice, because it is cruelty, like other cruelty, etc.; such is the argument of the anti-Vedists, and the Sāṃkhya-s. There, condemnedness is the extraneous adjunct. That alone, indeed, is what directly leads to viceness. For other cruelties also have viceness only as brought about by condemnedness; therefore, since there is no condemnedness in the cruelty in a sacrifice, viceness cannot be established by mere cruelty.

3. An extraneous adjunct is what has reciprocal pervasion with the probandum, while it does not pervade

तस्य लक्षणम्। निषिद्धत्वं हि साधनभूतहिंसात्वदेशे सर्वत्र न वर्तते क्रतुहिंसायां निषिद्धत्वाभावात्। साध्यभूतेन चाधर्मत्वेन निषिद्धत्वस्य समव्याप्तिरस्ति निषिद्धानां सर्वेषामप्यधर्मत्वाद् अधर्मभूतानां च सर्वेषां निषिद्धत्वाद् इति।

४. तत्सामग्रीकत्वं महानसत्वं पर्वतान्यत्वं चाग्न्यनुमितौ उपाधिर्माभूदिति तद्विशेषणत्रितयम्। अत्र यदि साध्यसमव्याप्त उपाधिरित्येवोच्येत तर्हि धूमवत्त्वेनाग्निमत्त्वे साध्यमाने अग्नि-सामग्रीकत्वमुपाधिः स्यात्। अस्ति हि तस्याग्निना समव्याप्तिः। अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थमुक्तं साधनाव्यापक इति। अग्निसामग्री हि साधनभूतस्य धूमस्य व्याप्तिकैव। धूमे सति सर्वत्राग्निसामग्र्या अवश्यंभावात्। यदि तु साधनाव्यापक इत्येवोच्येत तर्हि तत्रैव महानसत्वमुपाधिः स्यात्। न हि धूमे सति सर्वत्र महानसत्व-

the probans; this is its definition. Condemnedness indeed does not exist in all cases of cruelty, which is the probans, because there is no condemnedness in the cruelty in a sacrifice. And it has reciprocal pervasion with viceness, which is the probandum, because everything that is condemned is vice, and everything that is vice is condemned.

4. The threefold qualification is given so that having its causal aggregate, kitchenness and difference from the mountain may not become extraneous adjuncts in the inference of fire. Here, if it were said merely that an extraneous adjunct is what has reciprocal pervasion with the probandum, then, when fire is established from smoke, having the causal aggregate of fire would be an extraneous adjunct. It has indeed reciprocal pervasion with fire; therefore to exclude

मस्तीति साधनाव्यापकत्वस्य भावात् । अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं साध्यव्यापकत्वमाश्रयणीयम् । न हि महानसत्वस्याग्निव्यापकत्वमस्ति । मठादिष्वग्निसद्भावेऽपि तदभावात् । अथ यदि साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यव्यापक उपाधिरित्येवोच्येत तथापि पर्वतेतरत्वमुपाधिः स्यात् । पर्वतेतरत्वं विनापि पर्वते धूमस्य दर्शनेन साधनाव्यापकत्वात् । अग्निमत्त्वेन पूर्वमवधारितानां सर्वेषामपि पर्वतेतरत्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वस्यापि सद्भावात् । अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं समशब्दः ।

that it is said: 'when it does not pervade the probans'. For, the causal aggregate of fire is certainly a pervader with reference to smoke; because in all cases where there is smoke, the causal aggregate of fire must necessarily exist. And if 'while it does not pervade the probans' were alone mentioned, then, in this very instance kitchenness would be an extraneous adjunct. Indeed in all cases where there is smoke, there is no kitchenness, and as such there is the non-pervasion of the probans. Therefore to exclude that, there must be recourse to the element 'pervasion of the probandum'. Indeed, kitchenness does not pervade fire, as, in a monastery, etc. it does not exist, though there is fire. Again if it were said merely that an extraneous adjunct is what pervades the probandum while it does not pervade the probans, even then, difference from the mountain would be an extraneous adjunct. Because, since smoke is seen in the mountain, although there is no difference from the mountain there, there is non-pervasion of the probans; and since in everything that has been previously determined to possess fire, there is difference from the mountain, there is also pervasion of the probandum. Therefore to exclude that there is the word 'reciprocal'. It has indeed no reciprocal pervasion

न हि तस्याग्निना समव्याप्तिरस्ति। पर्वतेतरेषां सर्वेषाम् अग्निमत्त्वाभावाद् इति।

५. अन्यत्र वा विशेषणकृत्यं दर्शयितव्यम्। यदि साध्यसमव्याप्त एवोपाधिः स्यात् तर्हि शब्दोऽनित्यः जन्यत्वाद् घटवद् इत्यत्र सकर्तृकत्वमुपाधिः स्यात्। अनित्यत्वसकर्तृकत्वयोः समव्याप्तिसद्भावात्। अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थमुक्तं साधनाव्यापक इति। सकर्तृकत्वं हि साधनाभिमतस्य जन्यत्वस्यापि व्यापकमिति साधनव्यापकत्वाद् अनुपाधित्वम्। साधनाव्यापकस्यैवोपाधित्वे तु तत्रैव सावयवत्वं घटत्वम् इत्यादिरुपाधिः किं न स्यात्। न हि जन्यानामपि गुणादीनां सावयवत्वं घटत्वं वा अस्ति इति साधना-

with fire; because everything different from the mountain does not possess fire.

5. Or, the purpose of the qualifications has to be pointed out elsewhere. If an extraneous adjunct were merely what has reciprocal pervasion with the probandum, then, in 'sound is non-eternal, because it can be produced; like a jar', having an agent would be an extraneous adjunct, because non-eternality and having an agent are of reciprocal pervasion. Therefore to exclude that it is said 'what does not pervade the probans'. Having an agent is indeed pervasive of producedness, which is here considered the probans, and so it is not an extraneous adjunct, being pervasive of the probans. If an extraneous adjunct were merely what is non-pervasive of the probans, in this very case why would not 'having parts', 'jarness', etc. be extraneous adjuncts, because, since qualities, etc. though produced, have indeed neither parts nor jarness, there is

व्यापकत्वस्य सद्भावात् । अतः साध्यव्यापकत्वमप्याश्रयणीयम् । सावयवत्वघटत्वादीनां गुणक्रियादावनित्यत्वव्यापकत्वाभावात् । तथापि शब्देतरत्वस्य अनित्यत्वव्यापकत्वाद् उपाधित्वं स्यादिति तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं समशब्द इति ।

६. इदं तु अनुमानं व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनमात्रपरमेव । न स्वसिद्धान्तपरम् इति वेदितव्यम् ।

७. ननु पर्वतेतरत्वाभावेऽप्यग्निरस्ति चेन्नायं दोषः स्यादिति तर्कस्यासंभवेन पर्वतेतरत्वस्याग्निव्यापकत्वमेव नास्ति । सत्यम् । तथापि तस्य व्यापकत्वेनावगमात् अक्लेशेन तन्निरासार्थं समशब्दः चिदानन्दादिभिराश्रितः ।

non-pervasion of the probans? Therefore there is recourse to 'pervasion of the probandum'; because 'having parts', 'jarness', etc. have no pervasion of non-eternality in cases like quality and action. Even then, difference from sound, being pervasive of non-eternality, would become an extraneous adjunct, and therefore to exclude that there is the word 'reciprocal'.

6. And this inference is meant only to point out a case of pervasion and not meant to point out our own theory—this must be borne in mind.

7. Now this defect will not arise if there is fire even when there is no difference from the mountain; since such a counter-argument is impossible, there is no pervasion of fire at all for difference from the mountain. True. Even then, since it is understood as pervasive, in order to exclude that without any strain, the word 'reciprocal' is resorted to by Cidānanda and others.

समव्याप्तिमतामेव सर्वथापि ह्युपाधिता ।
इति विस्पष्टतार्थं च समशब्दो न दूषणम् ।।

८. अस्य चोपाधेः साध्यव्यापकत्वाद्यनिश्चये शङ्कितोपाधित्वम् । यथा मैत्रीतनयत्वेनाष्टमगर्भस्य श्यामत्वे साध्ये शाकाद्याहारपरिणाम उपाधिः । अष्टमपुत्रे च तस्य नास्तित्वे स्थिते एव तस्य साधनाव्यापकत्वं भवेत् । स च तत्रापि शङ्क्यत एव इत्यनिश्चितमेव साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । अतः शङ्कितोपाधिरसौ इति ।

९. क्वचिच्च साधनस्य विशेष एव प्रयोजको भवति ।

> It is only those that have reciprocal pervasion that can, in any way, become extraneous adjuncts: the word 'reciprocal' is to make this clear, and as such is not a defect.

8. And this extraneous adjunct becomes a doubted one if its pervasion of the probandum, etc. is not ascertained. For example: when dark complexion for the eighth issue has to be proved from being the son of Maitrī, transformation of food like greens is an extraneous adjunct. There can be its non-pervasion of the probans only when it can be shown that it does not exist in the eighth son. And certainly it is doubted there, and so the non-pervasion of the probans is only non-ascertained. Therefore this is a doubted extraneous adjunct.

9. And in certain cases, only particular forms of the probans are effective. For example: 'This twice-born will be proficient in scriptures, because he is a twice-born.' In

यथा अयं द्विजो वेदज्ञो भविष्यति द्विजत्वाद् इत्यत्र बुद्ध्यादिमद्द्विजत्वमुपाधिः इति।

तस्मादुपाधिमिच्छद्भिः पक्षभूमिमनाप्नुवन्।
सपक्षान् व्याप्नुवन् धर्मो मृग्यतामिति संग्रहः॥

१०. सोऽयमीदृश उपाधिर्धूमस्याग्निसंबन्धे नास्तीति स्वाभाविक एवासौ संबन्धः। स पुनः स्वाभाविकः संबन्धः कथं गृह्यत इति चेद् उच्यते। आदौ तावन्महानसादौ भूयो भूयो धूमस्याग्निसंबन्धं पश्यन् क्रमेण च महानसत्वगृहत्वग्रामत्वादीनुपाधित्वेनाशङ्क्य व्यभिचारादर्शनेन निरस्यन्नन्यानप्युपाधीन् निपुणं निरूप्य योग्यानुपलम्भेन निराकुर्वन् भूयोदर्शनोपाध्यभावग्रहणजनित-

this case, twice-bornness along with intellect, etc. is the extraneous adjunct.

> Therefore, those who seek extraneous adjuncts, must look for an attribute which does not exist in the subject, and which pervades the co-subjects; so may it be briefly put.

10. This extraneous adjunct of such nature does not exist in the relation of smoke with fire; so this relation is certainly natural. And how is this natural relation apprehended? If this is asked, the reply is: to begin with, seeing the relation of smoke with fire again and again in a kitchen, etc. then by steps, doubting kitchenness, houseness, villageness, etc. to be extraneous adjuncts and abandoning them because no inconstancy is seen, very closely examining other extraneous adjuncts also and discarding them by the non-cognition

संस्कारसहकृतेनेन्द्रियेण सोऽयमेकरूप एव धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभाविकः संबन्ध इति निश्चिनोति इति।

११. प्राभाकरास्तु—'धूमस्याग्निसंबन्धः सकृद्दर्शनादेवावगम्यत इति सकृद्दर्शनगम्यैव व्याप्तिः। उपाधिशङ्कानिरासार्थमेव तु भूयोदर्शनमर्थ्यते' इत्याहुः।

१२. तदयुक्तम् अनुमानाङ्गभूत एव संबन्धो व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते। निरुपाधिकत्वविशिष्टस्यैव च संबन्धस्यानुमानाङ्गत्वं न धूमाग्निसंबन्धमात्रस्य। निरुपाधिकत्वावधारणं च भूयोदर्शनसाध्यमेव इति तैरप्युक्तम्। अतो भूयोदर्शनगम्यैव निरुपाधिकसंबन्धरूपा व्याप्तिः।

of the capable, one decides, with senses aided by the impres sions produced by repeated observation and by the appre hension of the absence of extraneous adjuncts, that this natural relation between smoke and fire is only of one form.

11. The followers of Prabhākara say, however: the relation of smoke with fire is understood even with a single observation. So pervasion can certainly be understood from a single observation. Repeated observation is wanted only to remove doubts regarding extraneous adjuncts.

12. This does not stand to reason. It is only that relation which forms a member in an inference which can be called pervasion. And only a relation free from extraneous adjuncts is a member in an inference, not a mere relation between smoke and fire. Determination of freedom from extraneous adjuncts can be accomplished only by repeated observation. This is said by themselves. Therefore, pervasion

१३. ननु न भूयोदर्शनमात्रेण निरुपाधिकत्वावधारणम् । तस्य मैत्रीतनयत्वश्यामत्वयोरपि भावात् ।

१४. सत्यम् । अत एवाह चिदानन्दः—'न केवलं भूयोभिर्दर्शनैस्तादृशमवधारणं सिध्यति इति प्रमाणोत्पत्त्यनुगुणस्तर्कोऽपि तत्र सहकारी' इति ।

१५. कः पुनस्तर्कः । उच्यते । प्रमाणेन साध्यमानस्यार्थस्य अन्यथात्वशङ्कायां तन्निरासार्थम् अन्यथात्वे दोषकथनं तर्कः । अत एवानिष्टप्रसङ्गस्तर्क इति तार्किकाः । अयमेव बाधक

in the nature of a relation free from extraneous adjuncts can be understood only by repeated observation.

13. Now, merely by repeated observation, there need not be the determination of freedom from extraneous adjuncts, since it exists in the case of Maitrī's son and darkness.

14. True. It is for this reason that Cidānanda says: It is not merely by repeated observation that such a determination results; so counter-argument conducive to the production of valid knowledge is also an auxiliary thereto.

15. What then is a counter-argument? The reply is: when there is a doubt about an object, which is to be established by a valid means of knowledge, that it is otherwise, then, pointing out a defect in its being otherwise, in order to remove that doubt, is a counter-argument. If is for this reason that the Logicians speak of counter-argument as the occasioning of the non-desirable. And this same is said to be the sublater (of the opposite). For example: 'If there be no fire, then there can be no smoke either,' and

इति चोच्यते। यथा यद्यत्राग्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात् इत्यादि। अस्य च तर्कस्य पञ्च अङ्गानि। यदाहुः—

'व्याप्तिस्तर्काप्रतिहतिरवसानं विपर्यये।
अनिष्टाननुकूलत्वे इति तर्काङ्गपञ्चकम्॥'

इति। अत्र साध्यवैपरीत्यमग्न्यभावादिकमारोप्य तेन लिङ्गभूतेन धूमाभावाद्यनिष्टप्रसञ्जनं हि तर्केण क्रियते। तत्र प्रसञ्जकस्याहार्यलिङ्गस्य प्रसञ्जनीयेन व्याप्तिरेष्टव्या। तथा प्रतितर्कैरप्रतिघातः। प्रसञ्जनीयविपर्यये पर्यवसानम् एवं चेदेवं स्याद् न चैवम् इति। प्रसञ्जनीयस्य चानिष्टत्वं प्रसिद्धम्। अननुकूलत्वं प्रतिपक्षासाधकत्वम् इति।

so on. And this counter-argument has five elements. So is it said:

> Pervasion, non-defeat by another counter-argument, finality for the contrary, non-desirability and non-favourableness—these are the five elements of a counter-argument.

Here what is done by the counter-argument is indeed to occasion the non-desirable like the absence of smoke, etc. after assuming the contrary of the probandum like the absence of fire, etc. and taking that as the probans. There the pervasion of the assumptive probans which occasions, by that which is occasioned is to be looked for. Then there is non-defeat by another counter-argument. There must be a finality in the contrary of what is occasioned; 'if that be so, this will be so; this is not so'. The non-desirability of what is occasioned is well known. Non-favourableness is non-instrumentality in respect of the opposite.

१६. अङ्गवैकल्ये च तर्काभासत्वं भवति। व्याप्त्यभावे यथा। यद्यग्निमत्त्वं न स्यात् तर्हि पर्वतत्वमपि न स्याद् इति। तर्कप्रतिहतौ यथा। यदीयं मेघोन्नतिर्वृष्टिमती न स्यात् तर्हि निबिडापि न स्याद् इति तर्कस्य यदीयं वृष्टिमती स्यात् तर्हि वातोद्रेकवती न स्याद् इति तर्केण प्रतिहतिः। विपर्ययपर्यवसानाभावे यथा। शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वाद् इति मीमांसकं प्रति प्रयोगे यद्यनित्यो न स्यात् तर्हि कृतकोऽपि न स्याद् इति तर्कः। तत्र कृतकश्चायमिति पर्यवसाययितुं न शक्यते, मीमांसकपक्षे शब्दस्य कृतकत्वाभावात्। इष्टत्वमप्यत्रैव। कृतकत्वाभावस्य तं प्रतीष्टत्वात्।

16. If any of these elements be wanting, there is a fallacy of counter-argument. In the absence of pervasion, it is like this: 'If there be no fire, there will be no mountainness.' The case of defeat by another counter-argument is like this: 'If this rise of clouds is not accompanied by rain, then it will not be dense either'; for this counter-argument, there is defeat by another counter-argument: 'If it is accompanied by rain, then it will not be accompanied by strong wind.' In the case of the non-finality of the contrary, it is like this: in the syllogism against the Mīmāṃsaka-s, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced,' there is the counter-argument, 'If it is not non-eternal, then it will not be produced.' There, it cannot be decided that it is produced, because in the view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, sound is not produced. In this very case, there is desirability also, because the absence of producedness is desirable so far as he is concerned. In the case of favourableness, it is like this: 'Action is to be inferred, because it is an action like the action of the sun.' Here the counter-argument will be, 'Otherwise action itself cannot be

अनुकूलत्वे यथा। अनुमेयं कर्म कर्मत्वाद् आदित्यकर्मवत्, इत्यत्र अन्यथा कर्मैव न सिध्येदिति तर्कः। स च प्रत्यक्षवादिनामप्यनुकूलः। तैरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वं साधयित्वा अन्यथा कर्मैव न स्याद् इति वक्तुं शक्यत्वाद् इति।

१७. आत्माश्रयत्वादयश्च दोषाः तर्क एवान्तर्भूताः, अनिष्टप्रसङ्गरूपत्वात्।

स्वेनैव स्वस्य सिद्धिर्या तदात्माश्रयदूषणम्।
अनेनान्यस्ततश्चायमित्यन्योन्याश्रयं भवेत्॥
अनेनान्यस्ततश्चान्यस्ततोऽसाविति चक्रकम्।
अतीतास्पृष्टमन्यान्यग्रहणं त्वनवस्थितिः॥

established.' And this is favourable even to those who accept the doctrine of its perception, because to them too, after establishing its perceptibility it is possible to say, 'Otherwise action itself cannot be established'.

17. Defects like self-dependence are included in counter-argument itself, as they are in the nature of occasioning what is non-desirable.

When the establishment of one is by itself, it is the defect of self-dependence. That is established by this, and from that this follows: this is mutual dependence.

By this is established another, by that still another and by that is established this: this is arguing in a circle. When there is the apprehension of one from another and of

गौरवं लाघवं चेति तर्कौ सार्वत्रिकावुभौ ।
गौरवं कल्पनाधिक्यं लाघवं त्वल्पकल्पना ।।
दोषप्रसञ्जकरूपत्वं गौरवस्यैव विद्यते ।
साध्ये गुणकथाद्वारा लाघवस्य प्रसञ्जता ।।
साध्याभावानुवादेन दोषः साध्ये गुणोऽपि वा ।
यत्रानुकूलतर्कोऽसौ साध्यसिद्धावनुग्रहात् ।।
साध्यस्यैवानुवादेन यदनिष्टप्रसञ्जनम् ।
स तर्कः प्रतिकूलः स्यात् साध्यसिद्धिनिरोधनात् ।।

that from yet another without ever touching what has gone before, there is regress *ad infinitum.*

The two kinds of counter-arguments—prolixity and parsimony—are found everywhere. Prolixity is the assumption of more; and parsimony is the assumption of the least.

The nature of occasioning defect exists only in prolixity. This [nature] is occasioned by parsimony through pointing out merits in one's probandum.

Where there is defect by the acceptance of the absence of the probandum, or merit in the probandum, that is a case of favourable counter-argument, because that helps in the establishment of the probandum.

If there is the occasioning of something non-desirable by the acceptance of the probandum

इति ।

१८. स चायं तर्को व्याप्तिग्रहणवेलायामनुमानोत्थान-समये वा व्यभिचारशङ्कां निरस्य व्याप्तिं शोधयन् अनुमानस्यानु-ग्राहको भवति ।

१९. ननु यद्यग्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्याद् इत्यनेनैव तर्केण व्यभिचारशङ्का न निवर्तते । अग्न्यभावेऽपि धूमः किं न स्याद् इति शङ्कायाः पुनरपि अनपायात् ।

२०. सत्यम् । अत एव शङ्काव्याघातपर्यन्तं तर्कमार्गेणैव-गन्तव्यम् इति तार्किकाः । इह च यद्यग्न्यभावेऽपि धूमः स्यात्

itself, that is non-favourable counter-argument, because that arrests the establishment of the probandum.

18. And this counter-argument removes doubts about inconstancy either at the time of the apprehension of the pervasion or at the time of the production of the inference, and thus, purifying the pervasion, helps the inference.

19. Now, by the mere counter-argument: 'If there be no fire, then there will be no smoke,' doubts about inconstancy do not recede; because the further doubt: 'Why can there be no smoke even in the absence of fire?' still remains unaffected.

20. True. For this very reason the Logicians hold that one has to proceed along the path of counter-argument until doubt is finally exterminated. And here, when the counter-argument is advanced: 'If there can be smoke

तर्हि कारणं विनापि कार्यजननमङ्गीकृतं स्याद् इति तर्के प्रयुक्ते तदपि किं न स्यादिति शङ्का न लोकविदामङ्कुरति ।

२१. ननु तथापि धूमस्याग्निः कारणम् इति कुतो निर्णीयत इति शङ्का नापैति ।

२२. मैवम् । यद्यग्निः कारणं न स्यात् तर्हि कारणान्तरानुपलम्भेन धूमस्य निष्कारणत्वमेव प्रसजेदिति तर्के सति समस्तविजयात् । तदेवं तर्के व्यभिचारशङ्कायां सर्वतो निरुद्धायाम् उपाध्यन्तरशङ्काकथापि विधूतैव ।

२३. ततश्चादृश्योपाधिशङ्का सर्वथा दुर्वारेति चार्वाकदुर्वादोऽपि निर्वासित इति ।

even in the absence of fire, then it will amount to the acceptance of the production of the effect even in the absence of the cause,' a doubt: 'Why cannot that also be?' does not arise in the case of those who understand the world.

21. Now, even then the doubt: 'How is it determined that fire is the cause of smoke?' does not vanish.

22. Not so. 'If fire be not the cause, then since no other cause is seen, the result will be that smoke has no cause at all'; when there is this counter-argument everything is conquered. Therefore, when in this way, doubt regarding inconstancy is arrested on all sides by counter-argument, all talk of doubts regarding other extraneous adjuncts is certainly shaken off.

23. And therefore the wicked contention of the Materialists that doubts about invisible extraneous adjuncts are by no means resistible, is also banished.

अथवोपाधिशङ्कैव तर्कैर्निष्कास्यते स्फुटम् ।
उपाधिर्मानयोग्यो वा तदयोग्योऽथवा भवेत् ।।
अयोग्यश्चेन्न शङ्क्येत योग्यश्चेत् किं न दृश्यते ।
अनुमानादिगम्यश्चेल्लिङ्गादिः किं न दृश्यते ।।

इत्यादि ।

२४. ततश्च—

शङ्काव्याघातपर्यन्तमेवं सर्वानुमास्वपि ।
तर्कजालं प्रयोक्तव्यमत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते ।।

Or, the very doubts regarding extraneous adjuncts are clearly banished by counter-arguments. Extraneous adjuncts must be either capable of being known or incapable of it.

If they are incapable, they cannot be doubted. If they are capable, why cannot they be seen? If they are to be known through inference, etc. why cannot the probans, etc. be seen?

And so on.

24. And therefore,

Until there is the extermination of doubts, a series of counter-arguments must be applied in all inferences. And this is saying very little;

यतः प्रत्यक्षशाब्दादिप्रमाणान्यखिलान्यपि ।
तर्कं विना न जीवन्ति प्रत्यक्षे तावदीक्षताम् ।।

२५. अयं घट इति प्रत्यक्षं हि सुगतकथितपरमाणुगोचरतापराणोदिना तर्केणानुगृहीतमेवावयविगोचरं भवति । यदि परमाणुगोचरता स्यात् तर्हि एकत्वेन महत्त्वेन चावभासो न स्याद् इति तर्कः । तथा अयं गौरिति प्रत्यक्षमपि यद्यत्यन्तभिन्नविषयं स्यात् तर्हि इदंगोत्वे इति प्रतीतिः स्याद् इति तर्केणानुगृहीतमेवाभेदस्यापि ग्राहकं भवति इत्यादि । एवं शाब्देऽपि ब्रूमः । अध्ययनविधिरेव तावद्यदि स्वर्गफलकः स्यात् तर्हि दृष्टार्थत्वे

Because, even all means of valid knowledge, like perception and authority, cannot live without counter-arguments. Now see this in perception.

25. Indeed the perception, 'This is a jar', can have as its object the whole, only when favoured by the counter-argument that will dispel the view put forward by the Buddhists that ultimate atoms are its object. 'If its object be the ultimate atoms, then it cannot appear as unitary and having a size': this is the counter-argument. Similarly, 'If the perception "This is a cow", has as its object two entirely different things, then the cognition must be "The two things, this and cow"'; only when favoured by such a counter-argument can the perception become the apprehender of the identity too. And so on. Similarly we can say in the case of authority too: 'If now the prescription of study itself can have heaven as its fruit, then since there is recourse to an invisible fruit when there is the possibility

संभवति अदृष्टग्रहणाद् गौरवं स्याद् इति तर्कानुग्रहेण अर्थज्ञानफलबोधको भवति। यद्यर्थज्ञानफलकः स्यात् तर्हि विधिवैयर्थ्यं स्याद् इति प्रतिकूलतर्कश्च तत्र तत्र निरसनीयः। तथा—

'उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः।
सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥' (मनु. २. १४०)

इति स्मृतिः यद्यध्यापनविधिः स्यात् तर्हि 'तु यो द्विजः तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते' इत्यंशेनैकवाक्यता न स्याद् इति तर्केण आचार्यलक्षणपरता निश्चीयतेऽस्याः स्मृतेः। तथा 'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति' इत्यत्र यदि घृतेनाञ्जनं न स्यात् तर्हि 'तेजो वै घृतम्' इति वाक्यशेषो विरुध्यते इति तर्काद् घृताञ्जनपरता साध्यते इति।

of a visible fruit, there is prolixity'; being favoured by this counter-argument, the prescription teaches that the understanding of the meaning is the fruit. And the other counter-argument, 'If the fruit be to know the meaning, then the prescription will be in vain', has to be refuted wherever it occurs. Similarly—

'But the twice-born who shall teach the Veda-s to his disciple after initiating him, along with the Kalpa-s and the mysteries, he is called the preceptor.'

If this Code be a prescription to teach, then there will be no syntactical unity with the part, 'But the twice-born who ... he is called the preceptor': by this counter-argument, it is decided that this Code is intended to give the definition of a preceptor. Similarly: 'One shall bring near the smeared stones': here if the smearing be not with ghee then there will be conflict with the remainder of the sentence, 'Ghee verily

एवं सर्वत्र तर्कौघैरर्थाभासनिरासतः ।
वाक्यार्थस्थापनी सर्वा मीमांसा तर्करूपिणी ।।

उक्तं च मनुना—

'आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।
यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ।।' (१२.१०६)

इति ।

२६. एवमुपमानार्थापत्त्यभावेष्वपि तत्र तत्र तर्कापेक्षण-मूहितव्यम् ।

is fire': from this counter-argument it is established that smearing with ghee is what is intended.

> Thus in all cases, by the refutation of fallacious meanings through a flood of counter-arguments, the entire investigation which is of the nature of counter-argument establishes the meanings of sentences.

And it is said by Manu:

> And he who establishes the utterances of the sages and the teachings of the Law through counter-arguments not conflicting with scriptural science, he knows the Law, and none else.

26. Similarly in analogy, presumption and negation too, their dependence on counter-argument has to be reasoned out whenever it occurs.

तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणानां तर्कोऽनुग्राहकः स्थितः ।
साध्ये विपर्ययाशङ्काविच्छेदस्तदनुग्रहः ।।
अस्याविज्ञाततत्त्वोऽर्थः संदिग्धो विषयो मतः ।
हेतुरारोपितं लिङ्गं फलं तत्त्वार्थनिर्णयः ।।
तदेवं तत्त्वसिध्यर्थमन्यथानिष्टवर्णने ।
प्रसरत्यसदारोपतत्साधनपरंपरा ।।
तत्र चारोपवादेऽपि सिद्धान्तत्वभ्रमः क्वचित् ।
वेदश्चेदीश्वराधीनस्तर्हीशोऽपि न सिध्यति ।।

Therefore counter-argument stands settled as the helper in all means of valid knowledge. Its help consists in the removal of doubts regarding the contrary in respect of the probandum.

Its content is considered to be that object whose true nature is not known and is subject to doubt. The probans is an assumptive mark; the fruit is the determination of the truth of the object.

Thus in this way, when in order to establish the truth there is the statement of what is non-desirable otherwise, there proceeds the series of superimpositions of the non-real and the grounds for its establishment.

And here, even in the statement of what is superimposed, there is sometimes the delusion of the final doctrine. 'If Veda is dependent on God, then God himself is not established';

इत्युक्तावीश्वराभावः सिद्धान्त इति मन्वते ।
असंभाव्यस्य चारोपादसंतोषः क्वचिद्भवेत् ॥
अपकर्षाप्रतिष्ठश्चेत् परमाणुस्तथा सति ।
अनन्तावयवारम्भान्मेरुसर्षपयोर्द्वयोः ।
स्यात् तुल्यपरिमाणत्वमित्याद्युक्तिर्यथा भवेत् ॥
तत्र चास्य प्रमाणस्य तर्कोऽयं तस्य सिद्धये ।
अन्यदुक्तमिति व्यक्तं विविञ्चन्नैव मुह्यति ॥
तस्मात् तर्कप्रकारोऽयं प्रसङ्गप्रापितोऽपि सन् ।
अत्यन्तमुपकारीति विस्तरात् प्रस्तुतो मया ॥

इति ।

When this is said, it is supposed that the non-existence of God is the final doctrine. On account of the superimposition of what is impossible, sometimes there is dissatisfaction.

If the ultimate atom be not the final limit for diminishing size, then being produced by an infinite number of parts, the mountain Meru and a mustard seed will have the same size: such statements are like that.

There, 'For this means of valid knowledge, this is the counter-argument; for the establishment of that, something else has been said': a man who discriminates this well does not get confused.

Therefore the mode of counter-argument, even though brought in indirectly, has been discussed in detail, because it is of great help.

२७. तदेवं तर्कसहायेन भूयो दर्शनेनैव निरुपाधिकसंबन्धोऽवधार्यते ।

भूयो दर्शनतः शक्या दृश्योपाधिनिराक्रिया ।
अदृश्योपाधिशङ्का तु तर्कैरेव निरस्यते ।।

इति विभागः । अतः सिद्धा व्याप्तिः ।

२८. बौद्धास्तु तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामेव व्याप्तिसिद्धिरित्याहुः । यथा शिंशपात्वस्य वृक्षत्वेन व्याप्तौ तादात्म्यं धूमस्याग्निना व्याप्तौ तदुत्पत्तिः इति ।

२९. तन्न । कृत्तिकोदयरोहिण्यासत्त्योर्व्याप्तौ तदुभयाभावात् । तस्मान्निरुपाधिकत्वावधारणादेव व्याप्तिसिद्धिः ।

27. Therefore, in this way, the relation free from extraneous adjuncts can be determined only by repeated observation helped by counter-argument.

> By repeated observation can the visible external adjunct be removed. But the doubt regarding invisible external adjuncts can be removed only by counter-arguments.

This is the distinction. Therefore pervasion is established.

28. But the Buddhists say that pervasion can be established only through identity and origination therefrom. For example, in the case of the pervasion of *śiṃśapā*-ness by treeness, there is identity; in the case of the pervasion of smoke by fire there is origination therefrom.

29. This is not right; because in the pervasion as between the rise of Kṛttikā and the proximity of Rohiṇī, there is

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व्याप्तिर्नियमः प्रतिबन्धोऽव्यभिचारस्तथाविनाभावः ।
व्याप्यं पुनर्नियम्यं गमकं लिङ्गं च साधनं हेतुः ।
इत्युभयोः पर्याया इति तस्य तु दर्शनं त्रिविधम् ।।

३०. व्याप्तिग्रहणवेलायां धूमदर्शनं प्रथमम् । पर्वतोपान्तगतस्य धूमदर्शनं द्वितीयम् । ततश्च व्याप्तिस्मरणानन्तरं तादृशो धूमोऽत्रास्तीति यदनुसंधानं तत् तृतीयम् । तदत्र व्याप्यदर्शनमभिमतं तदनन्तरमेव वह्निज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेः इति ।

३१. असंनिकृष्टपदेन पुनः किमुच्यते । अपरिच्छिन्नमिति ब्रूमः । तदुक्तम्—

neither. Therefore the establishment of pervasion is only through the determination of freedom from external adjuncts.

> Pervasion, rule, mutual relation, non-inconstancy, similarly non-existence without; again, the pervaded, the ruled, the means of knowing, mark, probans and cause; these are the synonyms for each. The cognition thereof is, however, of three kinds.

30. The first consists in the sight of smoke at the time of apprehending the pervasion; the second consists in the sight of smoke by a man who goes near the mountain; and the third consists in the recollection that such smoke exists here, after remembering the pervasion. Among these, it is this that is acknowledged to be the cognition of the pervaded; because it is only after that, there arises the knowledge of fire.

31. Again, what is it that is expressed by the word 'non-proximate'? We say it is 'non-determined'. This is said:

असंनिकृष्टवाचा च द्वयमत्र जिहासितम् ।
ताद्रूप्येण परिच्छित्तिस्तद्विपर्ययतोऽपि वा ।।

इति । पूर्वं सत्त्वेन परिच्छिन्ने ह्यग्न्यादौ पुनरनुमानम् अनुवादः स्यात् । असत्त्वेन परिच्छेदे च बाधितत्वेनाप्रामाण्यमेव । इति तदुभयनिवर्तनार्थम् असंनिकृष्टपदम् इति ।

३२. अत्र चार्वाकाः । अग्निविशेषस्यानुमेयत्वे व्याप्त्यसिद्धिः अग्निसामान्यस्यैव धूमसामान्येन व्याप्तेः । सामान्यस्यानुमेयत्वे तु तस्य पूर्वमेव परिच्छिन्नत्वात् सिद्धसाधनत्वम् । तथा च असंनिकृष्टपदमप्ययुक्तम् । तदुक्तम् —

> By the term non-proximate two things are here meant to be excluded, namely determination as of that form or as of the contrary.

Inference in the case of fire, etc. which had been previously determined as existing, would be only re-statement; and if they were determined as non-existing, it would be non-valid, being sublated; so to exclude both, there is the word non-proximate.

32. Here the Materialists say: if what is to be inferred is a particular fire, there is the non-establishment of the pervasion; because the pervasion is only of the class fire with the class smoke. But if what is to be inferred is the class, since that has been determined even earlier, there is the establishment of what was already established. And therefore, even the word 'non-proximate' is inappropriate. This is said:

अनुमाभङ्गपङ्केऽस्मिन्निमग्ना वादिदन्तिनः ।
विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनम् ।।

इति ।

३३. अत्रोच्यते । न तावत् सामान्ययोरेव केवलयोर्व्याप्तिसिद्धिः । तथाहि सति धूमत्वेन वह्नित्वं स्वतःसंबद्धमिति व्याप्तिग्रहः स्यात् । तथा च वह्नित्वजातिसंबन्धाद् धूमत्वमेव वह्निः स्यात् । अतो विशेषद्वारेणैव सामान्ययोर्व्याप्तिः सिध्यति । विशेषश्च तत्र तत्र विभिन्नत्वान्न नियतो निरूपयितुं शक्यत इति अनियतविशेषालिङ्गितयोर्व्याप्तिरिति स्थितिः । ततश्च पर्वतवर्तितया दृष्टो धूमोऽनियतविशेषालिङ्गितमग्निं पर्वतेऽनुमापयति । इह

The disputants, like elephants, have fallen in this mire of the breakdown of inference: in the case of particulars, there is no uniformity; in the case of class, there is the establishment of what was already established.

33. The reply to this is: the establishment of the pervasion is not merely between two bare classes. If that were so, indeed, the apprehension of the pervasion would be that fireness is naturally related to smokeness. And thus, on account of the relation with the class fire, smokeness itself would be fire. Therefore, pervasion between two classes is established only through the channel of particulars. And the particulars, being different in each case, are not capable of being ascertained as uniform, and so the position is that pervasion is between the two that are embraced by non-uniform particulars. And therefore, smoke seen as existing on the mountain helps the inference of fire on the mountain,

च यद्यप्यनियतविशेषालिङ्गितमग्निसामान्यं व्याप्तिवेलायामेव गृहीतं तदेव चानुमेयं तथापीदानीं पर्वतेऽग्निरस्ति इति देशकालविशेषस्यापि अनुमीयमानत्वात् तस्य च पूर्वमप्राप्तत्वात् सिद्धसाध्यत्वस्य अनवकाश एव।

व्याप्तिश्च पक्षधर्मत्वमनुमाङ्गं द्वयं विदुः।
व्याप्त्या ह्युक्तप्रकारेण वह्निसामान्यवेदनम्॥
धूमस्य शैलनिष्ठत्वरूपा या पक्षधर्मता।
तया पर्वतसंबन्धो वह्नेरप्यवगम्यते॥

इति।

embraced by non-uniform particulars. And here, although the class fire, as embraced by non-uniform particulars, has been apprehended even at the time of pervasion, and although what is to be inferred is that itself, still, since particularity regarding place and time too has to be inferred, like 'now there is fire on the mountain', and since that is not known before, there is certainly no room for the probandum to be already established.

> Pervasion and being the attribute of the subject: these two are known to be the members in an inference. Indeed, by the pervasion as described already, there is the knowledge of fire in general.
>
> What is called being the attribute of the subject is of the nature of smoke existing on the mountain; by that is understood the relation of fire too to the mountain.

३४. गुरुस्त्वाह—'धूमवतो देशस्य वह्निमत्त्वमप्यस्तीति व्याप्तिवेलायामेव गृहीतत्वाद् धूमवत्त्वमेव पर्वतस्येदानीमपूर्वं गृहीतव्यम्। अग्निमत्त्वं तु तस्य पूर्वगृहीतमेवावगम्यते' इति।

३५. तदयुक्तम्। धूमवत्त्वं तावत् पर्वतस्येदानीमेव गृह्यत इत्युक्तम्। अतः कथं धूमवत्त्वप्राप्तिं विनात्र वह्निमत्त्वप्राप्तिः पूर्वमासीदित्यविचारयतो गुरोरयमुन्माद इति।

३६. अतः सिद्धम् असंनिकृष्टज्ञानस्यानुमानत्वम्। अत्र च प्रागुक्तप्रकारेण प्राकट्यरूपानुमितिकरणत्वादेव ज्ञानस्यानुमानत्वमुक्तम्। ज्ञानरूपानुमितिकरणत्वाच्च धूमादेरप्यनुमानत्वमस्त्येव इति।

34. But the Guru says: since it is apprehended even at the time of pervasion that a place having smoke has also fire, it is only the existence of smoke on the mountain that has now to be apprehended as something novel. But the existence of fire there that is now understood is only what was apprehended before.

35. This does not stand to reason. Now it is said that the existence of smoke on the mountain is apprehended only now. Then how, without the knowledge of the existence of smoke, can it be that there was here, even before, the knowledge of the existence of fire? Thus this is only an aberration of the Guru, who has not considered this point.

36. Therefore it is established that inference is knowledge of what is non-proximate. And here, in the way stated before, by the very fact of its being the instrument of inferential cognition of the nature of manifestedness, the

३७. तच्चानुमानं त्रिविधम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकि, केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकि चेति । द्वेधा हि व्याप्तिः अन्वयव्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्चेति । तत्र साधनस्य सद्भावे साध्यस्यापि सद्भावः अन्वयव्याप्तिः । साध्यस्याभावे साधनस्याप्यभावो व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । व्यतिरेके च व्याप्यव्यापकभावोऽन्वयाद्विपरीतो भवति । अग्न्यभावो ह्यत्र व्याप्यः । धूमाभावश्च व्यापक इति ।

अग्नेर्भावस्य भूयस्त्वात् तदभावोऽल्पतां व्रजेत् ।
धूमभावस्य चाल्पत्वात् तदभावो महत्तरः ॥

knowledge is said to be the means of inference. And being the instrument of inference of the nature of cognition, smoke, etc. are also means of inference.

37. And this means of inference is of three kinds: positively and negatively concomitant, purely positively concomitant and purely negatively concomitant. Pervasion indeed is of two kinds, namely positive pervasion and negative pervasion. Of these, the existence of the probandum where there is the existence of the probans is the positive pervasion. The non-existence of the probans where there is the non-existence of the probandum is the negative pervasion. And in the case of negative pervasion, the relation of the pervader and the pervaded is the reverse of that in the case of positive pervasion. Here indeed, the non-existence of fire is the pervaded, and the non-existence of smoke is the pervader.

Since the existence of fire is more extensive, its non-existence becomes less extensive. And since the existence of smoke is less extensive, its non-existence must be more extensive.

इति वैपरीत्यस्योपपत्तिः ।

३८. तत्र यस्योभयविधा व्याप्तिरस्ति तदन्वयव्यतिरेकि, यथा धूमानुमानादि । तत्र हि धूमस्याग्न्यन्वयो महानसादौ दृश्यते । अग्न्यभावे धूमाभावश्च महाह्रदादौ दृश्यते । तदन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वम् । यस्य पुनरन्वयव्याप्तिरेवास्ति तत्केवलान्वयि । यथा ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरप्रकाश्यं वस्तुत्वाद् घटवद् इत्यादि । अत्र हि ज्ञानप्रकाश्यत्वाभावे वस्तुत्वाभावो न क्वचिदपि दर्शयितुं शक्यः, सर्वेषामप्यर्थानां ज्ञानप्रकाश्यत्वात् । अतो व्यतिरेकव्याप्त्यभावः । यस्य तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरेवास्ति तत् केवलव्यतिरेकि । यथा सर्वं

This is the justification for the reverse relation.

38. Of these, where there is pervasion of both kinds, that is a case of the positively and negatively concomitant; for example smoke as the means of inference. Here indeed the concomitance of smoke with fire is seen in the kitchen, etc. And the absence of smoke in the absence of fire is seen in a big lake, etc. So it is positively and negatively concomitant. That, again, which has only the positive pervasion is the purely positively concomitant; for example: 'Cognition is manifested by another cognition, because it is an object like a jar.' Here indeed, the absence of being an object in the absence of manifestation by cognition cannot be pointed out anywhere, since every object can be manifested by cognition. So there is no negative pervasion. And when there is only the negative pervasion, it is the purely negatively concomitant; for example: 'Every cognition is self-manifesting because it is a cognition; what is not self-manifesting cannot be a cognition, for example, a jar.' Here, indeed, since it is

ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशं ज्ञानत्वात्। यस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वं नास्ति तस्य ज्ञानत्वमपि नास्ति यथा घटस्य इति। अत्र हि यस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वं तस्य ज्ञानत्वमप्यस्तीति क्वचिद् दर्शयितुमशक्यत्वाद् अन्वयव्याप्तिर्नास्ति। स चायं केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुरावीतहेतुरिति चोच्यते।

३९. तं च कौमारिलाः प्रायो नेच्छन्ति व्यतिरेकिणम्।
तत्स्थाने चाभिषिञ्चन्ति पञ्चमीं प्रमितिं पुनः॥
क्वचित् प्रसिद्धमन्यत्र साध्यते ह्यनुमानतः।
स्वप्रकाशत्वधर्मो हि सिद्धो नान्यत्र कुत्रचित्॥
तेन तत्साधने पक्षो ह्यप्रसिद्धविशेषणः।
एवं च दुष्टपक्षोऽयं व्यतिरेकी निवार्यताम्॥

not possible to point out anywhere that what is self-manifesting is also a cognition, there is no positive pervasion. And this purely negatively concomitant probans is also called a circumscribed probans.

39. And this negatively concomitant the followers of Kumārila do not ordinarily accept. And in its place they install the fifth variety of valid knowledge.

Indeed, by inference is established somewhere, what must have been already established elsewhere; and what has the attribute of self-manifestation is established nowhere else.

Therefore, in establishing such a one, the subject has a non-established qualification. And in this way, this is a defective subject; let the negatively concomitant be removed.

यच्चानुकूलतर्के सत्यप्रसिद्धविशेषणः ।
न दोष इति भाषन्ते तार्किकास्तदसङ्गतम् ।।
तर्को हि नाप्रसिद्धार्थं क्वचित् साधयितुं क्षमः ।
अतोऽप्रसिद्धतादोषस्तर्के सत्यपि दुस्त्यजः ।।

इति ।

४०. ननु वेद्यत्वं क्वचिदत्यन्तं नास्ति धर्मत्वाद् यथा घटत्वं पटादिषु । इत्यनेनानुमानेन वेद्यत्वविरहरूपे स्वयंप्रकाशत्वे सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धे पुनर्विशेषेण पक्षे साध्यते इति नाप्रसिद्ध-विशेषणत्वं पक्षस्य । तदुक्तम्—

The Logicians declare that when there is a favourable counter-argument, non-established qualification is not a defect; this is not proper.

Indeed a counter-argument can in no case establish an object entirely unknown. Therefore, the defect of 'having non-established qualification' cannot be avoided even when there is a counter-argument.

40. Now, 'cognizability can be absolutely non-existent somewhere, because it is an attribute, like jarness in a cloth, etc.': by means of such an inference, when self-manifestation of the nature of not being the object of a cognition is established in general, it is again inferred in the subject in particular. Thus there is no 'non-established qualification' in the subject. This is said:

सामान्यतोऽनुमानेन प्रसिद्धेऽपि विशेषणे ।
कथं कथय पक्षोऽयमप्रसिद्धविशेषणः ।।

इति ।

४१. अस्तु वा तर्ह्येवम् ।

अत एव चिदानन्दः केवलव्यतिरेकिणम् ।
नैव साक्षान्निराचक्रे नापि साक्षादुपाददे ।।
तस्मात् सामान्यतः सिद्धिहीनाश्चेद् व्यतिरेकिणः ।
सर्वथा वारणीया इत्येतत् तावद् व्यवस्थितम् ।।
इह च स्वप्रकाशत्वे नास्ति सामान्यतोऽनुमा ।
वस्तुत्वादेर्हि धर्मस्य नात्यन्तं नास्तिता क्वचित् ।।

Even when the qualification is established in general by inference, how can—tell me—this subject have a 'non-established qualification'?

41. Or, then, let it be thus:

And for this very reason, Cidānanda does not directly set aside the purely negatively concomitant, nor does he directly accept it.

Therefore, if 'the negatively concomitant' ones are not established in general, they are to be discarded by all means—so is it fixed.

And here, in respect of self-manifestation, there is no inference in general. Indeed, for attributes like thingness, etc. there cannot be absolute non-existence anywhere.

इति ।

४२. अत्र चान्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतोः पञ्च रूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तत्वम् अबाधितविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । तत्र जिज्ञासितसाध्यः पर्वतादिः पक्षः । तन्निष्ठत्वं हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वम् । निश्चितसाध्यो महानसादिः सपक्षः । तत्र वर्तमानत्वं सपक्षे वृत्तित्वम् । निश्चितसाध्याभावो महाह्रदादिर्विपक्षः। तत्र अवर्तमानत्वं विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिः। साध्यस्याबाधितत्वम् अबाधितविषयत्वम् । प्रतिहेत्वभावोऽसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् इति ।

४३. केवलान्वयिनस्तु विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिर्नास्ति विपक्षाभावात् । अतस्तस्य चत्वारि रूपाणि । केवलव्यतिरेकिणः सपक्षे

42. Of these, 'the positively and negatively concomitant' probans has five aspects, namely being the attribute of the subject, existence in the co-subject, non-existence in counter-subjects, non-sublation of its sphere, and having no counter-probans. Here, the subject is the mountain, etc. where the probandum is sought to be known. Existence of the probans there is 'being the attribute of the subject'. The co-subject is the kitchen, etc. where the probandum has been ascertained. To be there is 'existence in the co-subject'. The counter-subject is the big lake, etc. where the non-existence of the probandum has been ascertained. Not to be there is 'non-existence in the counter-subject'. Non-sublation of the probandum is 'non-sublation of its sphere'. Non-existence of an opposite probandum is 'having no counter-probans'.

43. But the 'purely positively concomitant' can have no non-existence in the counter-subject, as there is no

सत्त्वं नास्ति सपक्षाभावात् । यदि तु सपक्षे सत्यपि पक्षमात्रवृत्तिर्हेतुः स्यात् तर्ह्यसाधारणो नाम हेत्वाभास एव स्यात् । यथा नित्या भूः गन्धवत्त्वाद् इति । अत्र हि नित्यत्वेन सपक्षभूतानामाकाशानां सद्भावेऽपि भूमात्रवृत्ति गन्धवत्त्वम् । अतः असति सपक्षे पक्षमात्रवृत्तिः केवलव्यतिरेकी इति लक्षयन्ति तार्किकाः ।

पक्षमात्रस्थितं सिध्येत् पक्षमात्रस्थहेतुना ।
अन्यत्र स्थितमाक्रष्टुं तद्गतस्यैव पाटवम् ।।

इति । अतः सपक्षे सत्त्वाभावाच्चतूरूप एव व्यतिरेकी । तत्सिद्धं द्वैविध्यं त्रैविध्यं च अनुमानस्य ।

counter-subject. Therefore its aspects are four. The 'purely negatively concomitant' can have no existence in the co-subject, as there is no co-subject. But even when there is a co-subject, if the probans exists only in the subject, then there is even the fallacy of the probans called the 'non-common'. For example 'Earth is eternal, because it has smell'; here indeed, even though there are ether, etc. which being eternal are co-subjects, smell exists only in earth. Therefore the Logicians define the 'purely negatively concomitant' to be that which exists only in the subject, while there is no co-subject.

> What exists only in the subject can be proved by a probans that exists only in the subject. To draw in what exists elsewhere, only what exists there has the power.

Therefore, since there is no existence in the co-subject, the purely negatively concomitant has only four aspects. Therefore it is established that inference is twofold or threefold.

४४. तच्च पुनरपि द्वेधा दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं चेति । तत्र—

दृष्टैकव्यक्तिविषयं दृष्टमिष्टं हि मादृशाम् ।
कृत्तिकोदयमालक्ष्य रोहिण्यनुमितिर्यथा ।।
एवं सामान्यतो व्याप्तिदृष्टया यत्रानुमीयते ।
तद्धि सामान्यतो दृष्टं यथा वह्न्यनुमादिकम् ।।

४५. तार्किकादयस्तु प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थविषयमग्न्याद्यनुमानं दृष्टम् अतीन्द्रियार्थविषयं चक्षुराद्यनुमानं सामान्यतो दृष्टम् इत्याहुः।

४६. तदयुक्तम् । अतीन्द्रियार्थानामनुमातुमशक्यतया चक्षुरादीनामप्यर्थापत्त्यैव साध्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि—

44. That is again twofold, namely ' the seen ' and ' the generically seen '.

That whose content is only the particular seen object, is ' the seen one ', according to those of my way of thinking. For example, by seeing Kṛttikā rise, there is the inference of Rohiṇī.

Similarly, when there is the inference on seeing the pervasion in general, that is ' the generically seen '. For example, there is the inference of fire, etc.

45. The Logicians and others however say that ' the seen ' is the inference of fire, etc. whose content is a perceptible object and ' the generically seen' is where the content is a supersensuous object like the sense-organs.

46. This does not stand to reason. Because, since it is impossible to infer objects that are supersensuous, the sense

व्याप्त्यैकशरणं तावदनुमानमिति स्थितम् ।
तद्व्याप्तिदर्शितान्मार्गाच्चलितुं क्षमते कुतः ॥
ततश्च व्याप्तिविज्ञाने यादृशं वस्तु विद्यते ।
तादृगेवानुमातव्यं यथोष्णो भास्वरोऽनलः ॥
न चातीन्द्रियवस्तूनां प्राग्दृष्टाकारयोगिता ।
दृश्यत्वं तेजसां दृष्टं चक्षुषस्तदसंभवात् ॥
अत एव हि सर्वत्राप्यत्यन्तादृष्टसाधने ।
विशेषबाधकं नाम दोषं घोषयितास्महे ॥

of sight, etc. are established only by presumption. It is thus:

Now, inference depends solely on pervasion —this stands. How can it be shaken from the path shown by pervasion?

And, therefore, that nature of the object which is perceived in the knowledge of the pervasion, that alone may be inferred, like 'The fire is hot and bright'.

And supersensuous things are not associated with forms seen before. Visibility is seen for fire. For the sense of sight it is not possible.

And therefore in all cases of establishing what is absolutely unseen, we will proclaim a defect called 'the particular-sublater'.

तस्माद् रूपादिसंदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्तितः ।
चक्षुराद्याः प्रसाध्यन्ते न तेष्वनुमितिर्मता ।।

इति ।

४७. तच्चानुमानं स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेनापि द्विविधमाहुः । यत्र स्वयमेव धूमादिकं दृष्ट्वा व्याप्त्यादिनिरूपणेनानुमीयते तत् स्वार्थम् ।

यदा पुनः स एवार्थः परवाक्येन बोध्यते ।
तदा परार्थमित्याहुस्तयोरेतावती भिदा ।।

४८. तत्र परार्थानुमानवाक्यं पञ्चावयवमिति तार्किकाः—प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । यथा अयं पर्वतोऽग्नि-

> Therefore, because there is no other explanation for the sight of colour, etc. the sense of sight, etc. are established; but in respect of them inference is not accepted.

47. This inference is again spoken of as twofold, being divided into 'what is for oneself' and 'what is for another'. Where fire, etc. is inferred for oneself after seeing smoke, etc. through the ascertainment of pervasion, etc. that is 'for oneself'.

> When again that same object is known through the words of another, then it is said to be 'for another'. This much is the difference between the two.

48. Of these, the Logicians say that the statement of of inference for another has five members; the premise, the reason, the example, the application and the conclusion are

मान् । धूमवत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः । धूमवांश्चायम् । तस्मादग्निमानेव इति । अत्र परं बोधयितुं पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा पर्वतोऽग्निमान् इति । साधनत्वावेदकं लिङ्गवचनं हेतुः धूमवत्त्वाद् इति । व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपुरःसरं दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणं यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इति । सिद्धव्याप्तिकस्य पक्षे उपनयनमुपनयः धूमवांश्चायम् इति । सहेतुकं पक्षस्य पुनर्वचनं निगमनं तस्मादग्निमान् इति ।

४९. अत्र ब्रूमः—

प्रतिज्ञया निगमनं हेतुनोपनयस्तथा ।
गतार्थं इति कः कुर्यात् पञ्चावयवघोषणम् ।।

the members. For example: this mountain has fire; because it has smoke; whatever has smoke has fire, like the kitchen; and this has smoke; therefore it certainly has fire. Of these, the statement of the subject for the information of another is the premise: 'The mountain has fire'. The statement of the probans, which makes known its instrumentality, is the reason: 'because it has smoke'. The statement of the instance after pointing out the pervasion is the example: 'Whatever has smoke has fire, like the kitchen.' The application to the subject of what is established as having the pervasion is the application: 'and it has smoke'. The statement again of the subject, along with the reason is the conclusion: 'therefore it has fire'.

49. Here we say:

By the premise, the purpose of the conclusion and by the reason that of the application are served; so who would proclaim five members?

तस्मात् त्र्यवयवं ब्रूमः पौनरुक्त्यासहा वयम् ।
उदाहरणपर्यन्तं यद्वोदाहरणादिकम् ।।

५०. सौगतास्त्वाहुः। यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः। धूमवांश्चायम्। इत्येतावदुक्तौ तस्मादग्निमान् इति अर्थात् सिध्यति। अत उदाहरणोपनयौ द्वावेवावयवौ इति। तदपि साध्यांशे अध्याहारदोषप्रसङ्गादपास्तम्।

तदेवं पौनरुक्त्येन तथाध्याहारदोषतः ।
तर्कबौद्धमते हित्वा वयं त्र्यवयवे स्थिताः ।।

५१. तत्रोदाहरणान्तं यथा। पर्वतोऽग्निमान्। धूम-

Therefore we, unable to put up with repetition, speak of three members, either ending with the example, or beginning with the example.

50. The Buddhists however say: 'What has smoke has fire, like the kitchen; and this has smoke—by saying this much, it is established by implication that therefore it has fire. Therefore there are only two members, namely example and application.' This too is discarded, because it will result in the defect of the probandum element having to be imported.

Therefore in this way, discarding the views of the Logicians and the Buddhists, owing to the defects of repetition and of importation, we take our stand on the three members.

51. There when it ends with the example, it is like: 'The mountain has fire, becase it has smoke; whatever has

वत्त्वात् । यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः इति । उदाहरणादिकं यथा । यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः । धूमवांश्चायम् । तस्मादग्निमान् इति ।

५२. अथ प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोश्च दृष्टान्तस्य च दूषणम् ।
क्रमेण कथ्यतेऽस्माभिर्यद् वेद्यं वादिनां पुरः ॥

तत्र परप्रतिपादनार्थं पक्षवचनं हि प्रतिज्ञा । जिज्ञासितधर्मविशिष्टश्च पक्ष इत्युक्तम् । ततश्च तद्रूपपरिच्छेदात् तद्विपरीतपरिच्छेदाद्वा अन्यत्राप्रसिद्धत्वाद्वा यो न जिज्ञासितो धर्मः तद्विशिष्टस्य न पक्षत्वम् इति सिद्धविशेषणो बाधितविशेषणोऽप्रसिद्धविशेषणश्च पक्षाभासा एवेति तदावेदकं वचनमपि प्रतिज्ञा-

smoke has fire, for example, the kitchen.' When it begins with the example, it is like: 'Whatever has smoke has fire, for example the kitchen; and this has smoke; so it has fire.'

52. Then the defects of the premise and the reason, and of the example are dealt with by us in order, those having to be understood by disputants in advance.

Here, the premise is the statement of the subject for the information of another. And the subject, it has been stated, is that which is qualified by the attribute sought to be known. And therefore, because of determination in that form, or determination in the opposite form, or because of non-establishment elsewhere, when the attribute does not become one desired to be known, then what is qualified by such an attribute is not a subject; and so, what has an established attribute or what has a sublated attribute or what has a

भास एव। तद्यथा। वह्निरुष्ण इति सिद्धविशेषणः। वह्निरनुष्ण इति बाधितविशेषणः। क्षित्यादिकं सर्वज्ञकर्तृकम् इत्यप्रसिद्धविशेषणः घटादिषु क्वचिदपि सर्वज्ञकर्तृकत्वस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्।

५३. बाधकप्रमाणभेदेन बाधितविशेषणत्वावान्तरविशेषो द्रष्टव्यः। तत्र वह्निरनुष्ण इति प्रत्यक्षबाधः पूर्वमुक्तः। अनुमानस्यापि यदा प्रबलत्वं स्पष्टं भवति तदानुमानबाधः। यथा मन इन्द्रियं न भवति अभूतात्मकत्वाद् दिगादिवद् इति। अत्र इन्द्रियत्वेन मनसोऽनुमीयमानत्वाद् मनोधर्मिग्राहकेणैवानुमानेन तस्यानिन्द्रियत्वं बाधितम्। एवं शीघ्रभाविनामनुमानानां सर्वत्र बाधकत्वं द्रष्टव्यम्।

non-established attribute is only a fallacious subject; and thus the proposition that states it is only a fallacious premise. It is thus: 'Fire is hot' has its attribute established; 'Fire is not hot' has its attribute sublated; 'Earth, etc. has an omniscient creator' has its attribute non-established, because nowhere else, as in a jar, etc. has been established an omniscient creator.

53. According to the differences in the sublating means of valid knowledge, one has to understand the subdivisions of 'having sublated attributes'. Of these, in 'Fire is not hot' sublation by perception has been given above. When another inference is found to be clearly stronger, then there is sublation by inference. For example 'Mind cannot be a sense-organ, because it is not of the nature of an element, like space, etc.' Here, since mind is inferred to be a sense-organ by the very inference which apprehends the thing

५४. शाब्दबाधो यथा । यागादयः स्वर्गसाधनं न भवन्ति क्रियात्वाद् गमनवद् इति । अत्र 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादि-वाक्यैर्यागादेः स्वर्गसाधनत्वबोधनात् तदभावः शाब्दबाधितः । यथा वा । स्पृश्यं नरास्थि प्राण्यङ्गत्वात् शङ्खवद् इति ।

५५. गौर्गवयसदृशो न भवति प्राणित्वात् पुरुषवद् इत्य-त्रोपमानबाधः । देवदत्तो बहिर्नास्ति तत्रादृश्यमानत्वाद् इत्यत्रार्था-पत्तिबाधः अर्थापत्त्या बहिरभावस्य बाधितत्वात् । रूपवान् वायुः द्रव्यत्वात् पृथिवीवद् इत्यत्रानुपलम्भबाधः । अन्येऽपि प्रतिज्ञादोषाः सन्ति ।

called mind, its being a non-sense-organ is sublated. Similarly all inferences that come up more quickly must in all cases be considered as sublating.

54. Sublation by Authority is like this: 'Sacrifice, etc. cannot be the means to heaven, since they are actions, like walking.' Here, since sacrifices, etc. are known to be means to heaven from texts like 'One desiring heaven must sacrifice', the absence of instrumentality is sublated by Authority. Or it may be like: 'Human bone is touchable, because it is part of a living being, like a conch.'

55. There is sublation by Analogy in 'A cow cannot be like a *gavaya*, because it is a living being like a man'. There is sublation by Presumption in 'Devadatta is not outside, because he is not seen there'; because, that he is not outside is sublated through Presumption. There is sublation by Negation in 'Air has colour, because it is a substance, like earth'. There are also other defects of the premise

यावज्जीवमहं मौनीत्युक्तौ हि स्वोक्तिबाधनम् ।
नेन्दुश्चन्द्रगिरा वाच्य इति लोकविरुद्धता ॥
शब्दादेः प्रागनित्यत्वमुक्तं येनैव तेन तु ।
नित्यत्वे पुनरुक्ते स्यात् पूर्वसंजल्पबाधनम् ॥

इति ।

५६. व्याप्तः साधनधर्मो हेतुः । असिद्धो विरुद्धोऽनैकान्तिकोऽसाधारणश्चेति चत्वारस्तदाभासाः । तत्रासिद्ध उच्यते ।

हेतोर्व्याप्तिमतः पक्षसंबन्धित्वेन वेदनम् ।
सिद्धिरित्युच्यते हेतुसंपूर्तिस्तावतैव हि ॥

'All my life I have been silent': when a man says so, there is sublation by his very words. 'The moon is not expressed by the word "moon": this is opposed to the world.'

If by him who has affirmed the non-eternality of sound before, its eternality be subsequently affirmed, then there is sublation by previous statement.

56. The pervaded which is the instrumental attribute, is the probans. Its fallacies are four, namely the non-established, the contradictory, the non-conclusive, and the non-common. Among them, the non-established is described:

The knowledge of the pervaded probans as related to the subject is what is called establishment; with this much alone, indeed, there is the perfection of the probans.

तेषामेकतमांशस्याप्यभावे स्यादसिद्धता ।
हेतोर्व्याप्तेश्च पक्षस्य संबन्धस्य ग्रहस्य च ।।

तत्र हेतुस्वरूपस्यैवासिद्धौ स्वरूपासिद्धिः । यथा बुद्धो मोहरहितः सर्वज्ञत्वाद् इत्यत्र सर्वज्ञत्वं नाम नास्माकं क्वचित् सिद्धम् । अस्य विशेषणासिद्धो विशेष्यासिद्ध इति च द्वौ भेदौ भवतः । आद्यो यथा बुद्धो धर्मोपदेष्टा सर्वज्ञत्वे सति शरीरित्वाद् इति । अन्यस्तु शरीरित्वे सति सर्वज्ञत्वाद् इति ।

५७. व्याप्त्यभावे व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । यथा क्रतुहिंसा अधर्मः हिंसात्वाद् इति । अत्र सोपाधिकत्वाद् व्याप्त्यभावः ।

If there is the absence of any one of these elements, there will be non-establishment; it may be of the probans, of the pervasion, of the subject, of the relation thereto, and the apprehension thereof.

Of these, when the very existence of the probans is not established, there is 'the non-establishment of existence'. For example: 'Buddha is free from delusion, because he is omniscient.' Here what is called omniscience is not, so for as we are concerned, established anywhere. This has two varieties, non-establishment of the attribute and non-establishment of the substrate. The first is like this: 'Buddha is the teacher of the Law, because, while he is omniscient, he has a body.' But the other is like: 'Because, while he has a body, he is omniscient.'

57. When there is no pervasion, there is 'the non-establishment of being pervaded'. For example: 'Cruelty

५८. पक्षाभावे त्वाश्रयासिद्धः। यथा गगनकुसुमं सुरभि कुसुमत्वाद् इति।

५९. हेतोः पक्षसंबन्धाभावे संबन्धासिद्धः। यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः चाक्षुषत्वाद् इति। यस्य तु पक्षैकदेशे संबन्धो नास्ति स भागासिद्धः। स एव पक्षव्याप्त्यभावाद् व्याप्त्यसिद्ध इति च क्वचिदुच्यते। यथा वेदाः पौरुषेयाः उपाख्यानात्मकत्वाद् इति। यदा तु विशेषणस्य विशेष्यस्य वा पक्षसंबन्धो नास्ति तदा विशेषणासिद्धविशेष्यासिद्धौ भवतः। यथा अनित्यं गगनं जन्यत्वे सति द्रव्यत्वाद् इति। द्रव्यत्वे सति जन्यत्वाद् इति च। यत्र तु विशेषणं व्यावर्त्याभावाद् व्यर्थमेवेति संबन्धानर्हं भवति स व्यर्थविशेषणा-

in sacrifice is a vice, because it is cruelty. Here, since there is an extraneous adjunct, there is no pervasion.

58. Where there is no subject, there is 'the non-establishment of the base.' For example: 'The sky-flower is fragrant, because it is a flower.'

59. When the probans has no relation to the subject, there is 'non-establishment of the relation'. For example: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.' Where, however, the absence of the relation is in a part of the subject, there is partial non-establishment. This same is sometimes called 'non-establishment of the pervasion', because there is no pervasion of the subject. For example: 'Veda-s are human productions, because they are of the nature of stories.' Where, however, the absence of relation with the subject is in respect of either the attribute or the substrate, then there is non-establishment of the attribute or non-establishment of the substrate. For example: 'Ether is non-eternal, because

सिद्धः। यथा घटोऽनित्यः द्रव्यत्वे सति कृतकत्वाद् इति। एवं कृतकत्वे सति द्रव्यत्वादिति व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धः। यदा तु हेतुः पक्षसंबन्धित्वेन न प्रयुज्यते किंतु आश्रयान्तरसंबन्धित्वेन तदा व्यधिकरणासिद्धः। यथा अनित्यो घटः तद्गुणस्य कृतकत्वाद् इति। अत्र न घटाश्रितं कृतकत्वं किं तु तद्गुणाश्रितम् इति व्यधिकरणासिद्धः। यत्र पक्षाद्व्यतिरेकाभावेन पक्षसंबन्धित्वं नास्ति स व्यतिरेकासिद्धः। यथा अनित्यं गगनं गगनत्वाद् इति। अत्र

while it is producible, it is a substance'; or 'because while it is a substance, it is producible'. Where, however, the attribute is not fit for relation, being futile, as there is nothing to exclude, it is non-establishment through a futile attribute. For example: 'Jar is non-eternal because while it is a substance, it is produced'; similarly, 'because while it is produced, it is a substance' is non-establishment through a futile substrate. Where, however, the probans is not given as related to the subject, but as related to another base, there is non-establishment through a different basis. For example: 'Jar is non-eternal, because its quality is produced.' Here being produced does not exist in the jar but in its quality; so it is non-establishment through a different basis. Where the probans has no relation to the subject, not being different from it, there is non-establishment of difference. For example: 'Ether is non-eternal, because it has etherness.' Here, there is nothing called etherness distinct from the existence of the ether. In the absence of the knowledge of their existence, etc. there is non-establishment through non-knowledge or non-establishment through doubt. For example: 'Devadatta will become very rich, because he has the unseen merit which is the cause thereof.' Here, there is no means of

गगनस्वरूपादन्यद् गगनत्वं नाम नास्ति इति। एषां स्वरूपादीनामज्ञानेऽज्ञानासिद्धः संदिग्धासिद्धो वा भवति। यथा देवदत्तो बहुधनो भविष्यति तद्धेतुभूतादृष्टशालित्वाद् इति। अत्र तादृशादृष्टसद्भावे प्रमाणं नास्तीत्यज्ञातत्वम्। एवम् अग्निमान् पर्वतः धूमवावाद् इत्येतावत्प्रयोगेऽनुपदर्शितव्याप्तिकत्वाद् व्याप्त्यज्ञानासिद्धः। एवमेव संदिग्धविशेषणासिद्धादयोऽप्यज्ञातासिद्धभेदा ऊहितव्याः।

६०. तार्किकास्तु पक्षे हेतुस्वरूपाभाव एव स्वरूपासिद्धिरिति संबन्धासिद्धस्य स्वरूपासिद्धत्वमाहुः। तदयुक्तम्। सर्वज्ञत्वादेः स्वरूपमेव क्वचिदपि नास्ति चाक्षुषत्वादेस्तु पक्षसंबन्धमात्रं नास्ति इति पृथक्त्वप्रतीतेः।

knowing such an unseen merit, and so it is unknown. Similarly, 'The mountain has fire, because it has smoke': when only so much is said, since pervasion has not been pointed out, there is non-establishment through the non-knowledge of the pervasion. In the same way, 'non-establishment through doubted attributes', etc. must also be concluded to be varieties of 'non-establishment through non-knowledge'.

60. The Logicians, however, say: 'It is but the non-existence of the probans in the subject that is non-establishment of the existence; so non-establishment of the relation is non-establishment of the existence.' This does not stand to reason. Of omniscience, etc. there is no existence at all anywhere; whereas for visibility, etc. the absence is only of the relation with the subject; thus there is the cognition of difference.

६१. एते चासिद्धभेदाः यदान्यतरस्यैव वादिनोऽसिद्धा भवन्ति तदान्यतरासिद्धा इत्युच्यन्ते। तत्र बुद्धो मोहरहितः सर्वज्ञत्वाद् इत्युक्तोऽस्माकमेवासिद्धः। एवमुभयोरप्यसिद्धौ उभयासिद्धता वेदितव्या। यथा शशो हिंस्रः विषाणित्वाद् इति।

६२. अथ विरुद्धः।

स च बाधक इत्येवं वार्त्तिके व्यपदिश्यते।
द्विधा चासौ स्वरूपस्य विशेषस्य च बाधनात्॥

तत्र साध्यविपरीतव्याप्तः साध्यस्वरूपविरुद्धः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वाद् इति। अत्र नित्यत्वविपरीतेन अनित्यत्वेन व्याप्तं

61. And these varieties of non-establishment are called 'non-established for either party', if they are non-established only for one or the other of the parties. Here, in what has been said: 'Buddha is free from delusion, because he is omniscient' there is non-establishment only for us. Similarly, if there is non-establishment for both it must be understood as 'non-establishment for both'. For example: 'The hare is dangerous, because it has horns.'

62. Now the 'contradictory.'

> And this has been termed 'the sublater' in the *Vārttika*; and this is of two kinds, according as it sublates existence as such or a particular form of it.

Here, what is pervaded by the opposite of the probandum is 'the contradictory of the existence of the probandum'. For example: 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced.' Here, being produced is pervaded by non-eternality, which

कृतकत्वम् इति नित्यत्वं प्रति विरुद्धत्वात् तस्य बाधकं भवति । साध्यविशेषस्य विपरीतेन विशेषेण व्याप्तो विशेषविरुद्धः । यथा क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् इति । अत्र साध्यस्य क्षित्यादिकर्तुरशरीरित्वं नाम विशेषः । तस्य विपरीतेन शरीरित्वरूपेण विशेषेण व्याप्तं घटादिषु कार्यत्वं दृष्टम् इत्यशरीरित्वस्य बाधकं भवति ।

अशरीरित्वबाधे च कर्तृमत्तापि बाध्यते ।
प्रत्यक्षात् सशरीरित्वविशेषे बाधिते सति ॥
अशरीरित्वमादाय स्थास्यामीति कृतोद्यमा ।
कर्तृमत्ता हि तस्यापि बाधे नश्येन्निराश्रया ॥

is the opposite of eternality; and thus being contradictory to eternality, it becomes its sublater. What is pervaded by a particular opposite of a particular probandum is 'the contradictory of a particular'. For example: 'Earth, etc. have a creator, because they are effects like a jar.' Here, of the probandum, 'the creator of earth, etc.' not having a body is a particularity. In jar, etc. effectness is seen as pervaded by its opposite, namely the particularity consisting in having a body; and so it becomes a sublater of not having a body.

When there is the sublation of not having a body, there is the sublation of being a creator also. When the particularity of having a body is sublated by perception,

The property of having a creator makes an effort saying, 'I will stand accepting the absence of a body'; indeed, it has to perish, not having a support when that too is sublated.

इत्थं साध्यनिरोधित्वादेष दूषणमेव नः ।
तमीदृशमजानद्भ्यस्तार्किकेभ्योऽयमञ्जलिः ।।

६३. सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । विपक्षेऽपि वर्तमान इति यावत् । स एव साधारण इति चोच्यते । यथा अनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वाद् इति । अत्र हि प्रमेयत्वं नित्येष्वपि वर्तत इत्यनैकान्तिकम् । यत्र तु विपक्षवृत्तित्वं संदिग्धं स संदिग्धानैकान्तिकः । यथा क्षणिका भावाः सत्त्वाद् इत्यत्र अक्षणिकत्वेऽपि सत्त्वस्य बाधाभावाद् विपक्षवृत्तिः शङ्किता भवति । सति सपक्षे पक्षमात्रवृत्तिरसाधारणः । यथा नित्या भूः गन्धवत्त्वाद् इति ।

Thus, since it arrests the probandum, it is certainly a defect in our view. To the Logicians who do not understand this as of this nature, here is salutation.

63. The inconstant is 'the non-conclusive'; that means, what exists in the counter-subject also. This itself is termed 'the common'. For example: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' Here, indeed, knowability exists in eternals also; so it is non-conclusive. Where existence in a counter-subject is suspected it is 'suspected non-conclusive'. For example: 'Positive things are momentary, because they are existent.' Here, since there is no sublation of existence even in the case of the non-momentary, existence in the counter-subject becomes suspected. When there is a co-subject, what exists only in the subject is 'non-common'. For example: 'Earth is eternal, because it has smell.'

६४. केचित् पुनराहुः। असाधारणोऽपि अनैकान्तिक एव। यथा खल्वन्वयस्य विपक्षेऽपि वर्तनात् प्रमेयत्वस्य व्यभिचारित्वम् एवं व्यतिरेकस्यापि स्वस्थानभूतं विपक्षमतिक्रम्य सर्वेषु सपक्षेष्वपि वर्तनाद् गन्धवत्त्वस्यापि व्यभिचारित्वमस्ति इति।

६५. सत्यं किंत्वन्वयस्यैव स्वस्थानादतिलङ्घनम्।
व्यभिचारतया ख्यातं क्लिष्टस्त्वदुदितः क्रमः॥
तेन साधारणस्यैव व्यभिचारित्वमीरितम्।
हेत्वाभासान्तरत्वेन चासाधारण ईरितः॥
यद्वा त्वदुक्तमार्गेण तस्यापि व्यभिचारतः।
अनैकान्तिकतैवास्तु नास्माकं काचन क्षतिः॥

64. Others again say: even 'the non-common' is only 'the non-conclusive'. Just as knowability is inconstant because positive concomitance exists even in the counter-subject, similarly smell too is inconstant, because negative concomitance exists in all co-subjects too, passing beyond the counter-subjects, which form its legitimate place.

65. True; but it is only in the case of the positively concomitant that going beyond its place is known as inconstancy; and the way you have stated is strained.

Therefore only 'the common' is called the inconstant; and the 'non-common' is called a separate fallacy of the probans.

Or, in the way you have stated, for that too let there be non-conclusiveness alone, because of inconstancy; there is no harm so far as we are concerned.

तस्मात् त्रेधा चतुर्धा वा हेत्वाभासा व्यवस्थिताः।
पञ्चधा तार्किकाः प्राहुः षोढान्ये तदसङ्गतम् ॥

६६. असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदेन पञ्चधा इति तार्किकाः। अप्रयोजकः षष्ठ इति केचित्। अनध्यवसित एव षष्ठ इति भासर्वज्ञः।

६७. तत्र प्रतिहेतुमान् हेतुः प्रकरणसमः सत्प्रतिपक्ष इति चोच्यते। यथा अप्रत्यक्षो वायुः अरूपवत्त्वाद् मनोवत्। प्रत्यक्षो वायुः स्पर्शवत्त्वाद् घटवद् इति।

६८. सोऽयमुक्तेष्वेवान्तर्भावयितव्यः। तथाहि। तुल्यबलं विरुद्धहेतुद्वयं तावन्न संभवति। तथा सति एकस्यैव वस्तु-

Therefore, fallacies of the probans are established as either threefold or fourfold. The Logicians speak of it as fivefold, and others as sixfold; this is not right.

66. The Logicians speak of it as of five kinds, namely the non-established, the contradictory, the non-conclusive, the similar to the context, and the discarded due to lapse of time. Some speak of the non-efficient as the sixth. Bhāsarvajña says that the sixth is but the non-determined.

67. Of these the probans having a counter-probans is called 'similar to the context', and 'having an opponent'. For example: 'Air is non-perceptible, because it has no colour, like the mind; air is perceptible, because it has touch, like a jar.'

68. This one has to be included in those which have been already explained. It is thus: There cannot possibly

नोऽनुमानद्वयबलप्रापितविरुद्धरूपद्वयप्रसङ्गात् । प्रबलदुर्बलयोर्विरोधे दुर्बलस्य प्रबलापहृतविषयत्वेन बाधितविशेषणत्वाभिधं पक्षदूषणमेवेदम् । किं हेत्वाभासान्तरकथया ।

६९. ननु हेत्वोर्विशेषानवगमवेलायाम् आभिमानिकतुल्यबलत्वसंभवात् तादात्मिकं प्रकरणसमत्वम् ।

७०. मैवम् । तदापि बाधितविशेषणत्वस्य संदेहावस्थैव भवतु । न तु जात्यन्तरमन्वेषणीयम् । अन्यथा संदिग्धासिद्धादीनामपि अन्यत्वं स्यात् ।

be a pair of probans of equal strength; if it could be so, it would follow that the very same object has two opposite natures, brought about by the force of the two inferences. If there is conflict between a stronger and a weaker, the content of the weaker will be removed by the stronger, and this defect is but the defect of the subject called 'the sublation of the attribute'. Why should it be called a separate fallacy of the probans?

69. Now, at the time when the distinct natures of the two probans are not known, there is the possibility of equal strength imposed by conceit and it is in such a case that there is 'similarity to the context'.

70. This is not so. Even in this case, there may be merely the state of doubt regarding the sublation of the attribute. It is not necessary to go in for a new variety. Otherwise even the doubted, the non-established, etc. would become distinct fallacies.

७१. अथवा संशयहेतुरनैकान्तिकः इति अनैकान्तिकस्य लक्षणमाश्रीयते। साधारणधर्मादसाधारणधर्माद्विप्रतिपत्तेश्च संशयो भवति। यथा साधारणाद् ऊर्ध्वत्वात् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा इति। असाधारणाच्च गन्धवत्त्वात् पृथिवी नित्या अनित्या वा इति। वादिविप्रतिपत्तेश्च शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यो वा इति। तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिहेतुकः संशयः प्रतिसाधनप्रयोगे प्राप्त इति अनैकान्तिकेष्वेव प्रकरणसमोऽन्तर्भावयितव्यः।

७२. तस्य चास्य सप्रतिसाधनस्य एकेनैव हेतुना प्रतिकूलसाधने विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी नाम अवान्तरजातिः। यथा क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् इत्यत्र क्षित्यादिकमीश्वरकर्तृकं

71. Or, the definition of 'the non-conclusive' is taken as: a doubted probans is non-conclusive. Doubt arises out of common attributes, non-common attributes and conflict. For example: from the common attribute of erectness, there is doubt whether it is a post or a man; from the non-common smell, whether earth is eternal or non-eternal; and from conflict between the disputants, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal. Of these, doubt with conflict as cause results from the application of the counter-probans, and hence 'the similar to the context' has to be included in 'the non-conclusives' alone.

72. And of this 'having a counter-probans', if the opposite is established by the same probans, there is the sub-division called 'the contradictory non-inconstant'. For example: 'Earth, etc. have a creator, because they are effects like a jar.' Here, 'Earth, etc. cannot have God as creator, because they are effects like a jar'. Here indeed, effectness,

न भवति कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् इति। अत्र हि कार्यत्वं घटादिषु सकर्तृकत्वेन ईश्वरकर्तृकत्वाभावेनापि अव्यभिचरितम्। ईश्वर-कर्तृकत्वाभावश्च सकर्तृकत्वमुखेन ईश्वरं साधयतां तेषां विरुद्ध एवेति विरुद्धाव्यभिचारित्वं कार्यत्वस्य।

एवं परोदितैरेव पक्षहेतुनिदर्शनैः।
विरुद्धसाधनेऽस्माकं विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिता॥
सर्वसत्प्रतिपक्षाणां विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिताम्।
कदाचिदूचुराचार्या नत्वमुष्यैव केवलम्॥
चिदानन्देन तु व्यक्तमयमेव तथोच्यते।
यथा तथास्तु नामैतन्नाभासान्तरमत्र नः॥

in the case of the jar, etc. is as much non-inconstant with the absence of having God as creator, as with having a creator. And negation of God as creator is certainly contradictory to those who establish God through effects having a creator; so effectness is 'contradictory non-inconstant'.

Thus according to us, there is 'contradictory non-inconstant', when with the very subject, probans and example stated by the opponent, the contradictory is established.

The Preceptors sometimes declare contradictory non-inconstancy in all cases of having an opponent, not merely in the above-mentioned case;

But it is clearly said by Cidānanda that this alone is so. Be this as it may; for us it is not an independent fallacy.

तत्सिद्धं बाधितविशेषणे अनैकान्तिके वा अन्तर्भूतं सप्रतिसाधनत्वं नाम दूषणम् ।

७३. भासर्वज्ञस्तु स्वपक्षपरपक्षसिद्धावपि सरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः इत्युक्त्वा तत्र दुर्लभलब्धमेकमुदाहरणं दर्शयति । यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात् सपक्षवद् इति । अत्र हि शब्दो नित्यः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वाद् इत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यम् इति ।

७४. तदिदमयुक्तम् । इह खलु पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वाद् इत्यस्य अनित्यत्वे साध्ये शब्दघटयोरन्यतरत्वादित्यर्थः । नित्यत्वे तु शब्दाकाशयोरन्यतरत्वादित्यर्थः । अतः कथमेक एव हेतुः पक्षद्वयेऽपि समान इत्युच्यते ।

So is it established that the defect called 'having an opposing ground' is included in 'the sublated attribute' or in 'the non-conclusive'.

73. Bhāsarvajña however, after saying that the probans 'similar to the context' is that which is of the same form whether in the establishment of one's own position or that of the opponent, points out a single example thereof as a rare acquisition, as follows: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is either the subject or the co-subject, like the co-subject.' Here indeed it can also be said: 'Sound is eternal, because it is either the subject or the co-subject.'

74. This does not stand to reason. Here of course the expression, 'because it is either the subject or the co-subject', when non-eternality is the probandum, means 'because it is either sound or jar'; but in the case of eternality,

शब्दसादृश्यमेवात्र विद्यतेऽर्थस्तु भिद्यते ।
तस्माद् विरुद्धधर्माभ्यां व्याप्तिर्नैकस्य संभवेत् ॥
कथं तर्हि भवान् ब्रूते विरुद्धव्यभिचारिणम् ।
सत्यं न साध्यते तत्र साक्षात् साध्यविपर्ययः ॥
सकर्तृकत्वं वदतामिष्टा ह्रीश्वरकर्तृता ।
सैवात्र वार्यतेऽस्माभिस्तेनार्थात् प्रतिकूलता ॥
भवांस्त्वनित्यनित्यत्वे साक्षादेव विरोधिनी ।
एकेन साधयन्नद्य हास्यतामेव यास्यति ॥

इति ।

the meaning is 'because it is either sound or ether'. Therefore how can it be said that one and the same probans is common to both?

Here there is similarity only in words; but the meaning differs. Therefore, of the same thing there cannot be pervasion by two contradictory attributes.

How then does your honour speak of 'contradictory non-inconstant'? True; there the direct opposite of the probandum is not established.

Indeed by those who speak of having a creator, what is intended is that God is the creator. That alone is arrested here by us. Therefore the opposition is by implication.

But your honour establishes by a single means the two directly contradictory things,

७५. यस्तु बाधितविषयापरपर्यायः कालात्ययापदिष्टो नाम हेत्वाभास उक्तः अग्निरनुष्णः अद्रव्यत्वाद् इत्यादिः, सोऽपि बाधितविशेषणो नाम पक्षाभास एव।

७६. ननु नो पक्षदोषानेवानुमन्यामहे वयम्।
पक्षदृष्टान्तदोषाणां हेत्वाभासेषु योजनात्॥

तत्र सिद्धविशेषणे तावत्—

पक्षः खल्वाश्रयो हेतोर्न च निश्चितधर्मवान्।
पक्षत्वं भजते तस्मादाश्रयासिद्धिरेव सा॥

eternality and non-eternality, and certainly courts ridicule now.

75. But what has been given as a fallacy of the probans called 'discarded through lapse of time', which has the other name 'having its content sublated', as for example: 'Fire is not hot, because it is not a substance'—that too is only the fallacy of the subject called 'sublated attribute'.

76. Now, we do not accept at all these defects of the subject; because the defects of the subject and the example are brought within the fallacies of the probans.

Of these, in the case of 'the established attribute'

The subject, of course, is the base of the probans; and what has an established attribute cannot be a subject. Therefore it is only 'the non-establishment of the base.'

तथैव यदि दोषः स्यादप्रसिद्धविशेषणः ।
तदापि पक्षतानाशादाश्रयासिद्धिरुच्यताम् ।।

किंच

किं पक्षदोषैः कथितैरिदानीं
दृष्टान्तदोषा अपि वक्ष्यमाणाः ।
अन्तर्गता एव हि हेतुदोषे
न हेतुदोषादपरोऽस्ति दोषः ।।
तदेवं सर्वदोषेषु हेत्वाभासप्रवेशिषु ।
निःसहायः कथं तिष्ठेत् स बाधितविशेषणः ।।

तस्मादितरदोषवद् बाधितविशेषणोऽपि हेत्वाभासतयैव वक्तव्य इति ।

Similarly when there is the defect of 'non-established attribute' even then since subject-ness is destroyed, let it be said to be 'the non-establishment of the base'.

Further,

What benefit is there in stating the defects of the subject? Now even the defects of the example, that will be stated, are certainly included in the defects of the probans; there is no defect other than the defects of the probans.
Therefore, when all the defects thus come within the defects of the probans, how can this 'sublated attribute' stand without a help?

Therefore like other defects, 'the sublated attribute' also should be stated to be a defect of the probans.

७७. अत्र ब्रूमः ।

आभाससंकरे तावत् पुरः स्फुरितदूषणम् ।
उद्भाव्यमिति सर्वेषां निर्विवादं हि वादिनाम् ।।
ततश्च पक्षवचने दोषः कोऽपि चकास्ति चेत् ।
पक्षस्यैव स वक्तव्यः किं न्यायं नानुमन्यसे ।।
पक्षदुष्टत्वमाश्रित्यैवोक्ता सिद्धविशेषणे ।
त्वयापि ह्याश्रयासिद्धिः किं पुरोभावि तत्र ते ।।
एवं साध्यस्याप्रसिद्धिस्तथा बाधितसाध्यता ।
पक्षोक्तावेव निर्भातीत्युचिता पक्षदोषता ।।

77. To this we say:

When there is an intermixture of fallacies, the defect that shines in the forefront is what is to be taken up—this is incontestible in the case of all disputants.

And therefore, in stating the subject, if any defect appears, that has to be referred to the subject itself. Why can you not accept reason?

Even by you, the non-establishment of the base has been stated in the case of 'the established attribute' only having recourse to the subject being defective. What is it according to you that comes up first there?

Similarly, the non-establishment of the probandum, and in the same way the sublation of the probandum, appear even when the

इत्थं दृष्टान्तदोषाश्च वक्ष्यमाणाः समर्थिताः ।
यो यत्र स्फुरितो दोषः स तस्यैवेति निर्णयात् ।।
नावदत् पक्षदोषादीनक्षपादमुनिः पुरा ।
तद्भक्तिमोहिता मा मा न्याय्यं त्यजत तार्किकाः ।।

इति । तस्माद् बाधितविशेषणः पक्षाभास एवेति न पञ्चमो हेत्वाभासोऽङ्गीकार्य इति ।

७८. ये पुनरनुकूलतर्काभावे हेतोः प्रयोजकत्वं नास्तीति अप्रयोजकं नाम हेत्वाभासान्तरमातिष्ठन्ते तेऽपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धमेव

subject is stated; so it is proper that they are the defects of the subject.

And in this way, the defects of the example that will be stated are justified. Because it is decided that a defect pertains to that alone in which it appears.

The sage Akṣapāda did not mention defects of subject, etc. But being deluded by devotion to him, Logicians, you should not abandon reason.

Therefore, 'the sublated attribute' is only a fallacy of the subject, and so a fifth fallacy of the probans need not be accepted.

78. Those again who bring forward another fallacy of the probans called 'the non-efficient', on the ground that in the absence of a favourable counter-argument, the probans is not efficient, they too consider as such 'the non-establishment of pervasion' alone. In every inference doubts of

तथा मन्यन्ते। सर्वेष्वप्यनुमानेषु अनुकूलतर्कैर्व्यभिचारशङ्काम-पास्य निरुपाधिकत्वं साधनीयम्। ततस्तदभावे निरुपाधिकसंबन्धा-निश्चयाद् व्याप्त्यसिद्धिरेव। सोऽयं व्याप्त्यसिद्धो हेतुः उपाधि-मानिति अन्यथासिद्ध इति अप्रयोजक इति परप्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युप-जीवीति संदिग्धव्याप्तिक इति च व्यपदिश्यते न त्वाभासान्तरम्।

७९. यत्तु भासर्वज्ञेनोक्तम्। साध्यासाधकः पक्षे एव वर्तमानो हेतुः अनध्यवसितः। यथा नित्या भूः गन्धवत्त्वाद् इति। सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वाद् इत्यादि च। तत्रादिमः प्रकारोऽसाधारण एव। सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वाद् इत्यत्र तु सर्वस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् सपक्ष-भूतं विपक्षभूतं वा किंचिन्नास्तीति अन्वयव्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्वा

inconstancy must be removed by means of favourable counter-arguments, and thus absence of extraneous adjuncts must be established. Therefore in their absence, there is no certainty of a relation as free from extraneous adjuncts, and hence there is only non-establishment of pervasion. This probans of ‘non-established pervasion’ is also termed ‘having an extraneous adjunct’, ‘established as otherwise’, ‘non-efficient’, ‘living on the pervasion brought forward by the opponent’, and ‘of doubted pervasion’; but not as a separate fallacy.

79. It has been said by Bhāsarvajña: ‘the probans not establishing the probandum, existing only in the subject, is what is not ascertained; for example: “earth is eternal, because there is smell”; “everything is momentary, because it is existent”, etc.;’ of these, the first variety is only ‘the non-common’. But in ‘everything is momentary, because it is existent’, since ‘everything’ is made the subject, there

न वक्तुं शक्या इति व्याप्त्यसिद्धिरेवेयं न त्वाभासान्तरम्। इत्यास्तां तावत्। तस्मादस्मदुक्तैव हेत्वाभासव्यवस्था इति।

८०. अथ दृष्टान्ताभासाः।

साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिस्थलं हि यत्।
तदुदाहरणं नाम दृष्टान्त इति चोच्यते॥

तद्द्विविधं साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभेदात्। तत्र साधनस्य साध्येनान्वयोपदर्शनं साधर्म्यम्। यथा यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इति। साध्याभावस्य साधनाभावेनान्वयोपदर्शनं वैधर्म्यम्। यथा योऽग्निमान्न भवति नासौ धूमवान् यथा पाथ इति।

is nothing which can become co-subject or counter-subject, and hence it is not possible to state either the pervasion of positive concomitance or the pervasion of negative concomitance. So there is only non-establishment of pervasion; it is not a distinct fallacy. There let it remain. So the fallacies of the probans are but as we have fixed.

80. Now come the fallacies of the example.

> What is called an example is the place where the pervasion between the probandum and the probans is grasped; it is also called an instance.

That is of two kinds, being divided into 'the positively similar' and 'the negatively similar'. Of these positive similarity lies in pointing out the concomitance of the probans with the probandum. For example: 'what has smoke has fire, like a kitchen'. Negative similarity consists in pointing out the concomitance of the absence of the probandum with

८१. साध्यहीनः साधनहीनः उभयहीनः आश्रयहीन इति साधर्म्योदाहरणाभासाश्चत्वारः। तद्यथा। नित्यो ध्वनिः अकारणत्वात्। यदकारणं तन्नित्यम्। इत्यत्र प्रागभाववदिति साध्यहीनः। प्रध्वंसवदिति साधनहीनः। घटवदित्युभयहीनः। नरशृङ्गवदित्याश्रयहीनः। नित्यत्वमत्र अविनाशित्वमेव विवक्षितं न कोटिद्वयराहित्यम्।

८२. वैधर्म्योदाहरणाभासा अपि साध्याव्यावृत्तादयश्चत्वारः। यथा यन्नित्यं न भवति न तदकारणम् इत्यत्र यथा प्रध्वंस इति साध्याव्यावृत्तः। यथा प्रागभाव इति साधनाव्यावृत्तः। यथा गगनमित्युभयाव्यावृत्तः। यथा नरशृङ्गमित्याश्रयहीनः।

the absence of the probans. For example: 'what has not fire, does not have smoke, like water'.

81. Fallacies of the example having positive similarity are four, namely devoid of probandum, devoid of probans, devoid of both, and devoid of base. It is thus: 'Sound is eternal, because it has no cause; what has no cause is eternal.' Here, 'like prior non-existence' is devoid of probandum; 'like destruction' is devoid of probans; 'like a jar' is devoid of both; 'like a man's horn' is devoid of base. Here eternality is used in the sense of non-destructibility, not the absence of the two extremes.

82. Fallacies of the example having negative similarity are also four, namely 'not absent from the probandum', etc. For example: 'What is not eternal is not without a cause'; here, 'like destruction' is not absent from the probandum; 'like prior non-existence' is not absent from the probans;

८३. अत्र चोभयविधोदाहरणेऽपि अव्याप्त्यभिधानं विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानमिति च द्वौ दोषौ। तत्र अग्निमान् पर्वतः धूमवत्त्वाद् यथा महानसः इत्येतावदुक्ते अव्याप्त्यभिधानं यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् इति व्याप्तेरनुक्तत्वात् । तथैव योऽग्निमान्न भवति नासौ धूमवान् इति व्याप्तिमनुक्त्वैव यथा महाह्रदः इत्येतावदुक्तेऽपि अव्याप्त्यभिधानम् ।

८४. यदा तु यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् इति वक्तव्ये योऽग्निमान् स धूमवान् इत्युच्यते तदा विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । तथैव योऽग्निमान्न भवति नासौ धूमवानिति वक्तव्ये यो धूमवान्न भवति नासावग्निमानिति प्रयोगेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् इति ।

'like ether' is not absent from either; 'like a man's horn' is devoid of base.

83. Here in these two kinds of examples, there are the two defects, namely the non-statement of pervasion and the reverse statement of the pervasion. Of these, 'mountain has fire, because there is smoke like kitchen'—if so much is stated, there is the non-statement of pervasion; because, the pervasion, 'what has smoke has fire' is not stated. Similarly, 'what has no fire does not have smoke'—without stating this pervasion, if 'like a great lake' alone is stated, even then there is the non-statement of pervasion.

84. But when what is to be stated is 'what has smoke has fire', if it is stated 'what has fire has smoke', then there is the reverse statement of pervasion. Similarly, when it is to be said 'what has no fire does not have smoke', if it is stated, 'what has no smoke does not have fire', the same is to be seen here also.

अनुमानप्रपञ्चोऽयं बहुभिर्बहुधोदितः ।
चिदानन्दोक्तरीत्या तु मयैवमिह दर्शितः ॥

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४. शब्दः

१. अनुमानतः परस्तादुपमानं वर्णयन्ति तर्कविदः ।
वादिपरिग्रहभूम्ना वयं तु शाब्दं पुरस्कुर्मः ॥
तत्र तावत् पदैर्ज्ञातैः पदार्थस्मरणे कृते ।
असंनिकृष्टवाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दमितीर्यते ॥

These details of inference are dealt with differently by different persons. But here by me it has been thus pointed out in the way stated by Cidānanda.

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4. Authority

1. The Logicians explain Analogy after Inference. But we place Authority earlier, as it is recognized by a greater number of disputants.

Here, then, when through words that are known, there arises the recollection of the meaning of the words, the knowledge of the sense of a sentence, which is not in contact, is called Verbal Testimony (knowledge through Authority).

२. तदिदं शाब्दज्ञानं व्युत्पत्त्यधीनमिति तत्प्रकारमादौ प्रदर्शयामः । बालो हि 'गामानय' 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादिवाक्यानन्तरं प्रवृत्तिं हर्षादिकं वा कस्यचिदुपलभ्य तयोर्बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाद् गवानयनपुत्रजननाद्यर्थबुद्ध्यनन्तरमेवास्य प्रवृत्तिहर्षादिकं जातमिति बुध्यमानः तादृशार्थबुद्धेश्च शब्दानन्तरमेव जातत्वाद् गामानय इत्यादिशब्दस्य गवानयनाद्यर्थबोधकत्वमवबुध्यते । तदा च पिण्डित एव शब्दः पिण्डितस्यैवार्थस्य बोधकतया ज्ञातः । ततश्च 'गां बधान' 'अश्वमानय' इत्यादिप्रयोगान्तरेषु पदान्तरयोगत्यागरूपावापोद्वापौ दृष्ट्वा गोशब्दः सास्नादिमतो वाचकः आनयशब्द आनयनक्रियावाचक इत्यादि पदार्थविवेकमवधारयति ।

2. This verbal cognition depends on learning; therefore the method of this we show in the beginning. A young man, indeed, after statements like, 'Bring the cow', 'A son is born to you', etc. notices an activity or joy, etc. in one, and since these two must have some cognition as antecedent, he understands that the activity, joy, etc. were produced only in sequence to the knowledge of the sense of 'bringing the cow', 'birth of a son', etc.; and since such cognitions of the sense were produced only in sequence to the sound, he recognizes that the sounds, 'bring the cow', etc. convey senses like 'bringing the cow', etc. And at that time, the words taken in one mass are understood as conveying a sense in one mass. And afterwards, in other usages like, 'Tie up the cow,' 'Bring the horse', etc. he sees insertion and deletion in the form of acceptance and rejection of other words, and he ascertains the differentiation of the sense of words such as that the sound 'cow' signifies an object having a

३. तच्च पदैः पदार्थबोधनं शब्दशक्तिजन्यत्वादभिधानमेव इति पार्थसारथिप्रभृतयः। शब्दोऽपि संस्कारोद्बोधनद्वारेणैव पदार्थं बोधयतीति स्मरणमेव पदार्थज्ञानम् इति चिदानन्दादयः।

४. तथा च पदानां प्रत्येकमर्थेषु नियमितानामपि आदितः प्रभृति परिदृष्टमेकविशिष्टार्थज्ञानतात्पर्यं तावदवतिष्ठते। एवं पदार्थज्ञाने स्थिते यत्पुनस्तदनन्तरमेकविशिष्टार्थज्ञानरूपं वाक्यार्थज्ञानं जायते तत् पदैरेव वा पदार्थस्मृतिभिर्वा जन्यते इति चिन्तायां पदानां पदार्थबोधोपक्षीणत्वाद् व्यवहितत्वाच्च पदार्था एव स्व-

dew-lap, etc. the sound 'bring' signifies the action of bringing, and so on.

3. And this conveying of the sense of a word by the word, since it is produced by the capacity of the sound, is only expression: so say Pārthasārathi and others. But a sound indicates the sense of a word only through the channel of rousing up impressions and so the knowledge of the sense of a word is only recollection: so say Cidānanda and others.

4. And as such, for words, though confined to distinct senses, there is fixed even from the beginning the purport, the knowledge of a unitary qualified object. When the knowledge of the sense of words stands thus, the knowledge of the sense of the sentence produced immediately after that in the form of a knowledge of a unitary qualified object—is this produced by the words alone or by the recollection of the sense of the words? In considering this question, since the words are exhausted with conveying the sense of the words, and are also remote, it is only the sense of the words that convey the meaning of the sentence, which is in the form of a relation

संसर्गरूपं वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्ति इत्ययं तावत् तार्किकादिसाधारणः पक्षः ।

५. वयं तु पदार्था लक्षणयैव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः । वाच्यार्थानुपपत्त्या हि लक्षणा भवति । अत्र च पदैः स्मार्यमाणा गवादिपदार्था यद्यन्योन्यान्वयं विना सामान्यरूपा एवावतिष्ठेरन् तर्हि पदानां व्युत्पत्तिसमयावधृतमेकविशिष्टार्थबोधतात्पर्यं विरुध्येत इति सामान्यरूपस्य वाच्यस्यानुपपत्तेरन्योन्यान्वयरूपे विशेषे एव पदार्थाः पर्यवस्यन्ति । ततश्च गौरियमानीयमानैव आनयनं च गोसंबद्धमेव इति परस्परान्वयलाभाद् गवानयनरूपवाक्यार्थसिद्धिः ।

among themselves. Now, this is the view common among the Logicians and some others.

5. But we say that the sense of the words conveys the meaning of the sentence only by secondary implication. Indeed, secondary implication comes in through the non-intelligibility of the expressed meaning. And here, senses like 'cow', etc. recollected by the words, if they should remain in their generic form without mutual syntactical relation, then there would be contradiction of the purport of the words to indicate a unitary qualified object, as determined at the time of learning. And so, since the generic form signified is unintelligible, the meaning of words leads up to the particulars consisting in mutual syntactical relation. And hence, this cow is certainly to be brought, and bringing is certainly related to the cow: on account of this relation of the one to the other, we get the meaning of the sentence consisting in 'bringing the cow'.

तेनात्र पदावगताः पुनः पदार्था मिथोऽन्वयं यान्ति ।
इत्येवमभिहितान्वयसिद्धान्तो दर्शितोऽस्मदादीनाम् ।।
सकलपदान्तरपूर्तावितरपदार्थैः समन्वितं स्वार्थम् ।
सर्वपदानि वदन्तीत्यन्येषामन्विताभिधानमतम् ।।

६. गामानय इति प्रथमश्रवणे हि गवानयनरूपस्यान्वितस्यार्थस्य शब्द एव बोधकतया ज्ञातः । अतस्तदनुसारेण पुनरपि पदानामेवान्वितार्थबोधकत्वं वाच्यं न तु पदार्थानाम् । आवापोद्वापाभ्यां हि पदार्थेषु विविच्यमानेष्वपि तत्र तत्र तैस्तैरन्विता

Therefore, here, the meanings of the words, which are understood from the words, afterwards enter into mutual relation: in this way is shown the doctrine, according to those of my way of thinking, of 'the relation of what are expressed'.

When all the other words are completed, each of the words expresses its own meaning as related to the meanings of the other words: this is the doctrine, according to others, of 'the expression of what are related'.

6. Indeed, on first hearing, 'Bring the cow', it is the expression itself that is understood to convey the related sense in the form of 'bringing the cow'. Therefore in accordance with this, it is of the words themselves that conveying a related sense has to be declared, and not of the word meanings. Indeed, even when the meanings of the words are discriminated through insertion and deletion, in each case, the

एव पदार्था दृष्टा न त्वेकाकिन इति अन्विते स्वार्थे पदानां शक्तिर्न परित्यज्यते ।

७. ननु किं केवलपदार्थबोधः पदेभ्यो नास्त्येव । अस्तीति ब्रूमः । पदानि तावत् पृथक् पदार्थान् स्मारयन्त्येव । न तु तावता विरमन्ति । स्मारितमेव तु स्वं स्वमर्थं पुनरितरपदार्थान्वितत्वेनाभिधायैव विरमन्तीति राद्धान्तः । अतः पदाभिधेय एवान्वितरूपो वाक्यार्थः न तु पदार्थगम्यः । पदार्थगम्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नानामपि पदार्थानामन्वयः स्यात् । न चासौ दृश्यते ।

८. तदिदं गुरुमतं गौरवादेव हेयम् । अस्मन्मते हि

meanings of the words are seen only as related to this or that, not as isolated; so the capacity of the words in respect of their meanings as related is not abandoned.

7. Now, is it that there is no conveying of the isolated sense of the words by the words? We say that there is. Now, words certainly recall their meanings separately; but they do not stop at that. Their respective senses, already recalled, they express again as related to the senses of other words and then alone they stop: this is the final doctrine. Thus the meaning of a sentence in the form of relation is expressed by the words themselves, and is not to be understood from the meanings of the words. And if it were to be understood from the meaning of the words, there would be a relation with the objects even as comprehended by other means of valid knowledge; and this is not seen.

8. This doctrine of the Guru is to be discarded for its prolixity alone. Indeed, in our doctrine, since the meanings

पदार्थानां स्मृतिसिद्धत्वाद् वाक्यार्थस्यापि लक्षणासिद्धत्वात् शक्त्यन्तरकल्पनैव नास्ति इति पदेषु शक्तिकल्पनाप्रस्ताव एव भवतां गौरवमायातम् । किंच पदशक्तितः पदार्थशक्तिरेव लघीयसी । तदा खलु गमनरूपस्यैकस्यैवार्थस्यान्वयबोधकत्वे कल्पिते गमनपर्यायाणामन्येषामपि अन्वयः सिध्यति । पदशक्तौ तु गमनार्थानामनन्तानां पदानां शक्तिः कल्पनीया इति महागौरवम् । एकवाक्ये च सर्वपदैः प्रत्येकमितरान्वितस्वार्थे बोध्यमाने पदे पदे वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययोऽपि बलादापन्न इति कष्टतरमेतद् इति ।

९. यत्तु पदार्थानामन्वयबोधकत्वे प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्ना-

of the words are made out through recollection, and since the meaning of the sentence too is made out by secondary implication, there is no assumption at all of another capacity. So, for you there has resulted prolixity even in connection with the assumption of a capacity in the words. Further, capacity of the sense of words is certainly more in keeping with parsimony than capacity of words. Then, surely, when it is assumed of a single sense in the form of going, that it conveys a relation, there results relation even in the case of others synonymous with 'going'. But if the capacity be in the words, there should be assumed capacity for an infinite number of words having the sense of going: so there is great prolixity. And in a single sentence, if by each word, its own meanings as related to the others, be conveyed, there would inevitably arise the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence in word after word; so this is beset with more difficulties.

9. As for what has been said that if the sense of words conveyed the relation, there would be relation even with the

नामप्यन्वयः स्यादित्युक्तं तत्र ब्रूमः। भवतामपि गां बधान इत्युक्ते विगलितरशनो बन्धनापेक्षोऽपि दृश्यमानस्तुरगो बन्धनेन कथं नान्वयं भजते। तत्र खल्वश्वस्य शब्दप्रतिपन्नत्वाभावादनन्वय इति बलाद् वक्तव्यम्। तथा च तद्वदेव प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नानामपि शब्दप्रतिपन्नत्वाभावादेवानन्वयः सिद्ध इति तत्रापि नास्माकं किंचिदधिकं कल्पनीयम्। तस्मादस्मदुक्त एवान्वयप्रकारो लघीयान् इति।

१०. अत्राकाङ्क्षा च योग्यत्वं संनिधिश्चेति तत्त्रयम्।
वाक्यार्थाविगमे सर्वैः कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते ॥

objects comprehended by other means of valid knowledge, to this we reply: according to you too, when it is said, 'Tie up the cow', how is it that even a horse, seen with its bridle loose and requiring to be tied up, does not come into relation with 'tying up'? Here, surely, since the horse is not comprehended through a word, there is no relation: you will be forced to say so. And, therefore, in the same way, since what have been comprehended through other means of valid knowledge, have not been comprehended through words, for this very reason, non-relation is established. So, there too we have not to assume anything further. Therefore, the mode of relation as explained by us is more in keeping with parsimony.

10. Here, expectancy, compatibility and proximity—these three have been assumed by all as causes in understanding the sense of a sentence.

गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीत्याकाङ्क्षारहितेष्विह ।
अन्वयादर्शनात् तावदाकाङ्क्षा परिगृह्यते ॥
अग्निना सिञ्चतीत्यादावयोग्यानामनन्वयात् ।
योग्यतापि परिग्राह्या संनिधिस्त्वथ कथ्यते ॥

११. शब्दैः संनिहितत्वेन बोधितत्वं हि पदार्थानां संनिधिरित्युच्यते । अतः संनिहितत्वाभावात् शब्दबोधितत्वाभावाच्च द्वेधा संनिध्यभावो भवति । तत्र भिन्नकालोच्चारितयोः गाम् आनय इति पदयोः संनिहितत्वाभावादनन्वयः । गां बधान इत्यत्र बन्धना-

'Cow, horse, man, elephant': here, since they have no mutual expectancy, there is found no syntactical relation; and hence is expectancy accepted.

In cases like, 'One sprinkles with fire', since there can be no syntactical relation among what are incompatible, compatibility too has to be accepted. Then, proximity is explained.

11. To be signified by words in proximity is, indeed, the proximity of the sense of words. Thus non-proximity is of two kinds, because of not being near and because of not being signified by words. Of these, there is no syntactical relation, since there is no nearness between the two words 'cow' and 'bring' uttered at different times. In 'Tie up the cow', simply because the horse seen as requiring to be tied up is not signified by words, there is no syntactical relation. Thus is established the rule that syntactical relation is only for what have been comprehended through words. But

पेक्षस्य दृश्यमानस्य अश्वस्य शब्दबोधितत्वाभावादेवानन्वयः। अतः शब्दप्रतिपन्नानामेवान्वयः इति नियमः सिद्धः। गुरुस्तु बुद्धिसंनिधिमात्रमेव संनिधिं मन्यते न तु शाब्दसंनिधिम्। सोऽपि गां बधान इत्यत्र अश्वस्यानन्वयं वारयितुमशक्नुवन् शाब्दानामेवान्वय इति अकामेनापि अनुमंस्यते इति प्रागुक्तम्।

१२. ननु तत्र वाक्यस्याश्वं प्रति तात्पर्याभावादव तस्यानन्वयोऽस्तु न शाब्दत्वाभावात्। मैवम्। तथा सति अग्निना सिञ्चेद् इत्यादावपि तात्पर्याभावादेव अनन्वय इति योग्यत्वादीनामपि अपरिग्रहप्रसङ्गात्।

तस्मादन्वयसिद्धौ तात्पर्यं न स्वयं क्वचिद्धेतुः।
सामग्र्यन्तरभावे नियमार्थं त्वर्थ्यते पुनस्तदपि॥

the Guru considers as proximity, merely the proximity of cognition, not proximity of words. Even he, unable to prevent syntactical relation of the horse in 'Tie up the cow', admits, though unwillingly, that syntactical relation is only of words; this has been already said.

12. Now, in this case, let the absence of syntactical relation of the horse be due merely to the fact that the sentence has no purport with reference to the horse, not because it is not comprehended through a word. It cannot be so. If it be so, even in cases like, 'One should sprinkle with fire', the absence of syntactical relation may be due to want of purport, and hence there would result the non-acceptance of compatibility, etc.

Therefore in making out syntactical relation, the purport is not in itself a cause.

इति स्थितिः।

एवं गत्यन्तराभावाद् गुरुणापि समाश्रितः।
शब्दानामेव संसर्ग इत्ययं नियमोऽधुना ॥
तेन द्वेधोपकारो नस्तत्रैकः पूर्वमीरितः।
मानान्तरावबुद्धानां नान्वयः स्यादितीदृशः ॥
अन्योऽपि द्वारमित्यादावध्याहारे भविष्यति।
शाब्दस्यैवान्वयार्हत्वाद् द्वारमाव्रियतामिति।
शब्दाध्याहार एव स्यादित्येवं मादृशां मतम् ॥

When the rest of the causal aggregate exists, that too is again required for the sake of restriction.

This is the position.

Thus since there is no other choice, even the Guru has now recognized a rule like this, that only what are brought to mind by words have relation.

Therefore, for us there are two purposes: of these one has already been said, namely that there is no syntactical relation with what are understood through other means of knowledge.

The other too occurs in importation in cases like, 'the door'; since only what are cognized through the mind are capable of syntactical relation, there may be the importation of words alone in the form, 'Let the door be

गुरुस्त्वावरणार्थस्य तत्राध्याहारमिच्छति ।
बुद्धिसंनिधिमात्रेणाप्यन्वेतीति दुराशया ॥
तत्र यद्यवलिप्तोऽयं गुरुर्नाद्यैव शिक्ष्यते ।
अर्थाध्याहृतिरेवेति तर्हि गर्जिष्यति ध्रुवम् ॥

इत्यास्तामेतत् । उक्तस्तावद् वाक्यार्थज्ञानप्रकारः । असंनिकृष्ट-वाक्यार्थज्ञानं च शाब्दमित्युक्तम् । इदमेवागम इति चोच्यते । असंनिकृष्टपदेन च अनुवादानां बाधितार्थानां च वाक्यानाम-प्रामाण्यमुक्तम् ।

closed'. This is the doctrine of those of my way of thinking.

But the Guru is for importing the idea alone of 'closing', in this case, in the false hope that there can be syntactical relation even by the promixity of cognition.

There, if the Guru, who has grown very haughty, is not taught a lesson at least now, then, surely, he will begin to shout that there is the importation of the idea alone.

Let this remain at that. Now has been explained the method of knowing the meaning of a sentence. It has been said that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence which is not in contact, is verbal cognition. And this itself is called Revelation. And by the expression 'which is not in contact', there is stated the non-validity of sentences which are re-statements or whose contents are sublated.

१३. तच्च शाब्दं द्विविधं पौरुषेयमपौरुषेयं च । तत्राप्तवचः पौरुषेयं वेदवचोऽपौरुषेयम् । गुरुस्त्वाह । वैदिकमेव शाब्दमस्ति । पुरुषवचनानि तु वक्त्रभिप्रायानुमापकान्येव न स्वयमेव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्ति शङ्काकुण्ठितशक्तित्वात् । व्युत्पत्तिसमयसिद्धापि शब्दानां बोधकशक्तिर्व्यभिचारबहुलेषु पौरुषेयवचनेषु तदाशङ्कया कुण्ठिता भवति । तत्र च अनेन वक्त्रामुमर्थमवबुध्यैव वाक्यं प्रयुक्तम् इति यावन्नानुमीयते तावदन्यथात्वशङ्का न निवर्तत इति वाक्यमुदास्ते एव । तथा तात्पर्यमपि नरगिरां तद्बुध्यधीनमिति वक्तृबुध्यनुमानं विना तात्पर्यानिश्चयादपि वाक्यमुदास्ते । तस्माद् वक्तृधीस्तावदनुमातव्या । तत्र नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति

13. This verbal cognition is of two kinds, human and superhuman. Of these, the words of a reliable man are human, and the words of scripture are superhuman. But the Guru says: the scriptural alone is verbal cognition. The words of a man, however, simply lead to the inference of the intention of the speaker, and do not convey by themselves the meaning of a sentence; because their capacity is made blunt by doubt. The capacity for significance of words, although established at the time of learning, becomes blunt in the words of men with their profusion of inconstancies, on account of doubts about those inconstancies. And there, so long as it is not inferred that the sentence has been stated by the speaker only after knowing such and such a meaning, doubt regarding its being otherwise does not vanish; and so, one ignores the sentence. Similarly, the purport of the words of men too depends on the cognition thereof. So, without inferring cognition in the speaker, there cannot be the determination of the purport, and for this reason too, one

इति वाक्ये श्रुते पदार्थेषु च पृथक् पृथक् स्मृतेषु अनुमिनोति। एतानि पदानि एतेषां पदार्थानां संसर्गमवबुध्यैव प्रयुक्तानि आप्तप्रणीत-पदत्वाद् गामानयेति पदवद् इति। एवं च वक्तुः पदार्थसंसर्ग-ज्ञानमवगन्तुं परिश्रान्तः श्रोता पदार्थसंसर्गरूपं वाक्यार्थमपि बला-ल्लभते इति अनुमेय एव नरवचःसु वाक्यार्थः।

एवं व्यभिचारभये गलिते वाक्यार्थनिर्णये जाते।
पुनरभिधत्ते शब्दोऽप्यनुवादतयेति तस्य राद्धान्तः॥

१४. तदिदमयुक्तम्।

ignores the sentence. Therefore the cognition in the speaker is first to be inferred. Then when one hears the sentence, 'There are fruits on the banks of the river', and when the meanings of the words are remembered separately, one infers: 'These words have been used only after cognizing the relation to these meanings, because they are words uttered by a reliable man, like the words, "Bring the cow"'. And thus the hearer, attempting to understand the speaker's cognition of the relation of the meanings of words, understands in virtue thereof, the meaning of the sentence too, consisting in the relation of the meanings of the words; hence, the meanings of the sentences in the utterances of men, are certainly to be inferred.

> Thus, when fear of inconstancy has been expelled, and when there has arisen the ascertainment of the sense of the sentence, the sound too expresses that sense once more as a re-statement: this is his final doctrine.

14. This does not stand to reason.

व्यभिचारविशङ्कामप्यनादृत्येन्द्रियादिवत् ।
स्वमर्थमभिधातुं किं समर्था न पदावली ।।
तात्पर्यमपि सुज्ञानं स्वतो ज्ञानानुमां विना ।
यथा वेदे यथा चान्येष्वनालोचितकर्तृषु ।।
वक्तृज्ञानानुमानान्तं यदि च प्रतिपाल्यते ।
तर्हि तस्याप्यशक्यत्वाद् भग्नाशः किं करिष्यसि ।।

१५. आप्तप्रणीतत्वं खल्वत्र हेतुत्वेनोक्तम् । आप्तत्वं च भ्रान्त्याद्यभावोऽभिमतः । भ्रान्तिश्चास्य पुरुषस्य नास्त्येवेति क्वचिदपि न निरूपयितुं शक्यते । ऋषीणामपि भ्रान्तिराशङ्क्यते

Without paying heed even to doubts of inconstancy, is not a series of words capable, like the sense-organs, etc. of expressing its own sense?

The intention too is easy to understand by itself, without an inference of cognition; for example in the Veda-s, and, for example, in other works where the authorship has not been considered.

If you wait till the stage of inferring the cognition of the speaker, then what will you do in your despondency when that too is not possible?

15. Here, verily, being composed by a reliable man is stated as the probans. Reliability is considered to be the absence of delusion, etc. It is not possible to ascertain anywhere that there is no delusion in this man at all; because

किमङ्ग पुनरर्वाचीनानाम् इत्युक्तत्वात् । एवम् अस्मिन् देशे काले वा अस्य भ्रान्तिर्नास्ति इत्यपि दुर्निरूपमेव । तस्मादन्ततः अस्मिन् वाक्यार्थेऽस्य भ्रमो नास्ति इति वाक्यार्थज्ञानपुरःसरमेव भ्रान्तिर्निवारणीया । अतो वाक्यार्थावगमात् पूर्वमाप्तत्वमसिद्धमेव इति कथं तेनानुमीयते इति हतं गुरुमतम् ।

१६. **एवं लौकिकशब्दानामनुमानत्ववारणात् ।**
सर्वशब्दानुमानत्ववादिनोऽपि हि खेदिताः ॥

द्विप्रमाणा हि काणादादयो गुरूक्तप्रकारेणैव सर्ववाक्यार्थानाम् अनुमेयत्वमाहुः । तेऽप्यनेनैव निरसनीयाः । तैरपि हि निर्दोषवाक्यत्वा-

there is the saying, 'Delusion has been suspected even in sages; what, then, sir, about the moderns?' Similarly, 'In this place, or at this time, there is no delusion in this man': this too is not easily ascertainable. Therefore, as a last resort, in the form, 'There is no delusion in him with reference to the meaning of this sentence', the delusion is to be discarded only after the cognition of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, before understanding the meaning of the sentence, reliability is non-established; so how can there be inference from that? Thus is annihilated the doctrine of the Guru.

16. Thus, when the inferential nature of ordinary words has been set aside, those who uphold the doctrine of all verbal cognition being inferential, are also over-powered.

The followers of Kaṇāda, etc. who, indeed, accept only two means of valid knowledge, say exactly in the manner of the Guru, that the meanings of all the sentences have to be inferred. They too have to be refuted in the same way.

दिहेतुभिरेव वाक्यार्थोऽनुमातव्यः। निर्दोषत्वं च भ्रान्त्यादिराहित्यम्। तच्च वाक्यार्थनिरूपणपुरःसरमेव निरूपणीयमिति पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण तेषामपि हेत्वसिद्धिरेवेत्यास्तां तावत्। तदेवं लौकिकं वैदिकमपि शाब्दं सिद्धम्।

१७. तत्र—

दुष्टवक्तृप्रणीतत्वदोषः शब्दे यदा भवेत्।
तदा स्याद् व्यभिचारोऽपि पौरुषेयगिरां क्वचित्॥
अपौरुषेये वेदे तु पुरुषस्पर्शसंगतः।
कलङ्को न विशङ्क्यचेत तत्कुतो व्यभिचारिता॥

According to them too, the meaning of a sentence has to be inferred through probans like the sentence being free from fault, etc. And freedom from fault is the absence of delusion, etc. And this can be ascertained only after ascertaining the meaning of the sentence. So, in the manner stated above, for them too, the probans is non-established. Let it remain at that. Therefore, verbal cognition both ordinary and scriptural has thus been established.

17. There,

When there arises in words the defect of being composed by a defective person, then in words of human origin, there can sometimes be inconstancy.

In the Veda, however, which is of non-human origin, one should not doubt a taint, which would be intelligible if there were relationship to a person; how then can there be inconstancy?

१८. वैदिकं च विधिमन्त्रार्थवादभेदेन उपदेशातिदेश-भेदेन च बहुविधम् इत्यादि तु परिमितकथया न बोधयितुं शक्यते इति उपरम्यते ।

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५. उपमानम्

१. **दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यात् स्मर्यमाणार्थगोचरम् ।**
असंनिकृष्टसादृश्यज्ञानं ह्युपमितिर्मता ॥

यथा गवये गोसादृश्यदर्शनानन्तरं स्मर्यमाणे गवि गवयसादृश्य-ज्ञानम् । तथाहि—

18. And 'the scriptural' is of various kinds, being divided into 'injunctions', 'formulas' and 'praises', and divided also into 'direct teaching' and 'transfer'. This and other things cannot be made clear in a brief treatise; and so it stops here.

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5. Analogy

1. The knowledge of the similarity of what is not in contact, having as its sphere an object that is remembered, and arising from the similarity to an object that is seen—this, indeed, is recognized to be Analogy.

For example, after seeing the similarity to a cow in a *gavaya*, there is in the cow that is remembered the cognition of similarity to a *gavaya*. It is thus:

नगरे खलु पूर्वं गां पश्यतोऽपि न भासते ।
तत्स्थं गवयसादृश्यं गवयस्यानिरीक्षणात् ।।
कदाचित्तु वनं प्राप्य गवयं वीक्षते यदा ।
तदा तद्गतगोसाम्यं प्रत्यक्षेणैव गृह्यताम् ।।
यत्पुनस्तावदेवास्य भाति दूरस्थिते गवि ।
गवयेनापि सादृश्यं तत्र किंनाम कारणम् ।।
न हि पूर्वगृहीतं तद् येन स्मर्येत सांप्रतम् ।
दूरस्थितत्वाच्चेदानीं प्रत्यक्षेण न गृह्यते ।।

Verily, for one even when he sees a cow in the city before, the similarity present therein to a *gavaya* does not appear; because the *gavaya* has not been seen.

But when sometime, he goes to a forest and sees a *gavaya*, then he can apprehend, even through perception, the similarity present therein to a cow.

Then when at the same time, he notices in the cow which is remote, the similarity to the *gavaya* too, what may be the cause of that?

Indeed, it has not been apprehended before, whereby it could be recollected now; and since the cow is at a distance, it cannot now be apprehended through perception.

स्पष्टं च भासते तस्मात् प्रमाणान्तरमर्थ्यते ।
तत्रोपमानमाचख्युः शाबराः शांकरा अपि ।।

तत्र च--

गवयस्थितसादृश्यदर्शनं करणं भवेत् ।
फलं गोगतसादृश्यज्ञानमित्यवगम्यताम् ।।

२. तार्किकास्तु उपमानमन्यादृशमन्वेषयन्तो गोगतसादृश्यज्ञानमनुमानीकुर्वन्ति । यथा यो यद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तेनापि सदृशः यथा करतलं करतलान्तरेण । गवयगतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी च गौः । तस्माद् गवयेनापि सदृशः इति ।

And it appears clearly. Therefore a distinct means of valid knowledge is required. In this case, the followers of Śabara and Śaṃkara call it Analogy.

And here,

The instrument should be the knowledge of the similarity present in the *gavaya*; the effect is the knowledge of the similarity present in the cow: so must it be understood.

2. But the Logicians, who seek Analogy in another way, make the cognition of similarity in the cow an inference. Thus: what is the counter-correlate of similarity in another is similar to that too; for example, one palm with another palm; cow is the counter-correlate of similarity in a *gavaya*; and so it is similar to a *gavaya* too.

३. तदयुक्तम् । इह हि यो यद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तेनापि सदृश इति सामान्यव्याप्तिमात्रेणानुमीयमाने यः कश्चिदग्निरस्ति इतिवदनियतविशेषं यत्किंचित् सादृश्यमस्ति इत्येतावदेव भासते । न तु नियतमेव गोर्गवयसादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षवदेव विस्पष्टं परिच्छिद्येत । तस्मान्नियतपरिच्छेददर्शनान्न सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानमिदम् । अतोऽनुमानाभावान्मानान्तरमेव ।

४. ननु तदानीमेव गोर्गवयसाधर्म्यवत् पुरुषादेर्गवयवैधर्म्यमपि स्पष्टं प्रतिभासते । तत्रापि किं प्रमाणान्तरमाश्रीयते ।

५. नेति ब्रूमः । तत्र खलु पुरुषस्य गवयगतधर्माभावरूपं वैधर्म्यम् अभावप्रमाणेनैवावगम्यते इति किं प्रमाणान्तरेण इति ।

3. This does not stand to reason. When it is inferred from a mere pervasion of the generic that what is the counter-correlate of similarity present in another is similar to that too, all that appears is that there is some kind of similarity without a defined particularity, as in the case of there being some kind of fire; but the definite similarity of the cow to *gavaya* is not ascertained clearly as in perception. Therefore, that cannot be an inference, 'generically seen', since here we see definite ascertainment. Therefore, since there is no inference, it is a distinct means of knowledge.

4. Now, at that very time, like the similarity of the cow to the *gavaya*, the dissimilarity too of man, etc. to the *gavaya* appears clearly. Is a distinct means of valid knowledge adopted there too?

5. No, we say. There, of course, the dissimilarity of man consisting in the absence of the attributes present in

६. तार्किकैस्तु उपमानमन्यदुन्नीतम् । कश्चित्खलु नगरगतं वनचरं प्रति गवयो नाम कः इति पृष्ट्वा गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यः पुनर्वनमुपेत्य मृगविशेषं पश्यन् अयमेव स गोसदृश इति प्रत्यभिजानाति । ततश्च अयमेव गवय इति संज्ञासंज्ञिसंगतिमपि जानाति । तदिदं संगतिग्रहणमुपमितिः । तत्करणं वाक्यार्थप्रत्यभिज्ञानमुपमानम् इति ।

७. न चेदं संगतिग्रहणं प्रमाणान्तरसाध्यम् । पूर्वं वाक्यश्रवणसमये हि संज्ञिनो गवयस्यादृष्टत्वात् तत्र संबन्धग्रहो न शक्यते कर्तुम् । दृश्यमाने तु गवये वाक्यमतिवृत्तमेवेति न वाक्यस्य तद्बोधने प्रागल्भ्यम् ।

the *gavaya*, is cognized even by the means of valid knowledge called Negation; so why should there be a distinct means of valid knowledge?

6. But the Logicians make out a different kind of Analogy. Some one verily asks a forester who has come to the city what it is that is called a *gavaya*, and hears from him the statement of analogy that a *gavaya* is what resembles a cow. Then he goes to a forest, sees a particular kind of animal and recognizes that that is what resembles a cow. And he understands also the relation of the name and the named in the form, 'This itself is *gavaya*'. This apprehension of the relation is knowledge through analogy. Its instrument is the similarity, consisting in the recognition of the meaning of a sentence.

7. And this apprehension of the relation cannot be brought about through any other means of valid knowledge. For, since earlier, at the time of hearing the sentence, the

८. ननु गोसदृशे पिण्डे गवयशब्दः प्रयुज्यते इति तावद्वाक्यादवगतम् । तेन दृश्यमानेन गवयेऽनुमीयतां 'गवयशब्दोऽस्य वाचकः लक्षणादीन् विनात्र प्रयुज्यमानत्वाद् यथा गोर्गोशब्दः' इति।

९. तदप्ययुक्तम् । तत्र प्रयुज्यमानत्वमात्रमेव हि वाक्यादवगतम् । लक्षणाद्यभावस्तु वाचकत्वसिद्धेः पूर्वं दुर्विज्ञान एव इति विशेषणासिद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तस्मादुपमानसाध्यमेवेदं संबन्धज्ञानम् ।

१०. एतत्साधर्म्यवाक्यार्थादुपमानं समीरितम् ।
एवमेव हि वैधर्म्याद् धर्ममात्राच्च संभवेत् ।।

gavaya which is the named, was not seen, it is not possible to produce the apprehension of the relation then. But when the *gavaya* is seen, the sentence had lapsed long ago, and the sentence has no power to signify that.

8. Now, in respect of a mass which resembles a cow, the word *gavaya* is used: this is first understood from the sentence. Through that, when it is seen, let there be the inference about the *gavaya*, 'The word *gavaya* expresses this, because it is used here without secondary implication, etc. like the word cow in respect of a cow.'

9. This too does not stand to reason. Indeed, that it is used there is all that is known from the sentence; but the absence of secondary implication, etc. certainly cannot be known before the signification is established. So this probans has a non-established qualification. Therefore the cognition of this relation is brought about only through Analogy.

10. This Analogy has been said to result from the sense of a sentence that declares common attributes. In the same way, indeed,

यथा तुरङ्ग इत्येष द्विशफो न गवादिवत् ।
इति वैधर्म्यवाक्यार्थं बुद्ध्वा देशान्तरं गतः ॥
पशुमेकशफं दृष्ट्वा तुरङ्ग इति बुध्यते ।
तथैव धर्ममात्रे च श्रुते संबन्धधीः क्वचित् ॥
दीर्घग्रीवः प्रलम्बोष्ठः कण्टकाशी क्रमेलकः ।
इति श्रुत्वा ततोऽन्यत्र विजानन्ति क्रमेलकम् ॥
एवं साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यधर्ममात्रविभेदतः ।
त्रेधातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्तस्मादुपमितिस्त्रिधा ॥

इति ।

can it result from non-common attributes or from attributes in general.

For example, 'what is called a horse has not a cloven hoof like a cow'. After understanding the sense of this sentence which declares a non-common attribute, if one goes to another country,

And sees an animal with a single hoof, one understands it to be a horse. And in the same way, when one hears attributes in general, sometimes there arises the knowledge of relation.

'A camel has a long neck and drooping lips, and eats thorns.' After hearing this, they can know a camel elsewhere.

Thus, being divided into common attributes, non-common attributes and attributes in

११. तदिदं दुर्मतं हेयं यतः संबन्धधीरियम् ।
प्रत्यक्षानुगृहीतेन शाब्देनैवोपजन्यते ॥

को गवय इति गवयशब्दवाच्यार्थं पृष्टवता हि पुरुषेण गोसदृशो गवय इति उत्तरवाक्यस्यापि वाच्यार्थप्रदर्शने एव तात्पर्यमित्यवधार्यते ।

तेनाप्रदर्श्य वाच्यार्थं न शब्दः पर्यवस्यते ।
पूर्वं च गवयज्ञानान्न शक्यं तत्प्रदर्शनम् ॥

ततश्च अनवगततात्पर्यम् अपर्यवसितमेव वाक्यं पुनर्गवये प्रत्यक्षी-

general, the meanings of statements of analogy are of three kinds. Therefore knowledge through Analogy is threefold.

11. This is a mistaken theory, which should be discarded. Because, this knowledge of the relation is produced merely by verbal knowledge assisted by perception.

When a man asks the expressed meaning of the word *gavaya* in the form, 'What is a *gavaya*?' he concludes that the statement of reply, '*Gavaya* is what resembles a cow' has for its purport the indication of the expressed meaning alone.

Therefore, before indicating the expressed meaning, a sentence is not complete. And prior to the knowledge of a *gavaya*, it is not possible to indicate that.

And therefore, the sentence, whose purport was not understood, and which had not been completed at all, yet, when

क्रियमाणे स्मृतिगतं प्रत्यक्षोपदर्शितवाच्यार्थतया प्रतिलब्धतात्पर्यं तदानीमेव संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धस्यावबोधकं भवति। यथा खलु नवकम्बलो वणिगिति फणितिनिशमनमनु विपणिमुपगतो वणिजि नवसु कम्बलेषु दृश्यमानेषु संख्याविशेषतात्पर्यमवधार्य वाक्यार्थं बुध्यते तथा अत्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्। तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षानुगृहीतशाब्दसाध्यमेव संगतिग्रहणम् इति न प्रमाणान्तरमन्वेषणीयम्।

१२. किंच—

उपमानपदं लोके सादृश्ये सति विश्रुतम्।
वैधर्म्ये धर्ममात्रे च तत्प्रयोगः कथं हि वः॥

the *gavaya* is perceived, comes back to memory, and attains its purport having its expressed meaning cognized in perception, and at that very time, becomes the signifier of the relation of the name and the named. Just as, of course, after hearing the sentence, 'The merchant has *nava* (nine or new) blankets,' one goes to the market, and, seeing nine blankets with the merchant, concludes that the purport is a particular number, and understands the meaning of the sentence; so must it be seen to be here too. Therefore the apprehension of the relation is possible even through words assisted by perception, and so there is no need to seek a distinct means of valid knowledge.

12. Further,

> In the world, the word 'analogy' is found used when there is similarity. When there is a non-common attribute or when there are attributes in general, how can there be its usage according to you?

तथातिदेशशब्दोऽपि वाक्ये साधर्म्यबोधके ।
प्रसिद्धः सोऽपि चान्यत्र कथ्यमानो दुनोति माम् ।।

इति ।

१३. तस्मादनितरशरणं गोगतसादृश्यबोधमेव वयम् ।
उपमानं गृह्णीमो मानत्रयवादिनोऽपि तेन जिताः ।।
अत्र सादृश्यविषये गुरुणा कलहोऽस्ति नः ।
पदार्थान्तरमेवेदं सादृश्यं मन्यते गुरुः ।।
वयं गुणादिसामान्यसमाहारं वदामहे ।
पदार्थावसरे किंचित् तत्प्रकारो वदिष्यते ।।

Similarly the expression 'statement of analogy' too is well known in the case of a sentence which declares common attributes. And that expression, being used in other places, causes me pain.

13. Therefore, we accept as Analogy only the knowledge of similarity present in the cow, for which there is no other means. By this are defeated even those who uphold the theory that there are only three means of valid knowledge.

Here, in respect of similarity, we have a quarrel with the Guru. The Guru considers this similarity even as a distinct category.

We speak of it as the assemblage of common features like quality, etc. When we have occasion to deal with the categories, the mode of this will be declared to some extent.

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६. अर्थापत्तिः ।

१. अन्यथानुपपत्त्या यदुपपादककल्पनम् ।
तदर्थापत्तिरित्येवं लक्षणं भाष्यभाषितम् ॥

तत्र च प्रमाणद्वयविरोधोऽनुपपत्तिरित्युच्यते । तेनैवं लक्षणं शिक्षणीयम् ।

साधारणप्रमाणानामसाधारणमानतः ।
विरोधादविरुद्धांशे धीरर्थापत्तिरिष्यते ॥
यथा जीवनमानस्य गृहाभावप्रमाणतः ।
विरोधात् करणीभूताद् बहिर्भावस्य कल्पनम् ॥

6. Presumption

1. When something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is presumption: this alone is the definition as given in the *Bhāṣya*.

And here, opposition between two valid cognitions is called unintelligibility. Therefore the definition has to be enunciated thus:

When some general valid knowledge is in conflict with a special one, the cognition of the non-conflicting element is accepted as Presumption.

For example, from the conflict of the valid knowledge that the man is alive with the valid knowledge of his non-existence in his

गणितागममूलेनानुमानेन देवदत्तो गृहे बहिर्वा क्वचिज्जीवति इति साधारण्येनावगम्यते। तस्य गृहे नास्तीत्यनेन विरोधे सति अविरोधाय बहिरस्ति इति कल्प्यते। तदिदं प्रमाणद्वयविरोधकरणकमर्थापत्तिज्ञानम् इति।

२. अमुष्यास्त्वनुमानत्वमिच्छन्तस्तार्किका जगुः।
न मानयोर्विरोधोऽस्ति प्रसिद्धे चाप्यसौ समः॥

इति। प्रमाणयोस्तावद्विरोधो न संभवति इदं रजतं नेदं रजतम् इतिवदेकस्याप्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गात्। ननु तथापि उक्तप्रमाणयोर्विरोधो दृश्यते इति चेत् तदप्याशामात्रम्। अत्र हि गृहे बहिर्वेति

house, from this conflict as instrument there is the assumption that he is outside.

Through inference based on astrological science, it is known in general that Devadatta is alive somewhere, either in his house or outside. When that is opposed to the fact that he is not at home, to avoid this opposition, it is assumed that he is outside. This afore-mentioned cognition, whose instrument is opposition between two valid cognitions, is the cognition through Presumption.

2. But the Logicians, who prefer to regard this as inference, declare that there can be no conflict between two valid cognitions, and that this is common to what is well known.

Now, there is no possibility of conflict between two valid cognitions; because, as in the case, 'This is silver', and 'This is not silver', there would result the non-validity of one. Now, if it is said that even then, there is opposition seen between

सन्देहास्पदस्यैव देशविशेषस्य गृहाभावप्रमाणेन बाधो जातः। जीवनप्रमाणेन हि जीवनमात्रं देशसामान्यसंबन्धो वा विषयीकृतः। न तु तदुभयमपि गृहाभावप्रमाणेन स्पृष्टमाघ्रातं वा। तस्माज्जीवनगृहाभावप्रमाणयोर्विरोधस्यैवाभावात् कथं तेन करणभूतेनार्थापत्तिरुच्यते।

३. अपिच—

ईदृशस्य विरोधस्य प्रसिद्धानुमितिष्वपि।
संभवादनुमाजालमर्थापत्तिर्ग्रसिष्यते ॥

the two valid cognitions already mentioned, that is a mere hope. Here, indeed, it is only of one particular place which is the basis of the doubt, 'at home' or 'outside' that there is sublation by the valid knowledge of absence from the home. Indeed, the valid cognition that he lives has as its content merely his being alive, or his relation to some place in general. But the valid cognition of absence from home does not come within touching or smelling distance of either of these two. Therefore, since there is no opposition at all between the two valid cognitions, 'He lives' and 'He is not at home', how can it be said that with that as instrument there is Presumption?

3. Further,

Since conflict of this nature exists in inferential cognitions that are well known, Presumption will swallow the net of inference (that is cast to catch it).

यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्नि: इति व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणेन हि पर्वतेऽप्यग्नि: प्राप्त:। धूमो वा दृश्यमान: पर्वते स्वकारणमग्निमाक्षिपति इति व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणेन धूमदर्शनेन वा पर्वते क्वचिदग्निरस्तीति अवगतम्। तस्य च ऊर्ध्वदेशे अनुपलम्भेन विरोधादधोदेशे वह्नि: कल्प्यते इति अर्थापत्तितापत्ति:। तस्मादियमनुमानपक्षे प्रक्षेप्तव्या। इत्थं चानुमीयते। देवदत्तो बहिरस्ति जीवित्वे सति गृहेऽसत्त्वात्। यो जीवन् यत्र नास्ति स ततोऽन्यत्रास्ति यथा अहम् इति। अतो वञ्चितमेतत् पञ्चमप्रमाणम् इति।

४. तदिदं शिक्ष्यतेऽस्माभिर्विरोधोऽस्त्येव मानयो:।
न प्रसिद्धानुमाभङ्गो बहिर्भावे च नानुमा॥

'Where there is smoke, there is fire': it is, indeed, by the valid cognition apprehending this pervasion that fire on the mountain is known; or, the smoke that is seen implies the existence on the mountain of fire which is its cause. Hence, it is understood, either by the valid cognition apprehending the pervasion or by the sight of smoke, that somewhere in the mountain there is fire. And because of the opposition due to non-perception of it in the higher regions, fire is assumed in the lower regions; thus it becomes a case of Presumption. Therefore, this has to be thrown in along with Inference. And thus is the inference: 'Devadatta is outside, because, being alive, he is not at home; he who, being alive, is not in a certain place, must be in another place, for example, myself'. Therefore, this fifth means of valid knowledge is a fraud.

4. This is criticised by us; there certainly is conflict between two valid cognitions. There is no breakdown of inferential knowledge,

तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं प्रमाणयोर्विरोधे सति एकस्याप्रमाणत्वं स्यादिति तद् इदं रजतं नेदं रजतम् इतिवदुभयोरप्यसाधारणप्रमाणयोर्विरोधे एव ।

५. **साधारणप्रमाणस्य त्वसाधारणमानतः ।**
बाधेऽपि सावकाशत्वादप्रामाण्यं न जायते ॥

तस्मात् प्रमाणद्वयविरोधः संभवत्येव ।

६. यत्पुनरुक्तम् इहापि संदिग्धस्य देशविशेषस्यैव बाधः न जीवनप्रमाणस्य इति अत्र ब्रूमः ।

> which is well known. Nor is there inferential knowledge in respect of his being outside.

There, what was said that, when there is opposition between two valid cognitions, there would be non-validity for one, that is only when there is opposition between two valid cognitions, both of them being particular, as 'This is silver', and 'This is not silver'.

> 5. In the case, however, of a general valid cognition, in spite of its sublation through a particular one, there does not result its non-validity, there being scope (elsewhere for its validity).

Therefore, opposition between two valid cognitions certainly does occur.

6. What was again said that even here the sublation is only of the particular place doubted, not of the valid cognition of his being alive, here we say:

ज्ञायमानेऽनुमानेन देवदत्तस्य जीवने ।
ज्ञातव्यो देशसंबन्धोऽप्यस्यावस्थितिहेतवे ।।
तत्र देशत्वसामान्यमात्रं संबध्यते यदि ।
तर्हि देशत्वसंबन्धाद् देशः स्यात् पुरुषोऽप्यसौ ।।
ततश्चानियतव्यक्तिदेशसामान्यसंश्रितम् ।
ज्ञायते जीवनं तस्य क्वचिज्जीवत्यसाविति ।।
तस्माद् गृहे बहिर्वेति संदिग्धमपि कंचन ।
विशेषमवलम्ब्यैव प्रमितं खलु जीवनम् ।।
तत्रैकस्य विशेषस्य बाधेऽन्यग्रहणात् पुरा ।
बाध्येतैव निरालम्बा जीवनप्रमितिः स्वयम् ।।

If Devadatta being alive is known through inference, his relation to a particular place too is to be known, for the sake of his existence.

Here, if he is related merely to space in general, then on account of his relation to spatiality, this person too would become space.

Therefore what is known is his being alive, related to space in general without its particularity being defined, in the form, 'He is alive somewhere'.

Therefore his being alive can be validly known only in respect of some particular place, though it is doubted, whether 'at home' or 'outside'.

Of these, when one particular is subtlated and prior to the apprehension of the other,

एवं बहिष्ट्वसिद्धेः प्राग्गृहाभावग्रहागताम् ।
प्रतिरोधदशां सूक्ष्मामजानन्तो वदन्ति ते ।।

इति ।

७. यदप्युक्तं प्रसिद्धानुमानानामप्यर्थापत्तित्वं स्यादिति तदपि न । तत्र हि पर्वतस्य क्वचिदग्निप्रापकं साधारणप्रमाणं किं नाम इति वक्तव्यम् । ननूक्तं व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणेन पर्वतेऽप्यग्निः प्राप्त इति । हन्त भोः प्राभाकरपृष्ठचुम्बिना केनेदं प्रलपितम् ।

अदृष्टपर्वतः पूर्वं कथं तस्याग्निशालिताम् ।
अवगच्छेदिति ध्वस्तमनुमानेऽपि तन्मतम् ।।

the valid knowledge of his being alive, having no support, is itself certainly sublated.

Thus prior to the establishment of existence outside, there results through the apprehension of his not being at home, a subtle stage of conflict. And they speak without knowing this.

7. What was also said that what are well known to be Inferences, would become Presumption, that too is not so. There, indeed, should be stated what the general valid cognition is which reveals that there is fire somewhere on the mountain. Now it has been said that even by the valid cognition that apprehends the pervasion, fire on the mountain is also revealed. Well, also, who are they who, kissing the backs of the followers of Prabhākara, babble thus?

He who has not seen the mountain in advance, how can he understand that it has

८. यत्पुनरुक्तं धूमः स्वकारणमग्निमाक्षिपति इति तस्य कोऽर्थः। हन्त धूमोऽग्निम् अनुमापयति इति वक्तव्यम्। ततश्च पर्वतेऽग्निप्रापकमनुमानमेव तत्र साधारणप्रमाणतयोक्तम् इति नास्त्यनुमानकबलीकारः।

तस्योर्ध्वानुपलम्भेन बाधे चाधः प्रकल्पनम्।
अर्थापत्तितयैवेष्टमिति कष्टं न किंचन॥

इति।

९. यत्पुनरनुमानं बहिर्भावसिद्धौ प्रयुक्तं तत्स्वरूपासिद्धमायुष्मताम्। जीवनमात्रस्य निर्विशेषस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्। बहिर्भावग्रहणात् पूर्वं जीवनगृहाभावौ समुच्चित्य प्रत्येतुं न शक्येते।

fire? Thus that position, even in respect of inference, is annihilated.

8. As for what again was said that smoke implies its cause fire, what is the meaning of that? Alas, it has to be interpreted that smoke leads to the inference of fire. And therefore, it is only inference which reveals fire on the mountain, that is declared as the general valid cognition there; therefore there is no swallowing up of inference.

When that is sublated, because of non-perception above, the assumption of it as below is acceptable even as Presumption; in this there is no difficulty.

9. Again the means of inference that was used to establish his being outside, that has a 'non-established existence', for you long-lived ones; because it is impossible to conceive

अतो जीवनविशिष्टगृहाभावरूपस्य लिङ्गस्याप्रतिपत्तेः स्वरूपाज्ञानासिद्धोऽयं हेतुः। तदुक्तं बृहट्टीकायाम् —

‘ तस्माद्यो विद्यमानस्य गृहाभावोऽवगम्यते ।
स हेतुः स बहिर्भावं नागृहीत्वा च गृह्यते ।। ’

इति। अतः पृथगेवार्थापत्तिः।

**१०. तार्किकध्वंसनोपायमेवंरूपमजानता ।
गुरुणा तु प्रलपितो जीवनस्यात्र संशयः ।।
जीवनं किल विज्ञातं वेश्मवर्तितया पुरा ।
तस्माज्जीवनसंदेहो भवेद् वेश्मन्यदर्शनात् ।।**

of mere living without some specification. Before apprehending his being outside, it is not possible to think conjointly of his being alive and his not being at home. Therefore, since there is no knowledge of the probans in the form of his not being at home as qualified by his being alive, this probans has a non-established existence through non-knowledge. This is said in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*:

Therefore, the known absence from home of him who is alive, that is the probans, and that is not apprehended without apprehending his being outside.

Therefore Presumption is certainly distinct.

10. Not knowing this mode of annihilating the Logicians, there is this babble of the Guru, ‘There is doubt here about the being alive’.
Formerly, being alive was verily known as being in the home. Therefore there can be doubt about being alive, because of his not being found at home.

संदिग्धं जीवनं त्वेतद् बहिर्भावस्य बोधकम् ।
अर्थापत्तेः प्रभावोऽयं यत् संदिग्धोऽपि बोधयेत् ।।
एवं जीवनसंदेहे स्यात् संदिग्धविशेषणः ।
हेतुरित्यनुमानत्वनिरासः सुकरोऽत्र नः ।।

इति ।

११. तदिदमपहसनीयम् । तथाहि—

जीवनं यदि संदिग्धं गृहाभावनिरीक्षणात् ।
तर्हि तन्निर्णयः कार्य आप्तवाक्यादिना पुनः ।।
तत्प्रियाकण्ठसूत्रादिचिह्नसंदर्शनेन वा ।
न च तत् प्रार्थ्यते किंचित् तस्मान्नास्त्येव संशयः ।।

It is this doubt of his being alive, which makes known the being outside. This is the greatness of Presumption that even what is doubted gives knowledge.

Thus when there is doubt of his being alive, the probans would be one of doubtful qualification. Thus the refutation of this being an inference is here easy for us.

11. This aforesaid deserves ridicule. It is thus:

If his being alive was doubted because his non-existence at home is seen, then what should be done is to ascertain this once more through the words of a reliable man, etc.

Or from seeing marks like the auspicious thread round the neck of his wife. But

किंच नास्ति बहिर्भावग्रहः संदिग्धजीवनात् ।
मृतत्वस्यापि शङ्कायां बहिरस्तीति धीः कथम् ।।
यस्माज्जीवति वा नो वा तस्मात् तिष्ठत्यसौ बहिः ।
इति कल्पयितुं शक्तः कोऽपरो गुरुणा विना ।।
अर्थापत्तिप्रभावेण सर्वं संभवतीति चेत् ।
हन्तैवं सर्ववस्तूनामदृष्टया नाशसंशये ।।
अन्यत्रास्तीति निश्चित्य कृतार्थीक्रियतां मनः ।
तस्मात् संदिग्धता तावन्नैवार्थापत्तिकारणम् ।।

there is no recourse to any of these; therefore there is no doubt at all.

Further there cannot be the apprehension of his being outside, from the doubt of his being alive; because, when there is the doubt of his being dead too, how can there be the cognition of his being outside?

Because he is alive or not alive; therefore he is outside: except the Guru, who else is capable of making such an assumption?

If it be that anything is possible through the greatness of Presumption, alas, in this way, when there is the doubt regarding anything, that the thing has been destroyed because it is not seen,

Let the mind console itself with the assurance of its being elsewhere. Therefore, doubt is certainly not the cause of Presumption.

इति । अतोऽस्मदुक्तविधैवार्थापत्तिः ।

१२. सा पुनर्द्वयी दृष्टार्थापत्तिः श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्च इति । तत्र दृष्टार्थापत्तिरुक्ता ।

१३. यत्र त्वपरिपूर्णस्य वाक्यस्यान्वयसिद्धये ।
शब्दोऽध्याह्रियते तत्र श्रुतार्थापत्तिरिष्यते ।।

यथा द्वारं द्वारम् इत्यस्मिन् वाक्येऽन्वयसिध्यर्थं शब्दगम्येन आवरणाद्यर्थान्तरेण भवितव्यम् इति साधारणप्रमाणम् । तस्य श्रुतशब्दानुपलम्भेन बाधे सति अश्रुतशब्दगम्यत्वेन आवरणाद्यर्थः कल्पनीयः । तत्र च शब्देन सहैव आवरणाद्यर्थकल्पनोद्युक्तः

Therefore, Presumption is just as we have explained.

12. This again is of two kinds, namely 'Presumption from the seen' and 'Presumption from the heard'. Of these, Presumption from the seen is explained already.

13. Where, however, in an incomplete sentence there is importation of words to make out the syntactical relation, there is accepted 'Presumption from what is heard'.

For example, in the sentence, 'the door, the door', in order to get a syntactical relation, there is the ordinary valid knowledge that there must be some other sense like closing, etc. which are to be understood from words. And when there is sublation of it by non-perception from the words that are heard, there is to be assumed the sense of closing, etc. as to be understood from words that are not heard. And there, one proceeding to assume the sense of closing, etc. even along with a word, assumes only the word for the sake of parsimony, since the

शब्दादेवार्थविगतेः लाघवतः शब्दमेव कल्पयति। सेयं शब्द-कल्पनारूपा श्रुतार्थापत्तिः।

१४. गुरुस्तु आवरणाद्यर्थस्यैव कल्प्यतया शब्दकल्पना-भावात् श्रुतार्थापत्तिर्नास्ति इत्याह। स तु शब्दप्रतिपन्नस्यैव अन्वय-साधनात् पूर्वमेव मूकीकृतः।

१५. किंच यदि वाक्यपूरणार्थमर्थ एव कल्प्यते तर्हि 'सूर्याय जुष्टं निर्वपामि' इत्यादौ सूर्यरूपोऽर्थ एव ऊहितव्यः। न तु सूर्याय इति पदकल्पनं स्यात्।

१६. ननु प्रकृतौ पदार्पित एवायमंशो दृष्ट इति विकृ-तावपि पदं कल्प्यम्।

sense can be understood from the word itself. 'Presumption from what is heard' is of this nature of assuming words.

14. The Guru, however, says: 'There is no "Presumption from what is heard", since what is to be assumed is only the sense of closing, etc. and, as such, there is no assumption of a word.' He has already been silenced, because it has been made out that there can be syntactical relation only among what have been understood from words.

15. Further, if to complete the sentence, the sense alone is assumed, then in 'I offer what is pleasing to the sun', etc. it is only the sense in the form of the sun that has to be supplied; but there need not be the assumption of the words 'to the sun'.

16. Now, in the model sacrifice this element is seen only as intimated through a word; hence in the modelled too a word has to be assumed.

१७. मैवम् । न हि दृष्टत्वमात्रेण विकृतौ धर्मा आकृष्यन्ते किंतु प्रयोजनायैव । न तु तस्यांशस्य पदबोधितत्वेन युष्माकं किंचित् प्रयोजनमस्ति, अन्वयस्य अन्यथापि सिद्धत्वात् । दृष्टत्वमात्रेण ग्रहणे च अवहतगतमेव संस्कारान्तरं दृष्टम् इति अवघातोऽपि कृष्णलेषु कर्तव्यः स्यात् । तस्मात् श्रुतार्थापत्त्यैव ऊहसिद्धिः । इति आस्तामेतद् इति ।

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७. अभावः

१. अथोपलम्भयोग्यत्वे सत्यप्यनुपलम्भनम् ।
अभावाख्यं प्रमाणं स्यादभावस्यावबोधकम् ।।

17. This need not be so. Indeed, merely because they are seen, attributes should not be dragged into the modelled, but only if there is some purpose. But for you there is no purpose for that element as understood from a word, because syntactical relation results otherwise. And if it is apprehended simply because it is seen, then, since a particular purification is seen to exist only in what is pounded, pounding too would have to be done in the case of the gold grains. Therefore, 'modification' can be effected only through 'Presumption from the heard'. Thus let it remain at that.

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(7) Negation

1. Now, if a thing is not perceived even when it is capable of being perceived, that is the

२. अत्र ह्यनुपलम्भः करणम्। तस्य च ज्ञानाभाव-रूपत्वादभावः प्रमाणमित्युच्यते।

३. तत्र च

विषयं तदधीनांश्च संनिकर्षादिकान् विना।
उपलम्भस्य सामग्रीसंपत्तिः खलु योग्यता॥
सा च ज्ञाततयाभावज्ञानस्य सहकारिणी।
अज्ञातोऽनुपलम्भस्तु सत्तामात्रेण बोधकः॥

४. ततश्च विषयभूतं घटं तदधीनांश्चेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षादीन् विना यच्चक्षुरुन्मीलनालोकसंपातमनःप्रणिधानादिकं घटोप-

means of valid knowledge called Negation, which makes known the non-existence.

2. Here, indeed, the non-perception is the instrument; and since that is of the form of a non-existence of cognition, negation is spoken of as the means of valid knowledge.

3. And there,

> The presence in full of the causal aggregate for perception except the object and the contact, etc. dependent thereon, this of course is capacity.
>
> And this, when known, is the auxiliary to the knowledge of non-existence. But the non-perception, while not being known, gives knowledge, merely by its existence.

4. And therefore, when, except the jar which is the object and the contact of the senses, etc. dependent thereon,

लम्भकारणं तत्सर्वमिदानीमेव संजातमित्यवगमे सति तत्सहकृतः सन् घटानुपलम्भो घटाभावं बोधयति इत्येवं सर्वत्र द्रष्टव्यम् ।

योग्यत्वावगमार्थं हि सूक्ष्मार्थाभाववेदने ।
सूक्ष्मबोधकनेत्रांशुसंपातार्थं प्रयत्यते ।।
योग्यत्वस्य च संदेहे विपर्यासेऽथवा सति ।
अभावेऽपि हि संदेहो भ्रमो वास्त्येव तद्यथा ।।
तमसि भ्रष्टमन्विष्यन् कराभ्यामङ्गुलीयकम् ।
सर्वोर्वीस्पर्शसंदेहादभावेऽप्येति संशयम् ।।

it is known that what constitute the cause of the perception of the jar like the opening of the eye, the flow of light, the attention of the mind, etc. have all been produced even now, the non-perception of the jar as assisted by this knowledge makes known the non-existence of the jar. Thus is it to be seen in all cases.

It is, indeed, for knowing this capacity that in the case of understanding the non-existence of a subtle object, one exerts oneself for such a flow of the light from the eyes as would reveal subtle objects.

And when there is doubt, or when there is an error, regarding capacity, there is only doubt or delusion in respect of non-existence too; it is thus:

One searching for a ring that has fallen off the hand in the dark, begins to entertain doubt regarding its non-existence, through doubt regarding his having felt the entire ground.

तथैव सर्वतोऽस्पर्शे मत्वा सर्वाभिमर्शनम् ।
सत एवाङ्गुलीयस्याप्यभावं बुध्यते भ्रमात् ॥

तस्माद्योग्यत्वनिर्णयोऽत्र सहकारी ।

५. अनुपलम्भस्तु द्विविधः प्रमाणाभावरूपः स्मरणाभावरूपश्च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाभावरूपादनुपलम्भाद् घटाद्यभावज्ञानमुक्तम् । एवमनुमानगम्यार्थानामभावग्रहणे योग्यानुमानानुदयो बोधको द्रष्टव्यः । यथा रूपदर्शनबोधकस्य चेष्टालिङ्गकानुमानस्यानुत्पत्तिरुलूकस्य दिवा रूपदर्शनाभावं बोधयति इत्युक्तं मनोरथमिश्रैः । एवमन्यप्रमाणेष्वपि इति ।

Similarly, when he has not felt everywhere,
believing that he has felt everywhere, he
cognizes the non-existence of the ring through
delusion, though it certainly exists.

Therefore, the ascertainment of capacity is here an auxiliary.

5. Non-perception, however, is of two kinds, being in the form of the non-existence of the valid knowledge and the non-existence of the recollection. Of these, the knowledge of the non-existence of the jar, etc. through non-perception consisting in the non-existence of the valid knowledge, namely perception, has been mentioned. Similarly, when there is the apprehension of the non-existence of objects that are to be understood through inference, what makes it known is to be seen to consist in the non-production of the inference of the capable; for example, the non-production of the inference, which, with voluntary activity as its probans, makes known the perception of colour, makes known the owl's non-

६. स्मरणाभावाद्यथा प्रातरिह मैत्रो नासीदिति सायंकाले ज्ञानम् । तत्र हि प्रातःकालविशिष्टमैत्रस्य सायंकाले दर्शनयोग्यत्वाभावात् स्मरणयोग्यत्वे सति अस्मरणमेव तदानीं प्रातःकालविशिष्टमैत्राभावस्य बोधकमाश्रीयते इति ।

७. तार्किकास्तु अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षादिगम्यत्वमाचक्षाणा अनुपलम्भगम्यतां न संमन्यन्ते । तदयुक्तम् । तेऽपि हि सायंकाले प्रातःकालीनाभावज्ञानस्य इन्द्रियजन्यत्वाभावादुक्तप्रकारेणानुपलम्भजत्वमेव बलादङ्गीकुर्वीरन् ।

perception of colour by day: so has it been stated by Manorathamiśra. Similarly in regard to the other means of valid knowledge too.

6. From the non-existence of recollection, it is as follows: 'The cognition in the evening that Maitra was not there in the morning.' Here, indeed, since for Maitra as qualified by the morning, there is not the capacity to be seen in the evening, and since there is capacity for recollection at that time, only the non-existence of the recollection can be accepted as making known the non-existence of Maitra as qualified by the morning.

7. But the Logicians speak of non-existence being understood through perception, etc. and do not agree to its being understood through non-perception. This does not stand to reason. For, they too, since the cognition of absence in the morning cannot be produced through the senses in the evening, would, as a matter of necessity accept that it is produced by non-perception in the way explained.

८. ननु तत्र स्मरणाभावेन लिङ्गेन प्रातःकालीनाभावोऽनुमीयत एव। मैवम्। स्मरणाभावस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्।

स्मृत्यभावं मनोग्राह्यमिच्छन्ति किल तार्किकाः।
तच्चायुक्तं वयं तावज् ज्ञानाप्रत्यक्षवादिनः॥
मनःप्रत्यक्षगम्यत्वं ज्ञानानां वारयामहे।
ततश्च तदभावोऽपि मनसा गृह्यते कथम्॥

इति।

९. ननु अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमनुमिमीमहे। तदिदमुदितमुदयनेन।

8. Now, in this case, the absence in the morning is only inferred from 'the absence of recollection' as probans. It cannot be so. Because 'absence of recollection' cannot be known.

> The Logicians accept, verily, that the non-existence of recollection can be apprehended by the mind. This does not stand to reason. Now, we are upholders of the doctrine of the non-perceptibility of cognition.
>
> We reject the view that cognitions are perceptible to the mind. And therefore, how can its non-existence too be apprehended by the mind?

9. Now, we infer the perceptibility of non-existence. This has been thus stated by Udayana:

प्रतिपत्तेरापरोक्ष्यादिन्द्रियस्यानुपक्षयात् ।
अज्ञातकरणत्वाच्च भावावेशाच्च चेतसः ।।

इत्यादि । प्रयोगस्तु अभावः प्रत्यक्षः अपरोक्षप्रतीतत्वाद् घटवद् इति । तत्र अभावस्यापरोक्षप्रतीतत्वाभावात् स्वरूपासिद्धो हेतुः । भूतलादेस्त्वपरोक्षत्वादभावस्यापि तत्त्वभ्रम एवायुष्मताम् इति ।

१०. ननु अभावज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् अनुपक्षीणेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाद् घटज्ञानवद् इति । तदपि विशेषासिद्धम् । यतः—

पूर्वोक्तयोग्यतासिद्धावुपक्षीणमिहेन्द्रियम् ।
ग्राह्या चाभावबोधार्थं योग्यता तार्किकैरपि ।।

> Because its cognition is immediate, because the sense-organ is not exhausted, because the instrument is not known, and because the mind enters into positives,

and so on. The syllogism is: ‘ Non-existence is perceptible, because its cognition is immediate, like a jar.’ There, since there is no immediate cognition of non-existence, the probans has a non-established existence. However, since the floor, etc. are immediately cognized, there is only the delusion of the non-existence too being such, for you long-lived ones.

10. Now, ‘ the cognition of non-existence is perceptual, because it is produced by the senses which are not exhausted, like the cognition of a jar ’. This too has a non-established qualification. Because,

> When the capacity as explained before is secured, here the sense-organ is exhausted; and for the cognition of non-existence, capacity has to be accepted even by the Logicians.

घटो यदि भवेदत्र तर्हि दृश्येत भूमिवत् ।
इति तर्कात्मना तेऽपि योग्यतामेव गृह्णते ।।
अस्ति चेदुपलभ्येतेत्यस्य कोऽर्थो विचार्यताम् ।
घटादन्योऽत्र सर्वोऽपि ज्ञानहेतुरभूदिति ।।

११. यत्पुनः अभावज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् अज्ञातकरणत्वाद् घटादिज्ञानवद् इति तत् स्मृतावनैकान्तिकम् ।

संस्कारो हि स्मृतौ हेतुः स चाज्ञातोऽवबोधकः ।
अज्ञातकरणाप्येवं स्मृतिर्नाध्यक्षतां गता ।।

'If the jar exists here, then it should have been seen, like the floor.' In the form of such a counter-argument, they too accept capacity alone.

'If it exists, it should have been seen.' Consider what the meaning of this is. It is that here has been every other cause of cognition except the jar.

11. As for what was again said that the cognition of non-existence is perceptual, because its instrument is not known, like the cognition of the jar, etc. that is 'non-conclusive' in respect of recollection.

Impression, indeed, is the cause of recollection; and that produces knowledge without itself being cognized. In this way, though the instrument is not cognized, recollection does not come within perception.

इति ।

१२. यत्पुनः अभावज्ञानं भावरूपकरणाविष्टमनोजन्यं ज्ञानत्वात् ज्ञानान्तरवद् इति अनुपलम्भकरणकत्वं न युक्तम् इति तदपि न । अभावज्ञानम् इन्द्रियेतरकरणकम् अभावज्ञानत्वाद् अनुमेयाभावज्ञानवद् इत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वाद् इति ।

१३. यत्तु अभावज्ञानमिन्द्रियकरणकम् इन्द्रियदोषेण दूष्यमाणत्वाद् यथा चक्षुर्दोषेण दूष्यमाणं रूपज्ञानं चक्षुःकरणकम् इति तदप्यसिद्धमेव ।

न खल्विन्द्रियदोषः स्यादभावभ्रमकारणम् ।
योग्यताभ्रम एवात्र तत्कारणमितीरितम् ॥

12. As for what was again said that the cognition of non-existence is produced by the mind entering into the instrument of a positive nature, like any other cognition, and that hence it does not stand to reason to take non-perception as the instrument, that too cannot be. Because it may also be said thus: 'Cognition of non-existence has instruments other than the senses, because it is the cognition of a non-existence, like the cognition of an inferred non-existence.'

13. As for what was said that cognition of non-existence has the senses as its instrument, because it can be made defective through a defect of the senses, like the cognition of colour, which has the sense of sight as its instrument and can be made defective through a defect in the sense of sight, this too is certainly non-established.

Of course, defects of the sense-organs cannot
be the cause of the delusion of non-existence.

इति ।

१४. यानि पुनः ‘चक्षुः अभावग्राहकम् इन्द्रियत्वाद् मनोवद्’ इत्यादीन्यनुमानानि तानि सर्वाणि संबद्धस्यैवेन्द्रियस्य ग्राहकत्वाद् अभावेन संबन्धानभ्युपगमाद् विशेषणविशेष्यभावरूपसंबन्धस्य च संबन्धान्तरपूर्वकत्वनियमाद् विशेषविरुद्धानि ।

अपि चेन्द्रियसंबन्धयोग्यतैव हि वस्तुनः ।
प्रत्यक्षत्व उपाधिः स्याद् व्याप्त्यसिद्धास्ततोऽखिलाः ॥

१५. ननु विशेषणविशेष्यभावो नाम संबन्धः अस्त्येव । मैवम् ।

It has been said that the cause of that
in this case is but delusion regarding capacity.

14. Again, the other inferences like, ‘The sense of sight is the apprehender of non-existence, because it is a sense, like the mind’, and so on, all of them are particular-contradictories, because only a sense in contact can be an apprehender, because contact with non-existence is not accepted, and the contact of the relation of the qualification and the qualified has invariably to be preceded by another relation.

Further, indeed, the capacity of the object
to be in contact with the senses is in itself
an extraneous adjunct in respect of perception. Hence, every one of them has a non-established pervasion.

15. Now, there is certainly a contact called the relation of the qualification and the qualified. It cannot be so;

प्रत्यक्षत्वे ह्यभावस्य स्थिते कश्चित् कथंचन ।
कष्टोऽपि संनिकर्षः स्यात् तदेवाद्यापि न स्थितम् ।।

१६. किंच अभावभूतल विशेषणविशेष्यभावरहिते संबन्धान्तररहितत्वाद् मेरुविन्ध्यवद् इति विशेषणविशेष्यत्वमेवात्र नास्ति इति कथमसतः संनिकर्षत्ववादः ।

१७. किंच—

प्रतियोगिस्मृतिर्न स्यादादितो निर्विकल्पके ।
ततश्च सविकल्पेनैवाभावज्ञानमिच्छसि ।।

Indeed, if there were established the perceptibility of non-existence, then there could somehow be some contact, though with difficulty. That itself is not established up to now.

16. Further, the non-existence and the floor are devoid of the relation of qualification and the qualified, because there is no other relation, like the Meru and the Vindhya; hence in this case there is not even the relation of qualification and the qualified. And so how can there be a discussion about what does not exist, whether it is a relation?

17. Further,

In the case of a non-determinate cognition, there cannot be to start with the recollection of the counter-correlate. And therefore, you prefer the cognition of non-existence to be only determinate.

१८. तस्मादेवमनुमीयते। अभावः प्रत्यक्षो न भवति निर्विकल्पकानर्हत्वाद् अतीन्द्रियवस्तुवद् इति।

१९. तदेवं नैयायिकवैयात्यनिरोधादनुपलम्भवेद्य एवाभाव इति स्थितम्।

२०. **अभावाख्यं तु वस्त्वेव नास्तीत्याह प्रभाकरः।**
तेन प्रमाणचिन्तामेवैनां परिहसत्यसौ ॥
तमप्यपाकरिष्यामः पदार्थानां समर्थने।
तदेवं निष्प्रतिद्वन्द्वा षट्प्रमाणी समर्थिता ॥

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18. Therefore it is thus inferred: 'Non-existence cannot be perceptible, because it is not a fit object of a non-determinate cognition, like super-sensuous objects.'

19. Therefore having arrested in this way the obstinacy of the Logicians, it stands that non-existence is to be known only through non-perception.

20. Prabhākara says that there is no such thing at all called non-existence. Therefore he ridicules even this consideration about the means for its valid knowledge.

We shall refute him too when we establish the categories. So in this way, it has been established, as free from any opposition, that there are six means of valid knowledge.

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८. उपसंहारः

ये तु संभवमैतिह्यमिति मानान्तरं विदुः ।
तेऽनुमाने च शाब्दे च चोरवृत्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।।

तथाहि—

यत्सहस्रादिसंख्यासु शतादेः सत्त्ववेदनम् ।
खार्यादिपरिमाणेषु प्रस्थादिग्रहणं च यत् ।।
तत्संभव इति प्राहुरन्तर्भावो हि संभवः ।
तच्चानुमानिकं ज्ञानमिच्छन्ति स्वच्छचेतसः ।।

8. Conclusion

Those who declare Inclusion and Tradition as distinct means of knowledge, they have taken to the life of robbers in the region of Inference and Authority.

It is thus:

The inclusion of the number hundred, etc. in thousand, etc. and the knowledge of *prastha*, etc. as contained within *khārī*, etc.

This they say is Inclusion. Indeed, inclusion means to be within. Clear-minded persons prefer to consider this as inferential knowledge.

एकस्य तावद् द्वित्वादौ समावेशनिरीक्षणात् ।
ज्ञायतेऽधिकसंख्यायामल्पसंख्यासमन्वयः ।।
ततश्च व्याप्तिविज्ञानादल्पसंख्याः शतादयः ।
सहस्रादिषु गम्येरन्नधिकत्वेन हेतुना ।।
तथैव परिमाणेष्वप्यधिकादल्पवेदनम् ।
ऊह्यमित्यनुमानत्वसंभवात् संभवो हतः ।।
प्रवादमात्रशरणं वाक्यमैतिह्यमुच्यते ।
वटे वटे वैश्रवणस्तिष्ठतीत्यादिकं यथा ।।

Now, from observing the inclusion of 'one' in 'two', etc. one understands the inclusion of the smaller number in the larger number.

And from the knowledge of this pervasion, hundred, etc. which are smaller numbers, are known to be included within thousand, etc. through 'the latter being larger' as probans.

In the same way, among measures, the knowledge of the smaller from the bigger is to be inferred. Thus, since inferential character is possible, Inclusion is dead.

What is called Tradition is said to be a statement depending on common talk; for example, 'Vaiśravaṇa sits on every banyan tree.'

तत् प्रायो मूलराहित्यादप्रमाणतयेष्यते ।
नन्वेवं कृष्णरामादिकथापि हि कथं हि वः ।।
मैवं स्मृतिवदाप्तोक्तिप्रसिद्धया मूलसंभवात् ।
मानान्तराविरोधाच्च शाब्दमेव हि तादृशम् ।।
किंच कृष्णादिवृत्तान्तसाधुता साधु साधिता ।
न्यायनिर्णयकारेण पुरुषोत्कर्षसाधने ।।
तस्मात् कुत्रचिदैतिह्यं सत्यं चेच्छाब्दमेव तत् ।
अतः षडेव मानानि मानयन्ति मनीषिणः ।।

This is recognized to be not a means of valid knowledge, since, as a general rule, it has no foundation. Now, if it be so, then, indeed, how do you take the story of Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, etc.?

Not so; because, like the Codes, they can have a foundation, being well known to be the words of reliable persons; and because there is no opposition to other means of valid knowledge, such things are certainly Authority.

Further, the authenticity of the story of Kṛṣṇa, etc. has been firmly established by the author of *Nyāyanirṇaya* in establishing the superiority of the Puruṣa.

Therefore, if in any case, Tradition is true, that is only Authority. Therefore, scholars pay heed only to six means of knowledge.

[1]राम षड् युक्तयो लोके याभिः सर्वोऽनुदृश्यते ।
इति रामायणेऽप्युक्तं तस्मात् सर्वं सुमङ्गलम् ॥

इति प्रमाणखण्डः समाप्तः ।

'Oh Rāma, in the world there are six means whereby everything is known.' Thus has it been said in the *Rāmāyaṇa* too. Therefore everything is auspicious.

THUS ENDS THE SECTION DEALING WITH THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

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[1] *Rāmāyaṇa* III. 72. 8.

२. प्रमेयानि

१. उपोद्घातः

कुमारिलवचोजालपयोधिशरदिन्दवे ।
शिष्यसंतानसंतानतरवे गुरवे नमः ॥
यत्कीर्तिर्न हि माति हन्त महति ब्रह्माण्डभाण्डोदरे
यस्याज्ञां प्रणतैः शिरोभिरनिशं धत्ते नृपाणां गणः ।
सोऽयं नाटकतर्ककाव्यनिपुणः प्रज्ञातपातञ्जलो
भक्तश्चक्रिणि मानवेदनृपतिर्जागर्ति पृथ्वीतटे ॥

II. OBJECTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

1. Introduction

To the autumn moon risen from the ocean of the flood of Kumārila's words, to the Santāna tree for the array of his disciples, to the Teacher may this salutation be.

There remains awake on this earth King Mānaveda whose fame cannot be contained, alas, within the sphere of the universe, whose commands the host of kings bear ever on their bended heads, who is proficient in drama, logic and poetry, well versed in the system of Patañjali, and devoted to Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

पृथ्वीवृत्रजिता नितान्तमहितेनैतेन संचोदितै-
रस्माभिः कृशशेमुषीविलसितैरभ्यासहीनैरपि ।
प्राङ् नारायणसूरिणा विरचितं सन्मानमेयोदयं
मोहात् पूरयितुं कृता मतिरियं सन्तः प्रसीदन्तु नः ॥
प्रमेयं बहुधा लोके प्राहुः प्राभाकरादयः ।
प्रमाणाभासविश्वासव्याकुलीभूतचेतसः ॥
आचार्यमतपीयूषपारावारविहारिणः ।
वयं तावत् प्रमेयं तु द्रव्यजातिगुणक्रियाः ।
अभावश्चेति पञ्चैतान् पदार्थानाद्रियामहे ॥

Commanded by this earthly Indra of extraordinary glory, though our intellectual flashes are dim, though we lack intellectual discipline, we have through ignorance entertained the idea of completing the good work *Mānameyodaya* written formerly by the scholar Nārāyaṇa; may good people be favourable to us.

The followers of Prabhākara and others speak of the objects of valid knowledge in various ways, their minds being disturbed by faith in fallacious means of knowledge.

We, however, who sport in the nectar-ocean of the doctrine of the Preceptor, recognize as objects of valid knowledge, these five categories, namely substance, genus, quality, action and non-existence.

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२. द्रव्यम्

१. **परिमाणगुणाधारं द्रव्यं द्रव्यविदो विदुः ।**

तार्किकास्तु गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यम् इत्याहुः । तत्तु—
चतुर्विंशतिरुद्दिष्टा गुणाः कणभुजा स्वयम् ।

इति गुणानां संख्याश्रयत्वात् संख्यायाश्च गुणत्वस्वीकाराद् गुणेष्वतिव्याप्तम् । समवायस्याभावे समवायिनो दूरनिरस्तत्वात् समवायिकारणं द्रव्यम् इत्यपि निरसनीयम् । उक्तया रीत्या गुणेषु संख्यासमवायाद् गुणेष्वतिव्याप्तिश्च ।

2. Substance

1. Those who know what substance is know it as the abode of the quality, size.

But the Logicians say that a substance is the abode of qualities.

'Twenty-four qualities have been enumerated by Kaṇāda himself.'

In this, since qualities are the abode of number and since number is accepted as a quality, this is over-pervasive in respect of qualities. When inherence is non-existent, the abode of inherence is rejected at a distance; hence that substance is the inherent cause is also to be rejected; also because, in the manner stated, as number inheres in qualities, there is over-pervasion in respect of qualities.

२. नापि परिमाणस्य गुणत्वाद् गुणानां च द्वितीयक्षण एवोत्पत्तेः प्रथमे क्षणे परिमाणाश्रयत्वाभावादव्याप्तिः गुणगुणिनोः समानकालोत्पत्तिस्वीकारात्। तथा सति गुणगुणिनोः समानसामग्रीकत्वाद् अभेदप्रसङ्गस्तु तादात्म्यवादिनामस्माकं न कमपि दोषमापादयति।

३. नन्वेवं सति गुणगुणिनोः परस्परं कार्यकारणभावो न स्यात्। न हि समानकालीनयोरन्योऽन्यं कार्यकारणभावः अन्यत्र दृष्टचरः। इति चेद् मैवम्। समानकालीनयोरपि गुणिगुणयोरुपादानोपादेयभावस्य दृष्टत्वादेवोपपत्तेः। न चैतद् दर्शनं भ्रमः। बाधकाभावात्। तस्मात् परिमाणाश्रयो द्रव्यम्।

2. Nor is there under-pervasion too for the reason that size is a quality, that a quality is produced only at the second moment, and that in the first moment it is not the abode of size; because we accept for a quality and what has that quality origination at the same time. The contingency of the quality and what has that quality being non-distinct, since, when this is the case, both of them have common causal aggregates, does not bring about any defect to us who accept their identity.

3. Now, 'If this be so, between the quality and what has that quality there would not be the reciprocal relation of effect and cause; indeed elsewhere has never before been seen the reciprocal relation of effect and cause between what are produced at the same time.' If this be said, it is not so; because this is intelligible even through the relation of material cause and the effect of the material cause being seen to exist between what has a quality and that quality, though

४. पृथिवी सलिलं तेजः पवमानस्तमस्तथा ।
व्योमकालदिगात्मानो मनः शब्द इति क्रमात् ॥
एकादशविधं चैतत् कुमारिलमते मतम् ।
यथाशास्त्रं विधास्यामस्तत्स्वरूपनिरूपणम् ॥

५. तत्र तावद् गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा पुनर्धराधरमहीरुहादिरूपा । न च अनुमानादीनि बाधकानि । तेषां बलवत्प्रत्यक्षविरोधादनुमानाद्यनुत्थानात् । अन्यथा वह्निशैत्यानुमानादेरपि उत्थानप्रसङ्गः ।

६. शरीरघ्राणेन्द्रियरूपा च । तत्र आत्मभोगायतनं

simultaneous. And this sight is not a delusion, because there is no sublator. Therefore, substance is the abode of size.

4. Earth, water, fire, air, similarly darkness, ether, time, space, and soul, mind and sound, in this order.

It is of eleven kinds, as recognized in the system of Kumārila. In accordance with the teaching, we undertake to determine their nature.

5. Now, of these, earth is what has smell. This again, is of the form of mountains, trees, etc. And inference, etc. are not sublators; because, being in opposition to perception, which is a stronger means of valid knowledge, inference, etc. do not arise. Otherwise it would follow that even an inference of fire being cold to the touch could arise.

6. And it is of the form of the body, and the sense of smell. Here, the body is the vehicle for the enjoyment of

शरीरम्। तत्तु जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जभेदेन चतुर्विधम्। तत्र जरायुजं मनुष्यादिशरीरम्। अण्डजं पतङ्गादिशरीरम्। स्वेदजं मशकादिशरीरम्। उद्भिज्जं वृक्षादिशरीरम्।

७. तत्रोद्भिज्जानां शरीरत्वं नास्तीति प्राभाकराः। यथाह शालिकनाथः। उद्भिज्जं शरीरं न भवत्येव इन्द्रियायतनत्वे प्रमाणाभावाद् इति।

८. तदयुक्तम्।

श्मशाने जायते वृक्षः कङ्कगृध्रनिषेवितः॥
नलकूबमणिग्रीवावासतुर्यमलार्जुनौ॥

the soul. But this is of four kinds, being divided into what is produced from the womb, what is produced from eggs, what is produced from perspiration, and what is produced from sprouts. Of these, what is produced from the womb is the human body, etc.; what is produced from eggs is the body of birds, etc.; what is produced from perspiration is the body of flies, etc.; what is produced from sprouts is the body of trees, etc.

7. Of these, the followers of Prabhākara say that what are produced from sprouts are not bodies. So says Śālikanātha: 'What is produced from sprouts cannot be a body at all, because there is no means of valid knowledge in respect of being the abode for sense-organs.'

8. This does not stand to reason; because that is in conflict with the statements in Codes and Epics like:

In the burial ground one is born as a tree resorted to by eagles and vultures.

इत्यादिस्मृतिपुराणवचनविरोधात् ।

९. ननु निर्मूलमेवेदं वचनम् । तदुक्तं शालिकनाथैः । अस्याः स्मृतेर्निर्मूलतया वाक्यार्थत्वानुपपत्तेः । न च वेदमूलत्वमवकल्पते अकार्यत्वात् । यस्तु वेदे तथा भूतार्थपदप्रयोगः स गौणेनार्थेन लाक्षणिक्या वृत्त्या वा योजनीयः । इति त्रिविधमेव शरीरम् । इति ।

१०. तदप्ययुक्तम् । न वेदानां कार्य एवार्थे तात्पर्यं किंतु सिद्धेऽपि इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । अतस्तन्मूलत्वात् प्रमाणमेवैवंभूतानि स्मृतिपुराणवचनानि ।

११. न चेन्द्रियायतनत्वे प्रमाणाभावादुद्भिज्जानामशरी-

As a pair of arjuna trees stood Nalakūba(ra) and Maṇigrīva.

9. Now, these words have no basis at all. This is said by Śālikanātha: 'Because this Code has no basis, it cannot intelligibly be the meaning of a sentence. Nor can a basis be assumed in the Veda; because this is not what is to be done. Those words, however, that are used thus in the Veda, meaning an existent object, they have to be construed either as meaning a subsidiary or as having a secondary signification. Hence, body is only of three kinds.'

10. This too does not stand to reason. Because it will be said: 'The purport of the Veda-s is not only in things that are to be done, but also in those that are existent.' Therefore, being based on that, the statements of this nature in the Codes and in the Epics are certainly authoritative.

11. And it should not be said that, since there is no means for the valid knowledge of their being the abode of

रत्वम् इति वाच्यम् । आमिषादिसदसद्भावनिबन्धनपुष्टिह्रासादिदर्शनेन दाहच्छेदादिभिः इतरशरीरवदेव वैगुण्यावाप्तिदर्शनेन च सुखदुःखानुभवे सिद्धे तैनेवेन्द्रियकल्पनोपपत्तेः । न ह्यनिन्द्रियाणां सुखदुःखानुभवः संभवति ।

१२. यत्पुनः अचेतने अर्थबन्धनाद् इत्यत्र 'ओषधे त्रायस्वैनम्' इत्यादिमन्त्रमुदाहृत्य ओषधीनामचेतनत्वमुक्तं तद् अभिमुखीभावाद्यभावप्रयुक्तं न तु चेतनानधिष्ठातृत्वप्रयुक्तं तावन्मात्रस्यैव प्रकरणोपयोगात् । अत एवाहुराचार्याः । 'न चाचेतनस्याभिमुख्यं संभवति । न च पशुत्राणे प्रैषणप्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते' इति । चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वेऽपि ओषधीनामाभिमुख्याद्यभावः। वृक्षाद्यारोहण-

sense-organs, what are produced from sprouts are not bodies; when because there is found growth and decay which are conditioned by the presence and absence of nourishment, etc. and there is found the effecting of loss of qualities, exactly as for other bodies, by burning, cutting, etc. the experience of happiness and misery is established, even from this itself the assumption of sense-organs is intelligible. Indeed, for those that have no sense-organs, experience of happiness and misery is not possible.

12. As for what again was said that herbs have no intelligence, after quoting the *mantra*, 'Oh herb, protect this', in connection with, 'Because what is sought is associated with non-intelligent beings' this is due to the absence of their facing one, not due to their not being controlled by intelligence; because that alone is what is wanted in the context. For this very reason say the Preceptors, 'And for a non-intelligent being, facing towards one is not possible;

दर्शनेनैव चेतनाधिष्ठानत्वं कल्पनीयम्। भवतु वा वाचस्पतिमिश्रादिमतेन वृक्षादीनामचेतनत्वम्। तथापि नास्मन्मते किंचन हीयते। स्मृतिपुराणवचनानाम् अकार्यत्वादप्रामाण्यम् इत्येवास्माभिः प्रयत्नेन निराकार्यम्। अतः चतुर्विधं त्रिविधं वा शरीरम्।

१३. स्वाभाविकद्रवत्वाधिकरणं सलिलम्। तत्तु सरःसरित्सरस्वत्करकादिरूपं रसनेन्द्रियरूपं च।

१४. उष्णस्पर्शगुणं तेजः। तत् पुनरर्कचन्द्राग्निनक्षत्रसुवर्णादिरूपं नयनेन्द्रियरूपं च। तस्य पुनरुद्भूतानुद्भूताभिभूतभेदेन त्रिविधौ रूपस्पर्शौ। तत्रोद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं तेजस्तप्तायस-

and employing it in protecting the animals is unintelligible.' Although the herbs are controlled by intelligence, they do not face one and do such other things. That intelligence abides in them is to be assumed even from their climbing trees, etc. Or, according to the view of Vācaspatimiśra and others, let trees, etc. have no intelligence; even then there is no harm to our system. What is wanted to be refuted by us with effort is only that statements in Codes and Epics are non-authoritative because of their not being what is to be done. Therefore, bodies are of four or three kinds.

13. Water is the abode of natural fluidity. This, however, is of the form of lakes, rivers, oceans, hail, etc. and of the form of the sense of taste.

14. Fire is what has the quality of hot touch. That again is of the form of the sun, the moon, (ordinary) fire, the stars, gold, etc. and of the form of the sense of sight. Of this again, colour and touch are of three kinds, namely apparent, non-apparent and suppressed. Of these, fire with

पिण्डादिगतम् । अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं तेजो नयनेन्द्रियम् । अभिभूतरूपस्पर्शं तेजः सुवर्णम् । अभिभवस्तु बलवद्भिः पार्थिवरूपादिभिरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । तयोरेव रूपस्पर्शयोरेकैकानुद्भवे सति द्विविधं तेजः । तत्रोद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं तेजः प्रदीपप्रभामण्डलम् । अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शं तेजस्तप्तवारिगतम् । एवमभिभवेऽपि त्रैविध्यं द्रष्टव्यम् । तत्र सुवर्णे रूपस्पर्शयोरुभयोरभिभवः । उपलभ्यमानस्तु स्पर्शः तद्गतायाः पृथिव्या एव । अत एवानुष्णाशीतस्पर्शोपलम्भः । एवं तेजोऽन्तरप्रकाश्यत्वदर्शनेन रूपाभिभवोऽपि साधनीयः । चन्द्रिकायां जलस्पर्शादुष्णस्पर्शाभिभवः । झटिति प्रक्षिप्तजले तप्तायसपिण्डादौ रूपाभिभव इति ।

apparent colour and touch is what is present in a hot iron-ball, etc.; fire with non-apparent colour and touch is the sense of sight; fire with suppressed colour and touch is gold. It must be seen that the suppression is by the colour, etc. of the earth, which are more powerful. Of this same colour and touch, through one or the other alone being non-apparent, fire is of two kinds. Of these, fire with apparent colour and non-apparent touch is the orb of light around a torch; fire with non-apparent colour and apparent touch is what is present in hot water. Similarly, in the case of suppression too, a three fold division is to be understood. Of these, in gold there is suppression of both colour and touch. But the touch that is perceived is only of the earth that is present in it. It is for this very reason that a touch neither hot nor cold is perceived. In the same way is to be established the suppression of colour too, as it is seen to be manifested by another light. In moonlight there is suppression of the hot

१५. अरूपत्वे सति स्पर्शवान् वायुः । स च मन्दवातनिःश्वासवातादिरूपस्त्वगिन्द्रियरूपश्च ।

१६. तत्रेन्द्रियभूतानां भूतानामर्थापत्तिगम्यत्वं प्रागेव समर्थितम् । अन्यानि तु प्रत्यक्षलक्ष्याणि । तत्र पृथिव्यप्तेजसां प्रत्यक्षत्वे न विवादः । वायुरनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शानुमेय इति तार्किकाः । तथाहि—योऽयं वायौ वात्यनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शोऽनुभूयते स तु व्योमादीनामस्पर्शवत्त्वान्न तद्गुणः । नापि जलतेजसोः । तयोः शीतोष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । नापि पृथिव्याः तस्या नयनेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेनानुपलम्भनिरस्तत्वात् । अतः पारिशेष्याद् वायुसिद्धिः इति ।

touch through the contact of water. In a hot iron ball, etc. on which water is suddenly poured, there is suppression of colour.

15. Air is what has touch, while having no colour. And that is of the form of gentle breeze, the breath, etc. and of the form of the sense of touch.

16. Of these, those forms of these elements, which are sense-organs, have already been established as to be understood through Presumption; the others, however, are known through perception. Among these, there is no controversy in respect of the perceptibility of earth, water and fire. The Logicians say that air, however, is to be inferred from touch that is neither hot nor cold. It is thus: this touch, which is neither hot nor cold, that is experienced when the breeze blows, this is not the quality of ether, etc. because they are not tangible; nor of water and fire, because their touches are cold and hot respectively; nor even of earth, because this is rejected even through non-perception, earth

१७. तदिदमज्ञानविजृम्भितम् । शीतादिषु स्पर्शविशेषेषूपलभ्यमानेषु शीतो वायुरुष्णो वायुरनुष्णाशीतो वायुरिति वायुद्रव्यस्यैकस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् कृष्णो घटः पीतो घटः श्वेतो घट इतिवत् सकलस्पर्शानुगतमेकमेव वायुद्रव्यं प्रत्यभिजानतां भवतां स्पर्शमात्रमेव वयं प्रत्यभिजानीमो नान्यत् किंचिदिति वचनमनुभवविरुद्धमेव ।

१८. प्रयोगश्च भवति । वायुः प्रत्यक्षः महत्त्वानिन्द्रियत्वे सति स्पर्शवत्त्वाद् भूतत्वाद्वा घटवद् इति । यत् पुनः वायुरप्रत्यक्षः अनात्मत्वे सति नीरूपद्रव्यत्वाद् मनोवद् इत्युक्तं तदरूपिद्रव्याणामपि दिक्कालादीनाम् अस्मन्मते प्रत्यक्षत्वात् तेष्वनैकान्तिकम् ।

being capable of apprehension by the sense of sight. Therefore by elimination, air is established.

17. This is the expression of ignorance. Since, when particular touches, like cold touch, etc. are experienced, there is the recognition of the same substance, air, in the form, 'The air is cold,' 'The air is hot,' 'The air is neither hot nor cold,' your statement, 'We recognize only the mere touch, nothing else,' is certainly against experience, because as in, 'The jar is dark,' 'The jar is yellow,' 'The jar is white,' you have the recognition of one and the same substance, air, uniform in all touches.

18. And there is the syllogism: 'Air is perceptible, because while it is gross and is not a sense-organ, it is tangible, or, because it is an element, like a jar.' As for what was said, 'Air is not perceptible, because while it is not the soul, it is a colourless substance, like the mind,' this is 'non-conclusive' in respect of space, time, etc. which, though colourless, are perceptible, according to our system.

१९. नापि पारिशेष्याद् वायुसिद्धिः। असिद्धद्रव्यकल्पनातः सिद्धस्यैव द्रव्यस्य गुणान्तरकल्पनाया लघीयस्तरत्वात्। कल्पनालाघवस्यैव हि गुणवत्तरत्वमाहुराचार्याः—

कल्पनालाघवं यत्र तं पक्षं रोचयामहे।
कल्पनागौरवं यत्र तं पक्षं न सहामहे॥

इति। अतस्त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यो वायुः।

२०. अस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति रूपवत् तमः। तच्च नेत्रेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यमालोकाभावप्रकाश्यं कृष्णरूपम्।

19. Nor is there establishment of air through elimination; because it is more in keeping with parsimony to assume a new quality for an established substance than to assume a non-established substance. The Preceptors say that it is only parsimony in the matter of assumption that is indeed far the better:

> Where there is parsimony in the matter of assumption, we prefer that alternative; we do not put up with that alternative where there is prolixity in the matter of assumption.

Therefore, air is what is apprehended through the sense of touch.

20. Darkness is that which, while being intangible, has colour. And this can be apprehended by the sense of sight alone, can be manifested in the absence of light, and has black colour.

कलायकोमलच्छायं दर्शनीयं भृशं दृशाम् ।
तमः कृष्णं विजानीयादागमप्रतिपादितम् ।।

तत् पुनरन्धतमसादिरूपम् ।

२१. 'आलोकाभावस्तमः' इति तार्किकाः। तदयुक्तम् ।

गुणकर्मादिसद्भावादस्तीति प्रतिभासतः ।
प्रतियोग्यस्मृतेश्चैव भावरूपं ध्रुवं तमः ।।

२२. **नीलादिरूपयुक्तस्य स्पर्शवत्त्वं च दृश्यते ।**
स्पर्शाभावान्न रूपि स्यात् तम इत्यप्यपेशलम् ।।

One should understand darkness as black, as having the beautiful shade of the *kalāya* flower, as quite perceptible to the sense of sight and as declared in scripture.

That again is of the nature of pitch darkness, etc.

21. Logicians say that darkness is the absence of light. This does not stand to reason.

Because of the existence of qualities, actions, etc. because of the appearance that it exists, and even because of the non-recollection of the counter-correlate, darkness is certainly of an existent nature.

22. 'What has blue colour, etc. is found to be tangible too; darkness cannot have colour, since it is not tangible.' This is not a correct view;

स्पर्शयुक्तस्य सर्वत्र रूपवत्त्वं च दृश्यते ।
रूपाभावेन वायोरप्यस्पर्शत्वप्रसङ्गतः ॥

स्पष्टदृष्टरूपस्पर्शत्वं चोभयत्रापि तुल्यमेव ।

२३. 'आलोकादर्शने सति ग्राहकभूतात्मस्वरूपोपलम्भात् सामान्यतो नीलद्रव्यस्मरणे सति स्मृतित्वमगृह्णतस्तयोर्भेदाग्रहनिबन्धनस्तमोनैल्यव्यवहारः' इति गुरुमतम् ।

२४. तदपि हास्यम् । आत्मग्रहणस्य नैल्यस्मृत्या भेदाग्रहे सति इदं नीलम् इति व्यवहारमपहाय अहं नील इति

Because, in the case of every tangible thing
there is found colour too, and since air has no
colour it would result that air is not tangible.

In both these cases the position is the same in respect of the possession of clearly manifested colour and touch.

23. When light is not seen, because of the perception of the form of the Self who is the apprehender, there is the recollection of blue substances generally; in respect of one who does not apprehend the recollection-form of this, there is the empirical usage of darkness being blue, conditioned by the non-apprehension of distinction between the two (the perception and the recollection). This is the doctrine of the Guru.

24. This too deserves ridicule; because the result would be that, when there is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the recollection of blueness and the apprehension of the Self, one should discard the empirical usage, 'This is blue', and should accept the empirical usage, 'I am blue'; and because it is unintelligible to assume as based on

व्यवहारस्वीकारप्रसङ्गात् । देशान्तरे कालान्तरे चाप्यबाधितस्य प्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तिमूलत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च ।

२५. ननु तमसश्चाक्षुषत्वे पिहितलोचनस्य पटलपिहितलोचनस्यात्यन्तान्धस्य च कथं नीलं तम इति प्रतीतिः ।

२६. तत्र पटलपिहितलोचनस्य पिहितलोचनस्य च तत्तदावरणच्छायाग्रहणात् तमोव्यवहारः । महत्त्वभ्रमस्तु सामीप्यदोषात् । पक्ष्मादीनमग्रहणं तु निमीलनदशायामालोकाभावात् । उन्मीलनदशायामार्जवस्थित्यभावादिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

२७. 'अत्यन्तान्धानां पुनर्नीलबुद्धिरेवासिद्धा । तमसीव प्रविष्टोऽहम्' इत्यादिवाक्यं पुनः 'अमृतमिव पाथः

delusion a cognition which is unsublated at any other place or time.

25. Now, if darkness is visible, how can there be the cognition, 'darkness is blue' in the case of one who is blindfolded, or whose eye-sight is dimmed by a film, or who is absolutely blind?

26. There, in the case of one whose eye-sight is dimmed by a film or who is blindfolded, there is the empirical usage of darkness on account of the apprehension of the shade of the respective coverings. The delusion of grossness is due to the defect of proximity. But the non-apprehension of the eyelashes, etc. is due to the absence of light at the time when the eyes are closed. When they are open, it is due to their not being straight in front (of the eye).

27. Then, in the case of those who are absolutely blind, the cognition of blueness itself is non-established. Then,

पीतम्' इत्यादिवाक्यवद् वाक्यान्तरश्रवणजनितसंस्कारवशादिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

२८. 'तमः कृष्णं व्यक्तमस्थित' इति श्रुतिरपि तमसो नीलरूपतामनुवदति। तस्माद् द्रव्यान्तरं तमः नीलात्मकत्वाद् नीलोत्पलनैल्यवत्। पृथिवीगुणस्तम इति कौमारिलेष्वेव केचिन्मानरत्नावलीकारादयः प्राहुः। तदप्यनुमन्यामहे। अतस्तमो द्रव्यं गुणो वा। गुणपक्षे दश द्रव्याणि।

२९. एतानि पञ्चावयविद्रव्याणि। अवयवाश्च परमाणवः। अत्रावयवव्यतिरिक्तावयविसद्भावं प्रतिषेधयन्तो बौद्धास्तु 'महानेको घटः' इत्याद्यबाधितप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणबलेन परिहर्तव्याः।

statements like, 'I have entered darkness as it were', etc. must be seen to be due to impressions produced by hearing other statements, as in the case of 'The water is drunk like nectar', etc.

28. The scripture too, 'Black darkness stood clear' restates that darkness is blue. Therefore darkness is a distinct substance, because it is blue in character, like the blueness of the dark lily. Some among the followers of Kumārila like the author of the *Mānaratnāvalī* say that darkness is a quality of earth. That too we permit. Therefore darkness is either a substance or a quality. If it be a quality, then substances are ten.

29. These five are substances with parts. The parts are the primal atoms. Here the Buddhists, who deny the

३०. अत्र तार्किकाः पुनरस्मदादीनामनुमानैकगम्यान् योगिनां प्रत्यक्षोपलक्ष्यांश्च कांश्चन पदार्थविशेषान् परमाणून् नाद्रियन्ते । तैरिदमखिलमवयविद्रव्यं कुलाल इव घटं परमेश्वरः सृष्टिकाले द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण विरचयति कविरिव काव्यमखिलमपि वेदराशिमारचयति संहारकाले च बालक इव घटं चतुर्विधमवयविद्रव्यं परमाणुपर्यन्तं विनाशयति इति प्रतिपन्नाः ।

३१. जालरन्ध्रविसरद्रवितेजो-
जालभासुरपदार्थविशेषान् ।
अल्पकानिह पुनः परमाणून्
कल्पयन्ति हि कुमारिलशिष्याः ।।

existence of a whole as distinct from the parts, must be refuted on the strength of the unsublated perceptual valid cognition, 'This jar is one and gross', etc.

30. Here, the Logicians recognize as primal atoms particular entities which can be understood by people like us only through inference, and which can be seen by Yogin-s through perception. By them it is declared that the Supreme Lord creates through the stages of binary atoms, etc. all these substances with parts at the time of creation, as a potter makes a jar; that he composes the entire mass of the Veda-s, as a poet composes a poem; and that he breaks up the four-fold substances with parts right down to the primal atoms at the time of dissolution, as a child breaks a jar.

31. Those particular minute entities shining in the sun-beam proceeding through the opening of a window, these then the disciples

तदतिरिक्तप्रमाणाभावादनुपयोगाच्च तदतिरिक्तकल्पनस्य ।

३२. नन्वस्त्येव तदतिरिक्ते प्रमाणम् । वातायनातपगतः पदार्थोऽवयवी मध्यममहत्त्वाद् घटवद् इत्यनुमानेन तस्य स्वन्यूनपरिमाणारम्भकसिद्धिः । न च महत्त्वमसिद्धं दृश्यद्रव्यत्वहेतुना घटादिवन्महत्त्वसमर्थनादित्यस्ति तदतिरिक्तप्रमाणसिद्धिरिति ।

३३. मैवम् । आपेक्षिके हि पदार्थानां महत्त्वाल्पत्वे । यद्येतस्मादपि न्यूनपरिमाणः कश्चित् प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्येत तर्हि महानेवायम् । स च नोपलभ्यते । अनुमानं पुनर्योग्यानुपलम्भबाधितविषयत्वादप्रमाणम् ।

of Kumārila, indeed, assume as the primal atoms in this connection.

because there is no means for the valid knowledge of anything beyond these, and because there is no need for the assumption of anything beyond these.

32. Now, there is this means for the valid knowledge of something beyond these. By the inference, 'The entity present in the sun's rays falling through the window, is a whole, because it is of intermediate grossness, like a jar' it is established that it is produced by those which have a size smaller than its own. And their grossness is not non-established, because their grossness is justified as the cause of a substance being visible, as a jar, etc.; thus there is the establishment of a means for the valid knowledge of something beyond these.

33. This is not so. Grossness and smallness of things are, indeed, relative. If through perception anything is known as smaller in size than another, then certainly the

३४. एवमपि दृश्यस्य घटादिवन्महत्त्वं साधयतां तार्किकाणामवयव्यारम्भकस्य मृत्पिण्डादेरवयवित्वमहत्त्वयोर्दर्शनेन तदारम्भकाणामप्येवमणुतरतमभावस्य न क्वचिदपि विश्रमः। तथाच सति मशकमत्तमातङ्गयोरप्यनन्तावयवारब्धत्वाविशेषेण तुल्यपरिमाणत्वादिबहुविधदृष्टविरोधः प्रसज्येत। तस्माल्लोकसिद्धानेव वयं परमाणूनाद्रियामहे।

३५. नापि योगिप्रत्यक्षात् तत्सिद्धिः। योगिनामपि प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजं प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षवत्। योगी-

latter is gross; and such a thing is not known. The inference, then, is invalid, its content being sublated by the non-perception of the capable.

34. Similarly too, in the case of the Logicians who establish grossness in what is visible as in a jar, since a mass of clay, etc. which produce an object with parts is seen itself to have parts and to be gross, this relation of being smaller and still smaller among what produce them too has no finality anywhere. And this being so, there would result sameness of size for a fly and for an excited elephant, both being produced by an infinite number of parts, and such opposition to experience in many ways. Therefore we recognize as primal atoms only such as are established in experience.

35. Nor can they be established through yogic perception. 'The perception of the Yogin-s too is produced by sense-contact, because it is perception, like the perception of those like us.' 'The sense-organs of the Yogin-s do not have supersensuous things as objects, because they are sense-organs, like the sense-organs of those like us.' In this way,

न्द्रियमतीन्द्रियविषयकं न भवति इन्द्रियत्वात्, अस्मदादीन्द्रियवत् । इति योगिप्रत्यक्षस्याप्यस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षानतिरेकसिद्धेस्तदतिरिक्त-परमाणुसिद्धावपि नास्मन्मते किंचन हीयते । इत्यास्तामेतत् ।

३६. नापीश्वरारब्धं जगत् वेदव्यतिरेकेणेश्वरसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । अस्तु वेदादेव तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न । वेदानामपीश्वरकर्तृकत्वं साधयतां तार्किकाणां वेदप्रामाण्यादीश्वरसिद्धिः ईश्वरप्रामाण्याच्च वेदसिद्धिः इतीतरेतराश्रयचक्रकयोः प्रसङ्गात् ।

३७. ननु क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् इत्यनुमानं तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि ईश्वरः शरीरी वा न वा । नाद्यः उपलम्भयोग्यत्वे सति कैश्चिदप्यनुप-

since it is established that yogic perception too does not differ from the perception of those like us, even though there is the establishment thus of primal atoms as different from that, nothing is lost in our system. Thus let it rest.

36. Nor is the world created by God; because there is not, besides the Veda-s, any means for the valid knowledge of God. If it be said that His establishment may be from the Veda itself, no; because in the case of the Logicians who establish the creatorship by God even of the Veda-s, there is the establishment of God from the authoritativeness of the Veda-s, and of the Veda-s from the authoritativeness of God; and hence there would result the faults of mutual dependence and reasoning in a circle.

37. Now, if it be said that the means of valid knowledge in this case is the inference, namely 'Earth, etc. have a creator, because they are produced, like a jar', no; because

लम्भाद् भवद्भिरप्यनभ्युपगमाच्च । नाप्यशरीरी । अशरीरिणः करचरणाद्यवयवाभावेन जगन्निर्माणाशक्तेः ।

३८. अपिच—

शरीरेण विना यन्न कर्ता कुत्रापि दृश्यते ।
विशेषणविरुद्धं तत् कर्तृत्वमशरीरिणः ।।

यथा विशेषविरोधस्यानुमानदूषणत्वं तथानुमाननिर्णये वर्णितम् ।

३९. किंच घटादयः शरीरिकर्तृकाः, क्षित्यादयः पुनरीश्वरकर्तृका इति येन संनिवेशविशेषेण भवद्भिरप्यवधार्यते

it does not stand analysis. It is thus: Is God embodied or not? It cannot be the first; because, though He should be capable of perception He is not perceived by anybody, and it is not recognized by you too. Nor can He be non-embodied; because in the absence of hands, legs, etc. for the non-embodied there is no power to create the universe.

38. Further,

> Because no agent has anywhere been seen who is without a body, the agency of one without a body is 'contradictory to the particularity'.

How the 'contradiction of the particularity' is a defect in inference has been explained in the treatment of inference.

39. Again, that particularity by association with which it has been ascertained by you too that while a jar, etc. have an embodied creator, earth, etc. have God as creator, 'being in association with such a particularity' is an extraneous

घटादीनां तादृशसंनिवेशविशेषवत्त्वं सकर्तृकत्वे उपाधिरिति कार्यत्वमप्रयोजको हेतुः ।

४०. किंच आत्मत्वं क्षित्यादिकर्तृव्यक्तिसमवेतं न भवति जातित्वाद् गोत्ववत् । एवमेव गोत्वदृष्टान्तेन सत्त्वपर्यन्तं समर्थनात् प्रतिहेतुविरुद्धं च कार्यत्वम् ।

४१. इत्थं निरस्ते परमते स्वपक्षस्थापनार्थमनुमानमुच्यते । क्षित्यादयः कर्तृशून्याः शरीरिजन्यत्वाभावाद् आत्मवद् इति ।

४२. ननु क्षित्यादीनामकर्तृकत्वे कार्यत्वमेव हीयेत । उपादाननिमित्तासमवायिभेदेन त्रिविधं हि कारणम् । तत्र यत्

adjunct in respect of 'jar, etc. having a creator'; hence 'being produced' is a non-efficient probans.

40. Again, 'Soulness does not inhere in an individual who is the creator of earth, etc. because it is a genus, like cowness'. Since this can in this same way be justified in the case of all the genuses right up to existence, through the instance of cowness, 'being produced' is opposed by a counter-probans.

41. After refuting the theory of the opponents in this way, an inference is stated for the establishment of our view: 'Earth, etc. are devoid of a creator, because they are not produced by an embodied being, like the soul.'

42. Now, if earth, etc. have no creator, their being products will itself be given up. Indeed, causes are of three kinds, being divided into material, efficient and non-inherent.

कार्यमपि स्वात्मतयोपादत्ते तदुपादानकारणं यथा तन्तवः पटस्य। उपादानप्रत्यासन्नमनन्यथासिद्धमसमवायिकारणं यथा तस्यैव तन्तुसंयोगः। उक्तकारणद्वयानन्तर्भूतं कारणं निमित्तकारणं यथा तन्तुवायवेमादयः। तस्मात् क्षित्यादीनां तदभावे कथं कार्यत्वम्।

४३. उच्यते। नास्मन्मते कार्योत्पत्तौ त्रिविधकारणाकाङ्क्षा। जायते हि भूतभविष्यतोर्विषययोः समवाय्यसमवायिनिरपेक्षेण निमित्तमात्रेण ज्ञानेनैव प्राकट्याभिधानं कार्यम्। अतः कारणमात्रेण विनैव कार्योत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति कारणमात्रमेव कल्प्यम्। कर्त्रादिकं तु यथादर्शनमेवाङ्गीक्रियते।

Of these, what produces the effect too in its own form is the material cause, for example the yarn in respect of cloth. What is related to the material cause and is not 'otherwise explained' is the non-inherent cause, for example the conjunction of the yarn in respect of the same. A cause that is not included in the two already mentioned varieties of causes is the efficient cause, for example the weaver, the shuttle, etc. Therefore, in the absence of that (a creator) how can earth, etc. be a product?

43. This is the reply. In our system, there is no need for a threefold cause for the production of an effect. Indeed, in respect of objects past and future, there is produced the effect called manifestedness by cognition alone, even independently of an inherent and a non-inherent cause. Therefore, the production of an effect would be unintelligible only if there were no cause at all; hence it is only a mere cause which has to be assumed. A creator, etc. are recognized only according as they are perceived.

४४. ननु कर्त्रधिष्ठितत्वाभावे कथं कारणानां कार्यानुगुणतया परस्परोपसर्पणम्। न हि तन्तुवायमन्तरेण तन्तुतुरीप्रभृतयः पटोत्पत्तये परस्परमुपसर्पन्ति।

४५. यथा भवन्मते क्षित्यादिकर्तुः शरीरव्यापारेण विनैव कारणानां परस्परोपसर्पणं तथास्मन्मतेऽपीति ब्रूमः।

४६. अपिच सिद्धेऽपीश्वरे कर्तरि कथं भवन्मते सकलकालदेशेषु तुल्यतया प्रवृत्तयोर्विद्वेषादिकारणरहितयोरीश्वरेच्छाप्रयत्नयोः कादाचित्ककार्योत्पत्तिविघटनहेतुतया तत्कारणानां परस्परोपसर्पणहेतुत्वम्।

४७. तत्तद्भोगाधिकृततत्तच्चेतनगततत्तददृष्टपरिपाक-

44. Now, if the causes are not presided over by an agent, how do they approach one another in a way conducive to the product? Without the weaver, indeed, the yarn, the loom, etc. do not approach one another for the production of the cloth.

45. Our reply is that just as in your system the causes approach one another even without the bodily activity of a creator of earth, etc. so is it in our system too.

46. Further, even if God be established as the agent, for God's desire and effort, which, on your view, are active equally at all times and places and are devoid of causes like aversion, how can there be instrumentality to the reciprocal approach of causes in such a way as to cause the occasional production or destruction of particular effects?

47. If it be said that it is due to the fruition of particular 'unseen fruits' present in particular intelligences

वशादिति चेत् तर्हि तेनैव कारणानां परस्परोपसर्पणादिसिद्धेः किमीश्वरपरिकल्पनव्यसनेनेति सिद्धस्तार्किकेश्वरनिरासः।

४८. वैदिकेश्वरः परमकारुणिकः पुनरस्माकमनुगुण एव। एवमकर्तृकत्वसाधनात् प्रपञ्चस्यात्यन्तिको विनाशोऽपि परिहृतो भवति।

लोकस्यात्यन्तिको नाशो वैदिकानां न संमतः।
महतां वेदमार्गाणां स्रोतोभङ्गप्रसङ्गतः॥
ईश्वरो ननु लोकादौ वेदानपि विधास्यति।
ततो न वेदमार्गाणां विच्छेदो दोषमावहेत्॥

qualified for particular enjoyments, then, since by that alone there results the approach to one another, etc. of all causes, what is gained by the labour of postulating God? Thus there is effected the refutation of the Logicians' God.

48. Then the God of the (true) followers of the Veda-s is supremely merciful, and is certainly favourable to our system. Thus when it is established that for the universe there is no creator, its final dissolution too is refuted.

> The final dissolution of the universe is not acceptable to the (true) followers of the Veda-s, because it will result in an interruption of the flow along the great Vedic paths.
>
> Now, God will create the Veda-s too in the beginning of the universe; therefore the interruption in the Vedic paths does not import any trouble.

प्रयोगश्च भवति । 'वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वाद् भारतादिवाक्यवत्' इति ।

४९. अत्र वदामः ।

सोपाधिकं विरुद्धं च विशेषप्रतिहेतुभिः ।
वाक्यत्वं नैव वेदानां पौरुषेयत्वसाधकम् ॥

प्रमाणवाक्यानां पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्ये तावदक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरोपलक्ष्यमूलत्वमुपाधिः ।

५०. न चैवं सत्यष्टकादिकर्तव्यत्वप्रतिपादकानां मन्वादिवाक्यानामप्यपौरुषेयत्वापत्तिः । तेषामपि वेदवाक्यरूपमानान्तरोपलक्ष्यमूलत्वात् ।

And there is the syllogism: 'The Vedic sentences are of human origin, because they are sentences, like the sentences of the *Bhārata*, etc.'

49. To this we reply:

> Because there are extraneous adjuncts, because there is opposition to the particular and to counter-probans, 'being sentences' is not instrumental to the establishment of the human origin of the Veda-s.

In the matter of men having freedom in respect of authoritative sentences, the extraneous adjunct is 'being based on what is indicated by other means of valid knowledge, like the sense of sight'.

50. And it does not result that in the same way, even the words of Manu, etc. would be of non-human origin in

५१. मातापितृसम्बन्धोत्पन्नपाञ्चभौतिकशरीरत्वादिगुणविशिष्टानामेव पुरुषाणां वाक्यस्वातन्त्र्यदर्शनादतादृशस्य स्वातन्त्र्यकल्पनं विशेषविरुद्धं च ।

५२. विप्रतिपन्नः कालो न वेदशून्यः कालत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नकालवत् । विमतं वेदाध्ययनं परतन्त्राध्येतृकं वेदाध्ययनत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नाध्ययनवत् । आत्मत्वं वेदकर्तृव्यक्तिसमवेतं न भवति जातित्वाद् गोत्ववत् । इति प्रतिहेतुविरुद्धं च वाक्यत्वम् ।

५३. नन्वेवमेव भारतादीनामप्यपौरुषेयत्वं साधनीय-

so far as they declare that *aṣṭakā*, etc. are to be performed; because they too have as basis what is indicated by other means of valid knowledge in the form of Vedic sentences.

51. And since freedom in respect of sentences has been seen only in the case of persons qualified by the possession of a body, etc. produced through the union of father and mother and constituted of the five elements, the assumption of freedom in one who is not of this nature is opposed to the particular.

52. And, 'being of the nature of a sentence' is opposed to counter-probans in: 'The time under discussion is not devoid of the Veda-s, because it is time, like the well-known time.' 'The study of the Veda-s under discussion has as student one dependent on others, because it is the study of the Veda-s, like the known study of the Veda-s.' 'Soulness is not inherent in an individual who is the author of the Veda-s, because it is a genus, like cowness.'

53. If it be said that in this same way the *Bhārata*, etc. can be shown to be of non-human origin, no; because

मिति चेद् न। तेषां दृढतरकर्तृस्मरणबाधितविषयत्वात्। नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तत इति भवद्भिरभ्युपगतत्वाच्च।

५४. ननु श्रूयत एव वेदवाक्येषु वेदानां पौरुषेयत्वम्। 'वक्त्रेभ्यो वेदास्तस्य निःसृताः।' 'ऋग्वेद एवाग्नेरजायत यजुर्वेदो वायोः सामवेद आदित्यात्।' 'तस्मात् यज्ञात् सर्वहुतः ऋचः सामानि जज्ञिरे।' इत्यादिषु। अतः कथमपौरुषेयत्वम्।

५५. इति चेत् मैवम्। एतानि हि वाक्यानि परस्परविरुद्धानि प्रमाणान्तरबाधितविषयाणि च। 'आदित्यो यूपः' इत्यादिवाक्यवदेतेषामर्थवादत्वपरिकल्पनात्। काठकादिसमाख्यापि प्रवचननिमित्तैव। प्रवचनमिति प्रकृष्टाध्ययनमुच्यते।

in their case, the content of the inference becomes sublated by the very firm tradition of authorship, and because even you acknowledge that Logic does not extend to cases which are not known, or which are ascertained.

54. Now, in Vedic passages the human origin of the Veda-s is certainly declared; 'From his face the Veda-s proceeded.' 'The *Ṛgveda* was born even from the Fire; the *Yajurveda* from the Wind; the *Sāmaveda* from the Sun.' 'From that sacrifice of all-oblation the Ṛk-s and the Sāman-s were born' and so on; hence how is the origin non-human?

55. If this be asked it is not so. Indeed these passages are contradictory to one another and have their contents sublated by other means of valid knowledge; as in the case of 'The Sun is the sacrificial post', etc. these are accepted as praises. The appellations like 'pertaining to Kaṭha', etc. are also due to instruction alone. Praiseworthy study

कठप्रोक्तशाखाध्यायिनः कठाः। तेषामाम्नायः काठकमित्ये-तस्मिन्नर्थे वुञ्प्रत्ययस्मरणान्न कठादीनां वेदवाक्यविषयं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यमवगमयति। अतो न वेदवाक्यानां पुरुषानुप्रवेशाभा-वादप्रामाण्यगन्धोऽपि। पुरुषकृता हि शब्दे दोषाः।

५६. ननु पुरुषगुणनिबन्धना एव शब्दे गुणाः यथा रामायणादिषु। तस्मात् पुरुषाभावे पुरुषगुणस्य दूरापास्तत्वाद-प्रामाण्यं वेदवाक्यानां तदवस्थमेव।

५७. स्यादेतदेवं यदि गुणात् प्रामाण्यमित्यभ्युपगम्यते। न चैवमभ्युपगतमस्माभिः। तस्माद् गुणाभावेऽपि दोषाभावमात्रेण वेदानां प्रामाण्योपपत्तिः।

is instruction. Kaṭha-s are those who study the branch taught by Kaṭha. And since the suffix *vuñ* is taught in the sense 'the scripture pertaining to them is Kāṭhaka' there is not understood of 'Kaṭha', etc. 'independence' in respect of Vedic passages. Therefore in Vedic passages there is not even the odour of invalidity as a human element is not brought in. Indeed, defects in statements are imported by a human element.

56. Now, merits in statements are brought in only by merits in the human element, for example in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc. Therefore, in the absence of a human element, since the merits in the human element are thrown far off, invalidity in respect of the Veda-s remains in the same position.

57. This would be so, if it were acknowledged that validity is brought about by merits. And it is not thus acknowledged by us. Therefore validity of the Veda-s is

५८. अपिच स्वत एव सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यम् । अप्रामाण्यं तु कारणदोषैरापद्यते । यथा चक्षुरादीनां पित्तादिषु दोषेषु सत्सु शङ्खादिपीततामतिः, तदभावे च यथार्थभूतशुक्लिमावधारणम् ।

अत्र प्रामाण्यविषये वादिनो बहुधा जगुः ।
वदन्ति केचित् प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यमिति स्वतः ।।
उभयं परतः प्राहुरक्षपात्पक्षिलादयः ।
अप्रामाण्यं स्वतस्तत्र प्रामाण्यं परतो विदुः ।।
बौद्धा मीमांसकास्तत्र प्रामाण्यं तु स्वतो विदुः ।
अप्रामाण्यं तु परतस्तत्र चिन्ता विधीयते ।।

intelligible through the mere absence of defects, even though there be no merit.

58. Further, the validity of every cognition is intrinsic. But invalidity is brought about by defects in the causes. For example, when there are defects like jaundice, etc. in the sense of sight, etc. there results the cognition of the yellowness of the conch shell, etc.; and in their absence there is the ascertainment of the white colour which is the truth.

Here in the matter of validity, the disputants speak in different ways. Some say that validity and invalidity—these are intrinsic;

Akṣapāda, Pakṣila and others say that both are extrinsic. Invalidity is intrinsic, validity is extrinsic: so understand

the Buddhists. The Mīmāṃsaka-s understand validity to be intrinsic, but invalidity

५९. अत्र प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये सकलप्रमाणेषु स्वत एव वर्तमाने कारणगुणदोषाभ्यामभिव्यज्येते, अत्यन्तासतामुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। उपपत्तौ वा गगनकुसुमादीनामप्युत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। अत एव प्रागपि सन्त एव कार्यभूता मृदो घटादय इत्यस्माभिरभ्युपगम्यते। न चैवं सति कारकव्यापारानर्थक्यम् अभिव्यक्त्यर्थत्वात्तस्य। तस्मात् कारकव्यापाराद् घटाद्यभिव्यक्तिवद् गुणदोषाभ्यां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोरभिव्यक्तिरेव। इत्युभयमपि स्वतः। इति सत्कार्यवादिनां सांख्यानां मतम्।

६०. अत्र वदामः। यदि सर्वत्राप्यसतामनुत्पत्तिरेव तर्हि

to be extrinsic. A consideration of this point is taken up.

59. Here, 'Validity and invalidity, which are present in all cognitions as intrinsic, are manifested by merits and defects in the causes; because what is absolutely non-existent cannot intelligibly be produced; or if it be intelligible, the result would be that even sky-flower, etc. could be produced. For this very reason, it is recognized by us that the jar, etc. which are products of clay, were certainly existent even earlier. And there is no futility in the function of the causal conditions on this account; because that is for the purpose of manifestation. Therefore just like the manifestation of the jar, etc. by the function of the causal conditions, there is only the manifestation of the validity and invalidity too by merits and defects; hence both are intrinsic.' This is the view of the Sāṃkhya-s who uphold the prior existence of the product.

60. To this we reply thus. If in every case what is non-existent cannot at all be produced, then is there or is

मृदादिगतस्य घटादेः कारकव्यापारात् पूर्वमभिव्यक्तिरस्ति वा न वा। यद्यस्ति तर्हि कारकव्यापारानर्थक्यं तदवस्थमेव। अथ नास्ति तर्हि कथमसदुत्पत्तिः प्रतिषिध्येत। असत्या एवाभिव्यक्ते-रुत्पत्तिस्वीकारात्। तस्मान्नैतावता प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोरपि स्व-तस्त्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्।

६१. अपिच पयःपावकयोरिवात्यन्तविरुद्धयोः प्रामाण्या-प्रामाण्ययोः कथमेकस्मिन्नेव ज्ञाने समावेशोपपत्तिः। तस्मादुभयो-रपि स्वतस्त्ववादिनो निरस्ताः।

६२. 'गुणात् प्रामाण्यं दोषादप्रामाण्यमित्युभयमपि परतः' इति तार्किकाः। तथाहि। उत्पत्तौ प्रतिपत्तौ च परत एव

there not the manifestation of the jar, etc. present in the clay, etc. prior to the function of the causal conditions? If there is, then the futility of the function of the causal conditions remains in the same position. And if there is not, then how can the production of what did not exist be denied? Because production is recognized to be only of the manifestation which did not exist. Therefore on this account it need not be admitted that validity and invalidity are both intrinsic.

61. Further, how can validity and invalidity, absolutely contradictory like water and fire, be intelligibly brought within one and the same cognition? Therefore those who uphold that both of them are intrinsic are refuted.

62. 'Validity is due to merit; invalidity is due to defects; thus both are extrinsic.' So say the Logicians. It is thus. Validity is certainly extrinsic in point of production and ascertainment. Of these, if validity depends solely on

प्रामाण्यम्। तत्र तावदुत्पत्तौ ज्ञानहेतुमात्राधीनं यदि प्रामाण्यं स्यात् तर्ह्यप्रमाणज्ञानेष्वपि प्रामाण्यं स्यात् तत्रापि ज्ञानहेतूनां संभवात्। असंभवे वा ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरेवानुपपत्तेः। नाप्यप्रामाण्यं ज्ञानहेतुमात्राधीनम् उक्तेन न्यायेन प्रमाणज्ञानानामप्यप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मादिन्द्रियादिगुणादेव प्रामाण्योद्भवः तद्दोषादप्रामाण्योद्भवः। इति स्थितम् उभयोरुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम्।

६३. तथा प्रतिपत्तावपि परतस्त्वमेव युक्तं कल्पयितुम्। यदि ज्ञानग्राहकप्रमाणेनैव ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा गृह्यते तर्हि कथं ममेदमुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेति संशयोपपत्तिः। न ह्यन्यतरस्य रूपावधारणे शङ्कावतरति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्॥

the causes of the cognition for its production, then there would be validity even in cases of invalid cognition, because there too the causes of the cognition are present; or if they be not present, the very production of the cognition would be unintelligible. Invalidity too does not depend solely on the causes of the cognition, because by the same reasoning already given, the result would be invalidity even in cases of valid cognition. Therefore the production of validity is due only to merits in the sense-organs, etc. and the production of invalidity is due to their defects. Hence it stands that both are extrinsic in point of production.

63. Similarly, in point of ascertainment too, it is reasonable to assume that it is certainly extrinsic. If the validity or the invalidity of the cognition were apprehended by the same means of valid knowledge which apprehend the cognition, then how can the doubt in the form 'Is this cognition which has arisen in me valid or invalid?' be intelligible?

६४. कथं तर्हि प्रामाण्यग्रहणम् । उच्यते । 'ममेदमुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं प्रमाणं समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । यन्न समर्थां प्रवृत्तिं जनयति न तत् प्रमाणं यथा प्रमाणाभासः' इत्याद्यनुमानात् । तस्मादर्थक्रियानन्तरमेव प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः । एवमप्रामाण्यनिश्चयेऽप्यनुमानं द्रष्टव्यम् । इति सिद्धमुभयमुभयस्मात् परत इति ।

६५. अत्र वदामः । यदि ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमप्रमाण्यं वा स्वोत्पत्तौ हेत्वन्तराधीनं किमात्मकं तर्हि ज्ञानस्वरूपम् । न हि प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यतिरिक्तं किंचिदपि स्वरूपमस्ति विज्ञानस्य ।

Indeed, doubt does not come in when there is the ascertainment of one or the other form, because that would be an undue extension.

64. How then is there apprehension of validity? This is the reply. 'This knowledge which has arisen in me is valid, because it produces a successful activity; what does not produce a successful activity is not valid, for example a fallacious cognition'; it is from such inferences. Therefore ascertainment of validity is only subsequent to successful activity. Similarly, inference must be understood in the case of the ascertainment of invalidity too. Thus is established that both are extrinsic in respect of both kinds of cognition.

65. To this we reply. If the validity or the invalidity of a cognition be dependent for its production on another cause, of what nature then is the existence of the cognition? For cognition, indeed, there is no existence as distinct from validity and invalidity.

६६. ननु संदेहात्मकमस्तु । न । प्रतीतिविरोधात् । संदेहस्याप्रामाण्यपक्षनिक्षेपेणाप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

६७. यत्तु प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानहेतुमात्राधीनत्वे शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञानेष्वपि प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तं तत् तत्रापि पुरोवर्तित्वसत्त्वशुक्लत्वभास्वरत्वाद्यंशेषु प्रामाण्यस्यानुवृत्तेरस्माकमनुकूलमेव ।

६८. यत् पुनरुदयनेन 'प्रामाण्यस्य परायत्तत्वेऽनुमानं प्रयुक्तं प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वाद् अप्रमावत्' इति तदप्यसत् । 'प्रमा गुणदोषाभावयोरन्यतराधीना न भवति ज्ञानत्वाद् अप्रमावत्' इत्यनेनानुमानेन बाधितविषयत्वात् ।

66. Now, let it be of the nature of doubt. No; because it is opposed to experience; and because it would follow that invalidity is intrinsic, doubt being thrown together with invalidity.

67. As for what was said that, should validity depend solely on the causes of cognition, there would result validity even for the cognition of silver in a shell, this is but favourable to us in so far as validity does persist in respect of the elements of being present before one, existence, white colour, brilliance, etc.

68. As for the inference stated by Udayana to show that validity rests on what is extrinsic, namely 'Valid cognition depends on causes over and above the causes of the cognition, because while it is a product, it is a particular variety thereof, like an invalid cognition', this too is unsound; because its content is sublated by the inference, 'A valid

६९. सविशेषणहेतुजात् प्राचीनानुमानादविशेषणहेतुजस्यास्यानुमानस्य शीघ्रप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेर्युक्तं च प्राचीनानुमानस्य बाधितविषयत्वम् । इति सिद्धमुत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् ।

७०. एवं प्रतिपत्तावपि स्वतस्त्वमेव युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम् । तथाहि । तथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इत्यर्थस्य तथात्वावधारणात् प्रामाण्यसंवित्तिः । अतथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इत्यतथात्वावधारणादप्रामाण्यसंवित्तिः । तत्र तथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इति तथात्वावधारणं ज्ञानस्वरूपाधीनमिति तादृशावधारणगम्यं प्रामाण्यं स्वतोऽवगम्यत इत्युच्यते ।

cognition is not dependent on either merit or absence of defect, because it is a cognition, like an invalid cognition'.

69. Since it is intelligible that in comparison with the former inference, which arises out of a probans with a qualification, this inference, which arises out of a probans with no qualification, follows more quickly, it stands to reason that the former inference has its content sublated. Thus is established that in point of production, validity is intrinsic.

70. In this way it stands to reason that in point of ascertainment too, it must be admitted to be intrinsic. It is thus. The ascertainment of validity is through the determination of the object being of a particular nature, in the form, 'This object is of such a nature'. The ascertainment of invalidity is through the determination of the object being not of a particular nature, in the form, 'This object is not of such a nature'. Of these, the determination of being of a particular nature, in the form, 'This object is of such a nature' depends on the existence of the cognition; hence it is said that validity, understood from such a determination, is understood intrinsically.

७१. अतथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इत्यतथाभावावधारणं तु कारणदोषावगमाद् बाधकप्रत्ययाद् वा परतो जायत इति तादृशावधारणगम्यमप्रामाण्यं परतोऽवगम्यत इत्युच्यते। तस्मादतथाभूतमप्यर्थं तथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इत्येव ज्ञानस्वरूपमवगमयति। अर्थतथात्वनिश्चयस्य भ्रमरूपत्वात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयोऽपि तत्र भ्रम इत्येव विशेषः। भ्रमत्वं तु तस्य बाधकप्रत्ययावसेयमेव।

७२. न चैतादृशभ्रमदर्शनादर्थतथात्वावधारणेन प्रामाण्यावगमो दुष्कर इति वाच्यम्। बाष्पे धूमभ्रमदर्शनेऽपि धूमादग्न्यनु-

71. But the determination of not being of a particular nature in the form, 'This object is not of such a nature' is produced from outside, either from understanding defects in the causes or from the cognition of a sublater; hence it is said that invalidity, understood from such a determination, is understood extrinsically. Therefore, the form of the cognition makes known even the object which is not of a particular nature, only in the form, 'This object is of such a nature'. Since the determination of the object being of a particular nature is of the nature of a delusion, the determination of validity there is also a delusion; this is the only difference. Its being a delusion can be concluded only from the cognition of a sublater.

72. Nor may it be said that, since there is seen delusion of this kind, the ascertainment of validity through determination of the object being of a particular nature is difficult to accomplish; because even though delusion of smoke is seen in vapour, inference of fire from smoke is easy to accomplish. Nor may it be said that the determination of the

मानस्य सुकरत्वात् । न च तथाभूतोऽयमर्थ इत्यर्थतथात्वावधारणमर्थक्रियाज्ञानादिलक्षणपरापेक्षमिति वाच्यम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि । किमिदमर्थक्रियाज्ञानं स्वत एव प्रमाणम् उत परतः ।

७३. न तावत् परतः, तस्याप्यर्थक्रियाद्यन्तरापेक्षत्वेनानवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । अथ स्वत एव किमपराद्धमाद्यज्ञानेन येन तस्य परतःप्रामाण्यपक्षनिक्षेपः ।

७४. यत्तु समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन हेतुना प्रामाण्यमाद्यज्ञानस्यानुमेयमित्युक्तं तदप्ययुक्तम् । स्वप्ने कामिनीरूपदर्शनादिरूपस्यापूर्वज्ञानस्य तदालिङ्गनादिरूपसमर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्याभावेन तत्रानैकान्त्यात् ।

object being of a particular nature in the form, ‘This object is of such a nature’ is dependent on another, consisting in the cognition of successful activity, etc. because it will not stand analysis. It is thus. Is this cognition of successful activity valid intrinsically or extrinsically?

73. Now, not extrinsically, because that too being dependent on another successful activity, etc. there would result infinite regress. And if it is only intrinsically, what is the crime of the first cognition whereby it is thrown in with those whose validity is extrinsic?

74. As for what was said that from ‘the production of successful activity’ as probans, the validity of the first cognition is to be inferred, this too does not stand to reason; because, although in dream the original cognition of the form of seeing the body of a damsel, etc. produces successful activity in the form of embracing, etc. since there is no validity, it is non-conclusive in respect of that.

७५. यत् पुनर्ममेदमुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेति संदेहदर्शनात् प्रामाण्यस्य न स्वतोऽवधारणमित्युक्तं तदप्यसत्। सर्वेषामपि ज्ञानानां संदेहग्रस्तत्वादर्शनात्। यत्र पुनः कुत्रचिद् भ्रमदर्शनात् किं तादृशमिदं ज्ञानम् उतान्यादृशमिति संशयो भवति तत्रापि ज्ञानस्वरूपं प्रथमत एव विषयतथात्वमवधारयति। दूरत्वादीनां विषयदोषाणां तिमिरादीनां करणदोषाणां पारिप्लवादीनां मनोदोषाणां चाभावावगमः पुनरतथाभावशङ्कोच्छेदमात्र एवोपकरोति न तु ज्ञानस्वरूपाधीने विषयतथात्वावधारणे तदधीने प्रामाण्यनिश्चये च। तस्मात् स्वशब्दस्यात्मीयवाचित्वेन

75. Again, as for what was said that since doubt is seen in the form, 'Is this cognition that has arisen in me valid or invalid?' validity is not ascertained intrinsically, this too is not right; because every cognition is not seen to be associated with some doubt. Where, again, because some cases of cognition are seen to be delusion, there is doubt in the form, 'Is this cognition of that nature or not of that nature'? even there, the form of the cognition leads to the ascertainment, even from the outset, that the object is of such a nature. The determination of the absence of distance and other defects of the object, of blindness and other defects of the instrument, of agitation and other defects of the mind is useful, then, only in removing the doubt of 'not being of a particular nature', and not in the determination of the object as of such a nature, which is dependent on the form of the cognition, and in the ascertainment of validity dependent on that determination. Therefore is it established that, since the word *sva* means what belongs to oneself, validity which is understood from the determination of the object

ज्ञानस्वरूपाधीनादर्थतथात्वावधारणादवगम्यमानस्य प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञप्तावपि स्वतस्त्वं सिद्धम् ।

७६. यत्तु प्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायतेऽनभ्यासदशायां सांशयिकत्वाद् अप्रामाण्यवद् इत्युदयनोक्तमनुमानं तदस्मन्मतेऽपि विषयतथात्वावगमरूपात् परत एव प्रामाण्यावधारणात् सिद्धसाधनं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

७७. एताभिरेव युक्तिभिरप्रमाण्यं स्वतः, प्रामाण्यं परत इति बौद्धसिद्धान्तोऽपि निरुद्धो वेदितव्य इत्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

७८. सिद्धानि तावत् तमःपञ्चमान्यवयविद्रव्याणि तदारम्भकाण्यवयवद्रव्याणि च ।

as of a particular nature in dependence on the form of the cognition is intrinsic (i.e. from itself).

76. Again the inference stated by Udayana, 'Validity is ascertained extrinsically, because it is of the nature of doubt at the stage of non-repetition like invalidity', this is to be seen to establish what was already established, because, in our system too, determination of validity is only extrinsic, in the form of the determination of the object being of a particular nature.

77. By these very arguments, it must be understood that there is annihilated the Buddhist doctrine too that invalidity is intrinsic and validity is extrinsic. Hence there is no need to say anything more.

78. Now have been established the divisible substances, with darkness as the fifth, and also the substances which as parts produce them.

७९. स्वरूपाणि निरूप्यन्ते व्योमादीनामथ क्रमात् ।
नित्यानि चानवयवद्रव्याणि च विभूनि च ॥

८०. शांकराः पुनः 'आत्मन आकाशः संभूतः' इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधेन गगनादीनामनित्यत्वमाहुः । तदयुक्तम् । विवादपदानि द्रव्याणि नित्यानि निरवयवद्रव्यत्वाद् आत्मवद् इत्याद्यनुमानविरोधेन श्रुतेर्यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः ।

८१. एतानि मनोव्यतिरिक्तानि प्रत्यक्षाणि । तत्र च—

व्योमकालदिशामादौ प्रत्यक्षत्वं समर्थ्यते ।
अनिष्टं भट्टपादोक्तिमाधुर्यानभिलाषिणाम् ॥

79. Then the nature of ether, etc. are dealt with in order. They are eternal and indivisible substances and are all-pervasive.

80. The followers of Śaṃkara, again, in accordance with scriptural passages like 'Ether was produced from the soul' and so on, speak of ether, etc. as non-eternal. This does not stand to reason. 'The substances which are under dispute are eternal, because they are indivisible substances like the soul'; as coming into conflict with such inferences, the validity of such scriptural passages is unintelligible in their literal sense.

81. These except the mind are perceptible; and among them,

There is first demonstrated in respect of ether, time and space, their perceptibility, which is not acceptable to those who do not

दिक्कालाशाः प्रत्यक्षाः अमनस्त्वे सति विभुत्वाद् आत्मवत्। अपिच दिक्कालाकाशा यदि न प्रत्यक्षाः तर्हि तेषां स्वरूपमेव हीयेत प्रत्यक्षव्यतिरेकेण तेषु प्रमाणाभावात्।

८२. नन्वस्त्येव तत्र प्रमाणम्। शब्दस्य विशेषगुणत्वाद् गुणस्य च गुणिनमन्तरेणानुपपत्तेः शब्दगुणाश्रयत्वेन तावदाकाशसिद्धिः। कालस्तु युगपदादिप्रत्ययानुमेयः। दिक् पुनः पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययानुमेया। इति कथं तेषु प्रमाणाभावः।

८३. अत्र वदामः। यत् तावदुक्तं शब्दगुणाश्रयत्वेनाकाश-

cherish the sweetness of the words of the worshipful Bhaṭṭa.

Space, time and ether are perceptible, because, while they are not the mind, they are all-pervasive, like the soul. Further, if space, time and ether were not perceptible, then their very existence would be destroyed, because there is no means of valid knowledge in respect of them, other than perception.

82. Now, there is certainly a means of valid knowledge in respect of them. Since sound is a specific quality, and since a quality is unintelligible without something that has that quality, ether results as the abode of the quality, sound; time, however, is to be inferred from the concept of simultaneity, etc.; space, again, is to be inferred from the concepts of before, behind, etc.; hence how is it that there is no means of valid knowledge in respect of them?

83. To this we reply. As for what was said that ether results as the abode of the quality, sound, this does not stand to reason; because it will be said later that sound being a

सिद्धिरिति तदयुक्तम्। शब्दस्य गुणत्वानुपपत्तेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। भवतु वा गुणत्वम्। तथापि कथं दिक्कालादिव्यतिरिक्ताश्रयसिद्धिः असिद्धद्रव्यकल्पनातः सिद्धस्यैव द्रव्यस्य गुणान्तरकल्पनाया लघीयस्तरत्वात्।

८४. किंच नयनोन्मीलनानन्तरमेवाबालवृद्धमध्यक्षतयाध्यवसीयमानस्याकाशस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वं वदन्तः प्राभाकरादयः करतलकलितमामलकफलमपि प्रत्यक्षानुपलभ्यमिति वदेयुरेव।

८५. नापि कालो युगपदादिप्रत्ययानुमेयः। तथाहि। युगपदागतौ देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ, चिरेणागतः पुत्र इत्यादिप्रत्ययाः किं कालविषयाः अन्यविषयाः वा। न तावदन्यविषयाः काला-

quality is unintelligible. Or, let it be a quality. Even then how does there result an abode different from space, time, etc. since it is more in accordance with parsimony to assume a further quality in an established substance than to assume a non-established substance?

84. Further, the followers of Prabhākara and others who declare that ether to be imperceptible, which is ascertained as perceptible by everyone from the young to the old even immediately on opening the eyes, they will certainly say that even an *āmalaka* (myrobalan) placed in the palm of the hand is not known through perception.

85. Nor is time to be inferred from the concept of simultaneity, etc. It is thus. 'Devadatta and Yajñadatta came simultaneously.' 'The son came late.' Have concepts like these time as their content or something else? Now they cannot have something else as content, because in case

दन्येषां तेषां यौगपद्यादिलिङ्गानां प्रत्यक्षेण कालसंबन्धानवधारणं पूर्ववत् पारिशेष्यासिद्धेः। संबन्धावधारणे च कालस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अथ कालविषयाः तर्हि किमक्षजन्या लिङ्गजन्या वा। न तावल्लिङ्गजन्याः युगपदादिप्रत्ययातिरिक्तलिङ्गानङ्गीकरणात्। युगपदादिप्रत्ययानामेव लिङ्गत्वे चात्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात्। अथाक्षजन्याः तर्हि प्रत्यक्षत्वमेव कालस्यापन्नम्। युगपदादिप्रत्ययानामक्षजन्यत्वकालविषयत्वयोः स्थितत्वात्। अतः प्रातःकालोऽयं सायंकालोऽयमित्यादिप्रत्ययानां सूर्योदयादिदर्शनानुगृहीतनयनजन्यत्वात् कालस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं सिद्धम्। स च कालः षडिन्द्रियग्राह्य इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम्।

the relation to time of these probans like simultaneity, which are other than time, is not ascertained through perception, then as in the previous case, elimination does not result. And if the relation is so ascertained, the result is that time is perceptible. If, then, time is the content, are those concepts produced through the sense-organs or through the probans? Now it cannot be produced through a probans, because no probans is recognized other than the concept of simultaneity, etc. And if the concept of simultaneity, etc. be themselves the probans, then there would result self-dependence. Then, if it be produced through the sense-organs, then perceptibility alone is what results for time, because it stands that concepts of simultaneity, etc. are produced through the sense-organs and have time as content. Therefore it is established that since concepts like 'It is now morning time', 'It is now evening time' are produced by the sense of sight assisted by the sight of sunrise, etc. time is perceptible. And it has been said even earlier that this time is perceptible by the six sense-organs.

८६. एवं दिशोऽपि पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययानां नेत्रमात्राधीनत्वाद् दिग्विषयत्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षत्वं समर्थनीयम् । पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययानां लिङ्गत्वेन दिगनुमानं तु पुरोवर्तिनां घटादीनामपि घटादिप्रत्ययानुमेयत्वप्रसङ्गप्रतिपादनेन निराकरणीयम् । तस्माद् व्योमादीनामप्रत्यक्षत्वसाधनपराणामनुमानानां तत्प्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतार्थापत्तिबाधितविषयत्वात् सिद्धमप्रामाण्यम् ।

८७. तत्राकाशो विभुरपि घटाद्युपाधिवशाद् घटाकाशादिव्यपदेशं लभते कर्णशष्कुल्युपाधिवशेन श्रोत्रेन्द्रियव्यपदेशं च ।

८८. कालस्यापि विभुत्वेऽप्युपाधिवशादौपाधिको भेदव्य-

86. Similarly it is to be demonstrated that space too is perceptible on the ground that concepts of before, behind, etc. are dependent solely on the sense of sight, and have space as content. The inference of space, with the concept of before, behind, etc. as probans must be refuted, through declaring that there would result inferability from the concept of jar, etc. for even a jar, etc. that are in front. Therefore has been established the invalidity of the inferences whose purport is to establish the non-perceptibility of ether, etc. because their content is sublated by Presumption produced by the unintelligibility otherwise of their concepts.

87. Of these, ether, though all-pervasive, acquires names like jar-ether, etc. on account of extraneous adjuncts like jar, etc. and the name of the sense of hearing on account of the extraneous adjunct of the ear-cavity.

88. For time too, though all-pervasive, there is empirical usage of extraneous differences due to extraneous adjuncts. It is like this. Fifty winks make one *kāṣṭhā*; thirty *kāṣṭhā-s*

वहारोऽस्ति । स यथा । पञ्चदश निमेषाः काष्ठा । ताभिस्त्रिशता मुहूर्तः । ते त्रिंशदहोरात्रः । तैस्तावद्भिर्मासः । तैर्द्वादशभिः संवत्सरः । तैश्च क्रमेण युगादय इति । एवं दिशोऽपि पूर्वापराद्युपाधिवशाद् भेदव्यवहारो द्रष्टव्यः ।

८९. आत्मा चैतन्याश्रयः । स च मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्यः । अत्र प्राभाकरास्तावदिदमहं जानामीति सर्वार्थवित्तिषु व्यवहारदर्शनाद् आत्मस्वात्मनोरप्यप्रकाशमानत्वे तदनुपपत्तेरात्मस्वात्मनोः कर्तृतया वित्तितया च प्रतीयमानत्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । तत्राहंप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेनात्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, ज्ञानस्य तु स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेनेति च व्यवस्थां प्रतिपेदिरे ।

make one *muhūrta*; thirty *muhūrta-s* make a day and night; the same number of days and nights make a month; twelve months make a year; years in their turn make yuga-s, etc. Similarly for space too there is to be seen empirical usage of difference on account of extraneous adjuncts like before, behind, etc.

89. Soul is the abode of intelligence. And it is to be understood through mental perception. Now, here, the followers of Prabhākara acknowledge that since in respect of the cognition of every object there is the empirical usage of the form, 'I know this', and since this would be unintelligible if the soul and the form of the cognition itself be not manifested, the soul and the form of the cognition itself are understood as agent and as knowing. And they declare this distinction that of these the soul is perceptible being understood from the concept 'I'; but the cognition is so, being self-luminous.

९०. तत्र ज्ञानस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमुपरिष्टान्निराकरिष्यामः। आत्मा तु नाहंप्रत्ययगम्यः सर्वत्रार्थवित्तिष्वहं जानामीति व्यवहारादर्शनात्। यत् पुनरत्र शालिकनाथेन कथितम् 'अवश्यं च ज्ञातुरवभासो ज्ञेयावभासेष्वनुवर्तत इत्यास्थेयम्, अन्यथा स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयः' इति तदप्ययुक्तम्। ज्ञानस्य स्वात्मसमवेतत्वमात्रेणैवातिशयसिद्धेः। न च स्वात्मसमवेतत्वावगमस्यापि व्यवहाराङ्गत्वमस्तीति वाच्यम्, ऐन्द्रियकज्ञानेष्विन्द्रियावगमस्यापि व्यवहाराङ्गत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

९१. किंच—

90. Of these, the self-luminosity of cognition, we shall refute later. But the self is not to be understood from the concept 'I'; because in all cognitions of the objects there is not found the empirical usage, 'I know'. Again what has been said by Śālikanātha in this connection, 'It has to be decided that the manifestation of the self continues in all manifestations of the objects of knowledge; otherwise there will be no distinction between what is known by oneself and by another,' this does not stand to reason; because the distinction can be established even by the knowledge being inherent in one's own soul. It must not be said that even the understanding of its being inherent in one's own soul forms a part of the empirical usage; because the result would be that the cognition of the sense-organs too would become a part of the empirical usage in respect of cognitions through sense-organs.

91. Further,

अक्षसंबन्धहीनात्मस्वात्मप्रत्यक्षतार्थिनः ।
प्रत्यक्षशब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कथंकारं भवेद् गुरोः ।।

तस्माद् यथा दिगादीनां पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययानुमेयत्वं भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते तद्वदात्मनोऽप्यहंप्रत्ययानुमेयत्वमेव युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम्, नाक्षसंनिकर्षहीनस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम् । अपिच स्वप्रकाशज्ञानाश्रयत्वेऽप्यात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वानभ्युपगमे ज्ञानजन्यस्य तत्प्रकाशस्य घटप्रकाशस्येव कारणान्तरसापेक्षत्वं दुष्परिहरमेव । स्वप्रकाशत्वाभ्युपगमे च सिद्धो राद्धान्तविरोधः ।

९२. अत्र प्रकाशरूपदहनाद्याश्रयेषु काष्ठादिष्वपि दह्य-

In the case of the Guru who seeks perceptibility for the soul and the form of the cognition, which are not in contact with the sense-organs, what can be the etymology of the word *pratyakṣa* (perception)?

Therefore, just as space, etc. are acknowledged by you to be inferable from the concept of before, behind, etc. similarly it stands to reason that of the soul too there should be acknowledged inferability from the concept 'I', not the perceptibility of what has no contact with a sense-organ. Further, when the soul is not acknowledged to be self-manifesting, though it is the abode of the self-manifesting knowledge, for the manifestation of the soul produced by knowledge, it is difficult to avoid dependence on an external cause, as for the manifestation of a jar. And if self-manifestation is acknowledged there results opposition to the final doctrine.

92. Here, even in the case of fuel, etc. which are the abode of fire, etc. of the nature of light (manifestation),

मानस्यांशस्याङ्गारावस्थत्वेन प्रकाशरूपाद् दहनादभिन्नत्वम् । इतरांशस्य तु घटादिवत् परितः प्रसर्पितेजोऽवयवप्रकाश्यत्वमेवेति न कस्याप्याश्रयत्वेन प्रकाश इत्यवगन्तव्यम् ।

९३. शांकरास्तु ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरेकत्वं मन्यमानाः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमात्मनः समर्थयन्ति । 'अयं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः' 'आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिः' इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यं च तत्र प्रमाणीकुर्वन्ति । तत्र ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरेकत्वमत्रैव निराकरिष्यते । न च वेदान्तवाक्यात् स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः । 'समासीन आत्मा जनानाम्' इति श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधात् । आत्मा ज्ञानान्तराधीनप्रकाशः व्यवहार्यत्वाद् घटवदित्याद्यनुमानविरोधाच्च । न च व्यवहार्यत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् ।

that element which is being burnt is not different in the state of embers from the fire which is of the nature of light (manifestation); and the other elements can, like a jar, etc. be manifested only by the parts of fire spreading around; hence, for nothing is there manifestation in the capacity of abode; this must be borne in mind.

93. The followers of Śaṃkara, however, upholding the identity of knowledge and knower, establish the self-manifestation of the soul; and in this connection they take as authority Vedānta texts like, 'This Puruṣa the self-luminous,' 'The self is itself its light'. Of these, the identity of knowledge and knower will be refuted even presently. And from Vedānta texts, self-manifestation does not result; because there is opposition to another scriptural passage, namely 'The self is known to men,' and because there is

आत्मा व्यवहार्यो न भवति इत्यस्यैव व्यवहारस्यात्मगोचरत्वेन स्ववचनविरुद्धत्वात् ।

९४. नन्वेवं सत्येकस्यैव कर्तृत्वं कर्मत्वं च विरुद्धमिति चेद् मैवम् । भवन्मते कर्तृत्वकरणत्वकर्मत्वानामिवास्मन्मते कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोरप्येकस्यैवोपपत्तेः आत्मन एव कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्लौकिकवैदिकप्रयोगगम्यत्वाच्च । 'आत्मानं जानीहि' इति हि लौकिकाः प्रयुञ्जते । 'आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः' इति श्रूयते च । ज्ञानजन्यफलभागित्वलक्षणं कर्मत्वं पुनरात्मनः स्वयंप्रकाशवादिभिरप्यवश्याश्रयणीयम्, अन्यथात्मन एवाप्रकाशमानत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्मानसप्रत्यक्ष एवात्मा ।

opposition to inference like, 'The soul is dependent on another cognition for manifestation, because it is an object of empirical usage, like a jar'. Nor may it be said that 'being an object of empirical usage' is non-established; because the very empirical usage, 'The soul is not an object of empirical usage' has the soul as its sphere, and as such there is contradiction to one's own words.

94. Now, if it be said that, this being so, there is contradiction in so far as the same is both agent and object, it is not so; because, as in the case of agency, instrumentality and objectness according to your system, so in our system too, the very same thing being agent and object is intelligible; and because the soul itself being agent and object can be understood from usage, ordinary and scriptural. Indeed, the ordinary people say, 'Know thyself'. There is scripture too, 'The self is to be seen'. Then objectness of the self, consisting in experiencing the fruit resulting from knowledge,

९५. स च देहेन्द्रियज्ञानसुखेभ्यो व्यतिरिच्यते ।
नानाभूतो विभुर्नित्यो भोगस्वर्गापवर्गभाक् ॥

९६. अत्र केचित् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादिप्रत्ययानां शरीरगतस्थौल्यकार्श्यादिविषयत्वात् स्थौल्यकार्श्याद्यधिकरणं शरीरमेवात्मेति संगिरन्ते । तदयुक्तम् । आत्मविशेषगुणानां सुखदुःखादीनां शरीरगुणत्वानुपपत्तेः । यदि सुखदुःखादयः शरीरविशेषगुणाः तर्हि ते यावच्छरीरमवतिष्ठेरन् । न हि ते मृतशरीरे-

has necessarily to be resorted to even by those who uphold its self-manifestation; otherwise it would follow that the soul itself is not manifested. Therefore the soul is certainly perceptible by the mind.

95. And it is distinct from the body, the sense-organs, cognition and happiness; it is infinite in number, all-pervasive, eternal and is the experiencer of (worldly) enjoyment, Heaven and Release.

96. Here, some say that since concepts like, 'I am fat', 'I am lean', etc. have as content, fatness, leanness, etc. present in the body, the body which is the abode of fatness, leanness, etc. is itself the soul. This does not stand to reason; because the specific qualities of the soul, namely happiness, misery, etc. cannot intelligibly be the qualities of the body. If happiness, misery, etc. were specific qualities of the body, then they would continue as long as the body. Indeed, they are not perceived in a dead body. Therefore it has necessarily to be acknowledged that happiness, misery,

षूपलभ्यन्ते । तस्मात् सुखदुःखादीनामन्याश्रयत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम् । इति सिद्धः सुखदुःखाद्याश्रयस्यात्मनस्तदनाश्रयाद् देहाद् भेदः । स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादिबुद्धिस्तु शरीरात्मनोरत्यन्तसंसृष्टतया तोयौष्ण्यप्रत्ययवदिति द्रष्टव्यम् । दृश्यते च मम शरीरमिति शरीरात्मनोर्भेदव्यपदेशः ।

९७. न चेन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तत्र बाह्येन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वात्, भूतेषु चात्मगुणानां चैतन्यादीनामनुपलम्भात् कार्यगुणस्य च कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वनियमादचेतनभूतारब्धानां तेषामात्मत्वं निराकरणीयम् । इयमेव युक्तिर्देहात्मवादिनिराकरणेऽपि समर्थेत्यवगन्तव्यम् ।

etc. have other abodes. Hence is established the distinctness of the soul, the abode of happiness, misery, etc. from the body which is not their abode. The cognition, however, 'I am fat', 'I am lean', etc. it must be seen, is due to the very intimate relation of the body and the soul, like the concept of water being hot. And there is found statement of distinctness between the body and the soul in 'my body'.

97. Nor are the sense-organs the soul. Since among them, the external senses are of the nature of the elements, since the qualities of the soul like intelligence are not perceived in the elements, and since there is the rule that the qualities of the product are generated by the qualities of the cause, for these which are generated by non-intelligent elements, their being the soul would have to be discarded. This very reasoning, it must be understood, is competent to rebut even those who maintain the body to be the soul.

९८. अपरोक्षतया सिद्धरूपादात्मनस्तत्समवेतसुखदुःखाद्यापरोक्ष्यसाधनेन्द्रियत्वेन साध्यरूपस्यान्तःकरणस्य भेदावगमः पुनरनायाससाध्य एव ।

९९. न च ज्ञानमेवात्मा । तस्य क्षणिकत्वात् । आत्मनस्तु योऽहं प्राग् दुःखमन्वभूवं स एवेदानीं सुखमनुभवामीति पूर्वापरकालयोरेकत्वावगमाद् अक्षणिकत्वसिद्धेः । यस्य मे पूर्वं सुखमासीत् तस्यैवेदानीं दुःखमनुवर्तत इति पूर्वापरकालयोरात्मन एकत्वावगमेऽपि सुखनिवृत्त्यनुसंधानविरोधात् सुखरूपत्वमप्यात्मनो निराकरणीयम् ।

१००. तत्र पुनरौपनिषदाः 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म'

98. Then it is easy of accomplishment to understand the distinctness of the internal organ, which is to be established as the sense-organ instrumental to the immediate perception of happiness, misery, etc. inherent in the soul, from the soul whose nature is established to be immediately perceived.

99. Nor is cognition itself the soul; because that is momentary. But, for soul non-momentariness is established through understanding its identity at the prior and subsequent times in, 'I who experienced misery before, that same I now experience happiness.' In, 'That I for whom there was happiness before, for that same I misery now continues,' although there is the understanding of the identity of the soul at the prior and subsequent times, since there is conflict with the recall of the cessation of happiness, the happiness-nature must be denied to the soul.

100. Here, again, the followers of the Upaniṣad-s justify the knowledge-nature of the soul on the strength of

इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यबलादात्मनो विज्ञानानन्दरूपत्वं समर्थयन्ति। न च विज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वाद् आत्मनश्च नित्यत्वादात्मनो विज्ञानात्मकत्वमयुक्तमिति वाच्यम्। विज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्। नीलपीतादिविज्ञानविशेषेष्वपि नीलपीताद्युपहितं विज्ञानमेकमेवेति वयमभ्युपगच्छामः।

१०१. न च 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' इत्यत्र त्रयाणामपि पदानामैकार्थ्ये सत्येकेनैव पदेन चरितार्थत्वादितरपदद्वयाम्नानवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्। व्यवच्छेद्यभेदादेकार्थत्वेऽपि वैयर्थ्यानुपपत्तेः प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इतिवत्। अत्र खल्वस्मिन् ज्योतिर्मण्डले कतमश्चन्द्र इति चन्द्रप्रतिपादकप्रश्नस्योत्तरभूते प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र

Vedānta texts, 'Brahman is knowledge, bliss' and so on. And it should not be said that, since cognition is momentary and since the soul is eternal, it does not stand to reason that the soul is of the knowledge-nature; because knowledge is acknowledged to be eternal. Even in particular cognitions, like that of blueness, yellowness, etc. there is only one consciousness, conditioned by blueness, yellowness, etc.; so we recognize.

101. Nor may it be said that, since in 'Brahman is knowledge, bliss', if all the three words had a single meaning, the purpose would be served even by one word, there is futility for the statement of the other two words; because futility is unintelligible since there is distinctness of what is to be excluded, though the meaning is the same, as in 'Intense brightness is the moon'. Here, of course, to the question relating to the moon, 'In this orb of luminous bodies, which is the moon?', the reply is the statement, 'Intense brightness is the moon'. In this, by the word 'intense', the stars which are not intense(in

इति वाक्ये प्रकृष्टपदस्याप्रकृष्टनक्षत्रादिकं व्यावर्त्यं प्रकाशपदस्याप्रकाशतिमिरादिकमिति व्यवच्छेद्यभेदादवैयर्थ्यं भवति। एवमविज्ञानानानन्दव्यवच्छेदार्थं विज्ञानानन्दपदद्वयम्।

१०२. अपिच प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इत्यत्र प्रकृष्टप्रकाशपदयोरन्योन्यं चन्द्रपदेन चाभिन्नार्थत्वमङ्गीकरणीयम्। अन्यथा चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकार्थस्य पृष्टत्वात् तदितरस्य कथनेन प्रश्नोत्तरयोः परस्परमसंगतिप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद् विज्ञानानन्दपदयोः परस्परं ब्रह्मपदेन चाभिन्नार्थत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम्।

१०३. अत एवाखण्डमेव वयं वाक्यार्थमङ्गीकुर्मः। प्रयोगश्च भवति। विज्ञानादिपदमखण्डनिष्ठं लक्षणवाक्यत्वात् प्रकृष्ट-

brightness) are excluded; and by the word 'brightness', darkness, etc. which are not bright, are excluded. Hence, on account of the distinctness of what is to be excluded, there is non-futility. In the same way, the two words, 'knowledge' and 'bliss', are to exclude non-knowledge and non-bliss.

102. Further, in 'Intense brightness is the moon' it has to be admitted that for the words 'intense' and 'brightness' there is identity of meaning with each other and with the word 'moon'. Otherwise there would result want of connection between the question and the reply, since what is asked is the meaning of the stem 'moon', and the reply is something other than this. Therefore for the words 'knowledge' and 'bliss', identity of meaning with each other and with the word 'Brahman' has necessarily to be resorted to.

103. For this very reason we accept the sense of a sentence to be but impartite. And there is the syllogism: 'The

प्रकाशश्चन्द्र इतिवद् इति। अतः सिद्धं विज्ञानानन्दपदयोरेकार्थत्वमपर्यायित्वमवैयर्थ्यं च।

१०४. अत्र ब्रूमः—

वाक्यार्थं हि गुरुः कार्यमखण्डं शंकरोऽब्रवीत्।
संसर्गापरपर्यायं विशिष्टं ब्रूमहे वयम्॥

तत्र कार्यवाक्यार्थनिरासप्रकारं गुणनिर्णये वर्णयिष्यामः।

१०५. नाप्यखण्डं वाक्यार्थः। सर्वेषां पदानामेकस्मिन्नेवार्थे तात्पर्ये सत्येकेनैव पदेन तस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादितत्वादितर-

words 'knowledge', etc. relate to the impartite, because they are the statement of a definition, like, "intense brightness is the moon".' Therefore it is established that the words 'knowledge' and 'bliss' refer to the same thing, that they are not synonyms and that they are not futile.

104. To this we reply.

The Guru spoke of the meaning of a sentence
as what is to be done, Śaṃkara as the impartite.
We say that it is the qualified, which is another
synonym for relation.

Of these, the mode of refuting the meaning of a sentence as what is to be done, we shall explain in ascertaining the qualities.

105. Nor is the meaning of a sentence the impartite. If all the words had for purport the very same thing, since even by one word that thing would have been expressed, it would be impossible to avoid futility for the use of the other words.

पदाम्नानवैयर्थ्यस्य दुष्परिहरत्वात्। न च व्यवच्छेद्यभेदादवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्। एकार्थत्वे पर्याययोरिव व्यवच्छेद्यभेदानुपपत्तेः। न हि हस्तः कर इत्यादिषु कश्चिदपि व्यवच्छेद्यभेदः।

१०६. नापि प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इति वाक्यमखण्डनिष्ठं तस्य वाक्यस्य संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धप्रतिपादनमात्रपरत्वात्। नाप्येवं सति प्रश्नोत्तरयोरसंगतिप्रसङ्गः प्रश्नस्यापि कस्यात्र चन्द्रसंज्ञेति संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धविषयत्वात्। दृश्यमानस्य चन्द्रस्वलक्षणमात्रस्य प्रश्नोऽप्यनुपपन्न एव। अतः संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धस्याज्ञातस्यैव प्रश्नाव-

Nor may it be said that there is non-futility because of distinctness of what is to be excluded. If the meanings are identical, then, as in the case of synonyms, distinctness of what is to be excluded is unintelligible. Indeed, between words like *hasta* and *kara* (hand), there is no distinctness of what is to be excluded.

106. Nor does the sentence, 'Intense brightness is the moon' relate to the impartite; because the purport of that sentence is merely to declare the name, the named and the relation. Nor does there in this case result want of connection between the question and the reply; because for the question too, the content is the name, the named and the relation in the form, 'Of these, to which belongs the name moon'? In respect of the bare identity of the moon that is seen, even a question is not at all intelligible. Therefore there is room for question only in respect of the name, the named and the relation, which are unknown. And here, the reply in the form, 'The meaning of the word "moon" is what is marked out by brightness, which has the quality of being

काशः। तत्र च प्रकर्षविशिष्टप्रकाशोपलक्षितश्चन्द्रपदार्थ इत्युत्तरमपि सुस्थिरं भवति। तस्माद् विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्यादिवाक्यं विज्ञानादिविशिष्टात्मस्वरूपविषयमेव, न पुनरखण्डार्थविषयम्।

१०७. विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति सामानाधिकरण्यं पुनर्मधुरो गुड इतिवद् भेदसहिष्णोरभेदादिति द्रष्टव्यम्। किंच 'स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः' 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्' इति श्रुतिरप्यानन्दात्मनोः परस्परभेदं प्रतिपादयति। तस्माद् विज्ञानानन्दात्मानः परस्परं भिन्ना एव।

१०८. विज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमः पुनः अवेदयन्नेवाहमियन्तं कालमस्वाप्सम् इति सुषुप्तौ विज्ञानाभावानुसंधानादनुपपन्न एव। सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् इति सुखानुभवानुसंधानं पुनरखिल-

intense', becomes well founded. Therefore, sentences like, 'Brahman is knowledge, bliss', have certainly as content the existence of the self as qualified by knowledge, etc. and do not have as content what is impartite.

107. Then the apposition in 'Brahman is knowledge, bliss', it must be seen, is due to non-difference which can tolerate difference as in 'sugar is sweet'. Further, scriptural texts too, 'That is the one bliss of Brahman', 'One who knows the bliss of Brahman', declare the distinctness of bliss and Brahman from each other. Therefore, knowledge, bliss and Brahman are certainly different one from the other.

108. Again the acceptance of the eternality of knowledge is not at all intelligible, because there is the absence of a recognition of knowledge during sleep in 'I slept all this time without knowing anything at all'. In 'I slept happily'

दुःखनिवृत्तिमात्रपरम्, अन्यथा कामिनीसंभोगादिसुखलवलोपेन प्रबुद्धस्य दुःखोत्पत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात्। न ह्यनुभूतनिरतिशयब्रह्म-सुखस्य क्षुद्रसुखपरिक्षयाद् दुःखोद्भवः संभाव्येत। अनुभूतमपि विस्मृतमिति चेत् तर्हि कथं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् इति सुखानुभवानु-संधानाद् विज्ञानस्य नित्यत्ववाचोयुक्तिः। इति सिद्धमात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वम्।

१०९. सोऽयमात्मा सकलशरीरेष्वेक इत्यौपनिषदाः। तदपि नोपपद्यते। एकस्मिन् सुखिनि दुःखिनि वा सर्वेषामपि सुखदुःखानुसंधानप्रसङ्गात्। न चास्त्येवानुसंधानमिति वाच्यम्। देवदत्तपादलग्नकण्टकोद्धरणाय तत्करव्यापारवदितरेषामपि युग-पदेव करतलव्यापारप्रसङ्गात्। न चेन्द्रियभेदादनुसंधानवैधुर्य-

the recognition of the experience of happiness simply states the cessation of all misery. Otherwise there would result non-generation of misery, when he wakes up, through the loss of such bits of happiness as the enjoyment of a damsel. Indeed, in the case of one who has enjoyed the unsurpassed happiness of Brahman, origination of misery from the loss of paltry happiness is not possible. If it be said that though enjoyed, it was forgotten, how is it that from the recollection of the experience of happiness in ‘I slept happily’ you argue for the eternality of knowledge? Hence it is established that the soul is distinct from the body, the sense-organs, etc.

109. This soul is the same in all the bodies—so say the followers of the Upaniṣad-s. This too is unintelligible; because it would follow that when one is happy or miserable, everyone should recognize happiness or misery. And it

मिति वाच्यम् । इन्द्रियभेदेऽपि योऽहमश्रौषं स एव पश्यामीत्याद्यनुसंधानदर्शनात् । न च देहभेदादननुसंधानम् । देहभेदेऽपि जातिस्मराणामनुसंधानदर्शनात् । न च जीवभेदादनुसंधानाभावः । आत्मव्यतिरिक्तजीवसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । 'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति' इति श्रुतिरात्मद्वयसद्भावे प्रमाणमिति चेद् न । विकल्पासहत्वात् ।

११०. तथाहि । इयं श्रुतिर्जीवपरयोर्भेदं प्रतिपादयति वा न वा । नाद्यः, अद्वैतभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः, आत्मद्वयसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

should not be said that there certainly is such recognition; because it would follow that for removing the thorn stuck in the foot of Devadatta, just as his hand is active, even so simultaneously there should be the activity of the hands of others too. And it should not be said that the recognition becomes blunt owing to the differences in the sense-organs; because even when there is difference in sense-organs there is found recognition in 'That I who heard, the very I see', etc. Nor is the absence of recognition due to difference in the bodies; because, even when the bodies are different, recognition is seen in the case of those who remember past lives. Nor is the absence of recognition due to difference in the individual self; because there is no evidence for an individual self as distinct from the Supreme Self. If it be said that the evidence for the two kinds of selves is the scriptural text, 'Of these one eats the sweet berries, the other, not eating, shines bright', no; because it cannot stand analysis.

110. It is thus. Does this scripture declare or not the distinctness of the individual self from the supreme? It

१११. ननु कल्पनानिर्मित एव भेद इति नाद्वैतहानिः नापि पूर्वोक्तवेदनाननुसंधानदोषानुषङ्ग इति चेद् न। कल्पनामात्रनिर्मितस्य भेदस्य प्रामाणिकव्यवस्थाहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः। अन्यथा कल्पनानिर्मितरजतभावेन शुक्तिशकलेनापि कटकमकुटादिनिर्माणप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् 'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः' 'एक एव च भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः' इत्यादिश्रौतस्मार्तवचनानि प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाद् न यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रमाणं सहस्रसंवत्सरसत्रवाक्यवत्। तत्र हि कर्तव्यत्वप्रतिपादनविरोधात् सहस्रसंवत्सरपदं सहस्रदिवसपरतया व्याख्यातमाचार्यैः। तत् सिद्धमात्मा प्रतिक्षेत्रं भिन्न इति।

cannot be the first; because it would result in the breakdown of non-dualism. Nor the second, since it would follow that there is no evidence for the existence of two selves.

111. Now the distinctness is set up only as assumptive; hence there is no breakdown of non-dualism; nor does there persist the above-mentioned defect of the non-recognition of feelings. If this be said, no; because a difference set up merely as assumptive cannot intelligibly be the ground for valid distinctions; otherwise, it would follow that even with a piece of shell in which a silver-nature is set up as assumptive, bangles, crowns, etc. could be produced. Therefore the statements in scripture and Codes, ' One God concealed in all existents ', ' And the existent soul is only one, distinct from existent to existent ', are, on account of conflict with other means of valid knowledge, not authoritative in respect of their expressed sense, like the statements about the sacrifice extending over a thousand years. There, indeed, since there is conflict with a declaration of obligatoriness, the expression, ' thousand years ', has been explained by the Preceptors

११२. ननु कथमात्मनो विभुत्वम् । श्रूयताम् । युगपदेव चरणशिरसोः कण्टकविद्धस्य समकालमेव वेदनाद्वयानुसंधानदर्शनादणुत्वं तावदनुपपन्नम् । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वे तु शरीरतुल्यपरिमाणत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अधिकपरिमाणत्वे शरीरान्तःप्रवेशाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न्यूनपरिमाणत्वे तु शिरःपादवेदनयोर्युगपदनुसंधानाभावप्रसङ्गस्य तादवस्थ्यात् । तर्हि शरीरपरिमाणत्वमेवास्त्विति चेद् मैवम् । गजादिगतस्यात्मनः पिपीलिकादिदेहानुप्रवेशाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तदभावे च बहुविधश्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधात् । तस्मात् पारिशेष्यात् सिद्धं विभुत्वम् । 'तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम्' इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिश्च विभुत्वसिद्धिः । नित्यत्वं पुनः 'अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा' इत्यादिश्रुतेरनवयवद्रव्यत्वाद् विभुत्वाच्च गगनादिवत् साधनीयम् ।

to refer to thousand days. Therefore it is established that the soul is distinct for every body.

112. Now, how is the soul all-pervasive? Listen. Since in respect of a man who was pricked by thorns simultaneously on the foot and on the head, there is found recognition of pain at two places at the same time, its atomic nature is unintelligible. But if the size is intermediate, a size equal to that of the body has to be acknowledged; because if the size were bigger the result would be that it could not enter the body; but if the size were smaller, the result of non-recognition simultaneously of the pain in the foot and in the head would continue as before. If it be said that the size then may be that of the body itself, it cannot be so; because it would follow that a soul that was present in an elephant, etc. cannot enter into the body of an ant, etc. If this be not possible, there is conflict

११३. ननु कौ पुनः स्वर्गापवर्गौ नाम। लौकिकेषु सुखदुःखेष्वेव स्वर्गनरकादिव्यपदेशः। मोक्षस्तु शरीरपात एव। इति देहात्मवादिनश्चार्वाकस्य मतम्। तत्तु देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मसद्भावप्रतिपादनेन निरस्तं वेदितव्यम्। स्वर्गस्तु वक्ष्यते।

११४. सौगतास्तु नीलपीतादिविषयोपधानविलये सति निरुपधानस्य बोधसंतानस्य स्वरूपेणावस्थानं मोक्षमाचक्षते। तदयुक्तम्। निर्विषयस्य बोधसंतानस्य स्वयमवस्थानानुपपत्तेः। क्षणे क्षणे निरन्तरमुपजायमानेषु विनश्यत्सु च बोधसंतानेषु कस्यापि मोक्षफलानुभवानुपपत्तेः, मुक्तेरपरपुरुषार्थत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च।

with many scriptures and Codes. Therefore, by elimination, its all-pervasiveness is established. The all-pervasiveness is also established from the scriptures, 'By that Puruṣa is all this filled', etc. Then its eternality has to be established from the scriptures, 'Imperishable, verily, is this soul', etc. from its being a substance without parts, and from its being all-pervasive like ether, etc.

113. Now, what then are Heaven and Release? The names, Heaven, Hell, etc. are applied only to worldly happiness and misery; Release is only the destruction of the body; this is the view of the Materialist who upholds that the body is the soul. But this, it must be understood, has been refuted through the declaration of the existence of a soul as distinct from the body. Heaven will be dealt with later.

114. The Buddhists speak of that as Release when there remains in its own form the series of cognitions free from adjuncts, when there is the destruction of the adjuncts in the form of the objects like blue, yellow, etc. This does not stand

११५. एकविंशतिप्रभेददुःखोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति तार्किकाः कीर्तयन्ति । देहः षडिन्द्रियाणि षड्विषयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेत्येकविंशतिप्रभेदं च दुःखमाचक्षते । तत् सुखस्यापि विनाशेन मुक्तेरपरपुरुषार्थत्वप्रसङ्गादुपेक्षणीयम् । न च सुषुप्तेरिव मुक्तेरपि दुःखाभावमात्रेण समीहितत्वमिति वाच्यम् । दुःखाभावसमीहितस्याल्पविषयत्वात् । अन्यथा विस्मृत्य सुप्तोत्थितस्य दुःखाभावेऽनुसंधीयमानेऽपि कामिनीसंभोगादिसुखलवलोपनिमित्तदुःखानुषङ्गाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स्वर्गादिसुखमुन्मुच्य मोक्षमात्राकाङ्क्षा न मोक्षस्य दुःखाभावमात्रस्वरूपत्वे संभवति ।

to reason; because it is unintelligible that a series of cognitions remains by itself devoid of content; also because, since the series of cognitions are unintermittently being produced and destroyed moment after moment, the experience of the fruit, Release, by anyone is unintelligible, and hence Release turns out to be other than a human goal.

115. The Logicians glorify Release as the rooting out of the twenty-one varieties of misery; the body, the six sense-organs, the six objects, the six cognitions, happiness and misery—these they speak of as the twenty-one varieties of misery. This has to be discarded, because, when happiness too is destroyed, Release turns out to be other than the human goal. Nor may it be said that, as in sleep, Release too becomes desirable merely through the non-existence of misery; because what becomes desirable as the non-existence of misery has a limited sphere. Otherwise, in the case of one who having slept forgetfully wakes up, even though non-existence of misery is recognized, it would follow that there should not persist any misery due to regret for the absence of such bits of happiness as

११६. एतेन सकलबुद्ध्यादिविशेषगुणविलये सत्यात्मनः स्वरूपावस्थानं मोक्ष इति प्राभाकरमतमपि निरस्तं वेदितव्यम्, सुखविलयादपुरुषार्थत्वस्य तुल्यत्वात्। सततोर्ध्वगमनादयस्तु दूरापास्ताः, तेषामपरपुरुषार्थत्वस्य स्पष्टत्वात्।

११७. प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानात् पुरुषस्य स्वरूपावस्थानं मोक्ष इति सांख्याः। तस्याप्यानन्दव्यतिरेकसंभवेनापुरुषार्थत्वमेव।

११८. प्रपञ्चविलयो मोक्ष इति शांकराः। न च तस्यापुरुषार्थत्वम् आत्मन आनन्दमयत्वाभ्युपगमात्। तदपि न संगच्छते। प्रपञ्चविलयस्यैवाभावात्।

the enjoyment of a damsel. Therefore, setting aside the happiness of Heaven, etc. a desire for mere Release would not occur at all if Release were only of the nature of non-existence of misery.

116. By this, it must be understood, there is refuted the doctrine of the followers of Prabhākara that there is Release when the soul remains in its own nature, after all the specific qualities like knowledge are destroyed; because if there is destruction of happiness, the defect of being other than a human goal is common. Eternally going upward, etc. are driven far away as conceptions of Release, because their being other than the ultimate human goal is clear.

117. From the discriminative knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the soul remains in his own nature; this is Release: so say the Sāṃkhya-s. This too is only other than a human goal, since there is possibility of the exclusion of happiness.

118. The followers of Śaṃkara hold Release to be the dissolution of the Universe; and this is not other than a human

११६. ननु प्रपञ्चस्य मायामयत्वादुपपद्यत एव विज्ञानोदये विलयः शुक्तिकास्वरूपावबोधे रजतावबोधविलयवद् इति चेद् मैवम्। प्रपञ्चस्य मायामयत्वस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वाद् आत्मानन्दयोः परस्परभेदस्य समर्थितत्वाच्च आनन्दानुभवस्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वेन तद्भावप्राप्तेरपरपुरुषार्थत्वाच्च।

१२०. कस्तर्हि मोक्षः किं च तत्साधनम्। उच्यते।

दुःखात्यन्तसमुच्छेदे सति प्रागात्मवर्तिनः।
सुखस्य मनसा भुक्तिर्मुक्तिरुक्ता कुमारिलैः॥

goal, since the soul is acknowledged to be constituted of bliss. This too cannot pass, because there is no dissolution of the Universe at all.

119. 'Now, since the Universe is constituted of Māya, its dissolution is certainly intelligible at the dawn of knowledge, like the dissolution of the cognition of silver when there is the cognition of the shell-nature'; if this be said, it cannot be so; because, that the Universe is constituted of Māyā will be refuted, because the mutual distinctness of the soul and bliss has already been established, and because, the experience of bliss itself being the human goal, to become that itself must be other than a human goal.

120. What then is Release? And what is the means thereto? This is the reply.

When there is the absolute rooting out of misery, the experience mentally of the happiness that already existed in the soul is said to be Release by the followers of Kumārila.

१२१. ननु यदि संसारावस्थायामप्यात्मसमवेत एवायमानन्दः तर्हि कथं नानुभूयते। अनुभवहेतोरभावादिति ब्रूमः। देहेन्द्रियादीनामात्यन्तिकपरिध्वंसानुगृहीतं मनस्तदनुभवसाधनम्। किं तर्हि तादृशानन्दसद्भावे प्रमाणम्। 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यते' इति श्रुतिरेव।

१२२. 'न च अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' इति श्रुतिरानन्दानुभूतिबाधिकेति वाच्यम्। तस्या वैषयिकप्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनिवृत्तिमात्रपरत्वात्। अन्यथा मुक्तेरपुरुषार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

१२३. निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मभ्यः सम्यग्व्यावृत्तचेतसः।
नित्यनैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तप्रध्वस्तदुष्कृतेः॥

121. Now, if this bliss be certainly inherent in the soul even in the state of transmigration, then how is it that it is not experienced? We say that it is due to the non-existence of the cause of its experience. Mind assisted by the absolute destruction of the body, the senses, etc. is the means to the experience thereof. Then what is the authority for the existence of such a bliss? It is the scripture itself: 'Bliss is the nature of Brahman, and that is manifested at the stage of Release.'

122. Nor may it be said that the scripture, 'Him who becomes non-embodied, what is pleasing and not pleasing do not touch', sublates the experience of bliss; because this has as purport only the cessation of the touch of what is pleasing and not pleasing in the world; otherwise Release would be other than the human goal.

123. By him whose mind is properly withdrawn
from the prohibited and optional rituals,

सुखदुःखानुभूतिभ्यां क्षीणप्रारब्धकर्मणः ।
युक्तस्य ब्रह्मचर्याद्यैरङ्गैः शमदमादिभिः ।।
कुर्वाणस्यात्ममीमांसां वेदान्तोक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
मुक्तिः संपद्यते सद्यो नित्यानन्दप्रकाशिनी ।।

१२४. सुखाद्यापरोक्ष्यसाधनेन्द्रियत्वेन कल्प्यमन्तरिन्द्रियं विभुपरिमाणमस्पन्दं च मनः । अणुपरिमाणं चञ्चलं च मन इति केचिदूचिरे । तदसङ्गतम् । मनो विभु स्पर्शानर्हद्रव्यत्वाद् अना-

whose sins are destroyed by the obligatory and the occasioned rituals and by the expiatory rites;

Whose *karman-s* that have begun to take effect are exhausted through the experience of happiness and misery, who is endowed with *brahmacarya* and subsidiaries like calmness and equanimity;

Who betakes himself to a respectful inquiry into the soul along the path declared in the Vedānta, by him is immediately accomplished Release which manifests the eternal bliss.

124. Mind is the internal organ, assumed to be a sense-organ as the means for the direct experience of happiness, etc. all-pervasive in size, and motionless. Some have said that mind is atomic in size and moving. This is not proper; because its all-pervasiveness is established by inferencs like: 'Mind is all-pervasive; because it is a substance not fit to

रम्भ्यारम्भकद्रव्यत्वाद्वा ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वाद्वा आत्मवद् इत्यादिभिरनुमानैर्महत्त्वसिद्धेः। सिद्धे विभुत्वे चाकाशादिवदस्पन्दात्मकत्वमपि न पृथक् साध्यम्।

१२५. ननु धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणबाधितान्यनुमानानि। तथाहि। विभुनो मनसोऽनुपहितत्वे गगनादिवदिन्द्रियत्वायोगादुपाधिर्वक्तव्यः। तत्र श्रोत्रादीनामिव मनसः शरीरैकदेशोपाधित्वं नोपपद्यते। तदवयवनिरोधे मनोनिरोधप्रसङ्गात्। नापि सकलशरीरोपाधित्वं वेदनाविज्ञानसाधनस्यात्ममनःसंयोगस्य सार्वत्रिकत्वेन पादादिगतायाः कण्टकादिवेधवेदनायाः सकलशरीरव्या-

be touched; because it is a substance which is neither the produced nor the producer; or because it is the abode of a conjunction which is the non-inherent cause of knowledge; like the soul.' And when all-pervasiveness is established, then, as in the case of ether, etc. its motionlessness has not to be separately established.

125. Now, these inferences are sublated by the means of valid knowledge whereby is apprehended the substrate (the mind). It is thus. If the all-pervasive mind be not conditioned, then since, like the ether, etc. it cannot be a sense-organ, an extraneous adjunct has to be stated. Here, for some particular part of the body to be the extraneous adjunct, as in the case of the sense of hearing, etc. is not intelligible; because if that part be destroyed, the destruction of mind would follow. Nor can the entire body be the extraneous adjunct; because, since the conjunction of the soul and the mind, which is the means to the cognition of pain, comes to exist throughout, the pain present in the leg through being

पित्वप्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात् । अणुत्वाश्रयणे तु तत्तद्देहावयवगतात्ममनः-संयोगविशेषवशादुपपद्यत एव वेदनायास्तत्तदधिकरणत्वप्रतीतिः। इति मनोग्राहकमेव प्रमाणमणुत्वमपि गृह्णाति। इति सिद्धो धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणबाधः ।

१२६. अत्र वदामः। यत्तावदुक्तं मनसोऽनुपहितस्य नेन्द्रियत्वमिति तदङ्गीकुर्मः सकलशरीरोपाधित्वस्वीकारात् । न चैवं सति पादादिगताया वेदनायाः सार्वत्रिकत्वप्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः। मनसो बहिरिन्द्रियानुसारेणैव कार्यकरत्वस्वीकारात् । अतस्त्वगिन्द्रियैकदेशगतस्य स्पर्शस्य न सकलशरीरव्यापित्वप्रतीतिः। अपि च अणुत्वे सकलशरीरगतस्य चन्दनादिजनितस्य सुखस्य

pricked by a thorn, etc. would be cognized as pervading the whole body. But if an atomic size be resorted to, on account of the difference in the conjunctions of the soul and the mind as present in the respective parts of the body, it is certainly intelligible that the pain is cognized as having the respective abodes. Hence by the very means of valid knowledge whereby is apprehended the mind, its atomic size too is apprehended. Thus is established sublation by the means of valid knowledge whereby is apprehended the substrate.

126. To this we reply. What was said that the unconditioned mind cannot be a sense-organ, this we admit; because we accept the entire body as the extraneous adjunct. It would not follow that, if this be the case, a pain present in the leg, etc. must be experienced throughout the body, because mind is accepted as producing an effect only through the channel of an external sense-organ. Therefore, it is that, for touch present in a particular part of the sense of touch,

यौगपद्यप्रतीत्यनुदयप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादणुत्वमहत्त्वयोर्गुणदोषसाम्यान्मनोग्राहकं प्रमाणं मनोमात्रमेव गृह्णाति । विभुत्वं तु प्रमाणान्तरावसेयम् । तच्चोक्तमेव ।

१२७. न च संयोगस्यान्यतरकर्मजत्वादिनियमदर्शनाद् विभुत्वेनाकर्मणोरात्ममनसोः परस्परसंयोगासंभवादात्ममनःसंयोगजन्यज्ञानस्यानुदयप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम् । उभयोरपि विभुत्वे सुतरामितरेतरसंयोगोपपत्तेः । विभूनां परस्परसंयोगः कर्मज इति न वयं संगिरामहे तत्संयोगस्याजन्यत्वात् ।

there is no experience as pervading the entire body. Further, if it be atomic, it would follow that in the case of the happiness, etc. present in the entire body and produced by sandal-paste, etc. there could not arise the experience as simultaneous. Therefore, since in the cases of atomic size and all-pervasive size, the merits and defects are equal, the means of valid knowledge by which the mind is apprehended, apprehends only the bare mind. But its all-pervasiveness is to be concluded through other means of valid knowledge. And that has already been stated.

127. Nor may it be said that since there is found the rule that conjunction is produced by the activity in one or the other and so on, conjunction is impossible between soul and mind, which, being all-pervasive, have no activity, and that consequently it would follow that knowledge, to be produced by the conjunction of soul and mind, could not arise; because when both are all-pervasive, all the more is their mutual conjunction intelligible. We do not say that the conjunction of what are all-pervasive is generated by an activity; because their conjunction is not producible.

१२८. न च विभूनां परस्परसंबन्धस्य क्वचिदप्यनुपलक्ष्यमाणत्वाद् विभुनोरप्यात्ममनसोः परस्परसंबन्धानुमानं विशेषविरुद्धमिति वाच्यम्। विभूनामपि दिगाकाशादीनां प्राचीनाकाशः प्रतीचीनाकाश इति परस्परसंबन्धस्याध्यात्मतयाध्यवसीयमानत्वादस्माभिः। प्रयोगश्च भवति। विभुनी द्रव्ये परस्परसंयोगिनी अनारभ्यारम्भकद्रव्यत्वे सति निरन्तरत्वाद् घटवत्। आकाशः कालसंयोगी कालव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति निरन्तरत्वाद् घटवद् इत्यादि।

१२९. ननु सुखाद्यापरोक्ष्यसाधनेन्द्रियत्वेन कल्प्यमानं द्रव्यं दिगाकाशादीनामन्यतममेवास्तु। किं द्रव्यान्तरकल्पनव्यसनेन।

128. Nor may it be said that since the reciprocal relation of what are all-pervasive has not been seen anywhere, the inference of reciprocal relation between soul and mind too, which are all-pervasive, is 'contradictory of the particular'; because it has been established by us that for space, ether, etc. though all-pervasive, there is a reciprocal relation, which is of their very nature, in the form 'the eastern sky', 'the western sky'. And there are syllogisms, 'Two all-pervasive substances have reciprocal conjunction, because while they are substances neither producible nor producing, there is no intermediate space, like a jar'; 'Sky (ether) is in conjunction with time, because, while it is distinct from time, there is no intermediate space, like a jar' and so on.

129. Now the substance assumed as the sense-organ instrumental to the direct experience of happiness, etc. may be one or other among space, ether, etc. Why is there this trouble to assume a distinct substance? It is not so; because,

मैवम्। तत्र तावत् करणत्वात् कर्तृवैलक्षण्यसिद्धिः। दिगाकाशादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वात् तदवगमे मनसः करणभूतत्वाद् दिगाकाशादिव्यतिरेकसिद्धिरपि स्वध्यवसेया। इति सिद्धं दशमं मनोद्रव्यम्।

१३०. श्रोत्रमात्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यः शब्दः शब्दत्वजातिमान्।
द्रव्यं सर्वगतो नित्यः कुमारिलमते मतः॥

तत्र श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वे शब्दस्य न विवादः। शब्दत्वं नाम जातिर्जातिनिर्णये वर्ण्यते च।

१३१. वियद्गुणत्वं शब्दस्य केचिदूचुर्मनीषिणः।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात् तद्भट्टपादैरुपेक्षितम्॥

being an instrument, distinctness from the agent is established. Since space, ether, etc. are perceptible, and since mind is an instrument in their cognition, the establishment of distinctness from space, ether, etc. is easily to be concluded. Hence is established mind as the tenth substance.

130. Sound is what can be apprehended by the sense of hearing alone and has the genus, soundness; it is all-pervasive and eternal, and a substance; so is it accepted in the system of Kumārila.

Of these, there is no dispute as to sound being apprehended by the sense of hearing. And the genus called soundness will be explained in the establishment of genus.

131. Some scholars say that sound is a quality of ether. That is discarded by Bhaṭṭapāda since that is in conflict with perception, etc.

तत्र गुणस्य सर्वत्र साश्रयतया प्रतीयमानत्वादिह च निराश्रयतयैव प्रतीतिदर्शनात् प्रत्यक्षविरोधः। शब्दो द्रव्यं साक्षादक्षसंबन्धसाक्षात्कार्यत्वाद् घटवत्। शब्दो द्रव्यं सत्त्वे सत्यनाश्रयत्वाद् गगनवत्। इत्याद्यनुमानविरोधोऽपि। न चास्यानाश्रयत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यं प्रतीतिविरोधात्। विमतं द्रव्यं शब्दाश्रयो न भवति द्रव्यत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नद्रव्यवद् इति निराश्रयत्वसिद्धेश्च। शब्दो द्रव्यं न भवति श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वात् शब्दत्ववद् इति अद्रव्यत्वं साध्यमिति चेद् न। गुणो न भवति श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वात् शब्दत्ववद् इत्येताभ्यामेव हेतुदृष्टान्ताभ्यां गुणत्वनिवृत्तेरपि सुसाधनीयत्वात्। तस्माद् द्रव्यत्वं प्रमाणान्तरावसेयम्। तत्तूक्तमेव।

Here, since in all cases a quality is cognized as having an abode, and since it is seen here to be cognized without an abode, there is opposition to perception. ‘Sound is a substance, because it can be directly apprehended through a direct relation with a sense-organ, like a jar’; ‘Sound is a substance, because, while it has existence, it has no abode, like ether’; there is opposition to these and other inferences. Nor may it be said that, since sound has ether as abode, its having no abode is non-established; because it is opposed to experience; also because its having no abode is established in, ‘The substance under discussion is not the abode of sound, because it is a substance, like other admitted substances’. If it be said that it is possible to establish, ‘Sound is not a substance, because it can be apprehended through the sense of hearing, like soundness’, no; because, through the same probans and example, its exclusion from being a quality is also easy to establish as, ‘Sound is not a quality, because it

१३२. शब्दो विभुः स्पर्शानर्हद्रव्यत्वाद् अनारम्भकत्वे सत्यनवयवद्रव्यत्वाद्वा आत्मवद् इति विभुत्वसिद्धिः । न च द्रव्यत्वमसिद्धम् । तस्य साधितत्वात् । एकस्यैव गकारस्य सर्वत्रावस्थितैरपि युगपदुपलभ्यमानत्वाच्च महत्त्वसिद्धिः ।

१३३. नैयायिकाः पुनरेनमेव युगपदुपलम्भं व्यक्तिभेदेन समर्थयन्ति । व्यक्तीनां च विनाशित्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । स एवायं गकार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य तु जातिगोचरत्वमपि कल्पयन्ति ।

१३४. तच्चायुक्तम् । यस्य हि प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य बलवत्-

can be apprehended through the sense of hearing, like soundness'. Therefore its being a substance has to be concluded from other means of valid knowledge. That, however, has been already stated.

132. 'Sound is all-pervasive, because it is an intangible substance, or because while it is not a producer, it is a substance without parts, like soul'; thus is established its being all-pervasive. Nor is its being a substance non-established; because that has been established. Since of the same sound 'g' there is simultaneous cognition by those situated in all directions, there is established its grossness.

133. The Logicians again justify this simultaneous cognition through differences of the individual sounds; and they acknowledge the destructibility of the individual sounds. And the recognition, 'This sound "g" is but that', they assume, has the genus as the sphere.

134. And this does not stand to reason. If in respect of a recognition, it is not possible to assume the identity

प्रमाणविरोधेन व्यक्तिगतमेकत्वं गोचरीकर्तुमशक्यम्, तस्यैव जात्यात्मनैकगोचरत्वकल्पनं युक्तम्। अन्यथा सर्वत्रापि जात्यात्मना प्रत्यभिज्ञानकल्पने सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादावपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात्। न चात्र बाधकप्रमाणं किंचिदुपलभ्यते।

१३५. ननु उत्पन्नः शब्दः, विनष्टः शब्द इत्यादिप्रत्ययोऽत्र बाधक इति चेद् न। नित्यविभुत्वेन संमतानामपि गगनादीनां खननपूरणानन्तरभवस्य जननविनाशप्रत्ययस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकसांनिध्यसदसद्भावनिबन्धनत्वात् तस्यापि। 'नित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वे सत्यकारणत्वाद् व्योमवत्' इति नित्यत्वसिद्धिः। न च ताल्वादिव्यापाराणां कारणत्वदर्शनादकारणत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम्। ताल्वादिव्यापाराणां खननादेर्मूलोदकाभिव्यञ्जकत्ववदभिव्यञ्ज-

present in the individuals as the sphere because of opposition to a stronger valid knowledge, it is only in respect of that that it is proper to assume the identity of the genus-nature to be the sphere. Otherwise, if the recognition were in all cases assumed to be of the genus-nature, the same would result in cases like, 'This Devadatta is but that'. And in the present case there is not found any sublating valid knowledge.

135. Now, if it be said that here the sublater is the cognition, 'Sound is produced', 'Sound is destroyed', etc. no; for this too, like the cognition of production and destruction, which results from digging or filling up, even in the case of what are accepted to be eternally pervasive, like ether, is conditioned by the existence and non-existence of the proximity of a manifester. 'Sound is eternal, because, while it is existent, it has no cause, like ether'; so is established its eternality. Nor may it be said that since the activity of the

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कत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेः । ताल्वादिव्यापारः शब्दकारणं न भवति व्यापारत्वात्, संप्रतिपन्नव्यापारवद् इत्यकारणत्वसिद्धेश्च ।

१३६. ननु ताल्वादिव्यापारः शब्दकारणं भवति शब्दस्य तदनन्तरभावित्वात् । यो यदनन्तरभावी स तत्कारणकः, यथा कुलालव्यापारानन्तरभावी घटस्तत्कारणकः, इति तस्य कारणत्वमपि साध्यमिति चेद् न । मूलोदकादौ व्यभिचारात् ।

१३७. न च ताल्वादिव्यापाराणामभिव्यञ्जकत्वे शब्दानां विभुत्वादभिव्यक्तस्य वर्णस्य सर्वोपलभ्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति

palate, etc. are seen to be causes, its having no cause is non-established; because the activity of the palate, etc. are intelligible even as manifesters, like digging, etc. which manifest the water at the bottom; and because its not having a cause is also established as, 'The activity of the palate, etc. is not the cause of sound, because it is an activity, like the other admitted activities'.

136. 'Now the activity of the palate, etc. is the cause of sound, because sounds follow immediately after that; that which follows immediatly after another has that other for its cause; for example, the jar, which follows immediately after the activity of the potter, has that for its cause. Thus may the causality of the activity too be established'. If this be said, no; because there is inconstancy of the pervasion in respect of the water at the bottom, etc.

137. Nor may it be said that if the activities of the palate, etc. are manifesters, it would follow that since sounds are all-pervasive, the manifested sound should be audible to all; because what is acknowledged to be the manifester is

वाच्यम्। ताल्वादिव्यापारोत्पन्नध्वनिश्रोत्रसंयोगस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वाङ्गीकाराद् ध्वनीनां वायुविशेषत्वात् तत्प्रेरकताल्वादिव्यापारबलानुसारेण अदूरश्रवणादिव्यवस्थोपपत्तेश्च। यदाह भाष्यकारः। 'अभिघातेन हि प्रेरिता वायवः स्तिमितानि वाय्वन्तराणि प्रतियोधमानाः सर्वतोदिक्कान् संयोगविभागानुत्पादयन्तो यावद्वेगम् अभिप्रतिष्ठन्ते। अनुपरतेष्वेषु शब्द उपलभ्यते नोपरतेषु' इति।

१३८. न चैकस्यैव गकारस्य तीव्रतीव्रतरमन्दमन्दतरत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मानुपपत्तेर्भिन्ना एवैते गकारा इति वाच्यम्। एकस्मिन्नेव मुखे मणिदर्पणकृपाणाद्यभिव्यञ्जकभेदेन भिन्नत्वप्रतीतिवत् तदभिव्यञ्जकध्वनिधर्मसमारोपेण वर्णेऽपि भिन्नत्वप्रतिपत्त्युपपत्तेः।

only the conjunction with the sense of hearing of the audible sound produced by the activities of the palate, etc.; and because audible sounds are particular varieties of air, in conformity with the force of the activity of the palate, etc. which set it in motion, such distinctions as not hearing at a distance, etc. are intelligible. So says the author of the *Bhāṣya*: 'Indeed, the airs, set in motion by some impact, push their way through the silent air and produce conjunction and disjunction in all directions, and travel so long as they have velocity. Sound is cognized so long as they do not stop; and not, when they stop.'

138. Nor may it be said that since the opposite attributes of high, higher, low, lower, etc. are unintelligible in respect of the very same 'g' sound, these 'g' sounds are certainly distinct; because, just as there is the experience of

१३९. ज्वालैकत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानवद् भ्रान्तिमूलमिदं वर्णैकत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति न वाच्यम् । कारणदोषबाधकप्रत्यययोरन्यतरस्याभावे भ्रान्तिमूलत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः। ज्वालैकत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानं हि ज्वालाया विशीर्यमाणावयवत्वदर्शनात् तेनावयविविशरणस्याप्यनुमेयत्वादेकस्यामेव वर्तिकायां ज्वलद्दीपनिर्वाणे दीपान्तरोद्दीपने च विहितेऽपि तदनवलोकयतः सैवेयं ज्वालेति पूर्ववदेव प्रत्यभिज्ञानदर्शनाच्च विषयगतसादृश्यादिदोषनिबन्धनमिति शक्यावगमम् । गकारप्रत्यभिज्ञाने तु विनाशप्रतिनियतलिङ्गादर्शनाद् विषयदोषकारणदोषयोरन्यतरस्यादर्शनाच्च न भ्रान्तिमूलत्वकल्पनमुपपद्यते। तस्मादखिललोकैरपि युगपदुपलभ्यमानोऽप्यमेक एव गकारः ।

difference in respect of the same face, according as it is differently manifested in a gem, mirror, sword, etc. so in respect of sound too, the experience of difference is intelligible by the transfer to it of the attributes of the audible sound which manifests it.

139. Nor may it be said that, just as in the case of the recognition of identity in a flame, this recognition of the identity of the letter is based on a delusion; because in the absence either of a defect in the cause or of the perception of a sublater, the assumption of being based on a delusion is unintelligible. Here it is possible to understand that the recognition of identity in a flame is indeed conditioned by a defect such as similarity present in the objects, because the flame is found to have parts which are destroyed, because thereby the destruction of the whole too is inferable, and because in respect of the very same wick, even when the light that was burning is extinguished and another light is lit, for one who has not *seen* it, there is found the recognition, 'This flame is but that', exactly as before. But in the case of the

१४०. अपिच शब्दोत्पत्तिपक्षे प्रथमस्य शब्दस्य ताल्वादिव्यापारोत्पाद्यत्वम्, उत्तरेषां शब्दोत्पाद्यत्वम्, अन्त्येतरस्य कार्यविनाशित्वम् अन्त्यस्य कारणविनाशित्वं श्रोत्रसमवेतस्यैव ग्राह्यत्वं वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वारभ्यत्वमित्यादिबहुतरादृष्टकल्पनाभयाद् नित्यत्वपक्षमेव वयमाद्रियामहे। इति सिद्धाः शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वसर्वगतत्वादयः।

१४१. स पुनरयं शब्दो वाचकावाचकभेदेन द्विविधो भवति। तत्रावाचको भेरीप्रहरणादिजन्यध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः। अन्यस्तु ताल्वादिव्यापारजन्यध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यो वर्णात्मकः।

recognition of the identity of the 'g' sound, since there is not found any probans invariably associated with destruction, and since neither a defect in the object nor a defect in the cause is seen, the assumption of its being based on delusion is unintelligible. Therefore the 'g' sound that is simultaneously heard by the entire world is but one.

140. Further, according to the view that the sound is produced, the first sound is produced by the activity of the palate, etc.; the subsequent ones are produced by another sound; all except the last are destroyed by the product and the last is destroyed by the cause; what is inherent in the sense of hearing alone can be apprehended; it is originated on the analogy of the motion of a wave or on the analogy of *kadamba* buds; since there is the fear of a very large number of assumptions of these and others that are not observed, we support only the view of its eternality. It is thus established that sound is a substance; is eternal, is all-pervasive and so on.

141. This sound again is of two kinds, being divided into significant and non-significant. Of these what is

१४२. वर्णात्मकानां शब्दानां संभूयैकार्थवाचिनाम् ।
समाहारं पदं प्राहुराचार्यमतकोविदाः ॥
उत्तीर्णवर्णं यत्किंचित् तत्त्वं स्फोटपदोदितम् ।
वर्णव्यङ्ग्यं पदं प्रोक्तं पतञ्जलिमतानुगैः ॥

१४३. तत्र तावदुत्तीर्णवर्णे पदस्वरूपे किं प्रमाणम् । नन्वस्ति तावदेकं पदमिति प्रत्यक्षानुभवः । नासौ वर्णविषयः तेषामनेकत्वादिति तदतिरिक्तत्वादिसिद्धिरिति चेद् मैवम् । यथानेकपदारब्धं वाक्यमेकवाक्यार्थावबोधकत्वादेकबुद्धिविषयं भवति तथानेकेषामपि वर्णानामेकपदार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वेनैकबुद्धिविषयत्वो-

non-significant is manifested by the audible sound produced by beating a drum, etc. The other is of the nature of letters, manifested by the audible sound produced by the activity of the palate, etc.

142. The collection of sounds of the nature of letters, which, coming together, signify a single object, those well versed in the doctrine of the Preceptor call a word.

By those who follow the doctrine of Patañjali, the word is said to be a certain reality designated by the term Sphoṭa, transcending letters and manifested by letters.

143. Now here, what is the evidence for the existence of the word transcending letters? 'Now there is the perceptual experience that the word is one; for this the content is not the letters, because they are more than one; hence there is established its being beyond this.' If this be said, it is not so; just as a sentence produced by more than one word is the

पपत्तेः। न च वाक्येऽपि वाक्यस्फोटादेकत्वबुद्धिः, तत्राप्येकत्वप्रतिपादकत्वादेव तदुपपत्तेः। न हि दृष्टे सत्यदृष्टकल्पनावकाशः। तस्मात् पदे वाक्येऽप्येकत्वबुद्धिरेकार्थावबोधकत्वादेव। वर्णे पुनरेकत्वप्रतीतिर्नानुपपन्ना। इति वर्णातिरिक्तपदकल्पनानवकाशः।

१४४. यत् पुनर्वर्णानां पदत्वमक्रमव्युत्क्रमपठितेभ्योऽपि वर्णेभ्योऽर्थप्रतीतिप्रसङ्गादसङ्गतमित्युक्तं तद् वर्णानां स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकत्वपक्षेऽपि समानमेवेति न स्फोटाभिधानं पदान्तरं द्रव्यान्तरं वा कल्पनीयम्।

content of the cognition of oneness since it makes known the meaning of a single sentence, similarly, since more letters than one form the cause for the cognition of a single word-sense their being the content of a cognition of oneness is intelligible; nor is the cognition of oneness in a sentence due to the Sphoṭa of the sentence; because there too, it is intelligible as being due to a single meaning being conveyed. Indeed, when there is something seen, the assumption of something unseen has no place. Therefore, in a word and also in a sentence, the cognition of oneness is due to their conveying a single meaning. The cognition of oneness in a letter, again, is not unintelligible; hence there is no room for the assumption of a word beyond the letters.

144. As for what was said that the letters being the word is not proper, since there would result the cognition of the meaning even from letters uttered wthout an order or in a distorted order, this is but common even to the view that the letters manifest the Sphoṭa; hence it is not necessary

१४५. एतादृशस्य पदस्य पदार्थेन सह प्रत्याय्यप्रत्यायकलक्षणः संबन्धोऽपि नित्य एव। पदपदार्थसंबन्धः सांकेतिकः, ईश्वरोऽत्र संकेतयिता इति तार्किकाणां मतम्। तदपि तार्किकेश्वरनिराकरणेन निरस्तं वेदितव्यम्।

१४६. गवादिजातिरेव गवादिपदवेदनीया। व्यक्तिस्तु गामानयेत्यादिवाक्येषु जातेरानयनादिक्रियान्वयानुपपत्त्या लक्ष्यते। जातिनित्यत्वं पुनरत्रैव जातिनिर्णये वर्णयिष्याम इति, संबन्ध्यनित्यत्वनिबन्धनं संबन्धानित्यत्वमपि। इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण।

to assume a distinct word or a distinct substance called Sphoṭa.

145. And of the word of this nature, the relation with the meaning of the word, defined as that of the signified and the signifier, is certainly eternal. That the relation of the word and the meaning of the word is conventional, and that in this, God is the author of the convention, is the view of the Logicians. This too, it must be understood, is refuted by the refutation of the God of the Logicians.

146. It is only the genus, cow, etc. which is to be understood from the word cow, etc.; but the individual is secondarily implied, since in sentences like, 'Bring the cow' the syntactical relation of the genus with the act of bringing, etc. is unintelligible. The eternality of the genus again we shall describe presently in deciding the nature of genus. The non-eternality of the relation too is conditioned by the non-eternality of the related. Hence there is no need for further elaboration.

१४७. अनित्यत्वे हि शब्दानां शशशृङ्गप्रहारवत् ।
शब्दात्मकानां वेदानां नित्यत्वं हास्यतां व्रजेत् ॥
इति संचिन्त्य वादोऽयं विस्तरेण प्रपञ्चितः ।
एकादशविधं द्रव्यं तस्मादस्मन्मते स्थितम् ॥

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३. जातिः

१. जातिर्व्यक्तिगता नित्या प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरा ।
भिन्नाभिन्ना च सा व्यक्तेः कुमारिलमते मता ॥

147. Indeed, if sound were non-eternal, the eternality of the Veda-s which are of the nature of sounds, would meet with ridicule, like hitting with a hare's horn.

Considering this well, this discussion was enlarged upon in detail. Thus in our system substances stand as of eleven kinds.

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3. Genus

1. Genus is present in the individuals, is eternal, is the sphere of perceptual cognition; it is different and non-different from the individual: so is it considered in the system of Kumārila.

२. अत्र बौद्धास्तावज्जातिमेव नानुमन्यन्ते। वदन्ति च। जातिः सर्वगता व्यक्तिगता वा। न तावत् सर्वगता सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात्। नापि व्यक्तिगता तत्कालोत्पन्नाया व्यक्तेर्व्यक्त्यन्तरवर्तिजात्यन्वयाभावप्रसङ्गात्। न च व्यक्त्युत्पत्तिसमये तद्गता जातिरप्युत्पन्नेति वक्तव्यम्। मीमांसकैरेव जातेर्नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्। अस्तु तर्हि व्यक्त्यन्तरादागत्य संबन्ध इति चेद् न। तैरेव निष्क्रियत्वाभ्युपगमाद् व्यक्त्यन्तरेऽनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गाच्च। न चांशेनागत्य संबन्ध इति वाच्यम्। निरंशत्वपरिग्रहात्। अपिच जातिरियं व्यक्तिनाशे किं तयैव सह विनश्यति तत्रैव तिष्ठति वा व्यक्त्यन्तरं प्रति गच्छति वा। नाद्यः नित्यत्वात्। नापि द्वितीयः, तत्रानुपलम्भात्। न तृतीयः, निष्क्रियत्वाद् व्यक्त्यन्तरे जातिद्वयोपलम्भप्रसङ्गाच्च। तदुक्तम्—

2. Now, here the Buddhists do not accept genus at all. And they say: 'Is genus present in the whole or in each individual? Now, it is not present in the whole; because there would result cognition of all the things. Nor is it present in each individual; because it would follow that for the individual produced at the present moment, there can be no relation with the genus abiding in another individual. Nor may it be said that at the time of the production of the individual, the genus present therein is also produced; because by the Mīmāṃsaka-s themselves the eternality of the genus is acknowledged. If it be said, "Let there be relation coming from another individual", no; because even by them non-activity is acknowledged and because its non-perception in h e other would be the result. Nor may it be said that there

नायाति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान्न चांशवत् ।
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसंततिः ।।

इति ।

३. तत्र वदामः । तत्र यत् तावत् पृष्टं सामान्यं सर्वगतं व्यक्तिगतं वेति तत्र पक्षद्वयमपि वयं कक्षीकुर्मः । सर्वगतत्वे व्यक्तिगतस्यापृथक्साध्यत्वात् । न च सर्वगतत्वे सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः। व्यक्तेर्व्यञ्जकत्वाङ्गीकरणात् । न ह्यभिव्यञ्जकेन विनाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्योपलम्भः क्वचिदपि संभवति । न च व्यक्तिगतत्वे तत्कालोत्पन्नाया व्यक्तेर्जात्यन्वयवियोगयोरनुपपत्तिः । व्यक्त्यु-

may be relation as coming over in part; because its partlessness is accepted. Further when the individual is destroyed is this genus destroyed even along with it, or does it remain in that very place, or does it go over to another individual? Not the first, because it is eternal; not the second, because it is not perceived there; nor the third, because it has no activity, and because in that other individual there would result the perception of two genuses. This is said:

'It does not come, it was not there and it is there
afterwards. And it has no parts. It does not quit
its earlier abode. Alas, what a string of difficulties.'

3. To this we reply. Now as for the question, 'Is the genus in the whole or in each individual?' we adopt both the alternatives. If it be present in the whole, its presence in each individual need not be separately established. Nor from its presence in all does there result perception in all; because each individual is recognized to be the manifester. Nowhere indeed is it possible for the manifested to be perceived

त्पत्तिविनाशहेतुभिरेव व्यक्तेर्जात्यन्वयवियोगयोरुपपत्तेः। अन्यत्रावस्थितस्यान्येनान्वयो गतिपूर्वक इत्यादिनियमानां पृथक्सिद्धवस्तुविषयत्वाद् न तादात्म्यसंबन्धसंबद्धयोर्जातिजातिमतोरपि शक्यन्ते समापादयितुम्। येन केनचित् साधर्म्येणान्यधर्मस्यान्यारोपे सति विश्वस्य संकरप्रसङ्गादिति न पूर्वोक्तदोषानुषङ्गः।

४. शाबलेयादिष्वनुस्यूतो महिषादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तो गौरित्येकाकारावभासः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणनिष्पन्नः कथं न सामान्य-

without the manifester. Nor from its presence in each individual is there unintelligibility in regard to the relation with and separation from the genus, in the case of an individual produced at the present moment; because the individual's relation with and separation from the genus is intelligible even through the causes for the production and destruction of the individual. The rules such as, 'The relation of what is present elsewhere with another is preceded by motion', relate to things established as distinct; therefore it is not possible to apply them even to the genus and what has that genus, which are related through the relation of identity. If there be the imposition of the attributes of one on another through the commonness of some attribute or other, confusion in the world would be the result; hence the defect mentioned before does not persist.

4. The appearance of a single form 'cow', which is uniform in what have brown and other colours, but which is excluded from buflaloes, etc. and which is cognized through perception as the means, how can this not compel the Buddhists even though unwilling, to accept 'class'? And this knowledge has not for its content merely the exclusion of non-cows;

मनिच्छतोऽपि बौद्धानङ्गीकारयेत्। न चायमगोनिवृत्तिमात्रविषयः प्रत्ययः। विधिमुखेन जायमानस्य प्रत्ययस्य निषेधमुखत्वाङ्गीकरणानुपपत्तेः। अगोनिवृत्तिशब्दस्यापि निषेधद्वयविशिष्टत्वाद् गोत्वमेवार्थ इति पुनरपि शब्दान्तरेण जात्यङ्गीकरणमेवापन्नमायुष्मताम्। तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—

अगोनिवृत्तिसामान्यं वाच्यं यैः परिकल्पितम्।
गोत्ववस्त्वेव तैरुक्तमगोऽपोहगिरा स्फुटम्॥

इति। नापि वृक्षेषु वनबुद्धिवद् व्यक्तिषु जातिबुद्धिरपि इति वाच्यम्। पृथगवलोकनेऽपि बाधकज्ञानानुदयात्।

because in the case of a cognition produced affirmatively, it is not intelligible to recognize it as produced negatively. Since even the cognition of the exclusion of non-cows is qualified by two negations, the meaning is only cowness; hence, once again, what has resulted to you, long-lived ones, is the acceptance of genus through another word. This is said by the Preceptors:

> According to them by whom it has been assumed that what is expressed is the commonness of the exclusion of non-cows, clearly the thing called cowness is declared by them through the words 'exclusion of non-cows'.

And it may not be said that the cognition of the genus in the individuals is like the cognition of the forest in the trees; because even when viewed as distinct, there does not arise any sublation.

५. ननु सामान्यं व्यक्तेरत्यन्तमभिन्नं भिन्नं वा । नाद्यः, व्यक्तिव्यतिरेकेण जातेरभावप्रसङ्गात् । नापि भिन्नम्, गोरेव गोत्वजातिसामान्यस्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वं नाश्वस्येति विभागाभाव-प्रसङ्गादिति चेत् तदयुक्तम् । जातिजातिमतोर्भेदाभेदसमुच्चयाङ्गीकरणादुभयपक्षोक्तदोषानुप्रवेशानुपपत्तेः ।

६. ननु पयःपावकयोरिवात्यन्तविरुद्धयोर्भेदाभेदयोः कथमेकत्र समुच्चयः । दर्शनबलादिति ब्रूमः ।

७. तत्र तावदयं गौरित्यत्रेदंशब्देन व्यक्तिरभिधीयते गोशब्देन तु जातिः । तत्र यदि जातिजातिमन्तावत्यन्तभिन्नौ तर्हि

5. Now, is the class absolutely non-different or different from the individual? Not the first, because the non-existence of the genus as distinct from the individual would be the result. Nor is it different, because there would result the absence of the distinction that a cow alone is the manifester of the genus 'cowness' and not a horse. If this be said, it does not stand to reason. Since the combination of difference and non-difference between the genus and what has that genus has been accepted, the entry of the defects mentioned in both the alternatives is unintelligible.

6. Now, how is there the combination in the same place of difference and non-difference, which are absolutely opposed like water and fire? We reply that it is on the strength of what is seen.

7. Here, then, in 'this is a cow', by the word 'this' the individual is expressed, but the genus by the word 'cow'. Of these, if the genus and what has that genus were absolutely different, the perception would be 'this and cowness'; because

इदंगोत्वे इति प्रतीतिः स्याद् अत्यन्तभिन्नेषु घटपटादिषु तथा प्रतीतिदर्शनात्। यद्यत्यन्ताभिन्नौ तर्हि हस्तः कर इत्यादिवत् पर्यायत्वमिदंगोपदयोः प्रसज्येत। तस्मादिदंगोपदयोरपर्यायत्वे सति सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनाद् भेदाभेदसमुच्चयमेव वयं जातिजातिमतोराश्रयामहे।

८. समवायात् सामानाधिकरण्यमिति प्राभाकराः। तदुपरिष्टात् समवायनिराकरणे निराकरिष्यामः। ततो न जातिसिद्धौ काचिदनुपपत्तिः।

९. एवं सिद्धायामपि जातौ तदवबोधस्य पूर्वाकारावमर्शनियतत्वात् तदभावेन सत्त्वशब्दत्वब्राह्मणत्वादीनामभावमाह गुरुः।

such is found to be the perception in respect of 'a jar and a cloth', etc. which are absolutely different. If absolutely non-different, then, like *hasta* and *kara* (hand), 'this' and 'cowness' would turn out to be synonyms. Therefore, since for the words 'this' and 'cowness', which are not synonymous, there is found apposition, we have resort only to the combination of difference and non-difference between the genus and what has that genus.

8. The followers of Prabhākara hold that the apposition is through inherence. This we shall refute later in refuting inherence. Therefore there is nothing unintelligible in the establishment of the genus.

9. Although the genus is thus established, the Guru says that, since its cognition is invariably controlled by the knowledge of the earlier form, existence, soundness, Brahminness, etc. which have not that knowledge are non-existent.

१०. तदयुक्तम्। पूर्वाकारावमर्शस्य तत्रापि विद्यमानत्वात्। तथाहि। कोऽयं पूर्वाकारावमर्शो नाम। किं पूर्वानुभूतानां सर्वेषामाकाराणामवमर्शः, उत कतिपयानाम्। नाद्यः शाबलेयीमुपलभ्य बाहुलेयीमुपलभमानस्य शाबलेयीगतानां सर्वेषामाकाराणां बाहुलेयीगतत्वेनावमर्शादर्शनात्। दर्शने वा बाहुलेय्याः शाबलेयीत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

११. अथ द्वितीयः तर्हि किमपराद्धं सत्त्वशब्दत्वब्राह्मणत्वादिभिः पूर्वानुभूतस्य सत्त्वाद्याकारस्य तत्राप्यनुभूयमानत्वात्। ततः पृथिवीसलिलादिषु द्रव्येषु, गोत्वादिषु जातिषु, रूपरसादिषु गुणेषु, गमनादिषु कर्मसु च, सत् सदिति प्रतीतिशब्दप्रयोगयोर्दर्शनाद् द्रव्यादिचतुष्टयवर्ति सत्त्वं नाम महासामान्यमाश्रयणीयम्।

10. This does not stand to reason; because the knowledge of the earlier form exists in these cases too. It is thus: what is it that is called the knowledge of the earlier form? Is it the knowledge of all the forms experienced before, or of some? Not the first, because after seeing a *śābaleyī*, when one sees a *bāhuleyī*, it is not seen that he cognizes as present the *bāhuleyī*, all the forms present in the *śābaleyī*. Or if it were so seen, it would follow that the *bāhuleyī* is the *śābaleyī*.

11. If then the second, what crime has been committed by existence, soundness, Brahminness, etc. since the form of existence, etc. experienced before is experienced in them too? Therefore, since the concept and the usage of the word 'existent' are found in respect of substances like earth and water, in genuses like cowness, in qualities like colour and taste, and in action like going, a *summum genus* called 'existence' has to be resorted to as present in the four categories beginning with substance.

१२. तार्किकास्तु सामान्यस्य सामान्यान्तराश्रयणेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मगतमेव सत्त्वं न तु जातिगतमित्याहुः ।

१३. तदयुक्तम् । यदि द्रव्यत्वस्य द्रव्यत्वान्तरं गोत्वस्य वा गोत्वान्तरमाश्रयामहे तर्हि स्यादेवानवस्था । सत्त्वाश्रयणे तु न काचिदनवस्था इति नोक्तदोषानुषङ्गः । अपिच सत् सदिति शब्दप्रयोगप्रत्यययोस्तत्राविशेषेण विद्यमानत्वात् कथं नाम न तद्गतामपि सत्तामाश्रयामहे ।

१४. एवमश्रुतचरेऽपि शब्दे श्रूयमाणे झटिति शब्दोऽयं शब्दोऽयमित्यनुगताकारबुद्धिदर्शनाच्छब्दत्वसिद्धिः ।

12. The Logicians, however, say that since there would result infinite regress if another genus be accepted in a genus, existence is present only in substances, qualities and actions, but is not present in genus.

13. This does not stand to reason. If we had resort to another substanceness in substanceness, or to another cowness in cowness, then there would certainly be infinite regress. But in having resort to existence, there is not any infinite regress. Hence the defect stated does not persist here. Further, since the usage of the word and the concept 'existent' are found in all these cases without any distinction, why should we not have resort to 'existence' as present in them too?

14. Similarly when a sound, not heard before at all, is heard, since there is found immediately the cognition in a uniform way, 'This is sound', 'This is sound', sound-ness is established.

१५. ननु पाचकादिवदेकोपाधिनिबन्धनेयं सत्त्वादावेकशब्दप्रवृत्तिः इति चेद् न । तादृशोपाधेरनिरूपणात् । न च सत्त्वे प्रमाणसंबन्धयोग्यत्वमुपाधिः । प्रमाणसंबन्धयोग्यत्वावगमात् पूर्वमेव झटिति सदिति प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । न ह्युपाधिपरिज्ञानात् पूर्वमुपहितत्वबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । देवदत्तादिविषयपाचकत्वादिबुद्धेस्तद्गतपाकादिव्यापारावगमात् पूर्वमुद्भवप्रसङ्गात् ।

१६. अनेनैव शब्दत्वे श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वमुपाधिरित्यपास्तम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वग्रहणात् पूर्वमेव झटिति

15. Now, the application of the same word in respect of 'existence', etc. is conditioned by the same extraneous adjunct as in the case of 'a cook', etc.; if this be said, no, because such an extraneous adjunct has not been ascertained. Nor is it that in the case of 'existence', fitness for relation with a means of valid knowledge is the extraneous adjunct; because, even prior to the understanding of the fitness for the relation with a means of valid knowledge, there is found immediately the generation of the cognition 'existent'. Indeed, prior to the knowledge of the extraneous adjunct there cannot be produced the knowledge of being conditioned by an extraneous adjunct; because there would result the generation of the knowledge of Devadatta being a cook, etc. even before cognizing in him the operation of cooking, etc.

16. By this itself is refuted the view that fitness to be apprehended by the sense of hearing is the extraneous adjunct in the case of sound-ness, etc. because even prior to the apprehension of the fitness to be apprehended by the sense of hearing, there is immediately found through co-presence

शब्दोऽयमिति प्रतीतिदर्शनात् । एवमेव ब्राह्मणोऽयमिति शब्दप्रयोगप्रत्यययोर्दर्शनाद् ब्राह्मणत्वमपि साधनीयम् ।

१७. यत् पुनर्मातापितृगतो ब्राह्मणशब्दप्रयोगः पुत्रे तत्प्रयोगनिमित्तमित्युक्तं तदयुक्तम् एकत्र प्रयोगस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगनिमित्तत्वानुपपत्तेः । उपपत्तौ वा पित्रादिगतेन देवदत्तपदप्रयोगेण पुत्रादावपि तत्पदप्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद् भूयसां ब्राह्मणकुलानामेकवर्गीकरणं ब्राह्मणत्वजातिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते इति सिद्धं ब्राह्मणत्वम् । अविप्लुतब्राह्मणत्वमातापितृसंबन्धोत्पन्नत्वावगमानुगृहीतं चक्षुरेव तद्ग्राहकमिति न तस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वमपि ।

and co-absence the cognition, 'This is sound'. In this same way has to be established Brahminness too, from there being seen the usage of words and the concept 'This is a Brahmin'.

17. Again, as for what was said that the usage of the word Brahmin in respect of the father and the mother is the condition for its usage in respect of the son, this does not stand to reason; because the usage in respect of one cannot intelligibly be the condition for the usage in respect of another. Or if it be intelligible, the result would be that, because of the usage of the word 'Devadatta' in respect of the father, etc. it could be used even in respect of the son, etc. Therefore the unification in a single class of a large number of families is unintelligible without the genus 'Brahminness'. Thus is established 'Brahminness'. What apprehends it is the sense of sight itself assisted by the understanding of his being born of a Brahmin father and mother, whose Brahminness is not corrupted; hence it is not non-perceptible either.

१८. एवमेव द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वरसत्वादीन्यपि सामान्यान्तराणि प्राभाकरावकल्पिततत्तदुपाधिनिरसनेन निरुपाधिकत्वसमर्थनात् समर्थनीयानि । इति सिद्धा जातिः ।

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४. गुणः

१. **कर्मणो व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सत्यवान्तरजातिमान् ।**
उपादानत्वनिर्मुक्तो गुणो गुणविदां मतः ॥

स च रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसंस्कारध्वनिप्राकट्यशक्तिभेदाच्चतुर्विंशतिविधः ।

18. In this same way the other genuses too, like substanceness, qualitiness and tasteness are to be established, by establishing freedom from extraneous adjuncts, through the refutation of every extraneous adjunct that is assumed by the followers of Prabhākara. Thus is the genus established.

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4. Quality

1. That which, while being distinct from action,
has sub-genuses and is excluded from
material causality, this is a quality, as
accepted by those who know quality.

And it is of twenty-four varieties, being divided into colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, distinctness, conjunction,

२. तत्र रूपं चक्षुरिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यं पृथिव्यादित्रये तमसि च वर्तमानं विशेषगुणः। तच्च शुक्लकृष्णपीतरक्तश्यामभेदेन पञ्चविधम्। एतेषामवान्तरभेदाः पुनरसंख्याः।

३. रसो रसनेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यः पृथिवीजलमात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः। स च मधुरतिक्ताम्लकषायकटुलवणभेदेन षड्विधः। एतेषामप्यवान्तरभेदा बहुविधाः।

४. गन्धो घ्राणेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यः पृथिवीमात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः। स च सुगन्धदुर्गन्धसाधारणगन्धभेदेन त्रिविधः। जलादौ गन्धप्रतिभानं तु पृथिवीसंबन्धादिति द्रष्टव्यम्।

disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity cognition, happiness, misery, desire, aversion, volition, impression, audible sound, manifestedness and potency.

2. Of these, colour is what can be apprehended by the sense of sight alone and, existing in the three beginning with earth, and in darkness, is a specific quality. And being divided into white, black, yellow, red and blue, it is of five kinds. Of these, subdivisions are innumerable.

3. Taste is what can be apprehended by the sense of taste alone and, existing only in earth and water, is a specific quality. And this, being divided into sweet, bitter, sour, astringent, pungent and saline, is of six kinds. Of these too, the subdivisions are again innumerable.

4. Smell is what can be apprehended by the sense of smell alone and, existing only in earth, is a specific quality. And being divided into sweet, noxious and ordinary, it is of three kinds. The appearance of smell in water, etc. however, is due, it must be seen, to association with earth.

५. स्पर्शः त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टये वर्तमानो विशेषगुणः। सोऽपि शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदेन त्रिविधः।

६. संख्या पुनरेकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सर्वद्रव्यवर्तित्वात् सामान्यगुणः। सा पुनरेकादिपरार्धपर्यन्ता।

७. परिमाणमपि मानव्यवहारकारणं सर्वद्रव्यगतं सामान्यगुणः, अणुमहद्दीर्घादिभेदभिन्नं च। तत्राणुत्वं परमाणुगतम्। महत्परिमाणं गगनादिगतम्। इतराणि पुनरितरद्रव्यगतानि।

८. पृथक्त्वं भेदव्यवहारकारणं सर्वद्रव्यगतं सामान्यगुणः। अत्र प्राभाकराः कार्यद्रव्येषु पृथक्त्वं नानुमन्यन्ते। तदुक्तं पदार्थदीपिकायाम्—

5. Touch is what can be apprehended by the sense of touch alone and, existing in the four beginning with earth is a specific quality. That too, being divided into cold, hot, and neither hot nor cold, is of three kinds.

6. Number again, is the cause of the empirical usage, of 'one', etc. Existing in all substances, it is a common quality. And it begins with one and ends in *parārdha*.

7. Size too is the cause of the empirical usage of measurement and, being present in all substances, is a common quality. And it is divided into the varieties of atomic, gross, long, etc. Of these, atomic size is present in the primal atoms. Gross size is present in ether, etc. And the others are present in the other substances.

8. Distinctness is the cause of the empirical usage of difference and, being present in all substances, is a common quality. Here, the followers of Prabhākara do not accept

पृथक्त्वं तु गुणो नित्यद्रव्येषु परमाणुषु ।
भवेद् व्यावर्तको धर्मः कार्यद्रव्येषु नेष्यते ।।

इति। तदयुक्तम्। कार्यद्रव्येष्वपि भेदप्रतिपत्तेरवश्याश्रयणीयत्वात्।

९. ननु पदार्थानां स्वरूपमेव भेदः। तच्च कार्यद्रव्येषु प्रत्यक्षगम्यमिति न तत्र तदतिरिक्तव्यावर्तकधर्मकल्पनावकाशः। अदृष्टस्वलक्षणेषु तु स्वरूपदर्शनाभावाद् युक्तमेव व्यावर्तकधर्मानुमानम्। आत्मनि प्रत्यक्षेऽपि विभुत्वाद् व्यावर्तकधर्मस्वीकारः। इति चेद् मैवम्। स्वरूपभेदपक्षानुपपत्तेः। तथाहि।

'distinctness' in produced substances. This is stated in *Padārthadīpikā*—

> But the quality, distinctness, exists in the eternal substances, in the primal atoms, as a distinguishing attribute, and is not needed in produced substances.

This does not stand to reason; because the cognition of difference has necessarily to be resorted to even in respect of produced substances.

9. Now, for things, their own nature constitutes their difference. And this can be understood through perception in produced substances; hence in these cases there is no room for assuming a distinguishing attribute other than this. But in the case of those whose own distinctive feature is not perceived since their own nature is not perceived, inference of a distinguishing attribute certainly stands to reason. In the case of the soul, though perceptible, there is the acceptance of a distinguishing attribute because of its all-pervasiveness. If this be said, no; because the view of one's own nature

पदार्थानां स्वरूपस्यैव भेदत्वे घटस्य भेद इति संबन्धित्वेन घटात् पटो भिन्न इति विशेषणत्वेन च भेदप्रतीतिर्निराश्रया भवेत् । घटभेदपदयोः पर्यायित्वं च प्रसज्येत । तस्मात् सर्वद्रव्यगतमेव पृथक्त्वम् ।

१०. औपनिषदास्तु स्तम्भात् कुम्भो भिन्न इति कुम्भभेदावगमस्य तत्पूर्वभाविस्तम्भभेदावगमनिबन्धनत्वात् स्तम्भभेदावगमस्य च तत्पूर्वभाविकुम्भभेदावगमाधीनत्वाद् भेदप्रतिपत्तिमेव दुःसंपादनां मन्यमानाः तत्पूर्वकाणामनुमानादीनामपि भेदप्रतिपादकत्वं निराकुर्वन्तः 'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधं परिहर्तुं पृथक्त्वं नाम गुणान्तरं परमार्थतो नास्तीत्याहुः ।

constituting the difference is unintelligible. It is thus: If of a thing, its own nature constitutes its difference, the cognition of difference as a *relatum* in the form, 'The difference of the jar' and as an attribute in the form, 'Cloth is different from the jar' would have no abode; and there would result synonymity of the words 'jar' and 'difference'. Therefore distinctness is certainly present in all substances.

10. Since the understanding of the difference of the pot in the form, 'pot is different from the post' is conditioned by the understanding of the difference of the post which has gone before, and since the understanding of the difference of the post is dependent on the understanding of the difference of the pot which has gone before, the followers of the Upaniṣad-s however, consider even the cognition of difference as difficult to achieve through perception and deny that inferences, etc.

११. तदपि न रमणीयम् । स्तम्भकुम्भौ वादिप्रतिवादिनौ पयःपावकावित्यादीनां परस्परभेदस्य क्वचिदप्यप्रतीयमानत्वे निषेधानुपपत्तेः । न हि घटं क्वचिदप्यजानानाः इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति घटं प्रतिषेद्धुम् उत्सहन्ते । प्रतीयमानत्वे तु बलवत्प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणबाधितविषयत्वाद् भेदनिरासाय प्रवृत्तानामनुमानागमार्थापत्तीनाम् अनवकाशप्रसङ्गात् ।

१२. न च भेदप्रतिपत्तौ परस्पराश्रयदोषः । सप्रतियोगित्वेनैव भेदस्य प्रतिपत्तिरिति नियमस्य सविकल्पकत्वप्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युपजीवित्वात् । न च सविकल्पके तादृशनियमदर्शनाद्

consequent upon that convey difference; and in order to avoid the opposition of Vedānta passages like 'Here there is not a plurality' to perception, etc. they say that there is not in reality a separate quality called distinctness.

11. This too is not acceptable. 'The post and the pot', 'the disputant and the opponent', 'water and fire': if the mutual distinctness of these and others is not perceived in any place whatsoever, its refutation is unintelligible. Indeed, those who have not known a jar in any place whatsoever do not attempt to deny a jar in the form, 'On this floor there is no jar'. If it is known, the inference, authority and presumption employed for a denial of 'distinctness' have no scope, since their contents are sublated by the stronger means of valid knowledge, perception.

12. And in cognizing distinctness through perception there is no reciprocal dependence; because the rule, 'The understanding of distinctness has necessarily as antecedent the apprehension of the counter-correlate,' depends on the

निर्विकल्पकेऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन हेतुना शक्यं तदनुमानमिति वाच्यम् । यथाकथंचित् साधर्म्येणान्यत्रान्यधर्मारोपे सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकपूर्वत्वनियमदर्शनात् प्रत्यक्षत्वेन निर्विकल्पकस्यापि निर्विकल्पान्तरपूर्वत्वानुमानप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद् निर्विकल्पकसंविदा युगपदवभासितानां स्तम्भकुम्भभेदानां सविकल्पकसंविदा विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन सप्रतियोगित्वेन च प्रतीतौ न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । इति सिद्धं पृथक्त्वम् ।

१३. संयोगः सर्वद्रव्यवर्ती सामान्यगुणः । स च नित्या-

pervasion conditioned by the determinateness (of the cognition). And it should not be said that since such cognition of a rule is found in the case of determinate cognitions, its inference in the case of non-determinates too is possible from perceptibility as probans; because, if somehow or other there be the transfer of the attributes of one to another through similarity of attributes, then, since there is found the rule that a determinate cognition must have a non-determinate cognition as antecedent, there would result the inference of a non-determinate cognition too having another non-determinate cognition as antecedent, perceptibility being the probans. Therefore, if the post, the pot and their distinctness, which appear simultaneously in a non-determinate cognition, are known in a determinate cognition as in the relation of attribute and substrate, and as having a counter-correlate, there is nothing unintelligible. Thus is established distinctness.

13. Conjunction, existing in all substances, is a common quality. And, being divided into eternal and non-eternal, it is of two kinds. Of these, the reciprocal conjunction of ether, time, etc. which are eternal and all-pervasive, is eternal.

नित्यभेदेन द्विविधः। तत्र नित्यविभूनां व्योमकालादीनां परस्परसंयोगो नित्यः। स च संयोगः प्रागेव दर्शितः। अनित्यः संयोगः पुनरन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजः संयोगजश्चेति त्रिविधः। तत्र स्थाणुश्येनयोः संयोगोऽन्यतरकर्मजः। युध्यतोर्मल्लकृष्णयोः संयोग उभयकर्मजः। हस्ततरुसंयोगात् कायतरुसंयोगः संयोगजः संयोगः।

१४. विभागः पुनरविभुद्रव्यमात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः। तस्याप्यन्यतरकर्मजादिभेदेन त्रैविध्यं द्रष्टव्यम्।

१५. परत्वापरत्वे तु दिक्कालमात्रवर्तित्वाद् विशेषगुणौ। तत्र दूरस्थिते प्रतीयमानं परत्वं समीपस्थिते प्रतीयमानं चापरत्वं

And this conjunction has been set forth already. Non-eternal conjunction again is of three kinds, namely, produced by activity in one of the two, produced by activity in both, and produced by another conjunction. Of these, the conjunction of the post and the hawk is produced by activity in one of the two; the conjunction of the wrestler and Kṛṣṇa, as they fight, is produced by activity in both; the conjunction of the body and the tree, produced by the conjunction of the hand and the tree, is conjunction produced by another conjunction.

14. Disjunction, again, existing in non-pervasive substances alone, is a specific quality. Of this too, three varieties should be understood, being divided into what is produced by activity in one of the two, etc.

15. Remoteness and proximity, however, existing only in space and time, are specific qualities. Of these, remoteness

दिक्कृतमित्युच्यते। तयोर्दिङ्मात्रनिबन्धनत्वात्। स्थविरे प्रतीयमानं परत्वं यूनि प्रतीयमानमपरत्वं च कालकृतमित्युच्यते। तयोः कालमात्रनिबन्धनत्वात्।

१६. गुरुत्वं पतनासमवायिकारणं पृथिवीजलमात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः। द्रवत्वं पृथिव्यादित्रयवर्ती विशेषगुणः। स च स्वाभाविकनैमित्तिकभेदेन द्विविधः। तत्रापामेव स्वाभाविकं द्रवत्वम्। पृथिव्याः क्वचिज्जलसंयोगाद् द्रवत्वं क्वचित्तु जतुप्रभृतावग्निसंयोगात्। तेजसः पुनः सुवर्णादेरग्निसंयोगादिति द्रष्टव्यम्।

१७. स्नेहो जलमात्रवर्ती स्निग्धत्वादिबुद्धिविषयो विशेषगुणः।

perceived in what is at a distance and proximity perceived in what is near are said to be caused by space; because they are conditioned by space alone. Remoteness perceived in the older and proximity perceived in the younger are said to be caused by time; because they are condtioned by time alone.

16. Weight is the non-inherent cause of falling and, existing only in earth and water, is a specific quality. Fluidity, existing in the three beginning with earth, is a specific quality. And, being divided into natural and artificial, it is of two kinds. Of these, natural fluidity is in water alone. Then, for earth, sometimes fluidity is due to conjunction with water, sometimes, as in wax, etc. due to conjunction with fire. For fire again, i.e. gold, etc. it is due to conjunction with fire. Thus must it be understood.

17. Viscidity, existing only in water, is a specific quality which is the content of the cognition of viscidity, etc.

१८. बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्ना आत्मविशेषगुणाः। तत्र बुद्धिव्यतिरिक्तं सुखादिपञ्चकं मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्यम्। बुद्धिः पुनरर्थप्रकाशापरनामधेयप्राकट्यान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतार्थापत्तिगम्या।

१६. बुद्धिः स्वयंप्रकाशेति गुरुशंकरयोर्मतम्।
प्रत्यक्षेत्यक्षपादानां तन्निरासोऽभिधीयते ॥

२०. तत्र स्वयंप्रकाशवादिनस्तावदेवं प्रयुञ्जते। ज्ञानं स्वगतव्यवहाररूपे कार्ये स्वसजातीयपरानपेक्षं तथाभूतपरगतकार्यकारित्वाद् यथा प्रदीपः। न हि प्रदीपः स्वगतव्यवहाररूपे कार्ये प्रदीपान्तरमपेक्षते। तस्माद् बुद्धिरपि न बुद्ध्यन्तरम्। इति।

18. Cognition, happiness, misery, desire, aversion and volition are the specific qualities of the soul. Of these, except cognition, the other five beginning with happiness, can be understood through mental perception. Cognition again is to be understood through presumption, generated by the unintelligibility otherwise of manifestedness, which is another name for the manifestation of the object.

19. That cognition is self-manifesting is the view of the Guru and Śaṃkara; that it is preceptible is the view of Akṣapāda. Their refutation is stated.

20. Of these, those who uphold its self-manifestation use this syllogism: 'Knowledge is not dependent on another thing of its class in respect of the product in the form of an empirical usage regarding itself, because it produces a product of that nature in respect of another; for example, a lamp.

२१. तदयुक्तम्। अर्थान्तरानुमापके लिङ्गान्तरावगम्ये लिङ्गे व्यभिचारात्। तत्र हि परप्रकाशकं लिङ्गं स्वप्रकाशाय लिङ्गान्तरमपेक्षते।

२२. ननु ज्ञेयत्वे विज्ञानस्य घटादिवज्जडत्वं प्रसज्येत इति चेद् न। स्वप्रकाशत्वपक्षेऽपि परगतस्य ज्ञानस्य चेष्टा-लिङ्गकानुमानगम्यत्वेन जडत्वप्रसङ्गस्य तादवस्थ्यात्। ततो न धीकर्मत्वमात्रेण जडत्वसिद्धिर्ज्ञानस्यान्यस्य वा। यदधीनं व्यव-हारानुगुणत्वं तदजडं यदधीनं तु न कस्यचित् तज्जडम् इत्येव विभागः।

Indeed, a lamp does not depend on another lamp in respect of the product in the form of an empirical usage regarding itself; therefore, cognition too does not depend on another cognition.'

21. This does not stand to reason; because there is 'inconstancy' in respect of a mark which leads to the inference of another object and which is to be understood from another mark. Here, indeed, the mark which manifests another depends on another mark for its own manifestation.

22. Now, if it be said that if cognition is something to be known, then, inertness would follow as for a jar, etc. no; because, even according to the view of its self-manifestation, since the cognition present in another is to be understood through inference with voluntary activity as the mark, the result of inertness remains in the same position. Therefore, merely by being the object of cognition, inertness cannot be established for cognition or for anything else. That, the dependence on which is conducive to empirical usage, is

२३. इत्थं निरस्ते परमते स्वपक्षस्थापनार्थमनुमानमुच्यते। 'संवेदनं स्वप्रकाशं न भवति वस्तुत्वाद् घटवत्।' 'विप्रतिपन्नो व्यवहारः स्वविषयसंवेदननिबन्धनः व्यवहारत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नव्यवहारवत्।' 'संवेदनव्यवहारः संवेदनसंवेदननिबन्धनः संवेदनव्यवहारत्वात् परगतसंवेदनव्यवहारवत्।'

२४. मानसप्रत्यक्षं विज्ञानमिति तार्किकाणां मतम्। ते पुनरेवमाहुः। 'ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं क्षणिकात्मविशेषगुणत्वात् सुखादिवत्' इति। तदिदमसारम्। सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां प्राणादिक्रियानिमित्तेन प्रयत्नेनानैकान्त्यात्। अप्रत्यक्षत्वे प्रमाणं च भवति। विवादपदं ज्ञानम् अप्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नज्ञानवद् इति।

non-inert; but that, the dependence on which is not so for anything, is inert—this alone is the distinction.

23. Thus, the opposite view having been refuted, these syllogisms are stated to establish our own view: 'Cognition is not self-manifesting, because it is a thing, like a jar', 'the empirical usage under discussion is conditioned by the cognition with itself as object, because it is an empirical usage, like the admitted empirical usages'; 'the empirical usage about a cognition is conditioned by the cognition of that cognition, because it is the empirical usage about a cognition, like the empirical usage about a cognition present in another.'

24. That a cognition is mentally perceptible is the view of the Logicians. And they say thus: 'Cognition is perceptible because it is a momentary specific quality of the soul, like happiness, etc.' This is unsound, because it is 'non-conclusive' in respect of effort, which is the cause of activities like breathing in the condition of deep sleep. And there is

२५. ननु ज्ञानस्य प्राकट्यावगम्यत्वेऽपि ज्ञातस्यैव प्राकट्यस्य ज्ञानगमकत्वम् । ततश्च प्राकट्यगतेन ज्ञानान्तरेण भवितव्यम् । तदपि ज्ञानं प्राकट्यान्तरावसेयम् । इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्ग इति चेद् मैवम् । मूलक्षयाभावेनास्या अनवस्थाया अदूषणत्वात् तथा प्राहुः—

मूलक्षयकरीं प्राहुरनवस्थां हि दूषणीम् ।

इति ।

२६. कथं न मूलक्षयाभावः । उत्पन्नस्य ज्ञानस्यावश्यवेदनीयत्वाभावादिति ब्रूमः । न चाविज्ञायमानस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वा-

evidence for its non-perceptibility, namely 'Cognition, which is the topic of discussion, is non-perceptible, because it is cognition, like admitted cognitions'.

25. Now even if cognition is to be understood from manifestedness, it is only the known manifestedness that can lead to its understanding. And, therefore, there must be another cognition of the manifestedness. This cognition too is to be concluded from another manifestedness. Thus there results infinite regress. If this be said, it is not so; because, such an infinite regress is not a defect, in as much as it does not cut at the root. So they declare:

> They call a defect only such an infinite regress as cuts at the root.

26. How is it that there is no cutting at the root? We say that it is because the cognition produced need not necessarily be cognized. Nor may it be said that what is not cognized cannot intelligibly be the manifester of an object; because the result would be that the sense of sight, etc. too

नुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । चक्षुरादीनामप्यप्रकाशकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । जिघृक्षायां सत्यां पश्चादर्थापत्तिगम्यत्वस्य चोभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् ।

२७. विज्ञानं घटाद्याकारमिति बौद्धाः कथयन्ति । तदुपरिष्टान्निराकरिष्यामः । बुद्धिरयथार्थस्मरणानुवादयथार्थरूपेण चतुर्विधेति प्रमाणपरिच्छेदे समर्थितम् ।

२८. सुखं पुनरैहिकसुखं स्वर्गसुखं मोक्षसुखं चेति त्रिविधम् । तत्र ऐहिकसुखं तु स्रक्चन्दनवनितादिजन्यं दुःखमिश्रं च । स्वर्गसुखं पुनर्देशान्तरप्राप्यं दुःखरहितं च । तत्तु दर्शपूर्णमासेष्टिज्योतिष्टोमादावविशेषेण स्वर्गफलश्रुतेः सातिशयम् । उभयत्रापि धर्म एव कारणम् । मोक्षसुखं प्रागेवाभिहितम् ।

would be non-manifesters; and being understood later through presumption, when there is a desire to apprehend, is equal in both the cases.

27. The Buddhists say that cognition is of the form of the jar, etc. That will be refuted later. It was established, in the section dealing with the means of valid knowledge, that cognition is of four kinds, namely, invalid cognition, recollection, restatement and valid cognition.

28. Happiness, again, is of three kinds, namely happiness of this world, happiness of heaven and happiness of final release. Of these, the happiness of this world is produced by garlands, sandal-paste, women, etc. and is mixed with misery. The happiness of heaven, again, is to be attained in another region and is free from misery. That, however, has gradation, since there is declared heaven as fruit equally for the new and full moon sacrifices, *jyotiṣṭoma*, etc. In both

२९. दुःखं पुनरैहिकमामुष्मिकं च द्विविधम् । तत्रैहिकं रोगादिजन्यम् । आमुष्मिकं तु रौरवमहारौरवादिरूपम् । तत्रोभयत्राप्यधर्मः कारणम् ।

३०. इच्छा ममेदं स्यादित्येवमादिरूपा । द्वेषस्तु शत्रुविषयो भावविशेषः ।

प्रयत्नस्तु शरीरादौ हेतुः कर्मसमुद्भवे ।
एवमेते समुद्दिष्टाः संक्षेपादात्मनो गुणाः ॥

३१. संस्कारस्तु लौकिकवैदिकभेदेन द्विविधः । लौकिकस्तत्र वेगो भावना स्थितस्थापकश्चेति त्रिविधः । तत्र वेगः

these cases, virtue alone is the cause. The happiness of final release has been mentioned even before.

29. Misery, again, is of two kinds, namely, of this world and of the other world. Of these, misery of this world is produced through disease, etc. But the misery of the other world is of the nature of Raurava, Mahāraurava, etc. In both these cases vice is the cause.

30. Desire is of the form, 'I shall have this', etc. But aversion is the particular mood whose object is an enemy.

> Volition, however, is the cause of the production of activity in the body, etc. Thus has briefly been enumerated these qualities of the soul.

31. But impression, being divided into worldly and scriptural, is of two kinds. Of these, the worldly one is of three kinds, namely velocity, residue and elasticity. Of

पृथिव्यादिपञ्चद्रव्यवर्ती विशेषगुणः क्रियाहेतुश्च । भावनात्मकस्तु संस्कार आत्ममात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः । पूर्वानुभवोऽस्य कारणम् । स्मृतिस्तु कार्यम् । स्थितस्थापकस्तु संस्कारः स्पर्शवत्सु द्रव्येषु वर्तमानो विशेषगुणः । स यथा—

> वेणुरन्ध्रप्रयुक्तं वा बद्धं वा बहुवत्सरम् ।
> मुच्यमानं श्वलाङ्गूलं वक्रभावं न मुञ्चति ॥

इति ।

३२. वैदिकस्तु संस्कारस्तक्षणोत्पवनप्रोक्षणावहननादिक्रियाजन्यः । स च द्वितीयाश्रुत्यवसेयः । यथा यूपं तक्षति, आज्यमुत्पुनाति, तण्डुलान् प्रोक्षति, व्रीहीनवहन्तीत्यादि ।

these, velocity is a specific quality, existing in the five substances beginning with earth, and is the cause of activity. But the impression of the form of residue, is a specific quality existing only in the soul. Prior experience is its cause, but recollection is its product. But the impression, elasticity, is a specific quality, existing in tangible substances. It is like this:

> Whether kept in the hole of a reed, or tied up for many years, when released the tail of a dog does not discard its crooked nature.

32. The scriptural impression, however, is produced by shaping, purifying, sprinkling, beating, etc. And this is to be concluded from hearing a word in the second case; for example, 'One shapes the sacrificial post'; 'One purifies ghee'; 'One sprinkles the rice'; 'One beats the paddy'; and so on.

३३. तत्र हि द्वितीयाश्रुत्या तक्षणादिभिर्यूपादीन् संस्कुर्यादित्यर्थः सिध्यति। स च भूतभाव्युपयोगिद्रव्यमात्रवर्ती विशेषगुणः। यथाहुः—

भूतभाव्युपयोगं हि द्रव्यं संस्कारमर्हति।

इति। स तु शक्त्यन्तर्भूत इति केचित्। तदप्यनुमन्यामहे।

३४. ध्वनिर्वायुगुणः शब्दाभिव्यञ्जकः। स च प्रागेवोक्तः।

३५. प्राकट्यं विषयव्यवस्थापकः सर्वद्रव्यवर्ती सामान्यगुणः। स च संयुक्ततादात्म्यसंबन्धेन प्रत्यक्षगम्यः।

33. Here, indeed, by hearing the word in the second case, there is established the meaning, 'One shall produce an impression on the sacrificial post, etc. through shaping, etc.' And this is a specific quality existing only in things that are already existent and are needed for something else to be. So they say:

> A thing already existing and needed for something else to be, is fit for an impression.

Some say that this is included in potency. We accept that also.

34. Audible sound is a quality of air and is the manifester of sound. And this has been dealt with even before.

35. Manifestedness is what is determinative of the object and, existing in all substances, is a common quality. And this is to be understood by perception through the contact, 'identity with what is in conjunction'.

३६. तच्च प्राकट्यं द्रव्याश्रितमपि तेन तादात्म्यसंबन्धाज्जातिगुणकर्माण्यपि परंपरया समाश्रयते तत्प्रतियोगिकमभावमपि। इति न तेषामविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः। 'प्राकट्याश्रयो विषयः' इति विषयलक्षणमाहुराचार्याः।

३७. यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषयः इति प्राभाकराः। तत्तु पटादिज्ञानेष्ववभासमानयोरात्मस्वात्मनोरपि विषयत्वप्रसङ्गादयुक्तम्।

३८. ननु किमिदं प्राकट्यं नाम। श्रूयताम्। सन्ति तावल्लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां, घटः प्रकाशते, घटो भाति, प्रकटो घटः,

36. And though this manifestedness abides only in substances, it abides indirectly in genus, quality and action on account of the relation of identity therewith and also in non-existence for which they are counter-correlates. Hence it does not follow that they are non-objects. The Preceptors have stated the definition of an object thus: 'An object is the abode of manifestedness.'

37. The followers of Prabhākara say that when a thing becomes manifest in a cognition, that thing is the object of that cognition. But this does not stand to reason, since it would follow that the soul and the form of cognition too manifesting in the cognition of cloth, etc. would be objects.

38. Now, what is this that is called manifestedness? Listen. Among ordinary men and inquirers, there are empirical usages in the form, 'The jar appears', 'The jar is presented', 'The jar is manifest', etc. And these are not based on delusion; because there is no sublater. If even

इत्यादयो व्यवहाराः। न चैते भ्रान्तिमूलाः बाधकाभावात्। अबाधितानामपि प्रत्ययानां भ्रान्तिमूलत्वकल्पने सर्वेषामपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मादेते व्यवहारा एव स्वोपपादाय प्रकाशविशिष्टमर्थमवकल्पयन्ति। तत्र विशेषणभूतः प्रकाशपदार्थः प्राकट्यमित्युच्यते।

३९. न चागन्तुकं ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशपदार्थ इति वाच्यम्। आत्मसमवेतस्य ज्ञानस्य घटसमवेतत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः।

४०. ननु प्राकट्याश्रयस्यैव विषयत्वे भूतभविष्यतोः प्राकट्याश्रयत्वाभावात् कथं विषयत्वम्। न च तयोर्विषयत्वमेव नास्तीति वाच्यम्। नदीपूरणघनोन्नतिप्रभृतिभिः भूतभविष्य-

cognitions which are not sublated are assumed to be based on delusion, it would follow that all cognitions are so. Therefore these empirical usages themselves lead to the assumption of an object qualified by manifestation for their own intelligibility. Here, the meaning of the word 'manifestation', which is the qualification, is called manifestedness.

39. It should not be said that the cognition which has arisen is itself the meaning of the word manifestation; because, of cognition inherent in the soul, an empirical usage as inherent in the jar is unintelligible.

40. Now, if the abode of manifestedness alone can be an object, how can those that are past and those that are yet to be, be objects, since they are not the abode of manifestedness? And it should not be said that they are not objects at all; because the result would be that there cannot be an inference of past or future rain from the flood in the river,

द्वर्षानुमानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । इति चेद् मैवम् । भतभविष्यतोरपि प्राकट्योपपत्तेः ।

४१. ननु गुणिनमन्तरेण कथं गुणोत्पत्तिः । संख्यावदिति ब्रूमः । न च संख्यैव भूतभविष्यतोर्नास्तीति वाच्यम् । तिस्र आहुतयो हुताः, षडपूपा भक्षिताः, दश मोदकाः कार्याः, इत्यादि-व्यवहाराणां भ्रान्तिमूलत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवमभावस्यापि प्राकट्या-श्रयत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । इति सिद्धं प्राकट्यम् ।

४२. शक्तित्वसामान्यवतीं द्रव्यकर्मगुणाश्रयाम् ।
श्रुत्यर्थापत्तिविज्ञेयां शक्तिमाहुः कुमारिलाः ॥

rise of clouds, etc. If this be said, it is not so; because manifestedness is intelligible even in respect of what are past and of what are yet to be.

41. Now, without something that can have the quality, how can the quality arise? We say it is like number. And it cannot be said that in what are past or what are yet to be, there is no number at all; because it would follow that the empirical usages, 'Three offerings were offered', 'Six cakes were eaten', 'Ten sweets are to be made' and so on are based on delusion. In the same way, it must be seen that non-existence too is the abode of manifestedness. Thus is established manifestedness.

42. That which has the genus potentiality, which has a substance or action or quality as abode, and which is to be understood from scripture and presumption, this the followers of Kumārila speak of as potency.

सा तु लौकिकवैदिकभेदेन द्विविधा । तत्राद्या पुनरर्थापत्तिगम्या । यथा अग्न्यादीनां दाहकत्वशक्तिः । अन्या तु चोदनैकगम्या । यथा यागादीनां स्वर्गादिसाधकत्वशक्तिः ।

४३. तत्राग्न्यादीनां दाहकत्वशक्तिर्द्रव्यगता । हिंसादीनां नरकपातसाधकत्वशक्तिः कर्मगता । 'वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः' इत्यादिषु श्वेतत्वादिगुणविशिष्टस्यैव द्रव्यस्य भूतिसाधनत्वश्रवणाद् गुणगतोऽपि कोऽप्यतिशयः कल्पनीयः । स एव गुणगता शक्तिरित्युच्यते । एवं सर्वत्र द्रष्टव्यम् ।

४४. अत्र शक्तिरेव नास्तीति तार्किकाणां मतम् । अग्न्यादीनां दाहकत्वादिशक्तिं च स्वभावभेदेन समर्थयन्ति ।

This, however, being divided into worldly and scriptural is of two kinds. Of these, the first is to be understood through presumption; for example, the potency to burn, in the case of fire, etc. The other however, can be understood only from injunctions; for example the potency of sacrifice, etc. to bring about heaven, etc.

43. Of these potency of fire, etc. to burn is present in a substance. The potency of cruelty, etc. to bring about falling into hell is present in action. In 'One desiring plenty shall obtain a white offering for Vāyu', etc. since it is declared that a substance only, as qualified by the quality of white colour, etc. is instrumental to plenty, some excellence has to be assumed even as present in a quality. This itself is called the potency present in a quality. Thus must it be seen in all cases.

44. Here the view of the Logicians is that potency itself does not exist. And they justify the potency of fire, etc. to burn, etc. by their distinctive natures.

४५. तदयुक्तम्। स्वभावस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात्। दाहकत्वादेश्च मणिमन्त्रादिनिराकार्यत्वात्। स्वभावशब्देनापि शक्तेरेव पर्यायान्तरेण ग्रहणप्रसङ्गाच्च।

४६. न च प्रतिबन्धकाभावादेव दाह इति वाच्यम्। अभावस्य सर्वत्राप्यकारकत्वात्। न च नित्यकर्मणामकरणात् प्रत्यवायदर्शनादकारकत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम्। तत्रापि नित्यकर्मभिरक्षपितानामहरहः समापतितानामवर्जनीयानामेनसामेव प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वाभ्युपगमात्। यथाहुः—

स्वकाले यदकुर्वंस्तु करोत्यन्यदचेतनः।
प्रत्यवायोऽस्य तेनैव नाभावेन स जन्यते॥

45. This does not stand to reason; because one's own nature exists as long as the substance lasts, while burning, etc. can be destroyed by a gem, charm, etc.; also because it follows that even by 'one's own nature' potency alone is understood under another term.

46. And it should not be said that burning is due only to the non-existence of a counteracting agent; because non-exsitence is nowhere a causal condition. And it should not be said that since sin is found as a consequence of the non-performance of obligatory rites, its not being a causal condition is non-established; because there too, there is acknowledged as the cause of sin only faults that are unavoidable, that come about day by day, and that are not destroyed by the obligatory rites. So they say:

But when a non-intelligent person, not doing something in its proper time, does something else,

इति ।

४७. कथं तर्हि विशेषज्ञानाभावस्य संशयजनकत्वमिति चेत् तत्राभावस्य ज्ञापकत्वात्, ज्ञापकत्वकारकत्वयोश्च विशेषात् । इति शक्तिरवश्याश्रयणीया ।

४८. प्राभाकराः पुनरस्याः पदार्थान्तरत्वमनुमानगम्यत्वं च संगिरन्ते । तदयुक्तम् अस्याः सिद्धस्यैव पदार्थस्य गुणत्वेन कल्पने लाघवात् । अन्यथा गौरवप्रसङ्गात् । शक्तेः पदार्थान्तरत्वमपि कौमारिलानामिष्टमेव । इत्यलं तन्निरासप्रयासेन । अनुमानगम्यत्वं तु प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसंबन्धस्यैव लिङ्गस्यानुमापकत्वमिति समर्थयद्भिरस्माभिरेवानुमानपरीक्षायां निरस्तम् ।

his sin is due only to that; it is not produced by non-performance.

47. If it be asked how then non-existence of the cognition of particularity can generate a doubt, it is because non-existence there is what makes known, and because there is a distinction between what makes known and what is a causal condition. Thus, potency has necessarily to be acknowledged.

48. Then, the followers of Prabhākara say that this potency is a distinct category and that it is to be understood through inference. This does not stand to reason; because there is parsimony in assuming this to be a quality of a category that is already established. Otherwise there results prolixity. That potency is a distinct category too is certainly acceptable to the followers of Kumārila. But that it is to be understood through inference was refuted by ourselves in investigating inference, when we established that only that mark whose relation is perceived can lead to an inference.

४९. ननु कथमर्थापत्त्या शक्तिग्रहणम् । उच्यते—

यादृशादग्निसंयोगात् सर्वदा दाहदर्शनम् ।
तादृशादेव मन्त्रादिप्रयोगे तददर्शनात् ॥
अग्निसंयोगातिरिक्तं यत्किंचित् कारणान्तरम् ।
अस्ति दृश्यमदृश्यं वेत्येवं साधारणा प्रमा ॥
दृश्यादर्शनजाभावप्रमाणेन विहन्यते ।
तत्रानयोर्विरोधे सत्यविरोधाय कल्प्यते ॥
अदृश्यं कारणं किंचित् सा शक्तिरिति गीयते ।
गुणोक्तलक्ष्मसद्भावादस्याश्च गुणता मता ॥

49. Now, how is potency to be apprehended through presumption? This is the reply:

From that kind of conjunction with fire whence burning is always seen, since from the very same kind it is not seen, when a charm, etc. are applied,

Other than conjunction with fire, some further cause or other there is, either visible or invisible; the general valid cognition of this nature

Comes into conflict with the valid cognition of non-existence resulting from the non-perception of what is perceptible. Here, when there is opposition between these two, for the sake of avoiding the opposition there is assumed

A certain invisible cause; this is spoken of as potency, because of the presence of

सर्वद्रव्यवर्तित्वादेषापि सामान्यगुणः ।

५०. ननु द्रव्यव्यतिरिक्तेष्वपि वर्तनात् कथमस्या गुणत्वमिति चेद् मैवम् । गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यम् इति द्रव्यलक्षणस्यास्माभिरनङ्गीकृतत्वात् । अतिव्याप्तं चेदं तार्किकोक्तं द्रव्यलक्षणम् ।

चतुर्विंशतिरुद्दिष्टा गुणाः कणभुजा स्वयम् ।

इति गुणानामपि संख्याश्रयत्वस्य तैरेव कथितत्वात् संख्यायाश्च गुणत्वस्वीकारात् । इति सिद्धा गुणाः ।

५१. अत्र तार्किकास्तु ध्वनिप्राकट्यशक्तीनां गुणत्वं

the definition stated with reference to the qualities, it is considered to be a quality.

Since it exists in all the substances this too is a common quality.

50. Now, if it be asked how it is a quality since it exists even in those which are different from substances, it is not so; because the definition of substance, 'A substance is the abode of quality' is not accepted by us. And this definition of substance stated by the Logicians is over-pervasive, because by themselves it is stated that qualities too are the abode of number in

'By Kaṇāda himself, there have been enumerated twenty-four qualities',

and number is accepted as a quality. Thus are established the qualities.

51. Here the Logicians, however, do not accept audible sound, manifestedness and potency as qualities. And they look to sound, virtue and vice as qualities. Of these,

नानुमन्यन्ते । शब्दधर्माधर्माणां गुणत्वमाकाङ्क्षन्ति च । तत्र ध्वन्यादीनामगुणत्वपक्षस्तेषां गुणत्वसमर्थनान्निरस्तो वेदितव्यः । शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वं तु प्रागेव समर्थितम् ।

५२. धर्माधर्मावात्मविशेषगुणाविति तार्किकाणां मतमुपेक्षणीयमेव, आत्मविशेषगुणे लौकिकानां धर्माधर्मशब्दप्रयोगादर्शनात् । यथाहुः—

लोकप्रयोगगम्या हि शब्दार्थाः सर्व एव नः ।

इति ।

५३. अपि च श्रेयःसाधनमेव धर्मः । न ह्यग्निहोत्रात् स्वर्गो भवतीत्यत्राग्निहोत्रमिवात्मगुणं कस्यचिदपि श्रेयःसाधनतया

the view that audible sound, etc. are not qualities must be understood to be refuted by the justification of their being qualities. That sound is a substance, however, has already been justified.

52. The view of the Logicians that virtue and vice are specific qualities of the soul is certainly to be ignored; because the words 'virtue' and 'vice' are not found used by ordinary people in respect of specific qualities of the soul. So they say:

> According to us, the meanings of all words are to be understood from usage in the world.

53. Further, virtue is only the instrument of prosperity. Indeed, scripture does not say of a quality of the soul that it is an instrument of prosperity for anyone, as it does in the case of Agnihotra in the form, 'From Agnihotra heaven results'. Therefore, there is no virtue-ness in that. By this

श्रुतिरभिदधाति । ततो न तत्र धर्मत्वम् । एतेन आर्हतप्राभाकरादिमतेषु पुण्यपरमाण्वपूर्वादिष्वपि धर्मशब्दवाच्यता निरस्ता वेदितव्या । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—

पुद्गलेषु च पुण्येषु नृगुणे पूर्वजन्मनि ।
प्रयोगो धर्मशब्दस्य न दृष्टो न च साधनम् ।
पुरुषार्थस्य ते ज्ञातुं शक्यन्ते चोदनादिभिः ॥

इति ।

५४. किंच अत्यन्तापरिदृष्टचरं कार्याद्यपरनामधेयमपूर्वमभिदधति लिङादय इत्यपि प्राभाकराणां दुराग्रहमात्रं प्रमाणान्तरेण संज्ञासंज्ञिसबंन्धावधारणं विना कुत्रापि शब्दप्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् लिङादिभ्य एवावगमे परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मा-

it must be understood that there are refuted merit, primal atoms, the unseen result, etc. which according to the doctrine of the Buddhists, the followers of Prabhākara, etc. are what are expressed by the word 'virtue'. This is said by the Preceptors:

In respect of *pudgala*, merits, man's qualities, previous births, the use of the word 'virtue' is not seen. Nor can they be known from scripture, etc. to be instrumental to the human goal.

54. Further, that the optative mood, etc. express the unseen result, which is otherwise called 'that which is to be produced', etc. and which is absolutely not seen before, this too is only the obstinacy of the followers of Prabhākara; because nowhere is a word found used without the ascertainment of the relation of the name and the named through

ल्लिङादीनामपूर्वाभिधायकत्वानुपपत्तेश्च नापूर्वं धर्मशब्दवाच्यतोपपत्तिः ।

५५. ननु कार्य एव व्युत्पत्तिः । तथाहि । स्तनपानादिषु सकलकर्तव्येषु ममेदं कार्यमिति कार्यबोधादेव स्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा । ततश्च गामानयेति प्रवर्तकवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धं प्रवर्तमानमवलोक्य प्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या नूनमेतस्माद्वाक्यादेतस्य कार्यबोधो जात इति व्युत्पित्सुरवगच्छति । पुनश्च तस्य कार्यप्रतिपादकम् इदं वाक्यम् इति मतिरुपजायते ।

another means of valid knowledge, and because, if this be understood even from the optative mood, etc. there would result reciprocal dependence. Therefore since the expression of the unseen result by the optative mood, etc. is unintelligible, the expression of the unseen result by the word 'virtue' is unintelligible.

55. Now, one learns the meaning as something to be done. It is thus. In the case of everything to be done, like suckling, the activity of 'the independent one' is seen only out of the knowledge in the form, 'This is to be done by me'. And then, on seeing the intermediate elder, doing something immediately after hearing the words of the elder who commands 'bring the cow', the one who desires to learn understands, 'certainly from that sentence there has arisen the knowledge of this having to be done', since the activity is otherwise unintelligible. And, then, there arises for him the knowledge that this sentence states what is to be done by him.

५६. अनन्तरमावापोद्वापाभ्यां लिङादीनामितरान्वित-कार्यवाचकत्वमवधारयति । इतरपदानां कार्यान्वितस्वार्थवाचकत्वं च । इति क्रियाकार्ये व्युत्पत्तिः । पुनश्च 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादिषु लिङादीनां क्षणभङ्गुरक्रियाकार्यत्वे स्वर्गकामपदसमभि-व्याहारविरोधात् क्रियोत्तीर्णमपूर्वमेव मुख्यो लिङाद्यर्थः क्रियाकार्यं तु लक्षणया इति क्रमादपूर्वे व्युत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते ।

५७. इति चेन्मैवम् । कार्य एव व्युत्पत्तिरिति नियमा-भावात् । तथाहि । दृष्टपुत्रजन्मनः पित्रे तन्निवेदनाय धावन्तं

56. Later on, through insertion and deletion, one ascertains that the optative mood, etc. express something to be done as syntactically related to the other words, and that the other words express their own meanings as related to something to be done. Thus one learns the meaning that some action is to be done. Then again, in 'One who desires heaven shall sacrifice', etc. since there is conflict in the proximity of the optative mood, etc. to the words 'One who desires heaven' if they (the optative mood, etc.) signify something to be done which is momentarily destroyed, there arises the earning of the unseen result as the meaning in this way: 'The principal meaning of the optative mood, etc. is only the unseen result issuing from the act; the action to be done, however, is through secondary implication.'

57. If this be said, it is not so; because there is no rule that one learns the meaning as something to be done. It is thus. For a youngster who has seen the birth of the son, who hurries after the servant running to give the information to the father and who observes the father putting on a

भृत्यमनुधावतः पुत्रस्ते जात इति भृत्यवचनानन्तरं पितरं प्रसन्नवदनमवलोकयतः बालस्य पुत्रोत्पत्तिप्रतिपादकमिदं वाक्यम् इति वाक्यार्थावगमपुरःसरं पुत्रस्ते सुखी इत्यादिषु वाक्येषु श्रूयमाणेषु पूर्ववदावापोद्वापाभ्यां पुत्राद्यर्थेषु पुत्रादिपदव्युत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते इति ।

५८. अथ तत्र स्त्रियः सुखप्रसवादीनामनेकेषामपि दृष्टत्वाद् न पारिशेष्यसिद्धिरिति मतं तर्हि गाम् आनय इति प्रवर्तकवाक्येऽपि वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं श्रोतुर्गमनमेव आदौ दृष्टम् इति कुतः कालान्तरभाविगवानयनरूपकार्यबोधानुमानम् ।

५९. न हि कार्यबोधस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं कृतिसाध्येष्टोपायता-

cheerful countenance immediately after hearing the words of the servant, 'A son is born to you', there arises the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence in the form, 'This sentence states the birth of a son'; and in the wake of such a knowledge, when sentences like 'Your son is happy', are heard, through insertion and deletion as before, there arises the learning that the words, 'the son', etc. signify the things, the son, etc.

58. Now, if you think that since there are seen many other things like the easy delivery of the woman, there is not established any elimination, then, in the case of the words of one who commands, 'Bring the cow', what is seen first is only the going of the hearer; and hence, how can there be the inference that what is meant is something to be done in the form of bringing the cow, which comes about at a later time?

59. Indeed, the knowledge that something to be done is not what induces activity, because what induces activity

बोधस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न च तद् भवतामनिष्टम् । इष्टोपायताधिया ममेदं कार्यम् इति बुध्वा तत्र प्रवर्तते इति भवद्भिरेवोक्तत्वात् । तस्मादिष्टोपायताप्रतिपादनमेव वाक्येन क्रियते ।

६०. चिकीर्षापरपर्यायकार्यबोध: पुनरिष्टोपायताधिया जन्यते इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम् अनन्यलभ्य: शास्त्रार्थ: इति स्थितत्वात् । कृतिसाध्यं कृतिं प्रति प्रधानं कार्यम् इति कार्यलक्षणमपि फले व्यभिचारादुपेक्षणीयम् । ततो लिङ्गादीनामपूर्वाभिधायकत्वानुपपत्तेश्च नापूर्वं धर्मशब्दवाच्यत्वम् ।

is only the knowledge that what is to be accomplished by the volition is a means to what is desired. And this is not unacceptable to you, because you yourself have said that one engages oneself in activity in respect of a thing knowing, 'This is to be done by me' through the knowledge that it is a means to what is desired. Therefore what is done by a sentence is to state the knowledge that something is a means to what is desired.

60. It is again reasonable to acknowledge that the knowledge that something to be done which is another way of stating the desire to do, is produced by the knowledge of that something being a means to what is desired, since it stands, 'The meaning of the sacred teaching is what can be got through no other means'. The definition of what is to be done in the form, 'What is to be done is the principal in respect of volition and is produced by volition', has to be discarded, being inconstant in respect of the fruit. And therefore, since the expression of the unseen result by the optative mood, etc. is unintelligible, unseen result is not what is expressed by the word, 'virtue'.

६१. कौ तर्हि धर्माधर्मौ, यत्र लोके धर्माधर्मशब्दौ प्रवृत्तौ। श्रूयताम्। यागादिषु लौकिकानां धर्मशब्दप्रयोगो यागाद्यनुष्ठातरि धार्मिकत्वसमाख्यानात्। अधर्मशब्दप्रयोगस्तु हिंसासुरापानादौ। यदाहुः—

> अन्यत् साध्यमदृष्ट्वैव यागादीननुतिष्ठताम्।
> धार्मिकत्वसमाख्यानं तद्योगादिति गम्यते ॥

इति।

६२. अत्राह शालिकनाथः। 'यागाद्यनुष्ठातरि धार्मिकशब्दप्रयोगो नियोगानुष्ठाननिमित्तकः। तथाहि अनधिकृतयागाद्यनुष्ठातर्यपि धार्मिकशब्दो न प्रयुज्यते' इति। तदयुक्तम्। श्रेयः-

61. What then are virtue and vice, in respect of which the words 'virtue' and 'vice' are used in the world? Listen. Ordinary people use the word 'virtue' in respect of sacrifice, etc.; because those who perform sacrifices are spoken of as virtuous. The use of the word 'vice', however, is in respect of cruelty, drinking intoxicants, etc. So they say:

> That those who, even seeing no other result, perform sacrifices, etc. are spoken of as virtuous, is, it is understood, due to association with that (sacrifice).

62. In this connection, Śālikanātha says: 'The use of the word, "virtuous" in respect of one who performs sacrifices, etc. is conditioned by his performance of what is enjoined. Therefore, indeed, the word, "virtuous" is not used in respect of one who performs a sacrifice for which he is not eligible.' This does not stand to reason; because they are

साधनतयैव तेषां धर्मत्वाभ्युपगमात् । न हि अनधिकृतयागाद्यनुष्ठानं श्रेयःसाधनं भवति । अतो यागादिष्वेव धर्मशब्दप्रयोगः ।

६३. न केवलं लोके । वेदेऽपि 'यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त देवाः तानि धर्माणि प्रथमान्यासन्' इति । अत्र हि यज्ञशब्दवाच्यमेव धर्मशब्दवाच्यतया व्यक्तमभिदधाति श्रुतिरेव । लिङ्गसंख्याव्यत्ययस्तु छान्दसत्वात् ।

६४. अपि च यागादीनामेव श्रेयःसाधनतां श्रुतिरभिदधाति । तथाहि । 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति श्रूयते । तत्र लिङ्लोट्तव्यप्रत्यययुक्तेषु वाक्येषु द्वे भावने प्रतीयेते शब्दभावनार्थभावना च । तत्रार्थभावना सर्वाख्यातसाधारणी । अन्या तु लिङाद्यभिधेया । यथाहुराचार्याः—

accepted as virtue only in so far as they are means to prosperity. Indeed, the performance of a sacrifice, etc. for which one is not eligible, is not a means to prosperity. Therefore, the use of the word, 'virtue' is only in respect of sacrifice, etc.

63. This is not merely in the world. In the Veda too occurs this: 'The gods performed sacrifice for the sake of sacrifice; they became the primal virtues.' Here, indeed, scripture itself clearly says that it is virtue itself that is expressed by the word sacrifice. The variation of gender and number is due to Vedic usage.

64. Further, scripture speaks only of sacrifice, etc. as means to prosperity. It is thus. There is the scripture, 'One desiring heaven shall sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma*'. Here, in sentences where optative, imperative and the suffix *tavya* (to be done) are used, there are understood two productive

अभिधाभावनामाहुरन्यामेव लिङादयः ।
अर्थात्मा भावना त्वन्या सर्वाख्यातेषु गम्यते ।।

इति ।

६५. तत्रार्थभावनाया अयमभिधानप्रकारः। यजेत इत्यत्र लिङ्प्रत्ययस्य भावयेदित्यर्थः। तत्र किं भावयेदित्याकाङ्क्षां नियोज्यविशेषणतयोपात्तं स्वर्गपदं पूरयति स्वर्गं भावयेदिति। केन भावयेदित्याकाङ्क्षां प्रकृत्यर्थो यागशब्दः पूरयति यागेन भावयेदिति। कथं भावयेदित्याकाङ्क्षामङ्गोपाङ्गादिवाक्यानि पूरयन्ति अग्नीनाधायान्वाधानप्रयाजादिभिरङ्गानि संपाद्य भावयेदिति।

operations, namely the verbal productive operation and the objective productive operation. Of these, the objective productive operation is common to all the verbs. The other, however, is to be expressed by the optative mood, etc. So say the Preceptors:

> The verbal productive operation alone is the one which the optative mood, etc. express. But the other productive operation is of the nature of the object, and is found in all verbs.

65. Of these, this is the mode of expressing the objective productive operation. The meaning of the optative suffix that is used in ‘ shall sacrifice ’ is ‘ one shall produce ’. Here, the expectancy in the form ‘ What shall one produce?’ the word ‘ heaven ’ fulfils in the form ‘ One shall produce heaven ’, that word being used as qualification of what is enjoined; the expectancy in the form ‘ By what means shall one produce? ’ the word ‘ sacrifice ’, which is the meaning of the

६६. पुनश्च यागानन्तरं स्वर्गादर्शनसाधनत्वश्रवणरूपप्रमाणद्वयविरोधमूला श्रुतार्थापत्तिरपूर्वं कृत्वेति शब्दं कल्पयिष्यति। तस्मात् ज्योतिष्टोमयागेनान्वाधानप्रयाजाद्यनुष्ठानपुरःसरम् अपूर्वं कृत्वा स्वर्गं भावयेदित्यर्थः संपद्यत इति। एवमेव घटं करोति इत्यादावपि मृद्दण्डचक्रादिकमुपकरणं कृत्वा प्रकृत्यर्थभूतेन व्यापारेण घटं भावयति इति सर्वाख्यातेष्वपि द्रष्टव्यम्।

६७. शब्दभावनायाः पुनरन्यत्र स्वर्ग इव पुरुषप्रवृत्तिर्भाव्या। तया भावनया यो लिङादीनां वाच्यवाचकलक्षणः

stem, fulfils in the form 'One shall produce by means of sacrifice'; the expectancy in the form 'How shall one produce?' the statements of subsidiaries and minor subsidiaries fulfil in the form 'After making the fire, one shall produce by procuring the subsidiaries through *anvādhāna*, *prayāja*, etc.'.

66. And then, after the sacrifice, on the basis of the opposition of two valid cognitions, namely the non-perception of heaven and the scriptural statement of instrumentality, 'the Presumption from what is heard' will lead to the assumption of the expression, 'After securing the unseen result'. Therefore there results the meaning in the form, 'With the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice as the means, having previously done *anvādhāna*, *prayāja*, etc. and after securing the unseen result one shall produce heaven.' In the very same way, in cases like, 'One makes a jar' too, there must be seen in the case of even in all verbs, the meaning in the form, 'Taking clay, staff, wheel, etc. as auxiliaries, through the operation which forms the meaning of the stem, one brings into being a jar'.

67. Then, for verbal productive operation, what is to be produced is the activity of the person, like heaven in the

संबन्धः स तत्र याग इव करणम् । प्रवृत्तौ रुचिमुत्पादयन्त्यर्थ-वादवाक्यान्यङ्गोपाङ्गादिवाक्यवदितिकर्तव्यताभावमनुभवन्तीति विशेषः ।

६८. इदम् अभिधाभावनामाहुः इत्यादिवार्त्तिकानुसारिणां सुचरितादीनां मतमनुसृत्योक्तम् ।

श्रेयःसाधनता ह्येषां नित्यं वेदात् प्रतीयते ।
कर्तुरिष्टाभ्युपाये हि कर्तव्यमिति लोकधीः ॥

इत्यादिवार्त्तिकानुसारिभिश्चिदानन्दादिभिः पुनरिष्टसाधनता-प्रतिपादनमेव विध्यर्थ इत्युक्तम् । परितोषपार्थसारथिप्रभृतिभिस्तु

other case; the relation of the optative mood, etc. with that production, defined as that of the expressed with the expression, is the instrument, like sacrifice in the other case; the statements of praise which generate an enthusiasm in the action, take the position of the 'how to do', like the statements of the subsidiaries and minor subsidiaries. This is the difference.

68. This is stated in accordance with the view of Sucarita, etc. who follow the *Vārttika* passage, 'The verbal production' and so on.

> 'Their instrumentality in respect of prosperity is always understood from the Veda-s. It is in respect of what is instrumental to the agent's desire, that there is the ordinary cognition "this is to be done"'.

By Cidānanda and others, who follow this and other *Vārttika* passages, it is said again that the meaning of an injunction is only the statement of instrumentality to what is desired.

पक्षद्वयमपि कक्षीकृत्य तत्र तत्रोक्तम् । इति तत्तद्ग्रन्थादवगन्तव्यम् ।

६९. परमार्थतस्तु उभावपि लक्षणौ तुल्यार्थौ । इदमनेन इत्थं कुर्याद् इति हि भावनायाः पिण्डितार्थः । अतः साध्यसाधनसंबन्धोऽपि भावनापदार्थ एव । तदुक्तं काशिकायाम् । न हि अनासादितस्वर्गयागादिसाध्यसाधनविशेषसंबन्धो भावयेद् इति ।

७०. सर्वथापि न यागाद्यतिरिक्तस्य श्रेयः साधनतया धर्मत्वं लोकवेदगम्यम् । तथा हिंसादीनामेव नरकपातादिसाधनत्वादधर्मत्वम् । यागहिंसादयश्च द्रव्यकर्मगुणात्मकाः । तस्मात् तेष्वेव धर्माधर्मयोरप्यन्तर्भावः । तदुक्तमाचार्यपादैः—

But by Paritoṣa, Pārthasārathi and others, this is explained in different places by adopting both these alternatives. This is to be understood from their respective works.

69. In truth, however, both these definitions have the same meaning. Indeed, the consolidated sense of the productive operation is: 'One shall do this, by means of this, in this way.' Therefore, the relation too of what is to be accomplished and the means is certainly the meaning of the expression, 'productive activity'. This is said in the *Kāśikā*: 'Indeed, one cannot produce, if one does not know the relation of the particular things to be accomplished and the means, such as heaven, sacrifice, etc.'

70. In any case, nothing other than a sacrifice can be a virtue, as instrumental to prosperity, so far as can be understood from the world or from the Veda-s. Similarly, only

श्रेयो हि पुरुषप्रीतिः सा द्रव्यगुणकर्मभिः ।
चोदनालक्षणैः साध्या तस्मात् तेष्वेव धर्मता ।।

इति ।

७१. न चापूर्वं कृत्वा स्वर्गं भावयेद् इत्यत्रापूर्वस्य गुणान्तरत्वं पदार्थान्तरत्वं वा कल्पनीयम्——

तस्मात् फले प्रवृत्तस्य यागादेः शक्तिमात्रकम् ।
उत्पत्तौ वापि पश्वादेरपूर्वं न ततः पृथक् ।।

इति शक्त्यन्तर्भावात् । तस्मादस्मदुक्ता एव गुणाः ।।

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cruelty, etc. are vice, as instrumental to falling into hell, etc. Sacrifice, cruelty, etc. are of the nature of substances, qualities or actions. Therefore virtue and vice are included even in them. This is said by the adorable Preceptors:

> Prosperity, indeed, is the satisfaction of the person. This is to be accomplished through substances, qualities, or actions, as defined by scripture. Therefore these alone are virtues.

71. And the unseen result in 'One shall produce heaven after producing the unseen result', need not be assumed as a distinct quality or category;

> Therefore, it is the mere potency of sacrifice, etc. that are active in respect of their fruits, or of cattle, etc. while they are being produced that is the unseen result; it is nothing distinct from that;

because, this is included in potency. Therefore qualities are only those we have mentioned.

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५. कर्म

१. अविभुद्रव्यमात्रस्थं प्रत्यक्षं चलनात्मकम् ।
वियोगयोगयोर्मूलं कर्म कर्मविदो विदुः ॥

तत् पुनरुत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् पञ्चविधमेव।

२. अत्र प्राभाकरादयः कर्मणो नयनेन्द्रियगम्यत्वं नानुमन्यन्ते । तदयुक्तम् । तस्यापि घटादिवदनन्यथासिद्धेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् प्रत्यक्षत्वसिद्धेः ।

5. Action

1 They, who know what action is, know as action that which abides only in non-pervasive substances, is perceptible, is of the nature of motion and is the cause of disjunction and conjunction.

And this is only of five kinds, being divided into going upward, going downward, contraction, expansion and motion in general.

2. Here, the followers of Prabhākara and others do not accept action as capable of being understood through the sense of sight. This does not stand to reason. Because perceptibility of this too, as that of a jar, etc. is established through its uniform and not otherwise explained co-presence and co-absence with the sense-organ.

३. ननु संयोगविभागाभ्यामेव कर्मानुमेयम्। तेनेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकौ संयोगविभागदर्शनोपक्षीणौ। तस्मादनन्यथासिद्धत्वमसिद्धमेव। यदाह भट्टविष्णुः—

परोक्षं कर्म कर्मत्वादादित्यगतकर्मवत्।
अक्षतद्भावभावित्वं क्षीणं लिङ्गस्य दर्शने॥

इति।

४. तदिदमसारम्। अप्रत्यक्षत्वस्यानन्यथासिद्धेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकाभावप्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युपजीवित्वात्।

५. न च संयोगविभागयोरेवान्यथासिद्धत्वादनन्यथा-

3. Now, action is to be inferred from conjunction and disjunction alone. Therefore, co-presence and co-absence with the sense-organ is exhausted even with the perception of conjunction and disjunction. Therefore, 'being not otherwise explained' is certainly non-established. So says Bhaṭṭaviṣṇu:

> Action is super-sensuous, because it is an activity, like the activity present in the sun. The presence of the sense of sight where that action is present is exhausted with the perception of the probans.

4. This is not sound; because non-perceptibility is dependent on a pervasion resulting from the absence of the not otherwise explained co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ.

5. And it should not be said that since even when there is conjunction and disjunction they (co-presence and co-absence) are otherwise explained, 'not being otherwise

सिद्धत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् । संयोगविभागमात्रस्यैव नेत्रगोचरत्वे ताभ्यां च कर्मानुमाने श्येनसंयोगविभागाभ्यां स्थाणावपि कर्मकल्पनप्रसङ्गात् ।

६. अथ मतम् अर्थान्तरवियोगपूर्वकार्थान्तरसंयोगस्यैव कर्मानुमापकत्वम् । स्थाणौ तु श्येनमात्रेणैव संयोगवियोगयोर्दर्शनान्न तत्र कर्मकल्पनमिति । तर्हि श्येनान्तरवियुक्ते श्येनान्तरसंयुक्ते च स्थाणौ कर्म कल्प्यं स्यात् । नदीप्रवाहवर्तिनि स्थिरे स्तम्भादौ जलावयवसंयोगवियोगयोर्दर्शनात् कर्मकल्पनमपि दुर्वारमेव ।

७. नन्वन्यत्र क्लृप्तक्रिये श्येनादौ कर्मकल्पनादेव

explained' is non-established; because if conjunction and disjunction alone form the field of the sense-organ, and if action be inferred from them, then there would follow the assumption of action in the post too from the conjunction and disjunction of a hawk.

6. Then the view may be that what leads to the inference of action is only such a conjunction of an object which is preceded by disjunction from another object, but that in the case of the post, since conjunction and disjunction are seen only with the hawk, there is no assumption of action there. In that case, in a post from which there is the disjunction of one hawk and with which there is the conjunction of another hawk, action would have to be assumed. In a pillar, etc. standing fixed in the current of a river, since there is conjunction and disjunction of water-parts, the assumption of action too will become unavoidable.

7. Now, if it be said that, since even by the assumption of action in the hawk, etc. where action is ascertained from

स्थाणौ संयोगवियोगयोरुपपत्तेर्न तत्र कर्मकल्पनमिति चेत् मैवम् । अप्रत्यक्षत्वे कर्मणः श्येनस्यान्यत्र कुत्रापि क्लृप्तक्रियत्वानुपपत्तेः । तथाहि । नहि भवतामाकाशदेशसंयोगविभागयोर्दर्शनात् पतत्त्रिणि क्लृप्तक्रियत्वं आकाशदेशस्य भवतामप्रत्यक्षत्वेन तत्संयोगविभागदर्शनानुपपत्तेः ।

८. न च वियद्गततेजोऽवयवसंयोगविभागदर्शनात् क्लृप्तक्रियत्वम् । तत्रापि तेजोऽवयवानामेव श्येनावयवैः सह संयोगवियोगयोर्दर्शनात् तेजोऽवयवेष्वेव कर्मकल्पनप्रसङ्गात् । एवं सर्वत्र दर्शयितव्यम् । इति सकललोकप्रसिद्धस्थावरजङ्गमविभागोऽपि दत्तजलाञ्जलिरासीदायुष्मताम् ।

other sources, the conjunction and disjunction in the post become intelligible, there is no assumption of action in the latter, it cannot be so; because, if action is imperceptible, action in a hawk being ascertained from any other source is unintelligible. It is thus. According to you, the ascertainment of action in the bird cannot be by seeing conjunction and disjunction with the etherial region, because the etherial region, according to you, being imperceptible, the perception of conjunction with and disjunction from it are unintelligible.

8. Nor is there ascertainment of action by seeing conjunction and disjunction in the light-parts present in the etherial region, because there too, by seeing conjunction and disjunction of the light-parts themselves with reference to the hawk, the result would be the assumption of action in the light-parts themselves. Similarly must it be pointed out in all other cases. Thus the very division into movable and immovable, well known to the entire world, would have their funeral rites performed by you long-lived ones.

९. अपिच अन्धकारपदार्थस्यात्यन्ताभाववादिनां भवतां तेन सह संयोगविभागदर्शनानुपपत्तेः 'अन्धकारे खद्योतः पतति' इति प्रत्ययो निरालम्बन एव भवेत्। न च तत्रापि खद्योतगतेनैव तेजोंऽशेन संयोगविभागाविति वाच्यम्। खद्योतस्य स्वगतेन तेजसा कदाचिदपि वियोगाप्रतीतेः।

१०. न च नयनस्य विपरिवृत्त्यावलोकनानुमितदेशसंयोगविभागाभ्यां खद्योते कर्मकल्पनमिति वाच्यम्, अभिमुखपतनादौ तदसंभवात्। पूर्ववद्दिगादौ कर्मकल्पनप्रसङ्गाच्च। दिगादौ विभुत्वान्न कर्मकल्पनमिति चेद् मैवम्। विभूनामक्रियत्वस्य अद्याप्यव्यवस्थितत्वात्।

9. Further, the cognition, 'The fire-fly falls in the darkness' would certainly be baseless; because to you, who maintain that the category, darkness, is absolutely non-existent, the perception of conjunction with and separation from it are unintelligible. And it should not be said that there too there are conjunction and disjunction with reference to the light-parts present in the fire-fly itself; because never can there be the cognition of the disjunction of the fire-fly with reference to the light present in itself.

10. Nor may it be said that the assumption of action in the fire-fly is from the conjunction and disjunction in space inferred from having to move the eyes in seeing; because this is not possible in the case of falling towards one; and because as before there results the assumption of action in space, etc. If it be said that since space, etc. are all-pervasive, there can be no assumption of action there, it is not so; because up to now it has not been settled that all-pervasive substances can have no action.

११. नौकाधिरूढस्य नमितवदनं तन्मध्यमेवावलोकयतः सक्रियायामपि नावि निष्क्रियत्वप्रतीतिरत्यन्तसामीप्यजनितदोषनिबन्धनो भ्रम एव। दूरस्थितायां पुनरत्यन्तदूरत्वदोषनिबन्धनः। न हि तदा नौगतं परिमाणमपि गृह्यते। तस्मादेतादृशेषु स्थानेषु कर्माप्रतिपत्तिः अर्थेन्द्रिययोरुभयोरप्यवयवावयविनोः परस्परसंयोगरूपचतुष्टयसंनिकर्षाभावादेव, न संयोगविभागयोरदर्शनात्।

१२. अपि च यथा देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्तिमवलोक्य आदित्येऽपि गतिस्मरणम् इति भाष्यमपि कुण्डलनां नेतव्यम् उभयत्रापि कर्मणोऽनुमेयत्वे दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकत्वेन निर्देशानुपपत्तेः।

11. For one who is in a boat and who looks only at its middle with his face down, the cognition that it has no action, though it has action, is certainly a delusion conditioned by the defect produced by extreme promixity; and in the case of what is far away, it is conditioned by the defect of being extremely far away. Indeed in these cases, even the size of the boat is not apprehended. Therefore, in such positions, the non-cognition of action is due simply to the absence of the reciprocal conjunction consisting in the fourfold contact of the parts and the wholes in the case of both the object and the sense-organ; it is not due to the non-perception of conjunction and disjunction.

12. Further, the *Bhāṣya* too, 'Just as, seeing the arrival of Devadatta at another place preceded by a motion, there is the recollection of motion in the sun too' must be enclosed in a circle; for, since in both the cases action is to be inferred,

१३. किंच यदि न कर्मणः प्रत्यक्षत्वं तर्हि कर्मैव न स्यात्। असमावयिकारणमात्रापेक्षौ हि संयोगविभागौ। तत्र असमवायिकारणं प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोग एवास्तु। किं कर्मकल्पनया।

१४. ननु यत्र संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणं तत्र स्वाश्रये स्वाश्रयसमवेते वा कार्यं जायते। यथा तन्तुसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणत्वे स्वाश्रयभूते तन्तौ पटः। यथा च प्रचितावयवसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणत्वे स्वाश्रयसमवेते अवयविनि महत्त्वम्। इति कुतः प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगः स्वाश्रयतत्समवेतव्यतिरिक्ते देशे संयोगाख्यं कार्यम् आरच्चयति। अतः कर्मैवासमवायिकारणम्।

it is not intelligible to exhibit them as the illustration and what is illustrated.

13. Further, if action were not perceptible, then there would be no action at all; conjunction and disjunction require, indeed, merely some non-inherent cause; in this case, let the non-inherent cause be only the conjunction with the body of a soul exercising volition; why should action be assumed?

14. Now, where conjunction is the non-inherent cause, there the product is generated in its own abode or in what is inherent in that abode; for example when the conjunction of the threads is the non-inherent cause, the cloth exists in the threads which form its abode; also for example, when the conjunction of spread out parts is the non-inherent cause, grossness exists in the 'whole' which is inherent in its abode. Hence, how does the conjunction with the body of a soul exercising volition produce the effect called conjunction in some space which is different from its abode and what is

१५. इति चेद् मैवम् । अणुद्वयसंयोगस्य स्वाश्रयतत्समवेतव्यतिरिक्ते तृतीयाणौ अपि कार्योत्पादकत्वदर्शनेन तादृशनियमस्य व्यभिचारात् । अतः प्रत्यक्षेणैव कर्मसिद्धिः ।।

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६. अभावः

१. इत्थं भावपदार्थानां स्वरूपे सुनिरूपिते ।
अभावाख्यं पदार्थं च पञ्चमं चिन्तयामहे ।।

२. ननु भावपदार्था अपि केचिदवशिष्टाः सन्त्येव । यथाहुः प्राभाकराः—

inherent in that abode? Thus action alone is the non-inherent cause.

15. If this be said, it is not so; because, since the conjunction of two atoms is seen to produce an effect in the third atom, which is different from the abode of that conjunction and what is inherent in that abode, such a rule is inconstant. Therefore action is established by perception alone.

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6. Non-Existence

1. Thus the nature of positive categories having been well described, we consider the fifth category, too, called non-existence.

2. Now, certainly, there are even some positive categories left over; thus say the followers of Prabhākara:

द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म च जातिशक्ती सादृश्यसंख्ये समवाय एते ।
अष्टौ पदार्था इह तान् विभज्य संक्षिप्य वक्ष्यामि गुरोर्मतेन ॥

इति ।

३. द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म जातिश्चैतत्त्रयाश्रया ।
विशेषः समवायश्च पदार्थाः षडिमे मताः ॥

इति तार्किकाश्च । प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति च । ततः कथं सुनिरूपितत्ववाचोयुक्तिः ।

Substance, quality and action, genus and potency, similarity and number, inherence: these are the eight categories. Now, analytically and briefly I will deal with them according to the doctrine of the Guru.

3. Substance, quality and action, genus depending on these three, particularity and inherence, these six are accepted as the categories;

so say the Logicians. Also: 'Means of valid knowledge, objects of valid knowledge, doubt, purpose, example, final doctrine, members of the syllogism, counter-argument, demonstration, disputation, destructive reasoning, wrangling, fallacies, perversion, quibbling, vulnerable points—by knowing the truth of these, there is the attainment of the highest good.' Then how can the statement 'well described' stand to reason?

४. इति चेद् मैवम् । तत्र प्राभाकरोक्तयोः शक्तिसंख्ययोर्गुणत्वमेवेति गुणनिर्णये वर्णितम् । गोगतं गवयसादृश्यं तु तत्त्वान्तरमेव न भवति । गवयगतानां गुणावयवसामान्यानां गवि च वर्तमानत्वादेव गवि गवयसादृश्यप्रतिपत्त्युपपत्तेः ।

५. ननु सदृशतामतेर्गुणावयवसामान्यमात्रपरत्वे तदिति मतिरुत्पद्येत । अत्र तु तद्वदिति मतिरुपजायते । यथाह भवनाथः —तद्वदिति हि तद्धीः न तदिति इति ।

६. तदप्ययुक्तम् । गवयगतानां गुणावयवसामान्यानां गवाश्रितत्वाकारेण निरूप्यमाणानां तद्वदित्यादिबुद्धिविषयत्वं

4. If this be said, it is not so. Of these, potency and number, enumerated by the followers of Prabhākara are only qualities; this has been explained in determining the qualities. And the similarity of the *gavaya* present in the cow cannot be a distinct reality; because the cognition of the similarity of *gavaya* in a cow is intelligible even by the existence in the cow of qualities, parts and generality present in the *gavaya*.

5. Now, if the cognition of similarity meant merely qualities, parts and generality, the cognition should be produced in the form 'that'; but here the cognition is produced in the form 'similar to that'; as says Bhavanātha: 'The cognition of it is, indeed, in the form, "similar to that", not in the form, "that"'.

6. This too does not stand to reason; for there is differentiation in this way: the qualities, parts and generality present in the *gavaya*, when considered as existing in the cow, become the object of the cognition, 'similar to that',

स्वरूपेण निरूप्यमाणानां तदित्यनुवृत्ताकारबुद्धिविषयत्वम्, यथा देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तजन्यत्वेन निरूप्यमाणो यज्ञदत्तपुत्रबुद्धिविषयो भवति, स्वरूपेण तु निरूप्यमाणो देवदत्तबुद्धिमात्रविषय इति ।

७. अपिच सादृश्यस्य तत्त्वान्तरत्वे गवयेन गौर्बहुसदृशः, वराहेण पुनरल्पसदृश इत्यादिप्रत्ययानां कथमुपपत्तिः । नहि भवन्मते सादृश्यस्याल्पत्वबहुत्वे संभवतः । न च परिमाणभेदादल्पत्वबहुत्वे इति वाच्यम् । द्रव्यव्यतिरिक्तस्यापरिमाणत्वात् । न चाश्रयपरिमाणभेदात् परिमाणभेदः । एकस्यैव गोराश्रयत्वात् । अस्मन्मते तु गुणावयवसामान्यानामल्पसंख्याभाजां सादृश्याल्पत्वं बहुसंख्याभाजां सादृश्यबहुत्वमिति विवेकः सुकरः । तस्माद् द्रव्यादिष्वेव सादृश्यस्याप्यन्तर्भावः ।

and, when considered in their own form, become the object of the constant cognition, 'that', just as Devadatta, when considered as generated by Yajñadatta, becomes the object of the cognition, 'the son of Yajñadatta', but when considered in his own form, becomes the object merely of the cognition 'Devadatta'.

7. Further, if similarity be a distinct reality, how can there be intelligibility for the cognitions like 'A cow is very similar to a *gavaya*, but slightly similar to a boar'? Indeed, according to your view, smallness and greatness are not possible for similarity. And it cannot be said that smallness and greatness are due to difference in size, because there is no size except for substances. Nor is the difference in size due to the difference in the size of the abodes, because the abode is one and the same cow. But according to our view, it is easy to make a distinction thus: there is smallness in similarity

८. विशेषसमवायौ तु शशविषाणसब्रह्मचारिणौ, तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणाभावात्। नन्वस्त्येव विशेषसिद्धावनुमानं 'समानजातीयाः समानगुणकार्याः परमाणवो मुक्तात्मानश्च परस्परव्यावर्तकधर्मसमवायिनः, द्रव्यत्वाद् घटवद्' इति।

९. तदयुक्तम्। पृथक्त्वेन सिद्धसाध्यत्वात्। तस्माद् नित्यद्रव्यवर्ती व्यावृत्तिमात्रबुद्धिविषयो विशेष इति भाषिणो वैशेषिका दूषिता वेदितव्याः।

१०. समवायेऽपि प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा प्रमाणम्। तत्र न

for qualities, parts and generality, when they are smaller in number, and greatness in similarity when they are larger in number. Therefore, similarity is certainly to be included in substance, etc.

8. Particularity and inherence are co-disciples with the hare's horn, because there is no authority for their establishment. Now, certainly there is inference for establishing particularity, namely 'The primal atoms having a common genus and having common qualities and products, and released souls have inherent therein attributes which differentiate them from one another, because they are substances, like a jar'.

9. This does not stand to reason; because by the acceptance of distinctness, the probandum has already been established. Therefore the Vaiśeṣika-s who say that particularity is the content of the knowledge of a mere differentiation existing in eternal substances, are to be understood to be refuted.

10. For inherence too, perception or inference should be the authority. Of these, perception is not admitted by

तावत् तार्किकाभिमतं प्रत्यक्षम् अप्रतिभासात् । न च पटाश्रयं शौक्लचम् इह पटे शौक्लचम् इत्यादिप्रत्ययानामिन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति वाच्यम् । समवायरूपस्यैव विप्रतिपन्नत्वादेतेषां प्रत्ययानां समवायविषयत्वासिद्धेः । सिद्धे हि समवाये तादृशानां प्रत्ययानां समवायविषयत्वोपवर्णनमुपपद्यते।

११. कश्च समवायस्येन्द्रियेण संनिकर्षः । न तावद् विशेषणविशेष्यभावः, तस्येन्द्रियसंनिकर्षत्वासिद्धेः प्रागेव समर्थितत्वात् । अन्यस्य च संनिकर्षस्यानुपपत्तेः अनभ्युपगमाच्च ।

१२. नापि प्राभाकरानुमतमनुमानं प्रमाणम् । तत्र तावद् इह गवि गोत्वमिति प्रत्ययोऽधिकरणाधिकर्तव्यता-

the Logicians, because it is not manifested. And it should not be said that since in cognitions like ‘White colour has the cloth as abode’, ‘There is white colour in this cloth’, have uniform co-presence and co-absence with the sense-organs, inherence is perceptible; because since the very existence of inherence is under dispute, that these cognitions have inherence as content is non-established. When inherence is established, to say that such cognitions have inherence as content will be intelligible.

11. And what contact has inherence with the sense-organs? It is not the relation of the subject and attribute, because it has already been justified that this cannot be established as a sense-contact; and other contacts are unintelligible and are not admitted.

12. And inference, as acknowledged by the followers of Prabhākara is not the authority; because in this case,

संबन्धनिबन्धनः इहेति प्रत्ययत्वाद् इह घटे तण्डुला इति प्रत्ययवद् इत्यनुमानम्, इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति प्रत्ययेन व्यभिचारादनुपपन्नम्। विवादपदं विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंबन्धनिबन्धनं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद् दण्डीति ज्ञानवद् इत्यनुमानं तु विनष्टो घट इति प्रत्ययेन व्यभिचारादुपेक्षणीयम्।

१३. यत् पुनः आगमसंनिधिविहीनस्याप्युत्पन्नवस्तुपरतन्त्रतया भानं समवायगमकम् इति भवनाथेन कथितम्, तत्र प्रष्टव्यः। किमेतादृशभानं समवायेन व्याप्तम् उत तेन विनानुपपन्नमिति। न तावद् व्याप्तम् अन्यत्र सहादर्शनेन व्याप्तिग्रहणानुपपत्तेः। नापि समवायेन विनानुपपन्नम्, भेदसहिष्णुनाभेदेनोपपत्तेः।

the inference, 'The cognition that there is cowness in this cow is conditioned by the relation of the abode and what is to abide, because of the cognition "in this" like the cognition that there is rice in this jar', is unintelligible, since there is inconstancy with the cognition, 'There is no jar on this floor'. But the inference, 'What is under dispute is conditioned by the relation of the subject and attribute, because it is the cognition of the qualified, like the cognition of one having a stick', is to be discarded on account of inconstancy with the cognition, 'The jar is destroyed'.

13. As for what was said by Bhavanātha, 'The appearance of a thing, though it did not come and though it was not there, as dependent on an object that is produced, indicates inherence', here, this question may be asked: 'Is such appearance pervaded by inherence, or is it unintelligible without that'? Now, it is not so pervaded, because without seeing them together elsewhere, the apprehension of pervasion

१४. अपिच समवायः समवायिभ्यामत्यन्ताभिन्नो वा न वा। न तावदभिन्नः समवायिव्यतिरेकेण समवायस्याभावप्रसङ्गात्। भिन्नत्वे तु समवायस्य समवायिभ्यां संबन्धोऽस्ति वा न वा। न तावदस्तीति वाच्यम् तस्यापि संबन्धस्य समवायत्वात् समवायान्तरकल्पने तस्याप्येवमिति अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्।

१५. नापि नास्तीति वाच्यं पिण्डसामान्यसमवायानां परस्परं संबन्धाभावे सति इयं गौः इति व्यवहारमपहाय पिण्डगोत्वसमवाया इति व्यवहारस्वीकारप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मादवयवावयविनोर्गुणगुणिनोर्जातिजातिमतोः क्रियाक्रियावतोश्च परस्परं तादात्म्यमेव संबन्धः। तच्च प्रागेवोक्तम्।

is unintelligible. Nor is it unintelligible without inherence, because it is intelligible through non-difference which can tolerate difference.

14. Further, is inherence absolutely non-different from the two correlates of inherences or not? Now, it is not non-different, because there would follow the absence of inherence as distinct from the correlates of inherence. If, however, it be different, has inherence a relation with the two correlates of inherence or not? Now, it cannot be said that there is; because, that relation too being inherence, if another relation is assumed, there must be a similar one for that too; and there would result infinite regress.

15. Nor can it be said that there is not; for if there be the absence of the reciprocal relation among the mass, its genus and inherence, there would follow the adoption of the empirical usage, 'The mass, cowness and inherence', discarding the empirical usage, 'This is a cow'. Therefore,

१६. प्रमाणादयो यद्यप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति, तथापि प्रयोजनवशाद् भेदेन कीर्तनम् इति पदार्थषट्कप्रकरणे केशवमिश्रैरेवोक्तं च। यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमणानि इन्द्रियतत्संनिकर्षज्ञानप्राकट्यादिरूपाणि प्रमेये अन्तर्भवन्ति, तथापि प्रमाणैर्विना तेषां प्रमेयत्वानुपपत्तेः, मानाधीनत्वान्मेयसिद्धेश्च युक्तमेव प्रमाणानां पृथगुपवर्णनम्। संशयप्रयोजनादीनामस्मिन्नन्तर्भावः स्पष्टः।

१७. तस्माद् भावपदार्थानामेतेष्वेवान्तर्भावाद् अनन्तर्भूतानां च पदार्थत्वानुपपत्तेर्युक्तमभावपदार्थनिरूपणम्।

between parts and the whole, quality and what has that quality, genus and that which possesses that genus, and action and what has activity, the reciprocal relation is identity alone; and this has already been said.

16. Although 'means of valid knowledge', etc. are included even in this, still it is said by Keśavamiśra himself in the section dealing with the six categories, 'On account of a purpose, there is separate treatment'. Although means of valid knowledge like perception are included in the objects of valid knowledge in the form of sense-organs, their contact, cognition, manifestedness, etc. yet, since they are not intelligible as objects of valid knowledge without means of valid knowledge, and since the establishment of the objects of cognition depends on means of cognition, the separate treatment of the means of valid knowledge is quite reasonable. The inclusion of doubt, purpose, etc. in this is clear.

17. Therefore, since the positive categories are included even in these, and since what are not so included are not intelligible as categories, the treatment of the category, non-existence (hereafter) stands to reason.

प्रागभावादिभेदेन चतुर्धैव विभागवान् ।
षष्ठप्रमाणविज्ञेयः पदार्थोऽभाव उच्यते ।।

१८. अभावो द्विविधः संसर्गाभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्च । तत्र संसर्गाभावः प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावात्यन्ताभावभेदेन त्रिविधः ।

क्षीरे यो दध्यभावः स इह निगदितः प्रागभावः प्रवीणैः
प्रध्वंसाभावमाहुर्दधनि तु पयसोऽभावमाचार्यपादाः ।
अत्यन्ताभावसंज्ञो भवति हि पवनाद्येषु रूपाद्यभाव-
श्चान्योन्याभावमाशु स्फुटयति तु घटादौ पटत्वाद्यभावः ।

The category which has only a fourfold division, as divided into prior non-existence, etc. and which is to be understood through the sixth means of valid knowledge, is called non-existence.

18. Non-existence is of two kinds, relational non-existence and reciprocal non-existence. Of these, relational non-existence is of three kinds, namely prior non-existence, non-existence on destruction and absolute non-existence.

The non-existence of curd in milk is said to be prior non-existence by experts; but the non-existence of milk in curd is non-existence through destruction: so say the Preceptors; what is called absolute non-existence is the absence of colour, etc. in air, etc.; the non-existence of clothness, etc. in jar, etc. quickly makes clear reciprocal non-existence.

अभावाख्यः पदार्थस्तु नास्तीत्याह प्रभाकरः ।
घटाद्यभावस्तत्पक्षे केवलं भूतलं मतम् ।।

१९. यदुक्तं भावान्तरमभाव इति तन्मन्दम् । अघटं भूतलम्, इह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादिविशिष्टव्यवहाराणां विशिष्टभूतलविज्ञानमूलत्वे तद्विशेषणभूतस्य तत्त्वान्तरस्यावश्याश्रयणीयत्वात् । न च भूतलवेदनादेवायं व्यवहार इति सांप्रतम् । घटवति भूतलेऽपि तद्व्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् । अस्ति हि तत्रापि भूतलविज्ञानम् ।

२० ननु तन्मात्रज्ञानस्यैवाभावव्यवहारकारणत्वमिति

Prabhākara however said that there is no category called non-existence. According to his view, the non-existence of the jar, etc. is considered only as the bare floor.

19. What has been said in, 'Non-existence is another existence', is weak. 'The floor is devoid of a jar', 'On this floor there is no jar': since these and other empirical usages relating to qualified objects have as basis the cognition of the floor as qualified by something, some distinct reality has necessarily to be resorted to as being the qualification thereof. It is not admissible that this empirical usage is due merely to the cognition of the floor, because this empirical usage would follow even in respect of the floor where there is a jar. Indeed, there too, there is the cognition of the floor.

20. Now, if it be said that the cognition of 'that alone' is the cause of the empirical usage of non-existence, not so; if the word 'alone' signifies something other than the floor

चेद् मैवम् । मात्रशब्दस्य भूतलातिरिक्तार्थत्वे तत्त्वान्तरत्वापत्तिः अनतिरिक्तार्थत्वे घटवति प्रसङ्ग इति पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तेः ।

२१. न चैकाकिभूतलवेदनं तत्कारणमिति वाच्यम् । एकाकिशब्दस्यैकसंख्यायोगित्वेऽर्थे घटवति प्रसङ्गः 'एकादाकिनिच्चासहाये' इति द्वितीयासहायत्वेऽर्थे तत्त्वान्तरत्वापत्तिरिति घट्टकुटीप्रभातन्यायस्य पुनरप्यनतिवृत्तेः । एताभिरेव युक्तिभिः केवलादिशब्दोऽपि व्याख्यातो वेदितव्यः ।

२२. अत्राह भवनाथः । यत्राभावधीस्तत्र संसृष्टस्वरूपधीर्नास्ति स्वरूपधीस्त्वस्तीति द्वयी स्वरूपधीरास्थेया । तत्र

there results its being a distinct reality; if it does not signify anything else, there is the possibility (of the empirical usage) where there is a jar, and as such the defect previously stated is not surmounted.

21. Nor may it be said that its cause is the cognition of the solitary floor. If the word 'solitary' signifies relation to the number one, there is this possibility even where there is the jar. If it signifies 'not associated with a second' by the rule, 'To the stem "*eka*", the suffix "*ākinic*", in the sense of "having no associate"', there would result a distinct reality, and thus the principle of 'at the toll-gate at morn' is not even thus surmounted. By these reasonings, it must be understood that words like 'merely' too are explained.

22. Here says Bhavanātha: 'Where there is the cognition of a non-existence, there, there is no cognition of the existence of what is related, but there is the cognition of an existence: thus a twofold cognition of existence must be established. Of these, the cognition of the existence as distinct from the

संसृष्टस्वरूपधीतोऽन्या स्वरूपधीस्तन्मात्रधीः। तद्धीवेद्यं च तन्मात्रमिति न मेयान्तरम् इति।

२३. तत्र प्रष्टव्यम्—संसृष्टस्वरूपधीतोऽन्यस्याः स्वरूपधियः किं प्रमेयमिति। ननूक्तमेव तद्धीवेद्यं च तन्मात्रमिति। तर्हि मात्रशब्दस्य भूतलातिरिक्तार्थत्वे तत्त्वान्तरत्वम् अनतिरिक्तार्थत्वे घटवति प्रसङ्गः।

२४. ननु घटवति संसृष्टस्वरूपधीरेवेति न तत्र प्रसङ्ग इति चेद् न। उक्तया रीत्या स्वरूपधीद्वयस्यापि तत्रैव प्राप्तत्वात्। अन्यथा मात्रशब्दस्यातिरिक्तार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अपि च संसृष्टस्वरूपधीतोऽन्या स्वरूपधीरिति यदुक्तं तत्र अन्यशब्दस्य

cognition of the existence of what is related, is cognition of "that alone"; and what is made known by that cognition is "that alone"; hence there is nothing else to be known.'

23. Here it may be asked: 'What is it that is to be known from the cognition of existence, as distinct from the cognition of the existence of what is related?' Now it has been said that what is made known by that cognition is 'that alone'. In that case, if the word 'alone' signifies something more than the floor, there is another reality; if it does not signify something more, there results its possibility even where there is jar.

24. Now if it be said that where there is a jar there is the cognition only of what is related, and that consequently there is not the said contingency, no; because in the manner stated above, both the cognition of existence come in even there. Otherwise, the word 'alone', it would follow, has the

असंसृष्टत्वमेवार्थः इति बलादापन्नम्। इति न पुनरपि प्राचीन-दोषादुत्तारः। तस्मादभावो नाम तत्त्वान्तरमवश्याश्रयणीयम्। अतः पञ्चैव पदार्थाः।

२५. ननु शून्यमेवेदं जगदिति वादिनि माध्यमिके जीवति सति कथं पदार्थपञ्चकविभागसिद्धिः। एवं हि स वदति। विमतं विज्ञानं शून्यविषयं विज्ञानत्वात्, स्वप्नादिविज्ञानवदिति। ननु तत्रापि विज्ञानमस्त्येवेति कथं जगतः शून्यात्मकत्वमिति चेद् मैवम्। ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञानस्याप्यभावात्। अतः शून्यविवर्तं जगत्।

meaning of something more. Further, as for what was said, that the cognition of existence is different from the cognition of the existence of what is related, there the word 'different' means only 'what is not related'; this comes in inevitably. Hence the previous defect is not overcome. Therefore a separate reality called non-existence must necessarily be resorted to. Therefore the categories are certainly five.

25. Now, so long as there lives the Mādhyamika who upholds that the universe is but a void, how can there be established the fivefold division of categories? Indeed, this is what he says: 'The cognition under dispute has void as its content, because it is a cognition, like dream-cognition, etc.' Now, there (in dream) too there certainly exists the cognition and hence how can the universe be of the nature of a void? If this be asked, it is not so; because in the absence of something to be known, the knowledge too is absent. Therefore the world is only an illusory modification of the void.

२६. इति माध्यमिकेनोक्तं ज्ञानाभावमसहमानो योगाचारः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। अस्तु ज्ञेयाभावः। स्वप्नादौ ज्ञेयानामत्यन्ताभावे सत्यपि प्रतीयमानत्वात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन विमतानामप्यत्यन्ताभावस्य सम्यगवगम्यत्वात्। ज्ञानं तु न निराकर्तुं शक्यम्, स्वप्नादावपि ज्ञानोदयदर्शनात्।

२७. न च ज्ञेयाभावेन ज्ञानाभावोऽपि कल्पनीयः प्रतीतिविरोधात्। तस्माद् विज्ञानमेव जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चघटादिरूपेण परिवर्तते। समनन्तरप्रत्ययेन च तदेव गृह्यते। तस्माद् दृश्यमानं घटाद्याकारं विज्ञानस्यैव। अपिच स्वयंप्रकाशरूपाद् विज्ञानादभिन्ना एव घटादयः। तथाच प्रयोगः। यत् प्रकाशते तत् प्रकाशादभिन्नं यथोभयसिद्धः प्रदीप इति। तस्माद् विज्ञानविवर्तं जगत्।

26. There comes forward the Yogācāra unable to put up with this non-existence of cognition as stated by the Mādhyamika. Let what is known be non-existent; since in dream, etc. even though there is the complete non-existence of what are known, they are yet cognized, with these as example, the complete non-existence even of what are under dispute can well be understood. Cognition, however, cannot be denied, because even in dream, etc. cognition is seen to arise.

27. Nor from the absence of what is to be known can the absence of cognition too be assumed, since it conflicts with experience. Therefore, cognition itself is transformed in the form of the jar, etc. in the universe of the waking condition; and by the immediately following cognition that itself is cognized. Therefore the form of the jar, etc. that is cognized belongs to the cognition itself. Further, jar, etc. are certainly

२८. इति योगाचारेण साधिते बाह्यवस्तुनिरासमसहमानः सौत्रान्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। अस्तु ज्ञानं साकारम्। तथापि न बाह्यमर्थमपह्नोतुं शक्यम्। बाह्यपदार्थानां एकरूपस्य विज्ञानस्य बहुविधाकारसमर्पणमात्रं प्रति हेतुत्वादेकरूपमेव विज्ञानं नीलपीताद्याकारेण बहुधा विपरिवर्तत इति दुरुपपादमेव। तस्माद् विज्ञानाकाराणामनेकविधत्वदर्शनात् तत्तदाकारसमर्पणहेतुभूताः क्षणिकतरा बाह्यपदार्था अपि ज्ञानाकारविशेषदर्शनानुमेयाः।

२९. न च बाह्यपदार्थानां सर्वत्रानुमेयत्वे प्रत्यक्षा-

non-different from the cognition, which is by nature self-luminous. Thus there is the syllogism: 'That which is luminous is not different from luminosity, for example the lamp as accepted by both parties.' Therefore the universe is an illusory transformation of cognition.

28. When the Yogācāra has established this, there comes forward the Sautrāntika who does not put up with the denial of external reality. Let it be that cognition has the form. Even then it is not possible to deny external reality. Since the external objects form a ground merely for conferring various forms on cognition which is one in nature, it is difficult to make it intelligible that cognition which is of but one nature is transformed variously into the forms of blue, yellow, etc. Therefore, since the forms of cognitions are seen to be various in nature, external objects too, quite momentary, are to be inferred from the particularity seen in the forms of cognition, as forming the ground for conferring such and such forms.

29. And it may not be said that if external objects are only inferable in all cases, there would result the breakdown of the distinction of perception and inference; because

नुमानविभागभङ्गप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्। यस्य साक्षादाकारसमर्पणहेतुत्वं तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, यस्य तु परंपरया तस्यानुमेयत्वमिति विभागात्।

३०. अथ बाह्यार्थस्य नित्यानुमेयतावचनमसहमानो वैभाषिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। कथं नीलादिद्रव्यं विज्ञानानामाकारं समर्पयति। दृष्टमनुमितं वा। न तावदनुमितम् आकारसमर्पणात् पूर्वमनुमानानुदयात्। यदि दृष्टं तर्हि नीलादिपदार्थानां दृश्यत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयम् अन्यथाकारसमर्पणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः। असंबद्धस्य हेतुत्वे सर्वस्यापि सर्वत्र हेतुत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अतः क्षणभङ्गुरः प्रत्यक्षश्चार्थ इति स्थितम्।

there is this distinction: that which is directly the ground for conferring a form is perceptible; but that which is indirectly so is to be inferred.

30. Then comes forward the Vaibhāṣika who does not put up with the external objects being only inferable in all cases. How do things like blue confer a form on cognition? It must be seen or inferred. Now it is not inferred, since prior to conferring a form, its inference cannot arise. If it is seen, then objects like blue must necessarily be admitted to be perceptible, since otherwise their being the ground for conferring form is unintelligible. If what has no relation is a ground, it would follow that anything may be a ground for anything. Thus it stands that objects are momentarily perishable and perceptible.

३१. एते चत्वारोऽपि बुद्धशिष्याः। एष च तेषां सिद्धान्तसंक्षेपश्लोकः—

मुख्यो माध्यमिको विवर्तमखिलं शून्यस्य मेने जगद्
योगाचारमते तु सन्ति मतयस्तासां विवर्तोऽखिलः।
अर्थोऽस्ति क्षणिकस्त्वसावनुमितो बुद्ध्येति सौत्रान्तिकः
प्रत्यक्षं क्षणभङ्गुरं च सकलं वैभाषिको भाषते॥

इति। अत्र क्षणिकत्वपक्ष एवास्माकं निराकर्तुमवशिष्यते, इतरेषां स्वयूथ्यैरेव निरस्तत्वात्।

३२. तत्र तावत् क्षणिकत्वे प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा प्रमाणम्।

31. All these four are the disciples of Buddha. Here is a stanza which condenses their doctrines:

> The Mādhyamika who comes foremost considers the entire universe as an illusory transformation of the void; according to the Yogācāra view, cognitions exist, and everything is their illusory transformation; the Sautrāntika holds that there are objects which are momentary, and which are inferred from cognitions; and the Vaibhāṣika says that everything is perceptible and momentarily perishable.

Of these, there remains only the view of momentariness to be refuted by us, since the others have been refuted by the members of their own band.

32. Now, for momentariness the authority is either perception or inference, since in your view there is no authority

भवन्मते तदतिरिक्तप्रमाणाभावात् । तत्र न तावत् प्रत्यक्षम्, तस्य स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञानेन पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोरेकत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । न च सदृशापरापरोद्भवादयमेकत्वभ्रम इति वाच्यम् । मृद्दण्डचक्रादीनामभावे घटादेः पुनः पुनरुद्भवासंभवात् । न च ज्ञानादेवोत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । पूर्वमपि ज्ञानादेवोत्पत्त्युपपत्तेर्मृद्दण्डचक्रादीनां कुत्राप्यनुपयोगप्रसङ्गात् ।

३३. नाप्यनुमानेन क्षणिकत्वं समर्थनीयम्, सर्वे भावाः क्षणिकाः सत्त्वाद् विज्ञानवदिति । तस्य दृढतरोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञानविरोधेन बाधितविषयतया वह्निशैत्यानुमानवदप्रमाणत्वाद् विज्ञानस्यापि द्वित्रक्षणावस्थायित्वाङ्गीकारेण दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ।

beyond these. Now, it cannot be perception, because through the perceptual re-cognition in the form, 'This is that same jar', it proclaims the unity between the former and the later moments. And it must not be said that this unity is an illusion due to the rise of similars one after another, because the repeated production of a jar, etc. is not possible in the absence of clay, staff, wheel, etc. Nor may it be said that the production may be from the cognition itself; because from the intelligibility of production from cognition itself even before, there would result the non-utility of clay, staff, wheel, etc.

33. Nor can momentariness be justified through inference, in the form, 'Every existent is momentary, because it is existent, like cognition' because it has its content sublated, coming as it does into conflict with the perceptual re-cognition which rises more firmly, and thus, like the inference of fire

३४. अत्र पुनराभिरेव युक्तिभिः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां तत्सिद्धानां पदार्थानां मिथ्यात्वमौपनिषदाः साधयन्ति । प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् स्वप्नप्रपञ्चवदिति । 'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यं चात्र प्रमाणम् । अतः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वाद् 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यानां यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यमविहतमिति ।

३५. अत्र वदामः । तत्र यत् तावदुक्तं दृश्यत्वान्मिथ्यात्वमिति, तत्र किमिदं मिथ्यात्वं नाम । किमत्यन्तासत्त्वम् उत

being cold, becomes non-authoritative; and because the example is non-established, since even cognition is acknowledged to last for two or three moments.

34. Again in this connection, by the very same reasonings the followers of the Upaniṣad-s establish the illusoriness of objects as established through perception and other means of valid knowledge in the form, 'The universe is an illusion, because it is perceptible, like the dream world'. Vedānta passages like, 'Here there is no plurality' are also authority for this. Therefore, since the world as established by perception and other means of valid knowledge is illusory, for Vedānta passages like, 'Brahman is one only without a second', validity remains intact in respect of their literal sense.

35. To this we reply. Of these, as for what was said that there is illusoriness because of perceptibility, now what is it that is called illusoriness? Is it absolute non-reality, or is it being other than reality and non-reality, or is it being the content of sublation? It is not the first since of what

सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं बाध्यत्वं वा। नाद्यः, अत्यन्तासतो नरविषाणादेरिव ख्यानानुपपत्तेः। नापि सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं तस्यान्यत्राप्रसिद्धत्वेन पक्षस्याप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वापत्तेः।

३६. ननु सर्ववादिसिद्धमेव स्वप्नादिप्रपञ्चस्य सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्। तथाहि। असतो नरविषाणादेरिव ख्यानानुपपत्तेः सतश्चिदात्मन इव बाधानुपपत्तेः सत्वासत्वयोश्च एकत्र समावेशानुपपत्तेश्च सिद्धं स्वप्नादिप्रपञ्चस्य सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्। ततश्च नाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम्।

३७. मैवम्। सद्विलक्षणस्य नरविषाणादेरिव ख्याना-

is absolutely non-real cognition is unintelligible, as of a man's horn, etc. Nor is it being other than reality and non-reality, since, such a thing not having been known elsewhere, there comes in the fallacy of 'non-established qualification' for the subject.

36. Now it is certainly established that the dream-world, etc. are other than reality and non-reality, according to all disputants. It is thus: since of what is unreal cognition is unintelligible, as of a man's horn, and since of what is real sublation is unintelligible as of the intelligent self, and since the bringing in of existence and non-existence in the same place is unintelligible, it is established that the dream-world, etc. are other than reality and non-reality. And hence there is no fallacy of 'non-established qualification'.

37. It is not so. Since the cognition of what is other than real is unintelligible as of a man's horn, and since sublation of what is other than unreal is unintelligible as of the intelligent self, even though there can be the assumption of

नुपपत्तेः असद्विलक्षणस्य चिदात्मन इव बाधानुपपत्तेः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वकल्पनेऽपि स्वप्नादिप्रपञ्चस्य ख्यातिबाधयोरनुपपत्तेः। तस्मात् ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या सदसद्विलक्षणत्वमिति रिक्तं वचः। अतः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वमस्माकमसिद्धमेवेति युक्तमप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम्।

३८. नापि बाध्यत्वं मिथ्यापदार्थः, जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चस्य बाधकभूतप्रमाणान्तरादर्शनात्। न चेदमेवानुमानं बाधकमिति वाच्यम्। अस्यानुमानस्य प्रपञ्चप्रतिभासबाध्यत्वेन वह्निशैत्यानुमानवत् स्वोत्थानानुपपत्तेः।

३९. ननु प्रपञ्चप्रतिभासस्य मिथ्यात्वाद् युक्तमनुमा-

something being other than reality and non-reality, cognition and sublation are unintelligible in respect of the dream-world. Therefore the statement that on account of the unintelligibility otherwise of cognition and sublation, there is its being other than reality and non-reality, is empty verbiage. Therefore being other than reality and non-reality is certainly non-established for us. Hence the fallacy of 'non-established qualification' stands to reason.

38. Nor is being the content of sublation the meaning of the word 'illusory', since there is not found another authority that sublates the world in the waking condition. And it should not be said that this very inference is the sublater; because since this inference can be sublated by the manifestation of the world, its own rise is unintelligible, like the inference of fire being cold.

39. Now, if it be said that since the manifestation of the world is illusory, the inference can reasonably arise, it is

नोत्थानमिति चेद् मैवम्। प्रपञ्चप्रतिभासस्य मिथ्यात्वे सत्यनुमानोत्थानम्, अनुमानोत्थाने सति मिथ्यात्वमिति परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात्। एवमद्वैतश्रुतीनामप्युत्थाने परस्पराश्रयोऽनुसंधातव्यः।

४०. तस्मादद्वैतश्रुतिरपि न यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रमाणमित्यबाधितप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धानां द्रव्यजातिगुणकर्मणामभावस्य च सत्यत्वं सिद्धम्॥

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७. उपसंहारः

यदत्र क्लिष्टार्थं महति बत कौमारिलमते
विरुद्धार्थं वा तत् सकलमपि शोध्यं सुमतिभिः।

not so; because there results reciprocal dependence in this way: the inference can arise if the manifestation of the world is illusory; and it is illusory if the inference can arise. In the same way must be understood the reciprocal dependence even in respect of the non-dualistic scriptural texts coming up.

40. Therefore non-dualistic scriptural texts too are not authoritative in respect of their literal sense. Thus is established the reality of substance, quality, genus and action and of non-existence, that are established on the unsublated authority of perception, etc.

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7. Conclusion

If here there is anything of the great doctrine of Kumārila whose meaning is difficult or whose meaning is conflicting, all such things have to be examined by men of cultured mind. And may all my performances in the form of prattling turn out to be an adoration of

हरेश्च श्रुत्यन्तप्रथितपरमानन्दवपुषः
समस्तोऽत्र स्तोत्रीभवतु मम संजल्पनविधिः ॥ १ ॥
भो भो दुष्कर्मवर्गाः परिहरत मदीयामिमामङ्गवल्लीं
ब्रूमः सौहार्दयोगात् परिचयजनितान्नान्यथा यात शङ्काम् ।
हन्ता युष्मत्कुलानां दलितकुवलयश्यामलैः कोमलैस्तै-
र्गात्रैर्नेत्रोत्सवं नो वितरति भगवान् भार्गवीभाग्यभूमा ॥ २ ॥
यः ख्यातः पुरुषोत्तमस्त्रिजगति प्रज्ञाकवित्वादिभिः
पुत्र्यास्तस्य सुतस्तदीयतनयात् कौमारतन्त्राम्बुधेः ।
सुब्रह्मण्य इति त्रिलोकविदितादापीतशास्त्रामृतः
सोऽहं पूरितवानिदं प्रकरणं नाम्ना च नारायणः ॥ ३ ॥

Hari whose form of absolute bliss is extolled in the Vedānta.

Oh, the hosts of evil *karman-s*, keep away from this creeper-like body of mine. I say this on account of the friendship that has grown out of familiarity; do not entertain any doubts to the contrary. Lo, the Lord who is the embodiment of the fortunes in plenty of Bhārgavī, vouchsafes unto us, born of your line, a feast for the eyes by his beautiful limbs, blue like the bloom of the dark lily.

There is Puruṣottama famed in the three worlds for his intelligence and learning. There is a son to his daughter. From his son who is an ocean of the doctrine of Kumārila, who is known in the three worlds as Subrahmaṇya, having drunk the nectar of sacred teaching, I, Nārāyaṇa by name, have completed this treatise.

कृष्णो विबुधाधिपतिर्निष्णातो वितरणेषु विद्यायाः ।
मुष्णातु हृदयतिमिरं पुष्णातु च मङ्गलानि सकलानि ।। ४ ।।
सुब्रह्मण्यादधीताः क्षितिविबुधपतेः काशिकातर्कमार्गा
रामाचार्याच्च पश्चात् सकलमधिगतं येन कौमारतन्त्रम् ।
कृष्णात् काव्यार्थमीमांसकपरिवृढतः काव्यमार्गावगन्ता
सोऽहं नारायणाख्यो व्यलिखमखिललोकापहासार्थमेतत् ।।५।।
कुमारिलमताम्भोधौ गभीरेऽतिगरीयसि ।
युक्तिरत्नं दिदृक्षूणामिदं सिद्धाञ्जनं परम् ।। ६ ।।
वेलालङ्घिपयःपयोधिविसरत्कल्लोलतुल्योदयै-
रालापाविषयैर्यशोभिरखिलं लोकं परिष्कुर्वते ।

May Kṛṣṇa, the Lord of the gods (the best among scholars), skilled in conferring learning, take away the darkness from my heart, and develop in me all auspiciousness.

I, Nārāyaṇa by name, write this for the ridicule of the entire world, I who learned the logical methods of the *kāśikā* from Subrahmaṇya, a prominent Brahmin, and later the entire doctrine of Kumārila from the teacher Rāma, and who learned the path of poetry from Kṛṣṇa, who became eminent among the inquirers into the meanings of poetry.

This is the supreme magic ointment for those who desire to find the gem of reasoning in the ocean of Kumārila's doctrines, majestic and very vast.

For you who adorn the entire world with your fame which rises like the waves beating in the milk-ocean overflowing the shores and which is beyond the

लीलानिर्जितशात्रवाय च वयं तुभ्यं किमाशास्महे
शैलाब्धीश्वर मानवेदनृपते जीयाः सहस्रं समाः ।। ७ ।।

युष्मत्कीर्तिपयो नितान्तमहता युष्मत्प्रतापाग्निना
तप्तादण्डकटाहतोऽपि नितरामुत्सिच्यमानं मुहुः ।
नैवायाति विशांपते विरलतां नैवोष्णभावं कदा-
प्यादत्ते नरवर्य किंच नितरां माधुर्यमालम्बते ।। ८ ।।

त्रिभुवनकमल त्वदीयकीर्तिः प्रचुरमरन्दविलासमादधाति ।
बुधसमितिरसौ तु चञ्चरीकप्रकरदशामपि तत्र मानवेद ।।९।।

इति प्रमेयखण्डः समाप्तः

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scope of speech, and who as if in sport have conquered your foes, what is it that we can wish for you? Oh Lord of the hills and the ocean, King Mānaveda, may you reign supreme for a thousand years.

The milk of your fame, though constantly foaming forth in profusion from the big vessel of the universe heated by the fire of your prowess of extreme magnitude, never suffers diminution, Oh Lord of the people, nor ever gets heated; but, Oh best of men, it acquires supreme sweetness.

Oh lotus of the three worlds, your fame is resplendent as a stream of honey; this assembly of the wise, however, is there in the position of a swarm of bees, Oh Mānaveda.

NOTES

I. MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

(i) INTRODUCTION

1. 'Divided into means of knowledge and objects of knowledge' (*mānameyavibhāgena*): this suggests the title of the work, MĀNAMEYODAYA. The actual title is given in the introduction to the second part.

2. 'Restatement (*anuvāda*)': cognition is divided into recollection and experience. When there are two identical experiences, one coming after and repeating the other, the second is called *anuvāda*, the object being already known in the earlier cognition. Mīmāṃsaka-s do not bring *anuvāda* within the sphere of validity and invalidity.

7. Manifestedness is established in II. 4. 35-41 and time is established as perceptible in II. 2. 81-5.

15. For a tabular representation of the various *pramāṇa-s* accepted by the different systems, see the comparative tables.

(ii) PERCEPTION

1. 'Sense-contact': according to the difference in the intention of the speaker, either the sense or the contact may be regarded as the instrument (see para 23 below).

4. Sound, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, is a substance, not a quality; see II. 2. 131.

5. 'Mind is all-pervasive': established in II. 2. 124-8.

6. (*a*) 'Function by reaching to the object': the senses of taste, smell and touch can function only when they reach

to the object, not from a distance. But there is a dispute as to whether the senses of sight and hearing can function away from the object. On the analogy of the other three senses, these two are also made out to function only by reaching to the object.

(*b*) 'An extended field, which is made out as the nature of light': in seeing an object, rays of light are said to go forth from the eyes and reach the object. The sense of sight being a modification of fire, the rays of light are of its very nature.

(*c*) 'Unseen potentiality': every act, though perishing momentarily, is assumed to leave behind an unseen potentiality (*apūrva*) or (*adṛṣṭa*), the sum of which determines the experiences of another life. Such a potentiality is assumed to account for the diversity of experiences, pleasant or otherwise, which cannot be explained by the visible conditions of the experience. The unseen potentiality is a co-operating factor in every experience.

9. Conjunction between two all-pervasive substances: established in II. 2. 128. Concepts like simultaneity have time as object: established in II. 2. 85.

10. (*a*) 'Opponents': here refers to the Logicians.

(*b*) 'Identity as relation': established in II. 6. 15.

17. (*a*) One person approaches a lamp, mistaking its glow for a gem; he is evidently wrong. Another approaches a gem, thinking its glow to be the gem itself; he too is wrong, in so far as he mistakes the glow for what glows. Although both are wrong, one succeeds in getting the gem, not the other.

(*b*) 'The reality of genus, etc.': established in II. 3. 2ff.

19. 'Guru': this is a term commonly applied to Prabhākara.

23. 'Instrumentality (*karaṇatva*)': this is used in a technical sense. A *karaṇa* is that which is looked upon as of greatest service in the production of the effect. Thus, though the sense-organ and its contact are both instrumental in the production of the cognition, one or the other is pre-eminently the *karaṇa* according to the manner in which the production of the cognition is looked upon. Cognition is *karaṇa* in respect of manifestedness (see I. 11 above).

26. 'Perception of soul and of the form of cognition': refuted in II. 2. 90-2.

27. *Keśoṇḍuka* is the phenomenon of a woolly mass which one perceives in empty space when one closes one's eyes and rubs them hard.

(iii) Inference

1. 'Which is not proximate (*asaṃnikṛṣṭa*)': for the meaning and purpose of this term, see para 31 below.

6. 'This inference': 'Sound is non-eternal, because it can be produced,' given in para 5 above. This inference does not represent the Mīmāṃsaka view, according to which sound is eternal.

8. Maitrī's seven children are dark, and she is expecting an eighth child. One may infer thus: 'The eighth child will be dark because it is Maitrī's child.' Now, if the dark complexion be due to the fact that Maitrī had been eating 'greens', not because they are her children, then eating greens is an extraneous adjunct. Suppose that during the expectancy of the eighth child she had not been eating greens and the child is not dark, then it is decided that eating greens is the extraneous adjunct for the dark complexion. But until the child is born, one can only suspect such an extraneous adjunct.

10. 'Doubting kitchenness, etc. to be . . . because no inconstancy is seen': as between fire and smoke. If really kitchenness were an extraneous adjunct, where there is no kitchenness the pervasion of smoke by fire should be inconstant, i.e. absent. As a matter of fact, however, there is no such inconstancy; therefore kitchenness is not an extraneous adjunct. Similarly for houseness, etc.

13. 'In the case of Maitrī's son': see para 8 above.

15. 'Counter-argument (*tarka*)': *tarka* is more familiar to students of Western Logic as *reductio ad absurdum*. It consists in establishing the untenability of the opposite of what is desired to be established.

17. (*a*) Self-dependence, reciprocal dependence, etc. are not enumerated separately, though they are among the possible defects that may be urged against an argument; for, they are not in essence different from *tarka*, in that they involve the contingency of what is not desired.

(*b*) The nature of occasioning defects in parsimony and prolixity: prolixity can occasion nothing but a defect, and that being so, the defect is occasioned directly. Parsimony, however, being a merit, occasions defect indirectly, through establishing the merit of one's own position as contrasted with the adversary's, wherein the defect is occasioned.

23. 'Doubts about invisible extraneous adjuncts': the Materialists do not accept inference at all. They contend that there can be no validity in an inference in that there may be extraneous adjuncts that we cannot see, and as such cannot remove; hence they vitiate inference.

25. (*a*) 'Prescription of study': there is the statement in the Veda, 'One shall study one's own Veda'. There the question arises, 'Does this prescribe the study of the

mere recitation of the Veda for the sake of *svarga* or does this prescribe the study of the meaning of the Veda too?' Learning the meaning is a visible result of the prescription and *svarga* is an invisible result. When a visible result is possible, an invisible result is not to be assumed. Therefore the prescription is taken to be for the study of the meaning of the Veda.

(*b*) 'But the twice-born . . . called the preceptor': here there are two parts, namely (1) the twice-born shall teach the Veda-s to his disciple, and (2) the twice-born is called the preceptor. Now which is important and which is subordinate? It is decided that the second part, which defines a preceptor, is important.

(*c*) 'One shall bring near the smeared stones': the question arises as to what they are to be smeared with, ghee or oil or some other substance. Since the sentence, 'Ghee, verily, is fire' follows on the injunction, and since this is a eulogistic passage which would be purposeless unless related to the foregoing injunction, it is understood that the smearing is to be with ghee.

26. 'If Veda is dependent . . . is not established': because God is dependent on the Veda, as the source of the knowledge about him. And thus reciprocal dependence would be involved. This seems to be final, but is not really so. For, the alleged reciprocal dependence is illusory. The Veda is dependent on God for its being, while God is dependent on the Veda for the knowledge of him. The two dependences are not on a par. The Naiyāyika-s hold that the Veda depends on God for its validity, and this is one of the arguments of the Naiyāyika-s for establishing God rationally. The Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā systems do not accept this position; they do not bring in God within a rational interpretation of the universe and its phenomena. From this it is

sometimes argued that there is no God according to the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā systems. But really, the denial of God in these systems is only an *āropavāda* (statement of what is superimposed), not a basic doctrine of the systems.

29. (*a*) Kṛttikā is a constellation and Rohiṇī is the next. When Kṛttikā has arisen, then there is the universal connection (*vyāpti*) with the approach of Rohiṇī. Here, the approach of Rohiṇī is neither identical with nor produced from the rise of Kṛttikā. Yet there is *vyāpti*.

(*b*) 'Non-existence without' (*avinābhāva*)': i.e. inseparability from another.

31. There cannot be an inference about what is definitely known to be either of the particular nature desired to be established (according to the Mīmāṃsā system) or of the opposite nature. In the latter case, the inference though made, would suffer from the fallacy of conflict with other knowledge. In the former case there would be (for the Mīmāṃsaka-s) no inference at all, because, knowledge, if it is to be valid, must be of what is not already known. That which avoids both these possibilities is said to be 'non-proximate'.

36. In the way stated before: see 1. 11 above.

53. 'Similarly all inferences that follow quickly . . . as sublating': when there are two possible inferences, of which one can be effected more easily than the other, it is the former that arises and it does not allow the latter to come up. For example of this see II. 2. 69.

57. 'Here, since there is an extraneous adjunct': see para 2 above.

(iv) AUTHORITY

1. 'Which is not in contact (*asaṃnikṛṣṭa*)': for the meaning of this word see 3. 31 above and end of para 12 below.

2. 'Words taken in one mass . . . in one mass': one does not know at this stage which part of the statement means which part of what is signified; one simply understands that the whole of that statement means the whole of what is signified.

4. This is the view of the Logicians. Each word has a definite meaning. But the purpose of a word is to serve as part of a sentence and it has no independent value apart from a sentence. A sentence conveys a unitary sense, in which one element is the important one and all other parts are qualifications of this important part. Now, a word means merely the thing, and in a sentence there are signified not merely the things, but also the relations between the things. What is it that conveys this relation? Is it the words themselves or is it the things that are remembered by the words? The words have finished their function by conveying the sense of the isolated things; and between the words and the conveying of the relation, there intervenes the conveying of the isolated meanings. Therefore the order is like this: the words convey the isolated meanings and the isolated meanings (whose final purport is to convey a unitary qualified sense) convey the relation.

5. (*a*) 'Secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*)': this is the sense of a word other than the expressed sense. The latter may or may not form part of the former. Thus, in 'The white runs', the meaning of 'the white' is, by secondary implication, 'the white horse'; and in 'the village on the Gaṅgā', the word 'Gaṅgā' secondarily implies the bank and not the river (which is the expressed sense).

(*b*) The Siddhānta view of how the meaning of a sentence (i.e. the relation of the things) is conveyed is thus. True, it is the sense of the words that conveys the sentence-meaning, but this is by secondary implication. The isolated

senses of the words in themselves are unintelligible, and so we resort to secondary implication.

7. This is the view of Prabhākara. Both the isolated sense of the word and the relation are expressed by the word. If the sense of the word is taken to convey the relation among the word-senses, there is this difficulty. One hears the sentence, 'Tie up the cow' and also sees a horse that has to be tied up too. If it is the object cow that conveys the relation with the act of tying up, the object horse too is known at that time, and why cannot the relation be conveyed by the horse too? To avoid this difficulty, Prabhākara holds that the relation is conveyed by the word itself and not by the word-sense.

8. This is discarded because there is the fault of prolixity in it. According to the Siddhānta, there is no need to assume in the words the capacity to convey the relation. Further it is more in accordance with parsimony to assume this capacity of conveying the relation in the word-sense than in the word. The last sentence in this paragraph is a reply to the theory stated in the second of the two stanzas in para 5.

12. But the Guru is for importing the idea alone of closing: see I. 6. 13 ff.

18. These topics are dealt with in other texts on Mīmāṃsā like the *Āpadevīya*.

(v) Analogy

13. 'The mode of this will be declared to some extent': see II. 6. 4-7.

(vi) Presumption

3. 'Presumption will swallow the net of inference': the Logicians have cast the net of inference to catch presumption;

i.e. according to them, all cases of presumption should be brought under inference. If all cases where there is a conflict between two valid congitions be considered as cases of presumption, then, the Logicians say, all cases of inference would have to be brought under presumption.

5. 'There does not result its non-validity, there being scope': if a man is alive, then it is expected that he will be at home. Therefore his not being at home conflicts with his being alive. Yet the man can be alive and at the same time be out of his house; hence there is scope for his not being at home, though he is alive. Thus, it is not necessary that the man's not being at home should be invalid because of being in conflict with his being alive.

6. (*a*) 'If he is related merely to space . . . this person too would become space': what is related to space in general is but a particular space or locality. Individual existents are related to those particular localities, not to space in general. If they were related to space in general, then they would be identical with space itself; because it is only individuals coming under a generality that are directly related to that generality, and individuals other than such individuals are related to that generality only indirectly, i.e. through those individuals. Thus Devadatta is related only to a particular space, either in his house or outside. If when he is known to be alive, he is known to be related directly to space in general, he would be known but as a specification thereof, i.e. as a particular space: see 3.33 above: 'On account of the relation . . . itself would be fire.'

(*b*) 'Of these, when one particular is sublated . . . and prior to the apprehension of the other'; when it is known that a man is alive it is expected that he will be at home; and the man is not seen at home. This is a stage

of conflict between two valid cognitions. On account of this conflict, one begins to think further and assumes that he must be outside.

7. 'Well, alas, who are they . . . Prabhākara, babble thus?': see 3. 34 above.

14. 'He has already been silenced': see 4. 11 and 12 above.

15. There is the sentence, '*agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi*', in the description of the model sacrifice. In the sacrifice modelled on it, the word *agnaye* has to be changed into *sūryāya*. Now the question arises why the word in the dative, *sūryāya* should be supplied in the modelled sacrifice, why not merely the object 'sun'.

16. The reply is that in the model sacrifice we see the finished word (stem and suffix) and so in the modelled sacrifice too, we supply a similar finished word.

17. This is objected to by the Siddhāntin. Simply because something is seen in the model, it is not to be imported into the modelled one too; it is done only when such an importation has a purpose. In the modelled, there is no purpose in the object 'sun' being signified by a finished word. It may be argued that the object 'sun' must be related to the senses of the other words in the sentence, and that this relation can be effected only if there is a finished word. To this the Siddhāntin replies that the relation can be obtained otherwise too; if we have the statement *juṣṭam nirvapāmi* and if we have along with this the knowledge of the Deity, 'sun', we know that the *nirvapaṇa* is to the sun. The dative suffix is not absolutely necessary to indicate this relation. Further, the Siddhāntin says that if we are to import into the modelled some element, simply because that element is seen in the model, then in the model there is pounding to be done of the

paddy, and as such in the modelled too, where instead of paddy we use gold grains, pounding would have to be done of them too, because there is pounding in the model. In the model, such pounding produces a particular kind of purification; but no such purification is produced in the modelled.

(vii) NEGATION

2. (*a*) The first stanza explains the term 'capable' that occurs in para 1 (definition).

(*b*) 'And this, when known . . . merely by its existence': the capacity for perception must be ascertained and fully known, if it is to help the knowledge of non-existence. It is the non-cognition of the thing that leads to the knowledge of the non-existence of the thing; this non-cognition need not itself be known; i.e. one must know definitely that a thing is capable of being seen, but one need not know that he does not see the thing; it is enough if the thing is not seen.

8. 'We reject the view that cognitions are perceptible to the mind'; see II. 4. 24.

11. 'Because its instrument is known': in perception, the *karaṇa* is the sense-organ; in perceiving an object one does not have a knowledge of the sense-organ; but in inference, one knows the *hetu* before one has the inference; i.e. it is from the smoke that is known that one infers fire. Similarly it is from words that are known that one gets verbal knowledge. Similarly in the case of all *pramāṇa-s* except perception. In understanding the non-existence of a thing, its *karaṇa*, non-perception of the thing, is not known (see para 2 above). So it is concluded that the understanding of non-existence is a case of perception.

12. The *pūrvapakṣa* is: in perception, inference, etc. the mind comes in contact with a positive thing as *karaṇa*;

for example, the sense-organ in perception, the *hetu* in inference and so on. Why should we go out of the way and say that in the understanding of non-existence, the *karaṇa* is a negative thing? The Siddhānta is: if you are going to extend to the understanding of non-existence a feature that is observed in perception, etc. then we propose to extend to all cases of the understanding of non-existence a feature that is seen in some cases of the understanding of non-existence; i.e. the understanding by inference of the non-existence of a thing; and the feature is that its *karaṇa* is not a sense-organ. For example, when we infer the non-existence of smoke from the non-existence of fire, the *karaṇa* is the knowledge of the non-existence of fire, and this is not a sense-organ. From this why should we not generalize that in the understanding of non-existence, the *karaṇa* is not a sense-organ? Then, non-existence would cease to be perceptible.

20. 'We shall refute him too': see II. 6. 19 ff.

II. OBJECTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

(i) Introduction

(*a*) King Mānaveda: one of the kings of Calicut, usually known as the Zamorin Rāja-s; see vii below.

(*b*) Nārāyaṇasūrin: the author of the first part; also the author of *Nārāyaṇīya*, *Prakriyāsarvasva*, etc. He finished only the first part of this book, and the second part is the work of another Nārāyaṇa.

(*c*) *Mānameyodaya*: this is the first time that the name of the work is explicitly stated in the book. The title is suggested in the second stanza to the Introduction of the first part.

(ii) Substance

10. 'Because it will be said': see 4. 55 ff. below.

16. (*a*) 'Of these, those forms of these elements . . . understood through presumption': see I. 3. 46 ff.

(*b*) 'The Logicians say': it is only some Logicians who hold this view.

38. 'How the "contradiction of the particular" is . . . in the treatment of inference': see I. 3. 46.

40. This is the idea. Īśvara is, according to the Logicians, a variety of *ātman*. *Ātmatva* is a *jāti*. If Īśvara were to be the creator of earth, etc. the *jāti*, *ātmatva*, must be shown to inhere in the creator of earth, etc. This cannot be done by perception, because we have not seen anyone who is the creator of earth, etc. So it has to be done by inference. This too cannot be done; because we do not know of a single *jāti* which inheres in one who is the creator of earth, etc. Take any known *jāti*, say *gotva*; it does not inhere in one who

is the creator of earth, etc. So in the case of the other *jāti-s* too. Thus *ātmatva* cannot, by inference too, be shown to inhere in one who is the creator of earth, etc. Then how can we say that God is an *ātman* and is the creator of earth, etc.?'

43. God's desire and volition are, according to the Logicians, common causes of all events. How can they be the causes of events that are of a temporary nature? God's desire is eternal; so is his volition. The causes for the production and destruction of things in this world approach one another occasionally, and things are produced or destroyed. If the desire and volition of God (both eternal) be causes for such approach, how can such approach be only occasional, and not constant? God's desire and volition cannot be other than eternal. The usual causes for desire and volition are aversion, etc. In the case of God there can be no aversion. So either He has no desire and volition, or, if He has, they must be eternal, not produced like our desire and volition, there being no cause like aversion in His case.

52. 'Soulness is not inherent . . . like cowness': see note on para 40 above.

55. Suffx *vuñ*: the word *kāṭhaka* is formed from *kaṭha* by the addition of this suffix.

69. 'Follows more quickly': see I. 3. 53.

83. 'It will be said later that sound being a quality is unintelligible': see para 131 below.

85. 'And it has been said even earlier . . . by the six sense-organs': see I. 3. 46.

90. (*a*) 'Of these, the self-luminosity of cognition we shall refute later': see 4. 20-3 below.

(*b*) According to Prabhākara, in every cognition there appear three elements, namely the cognizer, the object (that is cognized) and the form of the cognition itself. The

element of the cognizer that appears in every cognition, is the entity called the soul. It is necessary to assume that in every cognition there is the appearance of the element of the cognizer too; otherwise, if the cognition stood alone, what is there to differentiate the cognition of one from that of another? What marks out the one from the other is the element of the cognizer that appears in the cognition. The Siddhānta view on the point is this: In order to demarcate a cognition as belonging to a particular individual, it is not necessary that the element of the cognizer should be assumed to appear in that cognition; the fact that the cognition is generated in a particular individual and not in another is enough to effect such a demarcation. To the possible objection, 'Does the statement of such a cognition include the element that such a cognition is known to be generated in that particular soul?', the Siddhāntin's reply is, 'No; the fact that the cognition is generated in that particular individual is there; but the knowledge of that is not included in a statement of that cognition, just as in a sense-perception, the fact that it is a cognition generated through a particular sense-organ is there, but the knowledge of that is not stated, when the cognition is expressed in language. We simply say that we have heard or that we have seen; but we never say that we know that the cognition is produced through the sense of hearing or that it is produced through the sense of sight. Similarly, we simply say that we know; but we do not say that we know that this knowledge is generated in us.'

91. The Siddhāntin continues his attack on the view of Prabhākara. According to Prabhākara, as explained in para 89 above, soul and cognition are perceptible (Cf. Prabhākara's definition of perception, I. 1. 24); soul is neither inferred from the concept 'I' just as space is inferred from

the concept of space; nor is it self-manifest, as in the case of cognition. Still the soul, though perceptible, is not in contact with any sense-organ. Soul is manifested in the cognition itself and does not depend on any other cause. The Siddhāntin objects to something being called perceptible when it is not in contact with a sense-organ; etymologically, it is impossible. Thus it is reasonable to hold that in so far as the soul, when it is being manifested, is not in contact with a sense-organ, the soul is inferred, just as space is inferred. Further, if it is not accepted that the soul, though depending on the self-manifest cognition, is not itself self-manifest, it is impossible to avoid the contingency that the manifestation of the soul which is generated by the cognition, depends on some other cause, just as the manifestation of a jar which is generated by the cognition thereof, depends on some other cause like the sense of sight. And the other alternative, namely the self-manifestation of the soul, is against the doctrine of Prabhākara.

92. Here too, the Siddhāntin replies to a possible defence of the position of Prabhākara. Prabhākara may say that the soul is not self-manifest, nor does it depend on anything other than a cognition for its manifestation. It is manifest as the abode of the self-manifest cognition, like the firewood which shines as the abode of the burning fire, though it is not self-manifest. The reply of the Siddhāntin is this: Even in the case of the firewood, the part that burns is identical with fire, and the parts round about, that do not burn but shine, are manifested by the fire nearby, just like a jar or any other thing. Thus nothing is known to shine merely because of being the abode of light.

104. 'Of these the mode of refuting . . . in ascertaining the qualities': see 4. 55 below.

113. 'Heaven will be dealt with later': see 4. 28 below.

115. (*a*) 'The six objects': corresponding to the six sense-organs.

(*b*) 'Otherwise, in the case of one who having slept . . . happiness as the enjoyment of a damsel': a person falls into deep sleep. During deep sleep there is no misery at all. When he wakes up, he knows that he had been sleeping without any disturbance, i.e. that he had no misery at all. When he was asleep, he had forgotten everything, even his appointment with a damsel; but when he wakes up, he remembers the appointment and feels sorry for the loss of the bits of happiness that he would have had. Now, if absence of misery as such is the object of one's ultimate desire, then, how is it that in this case, there is dissatisfaction along with the complete absence of misery?

119. 'That the universe is constituted of Māyā will be refuted': see 6. 34 ff. below.

126. 'And that has already been stated': see para 124 above.

130. 'And the genus called sound-ness . . . establishment of genus': see 3. 16 below.

131. 'That, however, has already been stated': in this same paragraph.

136. 'In respect of the water at the bottom': as stated in the previous paragraph.

139. 'Just as in the case of the recognition of identity in a flame': if a burning wick is put out and relighted, one would mistake the second flame to be the same as the first (as explained below in this same paragraph).

145. 'By the refutation of the God of the Logicians': see paras 36-47 above.

146. 'The eternality of the genus . . . nature of genus': see 3. 2 below.

(iii) GENUS

8. 'Later in refuting inherence': see 6. 10 ff. below.

15. 'As in the case of a cook, etc.'; we apply the term 'cook' to different persons, not because there is a genus called 'cook' existing in all of them, but because all such persons are conditioned by an extraneous adjunct, namely the act of cooking. Similarly, Prabhākara contends, we apply the term 'existent' to different things not because there is a genus called 'existence,' but because all such things are conditioned by an extraneous adjunct, say, fitness for relation with a means of valid knowledge.

(iv) QUALITY

6. *Parārdha*: means the number 100,000,000,000,000,000.

12. 'Because the rule, "The understanding . . . determinateness" (of the cognition)': We cannot have the knowledge of a mere difference, without a knowledge of its *pratiyogin*. This is the general rule. The Siddhāntin says that such a rule holds good, only if we introduce into this rule or *vyāpti* the element 'determinate knowledge'. This rule is not true of all forms of knowledge in which 'difference' is a constituent part. For example, we can have a non-determinate knowledge like this: 'pot, pillar, difference'. Here, 'difference' is a constituent part of the knowledge, yet we do not know which is the *pratiyogin* of the difference. Later, in the immediately following determinate cognition, we understand the difference as having the pillar or the pot as the *pratiyogin*.

13. 'And this conjunction has been set forth already': see II. 2. 127, 128.

27. (*a*) 'That will be refuted later': see 6. 28 below.

(*b*) 'In the section dealing with the means of valid knowledge'; in the introduction to the first part of this book.

39. One cannot say that the manifestation of the object is identical with our cognition of the object, because the cognition is in the soul (in the cognizer) and the manifestation is in the object.

48. 'But that it is to be understood . . . can lead to an inference': see I. 3. 46.

51. 'That sound is a substance . . . been justified': see II. 2. 131.

54. *Pudgala* is a potency that exists in seeds by virtue of which sprouts are produced from the seeds.

62. The difference in view is only this much. According to the Siddhānta, *yāga*, etc. which are *śreyaḥ sādhana*, are to be called *dharma*; according to Śalikanātha, what is enjoined is *dharma*.

63. (*a*) 'They became the primal virtues': here, by the pronoun 'they', sacrifices mentioned in the previous part of the Vedic passage are meant. By the statement that the sacrifice became *dharma*, there is shown the identity of sacrifice and *dharma*.

(*b*) 'The variation of gender and number is due to Vedic usage': in the second part of the Vedic passage, there is the pronoun *tāni* (they); this stands for the noun *yajña* that occurs in the first part. The noun *yajña* is masculine singular, and the pronoun *tāni* is neuter plural. It is this variation that is spoken of here.

71. 'Therefore it is the mere potency . . . that is the unseen result': *yāga* is the cause and cattle, etc. are the fruit. There is *apūrva* that comes between. This *apūrva* may be regarded as the potency of the cause to produce, or of the

fruit that is produced. In the latter case, 'potency' means 'subtle condition'.

(v) Action

5. 'There would follow the assumption . . . of a hawk': a hawk comes and seats itself on a post; then it flies away. In this case there is conjunction both in the hawk and also in the post; so is there disjunction. If from conjunction and disjunction we are to infer action, why cannot we infer action in the post too, just as we infer action in the hawk?

6. The *pūrvapakṣa* is this: We do not infer action merely because there is conjunction in an object. If an object is separated from something and immediately comes into conjunction with something else, then in such an object we infer action. In the case of the hawk coming and sitting on a post, there is its separation from the space where it was before and then immediately after, it has conjunction with the post; similarly when the hawk leaves the post. So we infer action in the hawk. But in the case of the post, before it is brought into conjunction with the hawk, it has no separation from anything, and when the hawk leaves the post, following on the separation from the hawk, the post has no conjunction with anything. Therefore we do not infer action in the post. This is the Siddhāntin's reply. Suppose one hawk leaves the post and, immediately after, another hawk comes and sits on the post; then the post has disjunction from one object and, immediately after, it has conjunction with another. Are we to infer action in the post in such a case? Similarly, suppose there is a pillar fixed firm in a river; at every moment water leaves the pillar and fresh water comes into conjunction with it. Can we infer action in such a pillar?

9. The Siddhāntin further refutes the inferability of action. On a dark night, we see fire-flies falling. How do we know this action in the fire-flies except through perception? The only possible object in which we may be said to see conjunction and disjunction, from which the action in the fire-fly is to be inferred, is darkness, and Prabhākara does not accept an entity called darkness. If it be said that there is another object and that is the fire-fly itself, then the reply is that though there is conjunction of light with the fire-fly, there is no disjunction of the light from the fire-fly. And it has been said in para 6 that it is from conjunction following on disjunction that action is to be inferred.

11. Here, the Siddhāntin defends his position against a possible objection. If action is perceptible, then a person sitting in a boat and looking only at the boat (without any possibility of seeing the surrounding objects) does not see the action of the boat, though the boat is moving. This is due to the defect of extreme proximity; and extreme proximity is a defect that vitiates perception. He further defends his position by saying that the size of the boat, which, according to both parties, is perceptible, is not perceived by that person, on account of the same defect.

15. 'Since the conjunction of two atoms . . . inherent in that abode': take a jar. The product called the jar is produced in all the atoms that constitute the jar; if we select any two such atoms, the conjunction of those two atoms is a cause of that jar, and the jar is not produced merely in those two atoms, but also in all the other atoms that constitute the jar.

(vi) Non-Existence

4. 'This has been explained in determining the qualities': see II. 4. 6 and 48.

12. (*a*) 'There is inconstancy with the cognition "There is no jar on the floor"': because the relation here, even according to the *pūrvapakṣa*, is only that of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*.

(*b*) 'On account of inconstancy with the cognition "The jar is destroyed"': because, there is no relation at all in this case; one of the possible *relata* does not exist, being destroyed.

15. 'And this has already been said': see I. 2. 10.

17. 'The sixth means of valid knowldege': i.e. negation.

(vii) Conclusion

'Oh, the hosts of evil *karman-s* . . . like the bloom of the dark lily': it is on account of *duṣkarman* that one is born in this world. And because one is so born, one is able to see the Lord in His corporeal form. That is why the author speaks of friendship that has grown out of familiarity.

GLOSSARY

Aṅga, subsidiary
Aṇḍaja, what is produced from eggs
Atideśa, transfer
Atideśaśabda, statement of analogy
Ativyāpti, being too wide
Atyantābhāva, absolute non-existence
Adṛṣṭa, unseen potentiality
Adharma, vice
Adhyāhāra, importation
Anadhyavasita, non-determinate
Anavasthā, infinite regress
Anavasthiti, infinite regress; *regressus ad infinitum*
Anukūlatarka, favourable counter-argument
Anudbhūta, non-produced; non-apparent
Anubhava, experience
Anumāna, inference; means of inference
Anuvāda, restatement
Anusaṃdhāna, recognition
Anaikānta, non-conclusive
Anyatarāsiddha, non-established for either party
Anyathāsiddha, established as otherwise; otherwise explained
Anyonyābhāva, reciprocal non-existence
Anyonyāśraya, mutual dependence; reciprocal dependence
Anvaya, co-presence; syntactical relation
Anvayavyatirekin, positively and negatively concomitant
Anvayavyāpti, positive pervasion

Anvitābhidhāna, expression of what are related
Ap, water
Aparatva, proximity
Aparokṣajñāna, direct cognition
Apavarga, release
Apūrva, unseen result
Apauruṣeya, superhuman
Apramātva, invalidity
Aprayojaka, non-efficient
Aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa, having a non-established qualification
Aprāmāṇya, invalidity
Abhāva, negation; non-existence
Abhidhāna, expression
Abhibhūta, suppressed
Abhimāna, conceit
Abhihitānvaya, relation of what are expressed
Abheda, non-difference
Arthakriyā, successful activity
Arthabhāvanā, objective productive operation
Arthavāda, praise
Arthāpatti, presumption
Avakṣepaṇa, going downwards
Avayava, part; member of a syllogism
Avayavidravya, substance with parts
Avinābhāva, non-existence without
Avisaṃvādi, which does not fail to accord
Avyabhicāra, non-inconstancy
Avyāpti, being too narrow
Asatpratipakṣatva, having no counter-probans
Asamavāyikāraṇa, non-inherent cause
Asādhāraṇa, non-common
Asiddha, non-established

Ākāṅkṣā, expectancy
Ākuñcana, contraction
Ākhyāta, verb
Āgama, revelation
Ātman, self; soul
Ātmāśraya, self-dependence
Āpta, reliable person
Āmla, sour
Āropavāda, statement of what is super-imposed
Āvāpa, insertion
Āvītahetu, cricumscribed probans
Āśrayāsiddhi, non-establishment of the base
Āhārya, assumptive
Icchā, desire
Indriya, sense; sense-organ
Utkṣepaṇa, going upwards
Udāharaṇa, example
Udbhidja, what is produced from sprouts
Udbhūta, apparent
Upadeśa, direct teaching
Upanaya, application
Upamāna, analogy
Upamiti, analogy (knowledge through)
Upāṅga, minor subsidiary
Upādānakāraṇa, material cause
Upādhi, extraneous adjunct
Ubhayāsiddha, non-established for both
Uṣṇa, hot
Ūha, modification
Ūhitavya, to be supplied
Enas, fault
Aitihya, tradition

Aihika, of this world
Kaṭu, pungent
Karaṇa, instrument; means
Kalpanānirmita, set up as assumptive
Kaṣāya, astringent
Kāmyakarman, optional rite
Kāraka, causal condition
Kāraṇa, cause
Kāla, time
Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa, discarded through lapse of time
Kṛṣṇala, gold grain
Kevalavyatirekin, purely negatively concomitant
Kevalānvayin, purely positively concomitant
Kriyā, action
Kṣaṇika, momentary
Kṣiti, earth
Gandha, smell
Gamana, motion in general
Guṇa, quality
Gurutva, weight
Gocara, sphere
Gaurava, prolixity
Ghrāṇa, sense of smell
Cakraka, arguing in a circle
Cakṣus, sense of sight
Caitanya, intelligence
Codanā, injunction
Chala, perversion
Jaḍa, inert
Jarāyuja, what is produced from a womb
Jalpa, destructive reasoning
Jāti, genus; class; quibbling

Tamas, darkness
Tarka, counter-argument
Tātparya, purport
Tādātmya, identity
Tikta, bitter
Tejas, fire; light
Toya, water
Tvac, sense of touch
Diś, space
Duḥkha, misery
Durgandha, noxious smell
Duṣṭapakṣa, defective subject; fallacious subject
Dūṣaṇa, defect
Dṛṣṭānta, example
Dṛṣṭārthāpatti, presumption from what is seen
Dravatva, fluidity
Dravya, substance
Dveṣa, aversion
Dharma, virtue
Dhārāvāhikajñāna, continuous stream of cognition
Dhvani, audible sound
Nigamana, conclusion
Nigrahasthāna, vulnerable point
Nityakarman, obligatory rite
Nimittakāraṇa, efficient cause
Niyama, rule
Niyamya, the ruled
Nirṇaya, demonstration
Nirvikalpaka, non-determinate
Naimittikakarman, occasioned rite
Pakṣa, subject
Pakṣadharmatva, being the attribute of the subject

Pakṣābhāsa, fallacious subject
Paṭala, film
Pada, word
Padārtha, category; word-sense; word-meaning
Parataḥprāmāṇya, extrinsic validity
Paratva, remoteness
Paramāṇu, ultimate atom; primal atom
Parimāṇa, size
Pavamāna, air
Piṇḍa, mass
Pṛthaktva, distinctness
Pṛthivī, earth
Pauruṣeya, human
Prakaraṇasama, similar to the context
Prakṛti, stem
Pratikūlatarka, non-favourable counter-argument
Pratijñā, promise
Pratibandha, mutual relation
Pratibandhaka, counteracting agent
Pratiyogin, counter-correlate
Pratyakṣa, perception
Pratyakṣatva, perceptibility
Pratyabhijñā, re-cognition
Pratyavāya, sin
Pradhvaṃsābhāva, non-existence through destruction
Pramā, valid knowledge; valid cognition
Pramāṇa, means of valid knowledge; evidence; authority; valid knowledge
Prayatna, volition
Prayojana, purpose
Pravartakavṛddha, the elder who commands
Prasāraṇa, expansion

Prākaṭya, manifestedness
Prāgabhāva, prior non-existence
Prātipadika, stem
Prāpyakāritva, functioning by reaching to the object
Phala, fruit
Bādhaka, sublater
Bādhitaviśeṣaṇa, what has a sublated attribute
Bādhitaviṣaya, having its content sublated
Buddhi, cognition
Bhāgāsiddhi, partial non-establishment
Bhāva, positive
Bhāvanā, residue; productive operation
Bhūta, element
Bhoga, enjoyment (worldly)
Bhrama, delusion
Madhura, sweet
Madhyamavṛddha, the intermediate elder
Manas, mind
Mantra, formula
Mātṛ, agent of cognition
Māna, means of knowledge
Māruta, air
Mithyā, illusion
Mithyātva, illusoriness
Meya, object of knowledge
Yoga, etymology
Yogarūḍhi, etymology cum convention
Yogya, capable
Yogyatva, capacity; capability
Rasa, taste
Rasana, sense of taste
Rāddhānta, final doctrine

Rūḍhi, convention
Rūpa, colour
Lakṣaṇa, definition
Lakṣaṇā, secondary implication
Lavaṇa, saline
Lāghava, parsimony
Liṅ, optative mood
Liṅga, probans; mark
Loṭ, imperative mood
Laukika, worldly
Varṇa, letter
Vācyārtha, expressed meaning
Vāda, disputation
Vitaṇḍā, wrangling
Vidhi, injunction
Vipakṣa, counter-subject
Vibhāga, disjunction
Vibhu, all-pervasive
Viruddha, contradictory
Viruddhāvyabhicārin, contradictory non-inconstant
Vivarta, illusory modification
Viśeṣa, particularity
Viśeṣaguṇa, specific quality
Viśeṣaṇa, qualification
Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva, relation of subject and attribute; relation of qualification and qualified
Viśeṣaṇāsiddhi, non-establishment of the attribute
Viśeṣabādhaka, particular-sublater
Viśeṣaviruddha, contradictory of the particular
Viśeṣyāsiddhi, non-establishment of the substrate
Viṣamavyāpti, non-reciprocal pervasion
Viṣaya, object; content

Vega, velocity
Vaidika, scriptural
Vyakti, individual
Vyatireka, co-absence
Vyatirekavyāpti, negative pervasion
Vyatirekāsiddhi, non-establishment of difference
Vyadhikaraṇāsiddhi, non-establishment through a different base
Vyabhicāra, inconstancy
Vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddhi, non-establishment through a futile attribute
Vyavacchedya, what is to be excluded
Vyavahāra, empirical usage
Vyāpaka, pervader
Vyāpti, pervasion
Vyāpya, the pervaded
Vyāpyatvāsiddhi, non-establishment of being pervaded
Vyāvartya, what is to be excluded
Vyutpatti, learning; learning the meaning
Vyoman, ether
Śakti, capacity; potency
Śaṅkitopādhi, doubted extraneous adjunct
Śabda, sound; authority
Śabdabhāvanā, verbal productive operation
Śarīra, body
Śīta, cold
Śūnya, void
Śravaṇa, sense of hearing
Śrutārthāpatti, presumption from what is heard
Śrotra, sense of hearing
Saṃkhyā, number
Saṃjñā name
Saṃjñin, the named

Saṃdigdhānaikāntika, suspected non-conclusive
Saṃdigdhāsiddhi, non-establishment through doubt
Saṃnikarṣa, contact
Saṃnidhi, proximity
Saṃbandhāsiddhi, non-establishment of the relation
Saṃbhava, inclusion
Saṃyoga, conjunction
Saṃśaya, doubt
Saṃsargābhāva, relational non-existence
Saṃskāra, impression; purification
Satkārya, prior existence of the product
Satpratipakṣa, having an opponent
Satpratisādhana, having an opposing ground
Sadasadvilakṣaṇatva, being other than reality and non-reality
Sapakṣa, co-subject
Samavāya, inherence
Samaveta, inherent
Samavyāpti, reciprocal pervasion
Salila, water
Savikalpaka, determinate
Sahakārin, auxiliary
Sādṛśya, similarity
Sādhāraṇa, common
Sādhya, probandum
Sādhyasvarūpaviruddha, contradictory of the existence of the probandum
Sāmagrī, causal aggregate
Sāmānādhikaraṇya, apposition
Sāmānyaguṇa, common quality
Siddhaviśeṣaṇa, having an established attribute
Siddhasādhana, establishment of what was already established
Siddhasādhyatva, the probandum to be already established

Siddhānta, final doctrine; theory
Sukha, pleasure; happiness
Sugandha, sweet smell
Sthitasthāpaka, elasticity
Sneha, viscidity
Sparśa, touch
Sparśana, sense of touch
Smṛti, Code; recollection
Svataḥprāmāṇya, intrinsic validity
Svatantra, independent
Svarūpa, form; existence; its own nature
Svarūpāsiddha, non-establishment of existence
Svarga, heaven
Svātman, form of cognition
Svedaja, what is produced from perspiration
Hetu, reason; probans
Hetvābhāsa, fallacy; fallacy of the probans